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ABSTRACT 
During the last two decades, the increasing scale of the Summer Olympic Games in 
terms of sports and participants has established it as an enormous event to plan and to 
manage. However, although organisational aspects of the contemporary Summer 
Olympics have emerged as a steadily growing area of interest by the Olympic 
Movement, it has attracted limited academic interest. The Organising Committees for 
the Olympic Games (OCOGs), in particular, which constitute the central planning and 
organisational bodies of the contemporary Olympics, have received little research 
attention in relation to their role in preparing and staging the event. In an attempt to 
provide insights into the organisational phenomenon of OCOGs and, to a broader 
extent, fill gaps in our understanding of the range of Olympic organisation, this 
research project provides an analysis of the Sydney 2000 Organising Committee for 
the Olympic Gaines (SOCOG). 
Specifically, by using a modified version of Mintzberg's configuration approach as its 
conceptual framework, this thesis aims to identify and analyse the nature and range of 
organisational configurations evident within the life cycle of SOCOG. Specific 
objectives of the thesis include the following: 
To identify and evaluate the structural and contextual features of SOCOG 
throughout its life cycle, using a modified version of Mintzberg's 
configuration analysis; 
To investigate the role and operation of SOCOG in the organisation of the 
2000 Olympic Gaines; 
To explore the applicability of the life cycle periodisation for the study of 
SOCOG; and 
To review and evaluate the utility of the modified Mintzberg's approach with 
regard to the examination of SOCOG. 
Primary data was collected from a series of semi-structured interviews with SOCOG's 
senior executives. Content analysis of SOCOG's organisational documents and press 
coverage from Australian and international newspapers also provided additional 
sources of data, as did informal discussion with Australian and Greek Olympic editors 
and academics. The analysis of data revealed that the organisational formation of 
SOCOG changed significantly throughout its life cycle. As a result, a chronological 
periodisation of SOCOG's operational life was applied. In doing so, it was found that 
SOCOG went through four main chronological stages, namely 'Start-up Period', 
'Build-up Period', 'Games-time Period' and Close-down Period', and exhibited four 
respective organisational formations. With regard to the applicability of Mintzberg's 
modified approach, it was argued that it was a useful analytical device even if not 
accurate for describing the organisational formation adopted by SOCOG during the 
period of its operational decline. Finally, it was found that the role of SOCOG with 
regard to the organisation of the Sydney Olympics gradually weakened particularly in 
favour of the New South Wales government, which exerted considerable control over 
the organisation's leadership and operations. 
KEYWORDS: Sydney 2000 Organising Committee for the Olympic Games 
(SOCOG), Organisational Life Cycles, Configuration Approach, Organisational 
Change, Organising Comn-dttees for the Olympic Games (OCOG), Olympic Gaines. 
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CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG CHAPTER[ 
During the last two decades, the increasing scale of the Summer Olympic Games in terms 
of sports and participants has established it as an enormous event to plan and to manage. 
However, although the organisational aspect of the contemporary Summer Olympics has 
emerged as a steadily growing area of interest by the Olympic Movement, it has attracted 
limited academic interest. The Organising Committees of the Olympic Games (OCOGs), 
in particular, which constitute the central planning and organisational bodies of the 
contemporary Olympics, have received little research attention in relation to their role in 
the planning and staging of the event. In an attempt to provide insights into the 
organisational phenomenon of OCOGs and, to a broader extend, fill gaps in our 
understanding of the range of Olympic organisation, this research project provides an 
analysis of the Sydney 2000 Organising Committee for Olympic Games (SOCOG). In 
particular, under a case-based methodological perspective, this study attempts to identify 
SOCOG's organisational nature by conducting an analysis of its organisational 
characteristics throughout its seven-year operational life. 
This chapter sets out the perspective from which SOCOG has been examined, and shows 
how this study could contribute to knowledge and understanding in the area of Olympic 
organisation. Moreover, it provides an overview of the nature of OCOGs, and their role 
within the current organisation of the Summer Olympic Games. Finally, it provides an 
outline of the structure of this thesis. 
1.1 THE STUDY OF SOCOG 
This thesis aims to perform an organisational analysis of aspects of SOCOG. 
Specifically, it looks at a number of SOCOG's organisational elements over time in order 
to identify the organisational type or types that SOCOG exhibited during its life cycle. 
An organisational analysis which aims to classify an organisation naturally uses the 
premises of the organisation theory literature. Within this body of literature, the 
6contingency theory' and the 'configuration approach' are the most prominent 
perspectives for classifying organisations. Although 'contingency theory' was first 
introduced by the Aston Group (Pugh et al, 1969a, 1969b, 1968) in the 1960s, its 
premises have been the basis for much recent organisational research, as much in the 
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mainstream organisation theory literature (e. g. Donaldson, 1987,1996) as in the literature 
of sport organisations (e. g. Greenwood and Hinings, 1993; Kikulis et al, 1992,1995). 
However, studies derived from 'contingency theory' have tended to use a limited set of 
structural elements of an organisation, such as centralisation of decision-making and 
specialisation of jobs, and the measurement of their relationship with a limited set of 
abstracted situational concepts, such as the size of the organisation and the type of 
technology used. The 'configuration approach', on the other hand, claims a holistic 
approach to the analysis of organisations, in the sense that particular situations or 
elements of organisation are explained in relation to the organisation as a whole and not 
in isolation. In effect, the 'configuration approach' gathers the premises of many other 
approaches into a multidimensional perspective, from which it ultimately aims to derive 
different organisational types, often referred to as 'configurations'. An organisational 
configuration constitutes a multidimensional collection of organisational characteristics 
that research has shown that commonly occur together (Meyer et al, 1993). 
This thesis uses the premises of the 'configuration approach' as it takes the standpoint 
that a fuller understanding of an organisation's reality comes from an examination of the 
organisation as a whole. Particularly, this study is based on a modified version of 
Mintzberg's (1979,1981) configuration approach. Mintzberg's approach holds a 
prominent position in organisation theory literature, as it constitutes a methodical 
combination of structural organisational elements and dimensions of the context in which 
an organisation operates. Mintzberg has identified five different -configurations, which 
are treated as ideal types in the sense that he presents a series of arguments that result in 
specific predictions about organisational effectiveness as a function of the degree of 
similarity between an actual organisation and one or more of the identified 
configurations. In that sense, Mintzberg provides us not only with a classification of 
organisations but also 'with a theory for classifying organisations. However, although 
Mintzberg's approach offers a strong standpoint for organisational research and analysis, 
there has been limited empirical evidence to support its appropriateness for the study of 
sport organisations; (e. g. Theodoraki, 1996). In view of this deficiency, by looking at 
SOCOG this study also aims to evaluate a modified version of Mintzberg's approach in 
regard to its suitability for the study of sport organisations. 
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Mintzberg's approach is presented as a universal model, in the sense that it is applicable 
for the study of any organisation from any sector. It is widely accepted, however, that 
organisational studies should be cautious with generalisations of such scope, since often 
organisations of different sectors carry unique organisational characteristics (e. g. Child 
and Smith, 1987). Consequently, the initial step prior to the use of Mintzberg's approach 
was to consider the uniqueness of SOCOG as a sport organisation. There are three 
characteristics which give SOCOG its organisational distinctiveness: first, SOCOG's 
operations and resources depended substantially on co-operations with other private, 
public and voluntary organisations (Theodoraki, 2001); second, SOCOG, as any OCOG, 
operated in a non-competitive industry, in the sense that it was the only organisation that 
was awarded the right to organise the 2000 Sydney Games; and third, SOCOG 
experienced birth, dramatic growth in terms of numbers of staff and death in 
approximately seven years. The first and second characteristics of SOCOG suggest 
certain organisational particularities which should be taken into account when 
considering the application of Mintzberg's approach to the study of SOCOG, namely, the 
presence of a strong resource-dependence status in SOCOG's operations and the lack of a 
competitive environment, with its implications for the strategic position of the 
organisation. In view of such particularities, Mintzberg's approach has been modified to 
accommodate the distinctive organisational characteristics of SOCOG. 
The third unique feature of SOCOG suggests an additional consideration for the study of 
SOCOG. Specifically, the development of SOCOG's life cycle indicates that the status of 
some of the organisation's elements are most likely to change throughout its life cycle, 
since it is evident within the organisation theory literature that the overall size of an 
organisation affects the type of structure adopted (e. g. Pugh et Hickson, 1976, Kimberly, 
1976, Meyer and Tsui, 1993). It has been found, for example, that large organisations 
favour bureaucratic and formal structures in contrast to small organisations, which find 
flexible and informal structures more applicable. In effect, SOCOG's structural 
characteristics were anticipated to change as the organisation progressed towards the time 
of the Games as well as after the Games. As a result, it was felt that in order to provide a 
thorough examination of SOCOG's organisational elements, it would be appropriate to 
consider SOCOG in multiple phases of its fife cycle rather than as a whole. Effectively, 
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the possibility of achieving a periodisation of SOCOG into distinctive life stages was also 
considered. 
To summarise the above, the aim of this thesis is to identify and analyse the nature and 
range of organisational configurations evident within the life cycle of SOCOG. As such, 
the research has the following objectives: 
9 To identify and evaluate the structural and contextual features of SOCOG 
throughout its life cycle, using a modified version of Mintzberg's configuration 
analysis; 
9 To investigate the role and operation of SOCOG in the organisation of the 2000 
Olympic Games; 
e To explore the applicability of the life cycle periodisation for the study of 
SOCOG; and 
9 To review and evaluate the utifity of the modified Mintzberg's approach with 
regard to the examination of SOCOG. 
1.2 THE NEW FACE OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
In recent years the Summer Olympic Games have become one of the most significant 
sporting events. Since the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics the steadily increasing income 
from television and corporate sponsorship has given the event a prominent commercial 
profile. Parallel to this commercial success, there has been a substantial increase in the 
size of the Summer Olympic Games. Since 1984, every Games has been bigger than the 
previous one, both in terms of numbers of competitions, participating nations and athletes 
(IOC, 2001). However, the contemporary Olympic Games are not only a series of sport 
competitions. They comprise a global media event, which in itself is a major and 
immensely complex management responsibility. Moreover, the Games attract enormous 
numbers of visitors in addition to the 15,000 or so athletes and officials, consequently 
posing substantial problems relating to areas such as security, accommodation and 
transportation. These responsibilities are peripheral to the sport competitions yet crucial 
for the smooth transaction of the Games. As a result, the staging of the contemporary 
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Summer Olympics has become an enormous project, which usually requires considerable 
investment in both sporting facilities and supporting infrastructure such as in 
trans po rtatio n, telecommunications, accommodation, and so on. 
Not surprisingly therefore, the Olympic Games have also grown in significance for host 
governments. For example, the event can promote economic activity as a result of the 
jobs created by the vast numbers of tourists visiting the city before, during and after the 
event. The construction of sports facilities can also play a role in governmental 
programmes of urban renewal by, for example, introducing new sporting and recreational 
facilities into previously under-provided areas. On a broader scale, preparations for the 
event can provide governments with a means of justifying new investment in transport 
infrastructure and in projects to enhance the city's landscape and physical appearance. 
Such a costly, high profile and diverse activity as hosting the Summer Olympic Games 
involves various interests including those of governments with their concern for political, 
social and economic benefits and the commercial with their concern to maximise profit. 
Given the vast economic and human resources required, the range of powerful interests 
involved and the intensity of media coverage, the management of such an event is 
certainly demanding. At the 1996 Atlanta Games, for example, the local Organising 
Committee had relationships with more than 1,000 organisations (ACOG, 1998). 
Consequently, Olympic organisers are involved in managing a highly complex network, 
which includes a diverse range of interests. 
1.3 THE ORGANISATION OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
The overall responsibility for the management of the Games rests with the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC), which owns the title to the Olympic Games (IOC, 1999b, 
Rule 11). The IOC entrusts the right for hosting the Games seven years prior to the event 
to the National Olympic Committee (NOC) of the host country of the Host City as well as 
to the Host City itself The NOC, in turn, forms an Organising Committee of the 
Olympic Games (OCOG), which, from the time it is constituted, is directly responsible to 
the IOC (IOC, 1999b: rule 39, §1). The OCOG becomes part of the Host City Contract 
(HCC), which involves the host city, and the NOC of the host country (IOC, 1999b: rule 
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39 § 4), and it conducts its activities according to the HCC and the Olympic Charter 
(OC). The IOC, theref6re, has legal power over an OCOG, which, in its extreme, can be 
expressed as withdrawal of the organisation of the Games from the city, and consequently 
from the OCOG (IOC, 1999b: rule 39 § 4). The IOC's major source of power, though, is 
its economic control over the Games, derived from its central role in determining the vast 
majority of the financing of the event. It has exclusive control of the negotiations of the 
television rights and the international sponsorship programmes for the Games, which 
both contribute as much as 60% to an OCOG's budget (Preuss, 2000a). 
An OCOG, however, does not co-operate only with the IOC but it also works closely 
with various bodies such as the International Federations (IFs), the National Olympic 
Committees (NOCs), departments and agencies within its own government, and many 
commercial organisations within the private sector. The IFs provide the technical support 
related to the competitions. They are responsible for determining the location of each 
venue, the physical layout of the field of play, as well as reviewing the format of the 
competitions, the utilisation of facilities and so on. The NOCs hold exclusive power over 
the presentation of their respective countries at the Olympic Games (10C, 1999b: rule 31 
§ 3). In co-operation with the IOC and the IFs, they are responsible for determining the 
number of qualifying athletes they will bring to the Games, and generally, they represent 
the interests of their national squad of athletes. An OCOG also co-operates with the host 
government, which is usually responsible for building the Games-related infrastructure, 
and for providing essential services for the event, such as security and transportation. 
Finally, an OCOG co-operates with private organisations such as sponsors and the media 
which financially support the Games and frequently contribute to the staging of the event 
with staff and services. 
1.4 THE ORGANISATIONAL MODEL OF THE SYDNEY 2000 OLYMPIC 
GAMES 
As with every modem Olympic Games, the Sydney 2000 Olympics were run by the local 
Organising Committee (SOCOG), which operated under the umbrella of the Olympic 
Movement, namely, the IOC, the lFs and the NOCs. However, a central entity involved 
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in the preparations for the Sydney Games was the government of the New South Wales 
(NSW). It has been claimed that the multiple failures in areas such as security and 
transportation which occurred at the privately-run 1996 Atlanta Olympics prompted the 
IOC to encourage more governmental involvement in the running of the event 
(Associated Press, 1998). As a result, SOCOG's responsibility was limited to the 
organisation of the core event, namely the sport competitions, since the NSW government 
undertook responsibility for the delivery of functions peripheral to the core event. For 
example, the NSW government established the Sydney Olympic Broadcast Organisation 
(SOBO) to produce the sound and image signal of the Games, the Olympic Roads and 
Transport Authority (ORTA) to undertake aU the transport-related matters, and the 
Olympic Security Command Centre (OSCC) to be responsible for the security of the 
whole event. Additionally, the NSW government established the Olympic Co-ordination 
Authority (OCA), which was responsible for the construction and management of all 
Games-related infrastructure, and also for co-ordinating the entire involvement of the 
NSW government in the event. An additional element of the organisation of the Sydney 
Olympics was the local Australian Olympic Committee (AOC), which was heavily 
involved in the planning and organisation of the sport competitions, particularly in later 
stages of the Olympic preparations when it undertook full responsibility for all the sport- 
related issues of the event. The fact, however, that the NSW government undertook some 
of the most vital responsibUities for the staging of the event should not devalue the task 
of SOCOG. SOCOG was operating in the centre of a complex organisational network, 
which involved various organisations, with diverse responsibilities (Figure 1.1). Its role 
was to put together these responsibilities in such a fashion that would result in a 
successful outcome, that is, the smooth transaction of the Games. 
This study is designed therefore to contribute to a better understanding of the 
organisation of the contemporary Olympic Games. In particular, the examination of 
SOCOG can reveal concealed organisational aspects and key actors of the organisation of 
the Games. In addition, the concept of considering an OCOG in different chronological 
stages can be of great benefit to Olympic scholars and practitioners, since it could allow 
large amounts of information about an OCOG to be broken down into manageable 
categories that would then be easier to comprehend, elaborate and store. Finally, the 
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employment of the modified version of Mintzberg's configuration approach can provide 
research evidence with regard to its applicability for the study of OCOGs and sport 
organisations with broadly similar event organising responsibilities, thus contributing to 
the field of organisation theory. 
Figure 1.1: The Organisational Model of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games 
NOCs 10C IFs 
Athletes Financial Technical 
Support Support 
AOC COG SOCOG Sport 
SOBO OCA ORTA OCA ORTA 
Broadcastinu Tr C Infrastructure Transnortation tructure 
NSW 
GOVERNMENT 
Financial Guarantee 
(Source: SOCOG, 1999) 
1.5 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis comprises six further chapters which are structured as follows: Chapter 11 
looks at the nature of Olympic Games within the spectrum of mega-sporting events. This 
chapter is composed of two main sections, the first of which explores the impacts of 
mega-sporting events on the cities and regions that stage them, in an attempt to uncover 
the range of interests involved in decisions made to host such events. The second section 
examines the Olympic Games within the wide context of the Olympic Movement with 
especial emphasis on identifying the implications for the organisational structure of the 
event. Particular focus is placed upon the role of the IOC in setting the framework for the 
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contemporary organisation of the Games, and on the critics that its practices have 
attracted. 
Chapter III comprises a review of the organisation theory literature. It provides a critical 
evaluation of the various schools of thought and the particular approaches that have been 
used for the study of organisations. Attention is focused on the perspectives that have 
been used to categorise organisations, and specifically on Mintzberg's approach, which is 
justified, though in a modified form, as the conceptual framework for the study of 
SOCOG. The nature of the modifications to Mintzberg's model is outlined and the 
justification of the modifications is presented. Chapter IV extends the discussion on 
organisational analysis by exploring the organisational change literature. Specifically, 
this chapter looks at the organisational life cycle literature in order to provide a 
conceptual base for identiýýg methods and practices for dividing SOCOG's life into 
logical and defensible stages. 
Chapter V presents the methodology which underpinned the empirical part of the thesis. 
Firstly, it provides the philosophical base upon which the study was designed in order to 
offer justification for the choice of the particular research design. Then, it exemplifies in 
detail the implementation phase of the research, with particular focus on the processes of 
data collection and analysis. 
Chapter VI presents the empirical results of the study. The organisational characteristics 
of SOCOG that are under investigation are structured with regard to SOCOG's contextual 
factors and structural characteristics. Finally, chapter VII starts with a consideration of 
the patterns of change of SOCOG's organisational elements in the course of the 
organisation's seven-year life cycle. Thereafter, it discusses the organisational 
configurations exhibited by SOCOG, and provides the pattern of its organisational 
development. Moreover, it juxtaposes SOCOG's formations to Mintzberg's ideal 
organisational types and comments on the suitability of Mintzberg's modified model for 
the study of OCOGs. Chapter VII also presents the conclusions of this research project 
and stresses its contribution to the field of Olympic organisation and broadly to 
organisation research and analysis. 
to 
CHAPTER 11 
MEGA SPORTING EVENTS AND 
THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
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In recent years, the Olympic Games have developed into one of the most significant 
mega international sporting events. The increasing number of cities bidding to host the 
Olympics and the increasing funds invested in Olympic bids indicate that local leaders 
perceive the securing of such an event as an opportunity to improve economic and social 
aspects of a city or region through the accumulated investment triggered by staging the 
Games. As a result, in the course of the last two decades there has been an increasing 
academic interest and research literature focused on the impact of the Olympics on the 
socio-economic and political life of the host city, region and country. From this 
perspective, the Olympic Games have been examined not only in relation to other mega- 
sporting events, such as the Football World Cup and World Championships, but also in 
relation to commercial and cultural events, such as Expos and festivals, since it has been 
claimed that regardless of their character, events such as the aforementioned generate 
similar dynamics for the host cities or regions. Here, however, it is suggested that an 
analysis of the character of the contemporary Olympic Games should not treat them as 
merely a typical mega-event, since the Olympics possess a number of distinctive 
characteristics. These special characteristics are primarily derived from the fact that the 
Games are presented and promoted as the prime expression of the philosophy of 
Olympism, and are also organised within a strict institutional framework set by the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC). 
In view of the above, this chapter aims to reveal the status of the Olympics both as a 
mega-event as well as a property of the Olympic Movement. It contains two main 
sections. The first section explores th 
'e 
significance of the contemporary Olympic Games 
within the spectrum of mega-sporting events by critically evaluating their impacts on the 
host cities, regions and countries. In doing so, it aims to uncover the range and diversity 
of interests as well as the high stakes involved in the hosting of such events, thus 
illustrating the complexity of tasks that Olympic organisers face. The second section 
explores the Olympic Games as an expression of Olympism and part of the Olympic 
Movement. It aims to specify the institutional particularities of the Olympic Games, and 
effectively expose its unique organisational characteristics and their implications for 
Olympic organisers. 
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2.1. DEFINING MEGA SPORTING EVENTS 
Before examining the Olympic Games as a mega-sporting event, it was considered 
appropriate that such events ought firstly to be defined. The initial step in defining 
sporting mega-events was to consider them within the field of other non-sporting events 
since most of the relevant research and analysis incorporates events of various types (e. g. 
commercial, cultural etc. ). Therefore, the key issue to be addressed is the identification 
of the criteria by which mega-events in general ought to be defined. In other words, the 
central question is 'How are mega-events distinct from other eventsT A mega-event can 
be viewed in two main respects: firstly, with regard to its internal characteristics, that is 
primarily its duration and its scale (i. e. number of participants and spectators, number of 
individual sessions, and levels of organisational complexity), and secondly, in respect of 
its external characteristics, which mainly take account of its media and tourism 
attractiveness, and its impact on the host city. 
The internal characteristics of an event alone have attracted limited attention since 
researchers are primarily concerned with the external implications of an event, and also in 
some cases it has been found that some internal and external elements of an event are not 
necessarily interrelated. Ingerson (1998), for example, has found that in Australia in 
1998, events with limited duration and media attractiveness made a bigger economic 
contribution than other longer-lasting events with bigger television audiences. Therefore, 
mega-events are usually perceived as having an impact on local tourism and economy 
(Hall, 1992a; Getz, 1998; Roche, 2000). Expenditures on facility and infrastructure 
preparation, as well as revenue from visitor spending, tickets and media exposure, form 
the baseline of the bulk of mega-event analysis. However, in looking even further, it has 
also become evident that mega-events can be analysed as tools of government policy or 
expressions of political ideologies (e. g. Hill, 1992). Furthermore, mega-events can be 
assessed in terms of their role in the process of capital accumulation through corporate 
sponsorships and media audiences (e. g. Whitson and Macintosh, 1996). Mega-events 
have also received attention in relation to the urban processes involved, such as the 
erection of landmark structures and the renewal of urban space with particular examples 
being the extensive waterfront development in Barcelona for the 1992 Olympics (De 
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Moragas and Bottela, 1995), and the refurbishment of the Homebush area in Sydney for 
the 2000 Olympics (Toohey and Veal, 2000). 
Sensibly, therefore, authors' attempts to determine the criteria for defining a mega-event 
reflect the areas of their interests, which, as was mentioned above, mainly focus on their 
external characteristics and impact. Extensive attention has been paid to the argument 
that the extent of media coverage and particularly television coverage, and the associated 
attraction of sponsorship determine whether an event may be described as a mega-event 
or not (Morphet, 1996). More specifically, Roche (2000) has claimed that the degree of 
media interest in an event (i. e. local, national, global) will effectively derme the type of 
event. In effect, Roche (2000) has suggested that the significance of an event depends 
upon the kind of media coverage it can attract and the degree to which it can become a 
national or international 'media event' (p. 7). 
Although the levels of media attractiveness have been the centre of much mega-event 
analysis (e. g. De Moragas, 1996; Dayan and Katz, 1992; Jackson and McPhail, 1989). 
particular cases suggest that this criterion alone cannot determine the status of a mega- 
event. The 1991 World Student Games in Sheffield, for example, had poor media 
coverage and poor associated sponsorship, thus creating a major debt for the organisers 
(Roche, 1994). However, this event had a significant economic impact on the city of 
Sheffield and was also the starting point of an ongoing regeneration of the city, which has 
gradually created a high-profile sporting image within the U. K. (Davies, 1998). 
Similarly, in Australia in 1998, the Spring Racing Carnival made a bigger economic 
contribution ($174m) than other more prestigious events such as the Formula One Grand 
Prix ($96m) or the Australian Tennis Open ($70m), while having the lowest estimated 
television audience (300m, 500m and 600m respectively) (Ingerson, 1998). 
Although the media-related aspect of events is rarely overlooked when authors attempt to 
classify an event, the focus is undoubtedly placed upon the consequences of an event on 
the host city, region or even country. Roche (1994,1999), for example, has suggested 
that the criteria for determining a mega-event should be sought in the impacts, primarily 
economic ones, the event has on the cities that stage them. In more detail, Sola. (1998) 
suggests that mega-events usually have an extraordinary impact on the host area in terms 
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of one or more of the following: "tourist volumes; visitor expenditures; publicity leading 
to a heightened awareness and a more positive image; related inftastructural and 
organisational developments which substantially increase the destination's capacity and 
attractiveness " (Sola, 1998, p. 242). It is claimed, therefore, that the degree and 
significance of the impact of an event on the host city or region mainly determine 
whether the event should be termed as a 'mega' one. In effect, here we adopt the notion 
that mega-events are those sporting, commercial or cultural occurrences whose impacts 
are significant for the cities, regions or countries that stage them. 
Besides, it is accepted within the relevant literature that cities' motives behind the 
decision to stage a mega-event are its potential positive consequences, and predominantly 
its contribution to economic development and urban regeneration (e. g. Emery, 1998; 
Essex and Chalkley 1998; Shibli and Gratton, 1998; Kitchen, 1996; Stevens, 1996; 
Roche, 2000). Dunn and McGuirk (1999) claim that the hosting of mega-events has 
become a global imperative of competition between nations, regions and even individual 
cities, which try to attract international investment. More specificafly, they claim that 
6place-competition' and 'place-marketing' are the effects of global competition and 
capital mobility in the contemporary borderless world. In that sense, the 
internationalisation of capital can enhance the mega-event as a form of 'place marketing' 
for inward investment (Kearns and Philo, 1993). 
Indeed, cities and regions are nowadays becoming increasingly concerned with 
promoting local economic development within their own boundaries, which involves 
different forms of restructuring of the city, region or even country, such as physical 
restructuring that enhances the repackaging of the location's identity. According to 
Graham (1992) the contribution of what he calls 'hallmark events', such as the Olympics, 
to strategies for urban regeneration is strongly associated with 'post-Fordism' and with 
the related transitions 6om industrial to post-industrial society and from modernity to 
post-modemity. Similarly, Harvey (1989) refers to mega-events as one of the main 
products of post-modem society and a key means by which cities express their 
personality, enhance their status and advertise their position on the global stage. The 
bottom line, therefore, is that both globalisation and the economic restructuring of cities 
have been powerful factors in enhancing the attractiveness of mega-events as stimulants 
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to urban economic development (Roche, 2000, Hughes, 1993, Mules, 1993). It has been 
claimed, for example, that the economic decline of old manufacturing cities such as 
Manchestqr in a post-Fordist environment led to the conceptual isat ion of its 1996 
OIYMpic Bid as a tool of urban regeneration in what was billed as the 'Regeneration 
Games' (Cochrane et al, 1996, p. 1322). 
Mega-sporting events include specialist world-level international sport competitions (e. g. 
the World Cup competitions in soccer, athletics, rugby etc. and Grand Prix events for 
horseracing and motor racing etc. ) and also the 'world regional-level' versions of these 
events. These are mainly connected to the multi-sport Olympics, such as the Asian 
Games, the Pan-American Games and the Conunonwealth Games, and to a lesser degree 
to the world-level specialist events such as the European zone competition for the soccer 
World Cup (Roche, 2000, p. 3). Such mega-sporting events provide great opportunities 
for regions and cities to develop internationally competitive investment environments. 
Through the processes of place competition and the restructuring they promote, regions 
and cities can benefit in the long term. in order to stage the Olympics, for example, 
considerable investment is required in both sporting facilities and supporting 
infrastructure (e. g. tourist accommodation, transportation, telecommunications etc. ). In 
the same context, mega-sporting events the size of the Olympics or the football World 
Cup can promote economic activity as a result of the jobs created by the vast numbers of 
tourists visiting the city before, during and after the event. The construction of sports 
facilities can also play a role in prograrnmes of urban renewal by, for example, 
introducing new sporting and recreational facilities into previously under-provided areas. 
On a broader scale, preparations for the event can also provide a means of justifying new 
investment in transport infrastructure and in projects to enhance the city's landscape and 
physical appearance. Even unsuccessful bids for the Olympic Games can bring benefits. 
One example being, through the urban projects and regeneration initiated in order to 
strengthen the city's Olympic bid (Lawson, 1996). 
In effect, cities' motives for wishing to stage mega-sporting events are largely derived 
from the stimulus to promote local economic development and urban regeneration 
(Kitchen, 1996). The realisation that mega-sporting events can be utilised in such a 
manner was firstly comprehended with the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games (Nash and 
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Johnstone, 1998). These Olympics had a limited contribution to the local urban 
development; however, their substantial commercial success, which resulted from 
increased television income and corporate sponsorship, and the subsequent surplus of 
US$ 215 million produced by the organisers, showed that the staging of sporting events 
the size of the Olympics can become a profitable business for host cities and regions 
(Essex and Chalkley, 1998). The most significant mega-sporting event in terms of 
economic and urban development was the 1992 Barcelona Olympics. These Olympics 
had a substantial impact on the local economy, and their preparations triggered public 
investment of US$ 6.2 billion (1995 prices) for redeveloping the city of Barcelona as well 
as the province of Catalonia (Preuss, 2000a). 
Therefore, the hosting of mega-sporting events with the diverse benefits that it can 
promote, naturally involves various interests ranging from governmental initiatives for 
urban development to profit-oriented initiatives of the private sector. As a result, 
organisers frequently have to deal with diverse and often conflicting interests, which 
means that they have to perform a highly complex task. Therefore, in order to perfect our 
definition of a mega-sporting event, we will add to the status of its external elements, that 
is the degree of its impacts, its internal determinants which do not include its scale or 
duration as much as its organisational complexity and the involvement of diverse entities 
such as Governments, private corporations and public groups, which more accurately 
characterise its internal nature. 
2.1.1 THE IMPACTS OF MEGA SPORTING EVENTS 
As the discussion above suggests, the impacts of mega-sporting events on the host city or 
region can be immense and manifold, and a great part of the relevant literature supports 
the idea that such events can primarily produce positive outcomes. Whether mega- 
sporting events do indeed produce such'net effects, however, has been under debate by 
several authors. In the following sections, the impacts of mega-sporting events will be 
discussed in succession with considerable focus on the relevant contradictory arguments. 
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Socio-Economic Impacts 
It is often argued that the most important reason behind the decision of a city, region or 
country to host a mega-sporting event is the potential positive impact of the event on the 
local economy, which in turn can improve the social status of the host community. 
According to Crompton (1995), the economic impact of an event can be defined as the 
'net economic change in the host community that resultsftom spending attributed to the 
event' (p. 14). In that sense, we need to comprehend that the direct income of a mega- 
sporting event, that is from sources such as ticket sales, television rights and sponsorship 
deals, does not necessarily contribute to the economic development of the host 
community, since such income usually covers the costs for organising the event itself 
(Preuss, 1999). The economic contribution of mega-sporting events is primarily thought 
of in terms of the possibilities they provide of increasing the awareness of the city or 
region as a tourism destination and the knowledge concerning the potential for 
investment and commercial activity in the region. Therefore, they can attract more 
investment and visitors, and consequently create new jobs and contribute to the economic 
growth of the city or region (Essex and Chalkley, 1998). 
On this basis, the bulk of the literature concerned with evaluating the socio-economic 
benefits associated with a particular sporting event draws attention to the effects of the 
event-related job creation on the unemployment rates of the host region (e. g. Miguelez 
and Carrasquer, 1995), the effects of the visiting spectators and the media-related 
advertisement on the tourism industry of the host city or region (e. g. Pyo et at, 1988; 
Kang and Perdue, 1994; Hughes, 1993) as well as the effects of the event on the social 
standards of the host community (e. g. Lenskyj, 2000; Eitzen, 1996). The latter primarily 
stresses the event-related impacts on the economic status of the citizens, and the role of 
the event with regard to the issues of Poverty and social exclusion. 
With regard to the issue of job creation, undoubtedly a mega-sporting event can generate 
large number of jobs not only those directly associated with the organisation of the event 
itself but also those in the tourism and retail industry due to the increased volumes of 
spectators-tourists, and in the construction industry especially when the staging of the 
event requires major infrastructural development, such as in the case of the Olympic 
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Games. For example, in Atlanta, the host city of 1996 Olympic Games, an investment of 
$2 billion was made in Olympic-related projects between the 1990 Olympic 
announcement and spring 1996. As a result, over 580,000 new jobs were created in the 
region between 1991 and 1997. A research commissioned by the Atlanta Convention and 
Visitors Bureau (ACVB) estimated that the cumulative economic impact of the Olympic 
Games between 1991 and 1997 was $ 5.1 billion (Stevens and Bevan, 1999). Barcelona, 
the host city of 1992 Olympic Games, had a similar experience, when, from October 
1986 to July 1992, the general rate of unemployment fell from 18.4% to 9.6% (Brunet, 
1995). 
Although it should be accepted that the staging of a mega-sporting event evidently 
generates new jobs, attention should be placed on the quality and duration of these jobs. 
As Schimmel (1995) points out, sporting events create service-related jobs which are 
often part-time or low-paying. In his analysis of the Cape Town 2004 Olympic bid, 
Hiller (2000) reaches a similar conclusion and suggests that the vast majority of the 
anticipated jobs would have been low-paying and short-lived. Moreover, Miguelez and 
Carrasquer (1995) reported that the Barcelona Olympics generated only a limited number 
of new jobs since most of the Olympic-related jobs were temporary. 
Related to the issue of job creation and to the broad economic development of the host 
city, region or even country is the boost to the tourism industry due to the staging of a 
mega-sporting event. For example, it has been reported that the tourism boom during the 
1996 Football European Championships helped push Britain's trade balance into its first 
surplus since the beginning of 1995. In total, over 280,000 visiting spectators and media 
came to the UK to attend Euro'96 matches, spending approximately L120 million in the 
eight host cities and surrounding regions during the three weeks of the championship 
(Dobson et at, 1997). Similarly, during the 1998 Football World Cup in France, between 
10m and 15m people visited the country because of the event, spending an estimated half 
a billion pounds on hotels, travel and food (Chaudhary, 1999). 
Morphet (1996) has argued that the role of the media is vital in terms of creating 
awareness of the host city or region. He has claimed that once the media has been in 
these event cities, they are never the same because 'likeformer celebrities, these cities 
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expect a certain respect and recognition long after their moments of glory have been 
faded ftom the memory' (p. 312). Research showed, for example, that the televised 
production of England's cricket tour to the West Indies increased package tourism to 
those islands by as much as 60 per cent (De Knop and Standeven, 1999). Moreover, 
Ritchie and Smith's (1991) five-year study of the image of Calgary before and after the 
1988 Winter Olympic Games, revealed that the Games had a dramatic impact on the 
levels of awareness and knowledge of the city of Calgary in Europe and the United States 
when compared to other Canadian cities. Similarly, in 1996, during the 17 days of the 
Centennial Olympic Games, it has been reported that two million people visited Atlanta 
and 3.5 billion people saw the city on world-wide television coverage in 214 countries 
and territories, and as a result, the tourist industry of the region increased dramatically 
(Stevens and Bevan, 1999). 
Research, however, indicates that extensive media coverage of a mega-sporting event can 
not guarantee a different tourist image for the host city or region- For example, a study 
conducted in Goeteborg, Sweden, two months before and after the staging of the 1995 
Athletics World Championships, looking at the effects of the event on foreign tourists' 
perceptions of the destination image, revealed that very few of the foreign tourists 
travelling to Goeteborg connected the games with the city, although the event was the 
biggest ever sporting event to have taken place in the city and the largest in the world that 
year (Larsson Mossberg, 1997). It was claimed that although the media coverage was 
intensive, it was focused on the sport activities, and as a result, very little information was 
transmitted about Goeteborg (Larsson Mossberg, 1997). Moreove r, contrary to the vast 
majority of tourism impact studies of mega-sporting events, that undertaken by Pyo et at 
(1988) reviewed the tourism impact of the Olympic Games from 1964 until 1984 and 
found that their overall impact was negative. These results were later supported by Kang 
and Perdue (1996) who have criticised tourism impact studies of events, such as the 
Olympics, for overestimated policy approaches and 'short-tertninism'. By employing a 
long-term view on the Seoul Olympics they found that the event did not have a long-term 
impact on local tourism. 
The discussion above supports the argument that mega-sporting events have a positive 
economic impact on the host cities, regions or countries, but also suggests that the 
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economic contribution of such events might lie in a single impulse of increased demand 
during the period of the event, and consequently it might lose its effect in a short period 
of time. It is sensible, therefore, for one to consider whether the argument, which claims 
that mega-sporting events can be of enormous benefit to the host community, is valid. It 
has been claimed, for example, that the economic growth generated from such events 
may actually make the life of low-income residents more difficult. Hall and Hodges 
(1998), for example, emphasise the effects of a mega-sporting event on the house market 
and land values. They have claimed that the building of event-related infrastructure can 
involve housing relocation because of the compulsory purchase of land for clearance and 
building, and it can also lead to a rise in rents and house prices. Consequently, this can 
cause problems for people living on low incomes in these areas. 
The 1996 Atlanta Games serves as an illuminating case of the negative social impacts of 
a mega-sporting event. 
.A 
task force that investigated the social impact of the Games 
reported that 15,000 residents were evicted from public housing projects which were 
demolished to make way for Olympic accommodation. Moreover, between 1990 and 
1995 9,500 units of affordable housing were lost, and $350 million in public funds was 
diverted from low-income housing, social services, and other support services for 
homeless and poor people to Olympic preparation during the same period (Beaty, 1999). 
In addition, homeless shelters were converted into backpacker accommodation during the 
Games, since human services organisations were offered financial incentives to convert 
their services for two weeks to accornmodate tourists rather than low-income people 
(Leskyj, 2000). Similarly, in Sydney, in 1998, when the Olympic-related infrastructure 
was at its peak, house prices rose 7% above inflation, compared to the usual 2% (Horin, 
1998). Moreover, in Sydney's Olympic corridor, an area which was primarily occupied 
by low-income tenants and where unemployment was as high as 38%, rents increased up 
to 23% in the period 1997-1998 (Horin, 1999). 
Consequently, mega-sporting events, such as the Olympics, could serve to exacerbate 
social problems and deepen existing divides among residents (Rutheiser, 1996). In 
Atlanta, for example, there were numerous reports of broken promises by the Olympic 
organisers regarding the poverty issue, in a region where 30% of the population lived 
below the poverty line (Beaty, 1999). 'Street sweeps' were made shortly after Atlanta 
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won the bid when attempts were made to criminalise poverty at the state level via several 
bills, such as that which made it unlawful to remove any item ftorn a public trash 
container! (Lenskyj, 2000, p. 139). The Task Force for the Homeless reported that the 
cost to the taxpayer for using the city jail as a shelter for the homeless people arrested 
under these measures was $57 per day (Beaty, 1999). 
The latter example raises the concern that when state and federal governments contribute 
to the staging of a mega-sporting event, they inevitably make use of public money. 
Although one could claim that tax money can be used for projects upon which an elected 
government decides, when an event creates public debts citizens are unfairly taxed to pay 
off these debts (Lenskyj, 2000). Nagano, for example, the host city of 1998 Winter 
Olympic Games, faced severe financial consequences for hosting such a big event and 
taxpayers suffered debts of up to 20,000 pounds per household to balance the city's 
books (Emery, 1998). Other examples include the city debts created from hosting the 
1976 Olympics in Montreal and the 1991 World Student Games in Sheffield (Kitchen, 
1996). 
To conclude, when the socio-economic impact of a mega-sporting event is assessed one 
should take into account a number of vital considerations. Firstly, it is of decisive 
importance whether the host city manages to use the one-time economic impulse of such 
an event to change its structure in a way that will provide a self-sustaining process 
through, for example, pen-nanent tourism, industrial settlements, regular follow-up events 
or even new economic relations with other regions or countries (Preuss, 2000b). 
Secondly, it needs to be comprehended that the extent of the benefit for the overall 
economy depends on the economic situation of the city when event-related investments 
are realised. A phase of increased investment activity and increased consumption 
expenditure in line with an economic upswing or boom may weaken the positive 
economic benefits. On the contrary, if event expenditures are made during an economic 
recession these will be considerably strengthen. The Olympic Games of Munich 1972, 
Barcelona 1992 and Atlanta 1996, for example, were fortunate that their investments fell 
in an economically weak phase, while those of Seoul 1988 probably led to crowding-out 
effects Wreuss, 2000a). This is supported by Hughes' (1993) study undertaken to 
provide background information for Manchester's ultimately unsuccessful bid for the 
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1996 Olympics, which concluded that such an event can have positive impacts on the 
cities which have an undeveloped sport infrastructure and which have high 
unemployment, and less so in cities with a developed infrastructure and low 
unemployment. Finally, as Preuss (1998) points out, cost-benefit analyses or economic 
impact studies are frequently ordered by the organising authorities of an event, and 
consequently, the results which the client favours can be produced, since there are some 
uncertain quantities and qualities, mostly of a social nature, which are easy to manipulate 
(Preuss, 1998). Therefore, one should bear in mind that a cost-benefit analysis of a 
mega-sporting event could be influenced in a way to bring out the desired results. 
Socio-cultural Impacts 
If we look at a mega-sporting event solely as a sport festivity, we can certainly argue that 
such an event can provide socio-cultural benefits for the host region. For example, 
sporting events the size of the Olympics can increase the local interest and participation 
in sporting activities (Ritchie, 1984), and also, as Essex and Chalkley (1996) have 
claimed, they can strengthen regional traditions and values, and increase local pride and 
community spirit. 
Increased sports participation can make a significant contribution to the quality of life of 
both the individual and community. Hooper (1998) has argued that increased sport 
participation provides a sense of well-being through fun and enjoyment leading to self- 
fulfilment and achievement, and encourages social interaction and cohesion for those 
who may feet socially excluded. For example, Barcelona saw a notable increase in the 
participation of new social sectors of the population in active sports in the years 
following the hosting of the Olympic Games. There has been an increase of 46,000 new 
users in the city's sports centres after the 1992 Games, with the percentage of women 
participating in sporting activities increasing from 35% in 1989 to 45% in 1995. 
Moreover, in 1994, more than 300,000 people took part in sporting events which 
involved the city's inhabitants on the streets of Barcelona such as athletic competitions, 
Popular marathon, the bicycle festival, the roller-skating festival and so on (Truno, 1995). 
It has been claimed that Catalans' drift into mass-community sporting activities was due 
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to an increased community spirit triggered by the 1992 Olympics. Truno (1995), for 
example, found evidence of increased civic pride during the Olympics and remarked that 
"the citizens have turned the city's streets into the world's largest stadium " (p. 55). This 
was also boosted by media coverage, which was presenting Catalans as a one of the most 
celebrative people in Europe (De Guevara et al, 1995). Similarly, a survey of the 
residents of the State of Georgia (USA), undertaken by the Governor's Department, 
confirmed that the 1996 Olympics generated civic pride, with 93% stating that the Games 
were positive for the community spirit of the city (Stevens and Bevan, 1999). A similar 
phenomenon was evident during the 1996 European Football Championship in England, 
where the country adopted the nostalgic theme 'football's coming home', and created a 
sense of national purpose, national unity and national pride (Morphet, 1996). The hosting 
of mega-sporting events, therefo re, can provide localities with an opportunity to generate 
world recognition and reinforce their local pride and community spirit. 
Mega-sporting events can also contribute to transforming the image of the host city. The 
city of Sheffield, for example, which was traditionally a manufacturing city, after the 
industrial recession of the 1980's and subsequent job losses, adopted sport, leisure and 
tourism as part of the re-imaging strategy of the city. Under that approach, the hosting of 
mega-sporting events was seen as an integral part of that strategy (Roche, 1994). The 
successful bid for the 1991 World Student Games and the subsequent investment of E139 
million in sporting infrastructure in addition to a further E600 million in associated 
leisure and cultural facilities by the early 1990's has given the city a new focus. In 1995 
Sheffield was designated by the Sports Council as the UK's first 'National City of Sport' 
in recognition of its ongoing contribution and commitment to sport, and in December 
1997 it was named as the city chosen to host the headquarters of the UK Institute of Sport 
(Davies, 1998), a decision which was however subsequently reversed. 
Physical Impacts 
Mega-sporting events can also create opportunities for the construction of new sporting 
facilities as well as the improvement of the physical environment of the host city. The 
staging of multi-sporting events such as the Olympics or the Commonwealth Games 
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often involve the building of new sporting facilities or the restructuring of existing ones 
in order for the organisers to be able to satisfy the requirements of staging multiple sports 
in a short period of time. Moreover, the great numbers of participants and officials as 
well as tourists associated with the event usually require the construction of new roads 
and the development of the public transport network to ensure their efficient 
transportation to the sporting venues during the event. In addition, infrastructural 
development that is not directly related to the event often takes place, such as leisure 
facilities, conunercial centres and open spaces, which aim to improve the physical 
appearance of the host city or region. Consequently, it has become increasingly common 
for mega-sporting events to be used as a trigger for large-scale urban improvement 
(Kitchen, 1996). 
Perhaps the best example of a mega-sporting event being used in this way was the 1992 
Barcelona Olympics, where major investments were made for new transport systems and 
for the rejuvenation of a run-down coastal area which now has a new marina, leisure 
facilities and attractive sandy beaches (Essex and Chalkley, 1998). It has been argued 
that the Olympic Village (Parc de Mar) was an excuse for opening the city up to the sea, 
thus realising a long-standing aspiration of the citizens, and the Vall d'Hebron, a huge 
sporting facilities area, provided an opportunity for organising and urbanising a chaotic 
urban space (Truno, 1995). Thus, the host authorities may see mega-sporting events as 
an opportunity to fund and bring forward long-term projects, which would otherwise 
remain in the pending file for many years. Portugal, for example, won the right to host 
the 2004 European Football Championships ahead of favourite Spain even though it had 
poorer stadiums and transport facilities. Giving the tournament to Portugal was seen as a 
way of helping both the country's football and overall sporting development (Stevens and 
Bevan, 1999). 
The 2000 Sydney Games continued the theme of major urban change. The organisers 
spent A$ 1,7 billion on the construction of sporting facilities, in addition to A$ 1,15 
billion on supportive infrastructure (NSW, 2001). The latter included spending A$ 137 
million in rehabilitating polluted sites in the area of Homebush Bay, which became the 
sporting centre during the Games. Similarly, in Athens, the host Olympic city of 2004, 
besides the creation and renewal of several sporting facilities, a E1,4 billion new airport 
25 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG CHAPTER 11 
opened in 2001 able to handle 16 million passengers and 220,000 tons of cargo a year. 
Moreover, the L820 million expansion of the City's underground was completed in early 
2001 with the new lines, carrying a total of 150 million passengers a year, thus creating 
3,000 full-time jobs. Moreover, it is estimated that US$ I billion will be spent between 
2000 and 2004 on projects that are not essentially Games-related but have been triggered 
by the staging of the event (Tzelis, 2001). 
Mega-sporting events can also provide opportunities to the host sporting authorities to 
undertake joint projects in order to serve multiple purposes. In Atlanta, for example, the 
Olympic Stadium has been converted to the home of the City's Baseball Team. Funding 
for the $120m stadium came from the 1996 Olympic organising committee (ACOG), 
while the additional $35m required for the conversion was raised by the Atlanta Braves, 
Turner Broadcasting and Time Warner (Cramer, 1997). Similarly, in Manchester, the 
host city of the 2002 Commonwealth Games, the Sportcity, a 45,000 seat stadium, is a 
joint project of the organisers and the Manchester City Football Club, which after the 
Games will be the home of the local football team (Manchester 2002,1999). 
Although the staging of a mega-sporting event can contribute to the urban improvement 
of the host city or region, attention should be placed on the processes involved for 
accomplishing major construction projects. As Lenskyj (2000) points out, the set 
deadline for the construction of venues and the completion of infrastructure supports are 
often used by local politicians as the excuse for major constructions to bypass the usual 
stages in urban development applications, including social and environmental 
assessment, public hearings, and so on. In Athens, for example, the host city of the 2004 
Olympics, the decision about the construction of the rowing centre for the Games at the 
Marathonas Lake was criticised for lacking adequate environmental analysis. It has been 
claimed that the project will undermine the natural resources of the waterland and cause 
collateral damage in the area (Mber4 2001). The staging of a mega-sporting event may 
pose additional environmental problems, especially when temporary structures are built 
for the needs of the event. At Atlanta Games, for instance, four sports were hosted in 
temporary facilities which had to be demolished after the Games because of their limited 
usefulness to the local community (Lensk)j, 2000). In this case, the practices of 
disposing of such material, which cannot be recycled, fail to qualify as ecologically 
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sustainable development. Finally, when infrastructure projects speed up, other public 
works can be delayed or displaced. Moreover, when a large proportion of state funds are 
channelled into one metropolitan area, this often results in fewer infrastructure projects in 
suburban areas and in other regions (Rutheiser, 1996). The choice for such projects is 
usually a political one, since the cost of the often extensive event-related infrastructure is 
primarily covered by local governments (Preuss, 2000a). This, in turn, stresses the role 
of governments and the subsequent politics involved in hosting a mega-sporting event, 
which is presented below. 
Political Impacts 
The staging of a mega-sporting event of the significance of the Olympic Games or the 
Football World Cup usually has as its central constituent local, regional or even central 
governments. The main reason for that is that the administration of such events produces 
difficulties in covering the cost for the supportive infrastructure of the event or even for 
operating costs from tickets sales, sponsoirship, television rights and so on, and therefore, 
governments' economic contribution is often required (Preuss, 2000a). For instance, the 
cost of the sporting and supportive infrastructure of the 2000 Sydney Olympics was 
mostly covered by the government of the New South Wales (NSW) which, in addition, 
provided several economic bailouts to the organisers to cover their operating costs (NSW, 
2001). 
Inevitably, therefore, the decision to bid for hosting a mega-sporting event is backed by 
governments, which frequently initiate such decisions, especially when the event 
provides the potential to pay them back in the form of economic, physical or other 
benefits. Public governance is mostly involved in such decisions at a local or regional 
level, since, with the exception of football events, mega-sporting events are awarded to 
cities rather than countries. Moreover, as Harvey (1989) points out, local governments 
have become comparatively autonomous from central governments, and as a result, they 
have adopted less bureaucratic and more competitive practices. Under this 
transformation, the competition to host and manage mega-sporting events has been an 
integral part of urban politics. Cochrane et at (1996) illustrate some of the key features of 
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this new urban politics through the example of Manchester's Olympic bids of the 1980s 
and 1990s, in which local government-based decision-making and bureaucratic politics 
were essentially replaced by a dynamic business leadership. 
Hall (1987) suggests that the decisions affecting the hosting of a mega-event grow out of 
a political process which not only involves the interests of political authorities, but also 
those of private, profit-oriented organisations. The New South Wales government in 
Australia, for instance, which was heavily involved in the organisation of the Sydney 
2000 Olympics, has adopted more entrepreneurial-driven forms of governance, since a 
broad range of non-government, often private, organisations were incorporated into the 
NSW government's decision-making and policy formulation process (Dunn and 
McGuirk, 1999). Therefore, under the new urban politics imperatives, a decision to bid 
for mega-events, such as the Olympics, is not solely made by local or regional 
governments but often involves business corporations (Essex and Chalkley, 1998). In 
that sense, mega-sporting events- are often credited with mobilising corporate elites and 
local politicians in profitable alliances that not only can boost local construction and 
retail and tourist industries but can also generate substantial infrastructure funding from 
higher levels of government. The practices of such alliances, which are termed by 
Lenskyj (2000) as 'Politics of Place' (p. 96), usually involve campaigns to persuade the 
citizens of the host city that the event will transform their hometown into a 'world-class' 
city, thus justifying the use of tax money. However, Eitzen (1996), through his analysis 
of Toronto's bid for the 2008 Olympics, has claimed that taxpayers disproportionately 
bear the burden when they give consent for the use of tax money for the staging of mega- 
sporting events. For example, he has provided sufficient evidence that the policy of the 
bid committee regarding the sporting infrastructure was primarily focused on the needs of 
professional sport. 
The organising committees of mega-sporting events frequently include elected 
representatives who serve as their members or even presidents, such as in the case of 
New South Wales MP Michael Knight, who was also the President of the Sydney 2000 
organising committee. Such politicians often experience conflicting pressures to 
represent taxpayers' interests, on the one hand, and profit-oriented interests on the other. 
The dual role of Michael Knight, for example, was promoted by the NSW government as 
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a major factor in keeping the project on target and on budget; however, it was claimed 
that the Olympics were compromised when Knight, as cabinet Minister, was not able to 
criticise the government's handling of issues, such as the contamination of Sydney's 
water supply due to Olympic works, and its serious implications for Olympic tourism 
(Lenskyj, 2000). In Sydney's case, the 'Olympics as catalyst' rhetoric attracted a lot of 
criticism, since politicians and businessmen who had promised dramatic improvements in 
the lead up to the Olympic bid failed to take adequate action when urban social problems 
were equally urgent (Lenskyj, 2000, p. 96). 
Finally, an additional political application of staging a mega-sporting event is what 
Ritchie (1984) refers to as a micro-political factor. This applies to the desire of 
individuals to utilise the visibifity offered by the involvement with an event with a view 
to enhancing their careers in both political and non-political arenas (p. 10). Indeed, 
politicians who are involved in the organisation of prestigious sporting events, such as the 
Olympics, have the opportunity to improve their political image by associating 
themselves with the event, as well as to develop their public relations through contacts 
with sporting authorities and commercial organisations involved in the event. The case 
of the President of the Sydney 2000 Organising Committee, for instance, who retired 
from politics after the Games and is now working for the International Olympic 
Committee, might be seen as such an example. 
Our discussion about the impacts of mega-sporting events suggests that such events can 
produce both positive and negative impacts for the host cities, regions or countries. It has 
been demonstrated that nearly all the positive applications of such events have also a 
negative side, which is often expressed in academic debates. However, what can be seen 
as indisputable is that mega-sporting events can benefit the managerial practices and 
capacities of the organising authorities. The sporting authorities involved in the 
organisation of a mega-sporting event can benefit by obtaining experience essential for 
organising future sport events. It has been reported, for example, that for the Barcelona 
sports world the organisation of the 1992 Olympic Games was a tremendous opportunity 
for improving its methods of management and its organisational capacity, for linking up 
better with the international sports network, and therefore for being better prepared to 
serve the city's daily sports requirements. Sport clubs, sporting federations, and sports 
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management companies have also benefited from the accumulated know-how, having 
improved their workforces with the addition of workers involved with the organising 
committee of the Games (Truno, 1995). The organisers of mega-sporting events the size 
of the Olympics co-operate with International Federations, corporate sponsors, 
broadcasting corporations, governmental authorities, and the like. Individuals, therefore, 
can acquire sport-specific managerial experience, which can then be returned as a benefit 
to the sport administration of the host country, and can also provide these countries with a 
considerable advantage when they wish to stage future sporting events. Moreover, the 
organisation of complex events, such as the Olympic Games, which often requires 
business-like management, can improve the practices of the public administration. In 
Greece, for example, the Olympic preparations for the 2004 Games, which required the 
creation of many temporary companies, triggered the restructuring of the legal framework 
concerning the creation of Public Corporations and Limited Companies. In particular, the 
time span for establishing such organisations was dropped to one week from the two 
months that previously existed (Christodoulakis, 2001). 
2.2 OLYMPISM, OLYMPIC MOVEMENT AND THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
In many ways the Olympic Games might be seen as simply the clearest example of a 
mega-event in terms of scale, complexity and the various impacts mentioned in the 
previous section. The Olympic Games, however, possess additional levels of complexity 
deriving from its nature as the most prominent outcome of the ideology of Olympism. Its 
ideological background together with its unique organisation structure, and its cultural 
and political role on the global stage constitute some of the characteristics that distinguish 
them from other mega-sporting events. 
2.2.1 OLYMPISM AND THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
The institution of the modem Olympic Games was revived in 1896 by Baron Pierre de 
Coubertin. Coubertin was a visionary educator who claimed that high-minded 
international sport could foster individual and collective goodwill and even contribute to 
30 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG CHAPTER 11 
world peace. He believed that this kind of event was not supposed to be simply a sport 
event but the focal point of a broadly based social movement which, through the activity 
of sport and culture, would enhance human development (Lucas, 1992). The modem 
Games, therefore, were revived as an expression of an ideology, a philosophy, that 
Coubertin called Olympism. It has been claimed that Olympism grew from Coubertin's 
initial goal of revitalising the youth of France through a global ideology that could 
embrace sport for all males, and eventually the inclusion of women athletes (Mechicof, 
2000). 
Coubertin believed that honest sport, enriched with style, ritual and symbolism could act 
for millions of people as a distinct set of beliefs, a kind of secular religion (Lucas, 1992). 
Today, the intended function of the plethora of Olympic ritual practices and ceremonies 
during the Games, from the reception of the 'sacred' flame to the taking of the Olympic 
oath, the victory ceremopies and the hand-over ceremony to the representatives of the 
next Olympic City, is to convey the message of what is, essentially, a form of pagan 
religion (Hargreaves, 2000). In that sense, it has been claimed that the Olympic Games 
can become the symbolic expression of a common 'global culture' which aims to bridge 
the gap between people of diverse backgrounds and interests (Hargreaves, 2000, p. 42), 
hence, then can serve humanity (Mechicof, '2000). 
The Olympic Charter describes Olympism. as a "philosophy of life, exalting and 
combining in a balanced whole the qualities ofbody, will and mind", which, by blending 
sport with culture and education, seeks to create a way of life based on the joy found in 
effort, the educational value of good example and respect for universal fundamental 
ethical principles (IOC, 1999b: Fundamental Principles §2). Consequently, the goal of 
Olympism is to "Place everywhere sport at the service ofthe harmonious development of 
man, with a view to encouraging the establishment ofa peaceful society concerned with 
the preservation of human dignity" (IOC, 1999b: Fundamental Principles §3). There is 
no doubt contemporary societies place a high premium on the ideals of Olympism. 
However, the institution of the Olympic Games, which is the most prominent expression 
of Olympism, has, as will be shown later, attracted considerable criticism especially 
during the last couple of decades. The focus of the criticism has been the Olympic 
Movement, that is, the international sport alliance which has derived from Olympism, 
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and particularly the International Olympic Committee (IOC), which has ultimate control 
over it. 
2.2.2 OLYMPIC MOVEMENT AND THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
The Olympic Movement includes the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the 
International Federations (IF), the National Olympic Committees (NOC), and all the 
associations, clubs and individuals belonging to them (IOC, 1999b: Rule 3 1). The IOC 
is the central power of the Olympic movement. It is a self-perpetuating body consisting 
of a maximum of 115 members drawn from a relatively wide variety of countries. 
Members are appointed by the IOC itself, and more specifically by its President and 
Executive Board (IOC, 1999b: Bye-Law to Rule 20, § 2.5). The IOC also holds the 
power to select the city to stage the Olympics. The responsibility for the organisation of 
the Olympic Games is entrusted by the IOC to the NOC of the country of the host city as 
well as to the host city itself. The NOC forms an Organising Conunittee of the Olympic 
Games (OCOG), which, in turn, co-opetates with various entities, such as the IOC, the 
IFs, governments, the private sector and so on, in order to ensure the best possible 
facilities and environment for the athletes and visitors as well as the smooth transaction 
of the Games. Therefore, the organisation of the Olympic Games is a complex system 
which has as its central constituent the OCOGs. An OCOG co-ordinates the 
competences of the NOCs, which represent their athletes, the IFs, which set the technical 
requirements for the Olympic sports, and also the different levels of government which, 
as was mentioned earlier, contribute to the Games mainly with the provision of the 
Supporting infrastructure. 
However, the overall supervision of this organisational scheme is undertaken by the IOC, 
since legally the Olympic Games are its exclusive property (IOC, 1999b: Rule 11), as 
well as the OCOGs, which enter the Olympic Movement as temporary organisations. An 
OCOG becomes part of the Host City Contract (HCC), which involves the host city and 
the NOC of the host country (IOC, 1999b: Rule 39 § 4), and it must conduct its activities 
according to the HCC and the Olympic Charter. The IOC, therefore, has legal power 
over an OCOG, which, in its extreme, can be expressed as withdrawal of the organisation 
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of the Games from the city, and consequently from the OCOG (10C, 1999b: Rule 39 § 
4). 10C's major exertion of power, though, is based on its economic control over the 
Games. It. has been claimed that this control was tightened considerably after the local 
OCOG for the 1984 Los Angeles Games successfully demonstrated how the Games could 
be organised to maximise income from television rights, sponsorship and merchandising, 
and make a financial surplus over costs (Lenskyj, 2000). The IOC now determines in 
detail the nature of the event with regard to its financing and contributes as much as 60% 
to an OCOG's budget (Preuss, 2000a). It has exclusive control of the negotiations of the 
television rights and the international sponsorship programmes for the Games, and keeps 
part of the relevant funds for internal administration and for its constituents. In detail, the 
IOC, the NOCs and IFs receive approximately 40% of the media and commercial 
negotiations. The money coming into the Olympic Movement often reaches exceptional 
amounts, especially if we consider that the television rights contracts alone for each 
Games typically exceed $1 billion (Preuss, 2000a, p. 108). 
2.23 IOC, OLYMPIC GAMES AND CRITICISM 
An organisation as powerful as the 10C inevitably has its critics. As Toohey and Veal 
(2000) point out, the 10C's success in recent years in securing substantial funding, 
together with its power to determine the location of the Games, which can bring millions 
of dollars to successful host cities, has led to scrutiny and criticism of its operations. Two 
major focuses of criticism concern its statutory nature and its internal administration. 
With regard to the former, the 10C is often viewed as a non-democratic and non- 
representative international body which appears anachronistic in the modern world 
(Krotee, 1988). This primarily refers to the election process of its members, since it is 
the 10C that appoints the individuals who will represent their countries in the 
organisation instead of the countries themselves. As a result, critics question the criteria 
used to select members, with its over-emphasis on Europe and such idiosyncrasies as 
longstanding members from the mini states of Liechtenstein and Monaco and three 
members from Switzerland (Toohey and Veal, 2000). 
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The leadership of the IOC, following sustained criticism of its structure, and triggered by 
the bribery allegations of some IOC members involved in the evaluation of the Salt Lake 
2002 Winter Olympics candidature, introduced reforms in 1999 which focused on the 
composition and membership of the organisation. The IOC composition, for example, 
now includes 15 IF presidents and 15 NOC presidents; however, the 70 members elected 
on an individual basis still guarantee the majority power in the sessions (IOC, 1999a). 
The members' term of office is now eight years which is, however, renewable every eight 
years. The President is elected for an eight-year term, with the possibility of re-election 
for a second term of four years (IOC, 1999b: Rule 24, § 1). Akhough these reforms were 
intended to distribute the power within the IOC more evenly, it has been claimed that the 
decision-making power has in fact been concentrated in the IOC's executive board, 
which has now even more power in membership decisions and in the selection of the host 
cities (MacAloon, 2000). Therefore, it could be claimed that in a democratic world such 
practices can be viewed as more oligarchic rather than democratic. 
Simson and Jennings (1992) have been severely critical of the IOC's internal 
administration. They have argued that modem Olympic sport is a secretive, elite domain 
where decisions are taken behind closed doors, and where money is spent on creating a 
fabulous lifestyle for a tiny circle of officials rather than providing facilities for athletes. 
Moreover, with regard to IOC's activities they have claimed that all Olympic gatherings 
are a constant and glittering round of first-class travel, five-star hotels, champagne 
receptions, extravagant banquets, mountains of gifts and lavish entertainment (Simson 
and Jennings, 1992). The criticism of such practices was broadly revealed in 1999, when 
some IOC members were found to have accepted bribes in the form of exceptional 
treatment and expensive gifts from the 2002 Winter Olympics organisers, (Lenskyj, 
2000). 
An additional area of major criticism of the IOC ýoncerns the role of the organisation in 
setting the current commercial image of the Olympic Games. It has been claimed, for 
example, that, in seeking financial independence by means of the sale of television rights 
and the pursuit of sponsorship, the IOC is selling out the Olympic ideals to media and 
commercial interests (Toohey and Veal, 2000). The role of the IOC's Presidents has 
been seen as enormously influential in setting the tone and direction of the IOC during 
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their terms of office. In recent years, particularly under the presidency of Juan Antonio 
Samaranch, the Olympic Games have been transformed into a highly significant sporting 
event, and Samaranch is frequently characterised as the reformer of the Olympic 
Movement. Lucas (1992), for example, has argued that Samaranch's ability to blend the 
traditional Olympic views with new directions has helped the movement to survive in a 
period of rapid changes in the world of sports, and that he has merged the very best 
traditional Olympic values with his vision of a new more embracing and more humane 
Olympics. 
Lucas' (1992) views, however, can be seen as dubious, since the modem scenario of 
Olympic organisation is mostly dealing with television contracts, multimillion dollar 
commercial negotiations and doping accusations, and is often involved in serious 
international political crises (Guttman, 1992). It has been claimed, for example, that 
through the intervention of television and the ever-increasing commercialisation of the 
Games since the 1980s, they have become a very lucrative branch of the worldwide 
entertaint'nent industry (Hargreaves, 2000). It can sensibly be said, therefore, that 
Olympism is not treated as a global ideology but rather as a global brand. The over- 
commercialisation of the Games has been clearly in evidence during the 1996 Atlanta 
Olympics. As Aspden (1996) has reported, Atlanta was unable to make people forget the 
dollar signs and concentrate on the sport, since the city's centre was transformed into a 
maze of flashy vending stalls. In a similar vein, Toohey and Veal (2000) believe that the 
primary aim of the organisers of the contemporary Olympics is not sport for its own sake 
but rather sport for capitalist profit. Similarly, Simson and Jennings (1992) have claimed 
that the IOC simultaneously proclaims the independence of the Olympic Movement 
while giving blessing to alrnost any commodity that pays a 'kick-back' to the IOC. The 
invitation, for example, of professional players for the first time to take part in the 1988 
Seoul Games and the addition of professional basketball players to the 25th Olympiad in 
Barcelona was seen as a strategy to involve more commercial interests in the Games 
(Isao, 1992). Under the current status of the Olympic Games, therefore, it is often said 
that the Olympic ideals are 'for sale" in an Olympic global bazaar (Sirnson and Jennings, 
1992). 
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An additional criticism of the IOC is levelled at its role with regard to the political 
implications of the Olympic Games. A basic contradiction of the Olympic Movement, 
for example, is that it claims to be international but relinquishes moral authority to 
national governments. While, in principle and according to the rhetoric of the IOC, 
athletes who participate in the Games represent just themselves, in practice they represent 
individual nation-states, and therefore politics, political analysis and political debate are 
often close to any consideration of the Games (Toohey and Veal, 2000). Because the 
Olympics have pre-eminence as an international sporting event, one which is watched in 
the four comers of the world, they have become the perfect medium through which to 
demonstrate political power and promote political causes. Added to this incentive are the 
organisational structure and rituals of the games themselves. It has been argued, for 
instance, that when during Olympic medal ceremonies the national anthem is played and 
the flag of the victor's country is raised, and when, at the Opening Ceremony, athletes 
march into the stadium nation by nation, then these practices are overtly creating 
nationalistic tensions, rivalries and pride (Toohey and Veal, 2000). 
States and nations have tried to exert political pressure in pursuit of their interests through 
the Games. Since the 1950s it has become more systematic, particularly against the 
background of the cold war between the US and forrner USSR and the 'new world order. 
Besides the well-known boycotts of the Moscow 1980 and Los Angeles 1984 Olympics, 
other notable instances include the dispute of the 'two Chinas' and the 'two Germanys' 
when the People's Republic of China, Chinese nationalist Taiwan, the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the former DDR used the Olympic movement to resolve the question of 
international recognition of their regimes. Moreover, the Arab-Israel conflict was 
manifested at the 1972 Munich Games with Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israeli 
athletes, and the anti-apartheid lobby had South Africa excluded from the Games for a 
long time (Hargreaves, 2000). 
Consequently, it is often argued that IOC's sovereignty is largely an illusion, as its 
autonomy and immunity to political pressure have been overrated. The IOC has 
presented a questionable 'independence' by collaborating with political power, while 
only rarely resisting it (Hoberman, 1986). The worst crime in Olympic history, for 
example, the massacre of students demonstrating against the Mexican dictatorship during 
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the 1968 Olympic Games, was carried out by the Mexican Government to guarantee what 
was then called 'Olympic peace'. Moreover, the 1988 Olympic Games took place in 
Seoul, South Korea, which was under military dictatorship. It has been claimed that the 
regime in Seoul used the 1988 Games to promote both their economic and, by securing 
the participation of the Chinese, their foreign policy (Hoberman, 1986). Sensibly, 
therefore, Hoberman (1986) terms the core doctrine of the Olympic Movement as 
6amoral universalism', in the sense that it strives for global participation at all costs, even 
sacrificing rudimentary moral standards. Hoberman carries on to claim that when 
confronted with political conditions beyond its control, the IOC elite reacts instinctively 
as the conservator of the Olympic status quo, rather than as a vanguard of change 
(Hoberman, 1986). 
A final criticism of the IOC is that, despite the responsibility it has assumed for the 
control of doping in Olympic sports, it has not been sufficiently tough on drugs'. It is 
claimed that, for fear of offending major member nations or particular sporting 
federations, it has been slow to use its Moral authority to demand penalties on offenders, 
and has put insufficient resources into testing (Toohey and Veal, 2000). Houlihan (1999) 
has suggested that the various interests involved in the anti-doping policy of the IOC are 
reflected in its limited list of banned substances and practices. More specifically, he has 
argued that the IOC has shown considerable compromise to different parties concerned 
with doping, such as doctors, sports administrators, scientists, lawyers and so on, who 
have different priorities on this matter. For doctors, for example, the priority should be 
the athlete's health, while for sport administrators the ergogenic potential as well as the 
image of the sport. This naive IOC anti-doping policy reflects what Houlihan (1999) 
calls "the current mLv ofscience, morality and administrative pragmatism" (p. 96). 
The strength of criticism of the IOC and the Olympic Games is clearly evident and we 
agree with Hoberman (1986), who has claimed that most of such criticism is a reaction 
against contemporary culture. That is, the presence of advanced technology in sports, the 
problems associated with a mass culture of sports, the commercialisation of sports, the 
distortions of human life introduced by specialised training and so on (Hoberman, 1986). 
The criticism of the IOC, therefore, can be seen as a critique of contemporary sport in 
general, as a uniquely modem social phenomenon. We also accept that Olympism is a 
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worldwide sports movement with its own structure and culture, whose activities have 
important political, economic and cultural ramifications (Hargreaves, 2000). Therefore, 
perhaps, as. Mechicof (2000) has stated, Olympism is yet another example of 'social 
Darwinism'. In that sense, those individuals and social institutions that adapt to changing 
environments have a much better chance of surviving than those who insist on 
maintaining the status quo and resist change (Mechicof, 2000). 
2.2.4. THE OLYMPIC GAMES TODAY AND THE STUDY OF SOCOG 
In its current status the Olympic Games come in two forms: Summer and Winter 
Olympics. Each runs every four years, and since 1994 the Winter Games alternate with 
the Summer Games in a two-year cycle. In the last couple of decades, both forms of 
Olympic Games have experienced exceptional growth. This is evident not only from the 
steadily increasing number of sports in the Olympic programme, but also of the numbers 
of participating nations and athletes (see Appendix 1). As a result, the Olympics have 
been transformed into a massive sporting event, which, besides the large numbers of 
spectators they attract, in the case of the Summer Games, are viewed by a global 
audience of 3.5 biflion (De Moragas, 1996). 
However, if one considers the negative implications associated with the Olympics 
mentioned earlier, it is sensible to wonder how the magnitude and significance of the 
event has been enhanced rather than diminished through the years. Probably, as 
MacAloon (1995) believes, the Olympics have a positive, reconcilable effect on its 
international audience. He has stated, for instance, that " the Olympic Games create a 
sort of hyperstructure in which categories and stereotypes are condensed, exaggerated, 
and dramatised, rescuedfrom the 'taken for granted' and made the objects of explicit 
and lively awareness for a briefperiod everyfour years " (p. 182). It is true that most 
sports spectators are more interested in the athletes and their performances than in 
Olympism and its ramifications as a social movement. Moreover, as Guttmann (1992) 
has claimed, the history of the Olympic Movement remains concealed from its enormous 
audience; which does not just overcome its history but it has also demonstrated a 
prodigious ability to forget it (Guttmann, 1992). For example, a study conducted by the 
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IOC in 10 countries around the world after the Salt Lake bribery scandal, concerning 
people*s changes of perceptions about the image of the Olympic Movement and the 
Games, revealed that the Olympics are still considered peaceful, multi-cultural, and 
global and not exploitative or political (Sponsorship Research International/lOC, 1999). 
Lenskyj (2000) believes that the IOC, along with local Olympic Organisers and public 
relations experts, have largely succeeded in maintaining the illusion that, while 
international tensions may manifest themselves in boycotts or malpractices, the sport 
world is unequivocally supportive of the Olympic venture. 
Therefore, despite the widespread criticisms around the institution of the Olympic 
Games, which mainly challenge the connection between the ideas of Olympism and the 
contemporary nature of the event, the Games continuously grow in magnitude and 
significance. In effect, the contemporary Olympics sustain the status of a mega-event, 
which has multiple impacts on the host area, both positive and negative, and 
consequently involves diverse interests. As was shown earlier, economic benefits are the 
prime motive for all the interests involved in the hosting of the Games, whether it is the 
local Government, which seeks urban development of the region through infrastructure 
made for the staging of the event, or the corporation that becomes a sponsor of the event 
to attract publicity. 
The discussion in this chapter, therefore, stresses a main issue, which has important 
implications for the study of SOCOG. That is, SOCOG should be realised as an 
organisation which, by undertaking the task of organising an event with multiple 
ramifications, effectively served external interests. Specifically, an examination of 
SOCOG should take into account the role of the Olympic Movement and especially the 
IOC which, in order to secure the best possible presentation of the event, directly affects 
the organisation of the Olympic Games, and consequently the OCOG. The practices and 
reputation of the IOC 'during SOCOG's term of office, affected certain aspects of the 
organisation, including its organisational structure, its relations with other organisations, 
and predominately its fimancing. For instance, the IOC's encouragement for more public 
involvement in the organisation of the Sydney Games resulted in the appointment of a 
NSW Cabinet Minister to the leadership of SOCOG. Furthermore, the bribery scandal in 
the evaluation of 2002 Winter Olympics candidature triggered bad publicity for the 
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practices of the Olympic Movement, and as a result, potential sponsors for the Sydney 
Olympics were discouraged from associating themselves with the Games, thus creating 
gaps in SOCOG's budgetary provisions (Associated Press, 1999). 
In the case of the Sydney Olympics attention should also be placed on the role of public 
governance and particularly the New South Wales (NSW) government. As was shown in 
the previous chapter, the NSW government established state agencies to undertake some 
important responsibilities of the Games' preparations, and also possessed ultimate 
authority over SOCOG's leadership. The NSW government aimed to draw maximal 
benefits from the Games, as much with regard to local physical development as with 
regard to local economic growth. Consequently, the organisational aspect of the Games, 
ibility undertaken by SOCOG, was under the strict supervision of the NSW a responsi 
government. In effect, SOCOG was not only operating in co-ordination with state 
agencies but, as will be shown in later chapters, the NSW governrnent imposed 
leadership changes on the organisation and gradual shift of some of its responsibilities to 
govenunental agencies. 
Therefore, although SOCOG may appear as an independent organisational entity, in 
reality it operated in the centre of a complex organisational model, and inevitably had to 
deal with the needs of the various constituent groups. The preparations for the Sydney 
Olympics lasted seven years and during this period SOCOG needed to elucidate its 
relations with the various entities of the Olympic Movement, such as the IOC, the NOCs 
and the IFs, and simultaneously to deal with other groups whose interests are attracted by 
the event, such as public authorities, commercial organisations, spectators and various 
public groups. In effect, SOCOG faced the difficulty of bringing together often- 
conflicting interests, which stemmed from the dual nature of the Olympic Games, that is, 
as product of the Olympic Movement but also as a mega-sporting event. Therefore, by 
unfolding SOCOG's peculiar organisational character, which by nature acted as target of 
pressures coming from all the entities involved in the preparation and staging of the 
Sydney Games, the reader could ultimately acquire a deep understanding of the 
organisational nature of the contemporary Olympic Games. 
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The aim of this chapter is to provide a critical review of the organisation theory literature. 
In doing so, it ultimately aims to stress the premises of contemporary organisational 
research, and provide a justification for the selection of Mintzberg's (1979) configuration 
approach as the conceptual framework for this study. According to Pugh (1997), 
organisation theory is "the body of thinking and writing which addresses itself to the 
problem of how to organise " (p. xii). This body of literature has emerged in the form of 
various schools of thought, which have provided certain conceptual lenses for analysing 
organisations, thus attempting to identify the best way to manage organisations. As 
McKinley et al (1999) maintain, a school of organisational thought is "an integrated 
theoretical framework that provides a distinct viewpoint on organisations and that is 
associated with an active stream ofempirical research " (p. 635). As such, the schools of 
organisational thought provide the basic intellectual structure within which ongoing 
theoretical and empirical work takes place. Thus, by understanding and critically 
evaluating the development of this intellectual structure, this chapter will ultimately 
provide insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the available frameworks for the 
study of organisations, and particularly for the study of SOCOG. 
3.1. THE ORGANISATION THEORY LITERATURE 
The study of organisations is not a recent phenomenon. In the early years of the 20 1h 
century, the rise of industrial corporations coupled with an increased impact of social 
science thinking on our society led to a continual stream of organisational writing (Pugh, 
1990; Clegg and Hardy, 1999). The study of organisations draws largely from disciplines 
such as sociology, psychology, biology and economics. Therefore, the development of 
schools of thought within organisation theory is subject to the wider development 
processes of those disciplines (Reed, 1999), and consequently, the field is often seen to 
be composed of multiple and largely incommensurable theoretical frameworks 
(McKinley et al, 1999). However, as Shenhav and Weitz (2000) have claimed, the 
dominant intellectual thread and the main force behind the development of organisation 
theory has been the elimination of organisational uncertainty, in the sense that the various 
42 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG CHAPTER III 
approaches to organisation studies share the underlying assumption that "organisations 
exist in a world teeming with uncertainty which poses a real and actual threat to the 
business enterprise " (Shenhav and Weitz, 2000, p. 376). 
Given that organisation theory is a multiple, overgrown yet still developing field (Kilduff 
and Kelemen, 2001), it was felt that a review of the relevant literature should be 
organised in as comprehensive and distinct set of categories as possible. Carper and 
Snizek (1980), for example, have categorised the organisation theory literature as either 
primarily theoretical, that is deriving from 'typologies", or empirical, that is deriving 
from 'taxonomies', in its methodologies, analyses and conclusions. Moreover, Astley 
and Van de Ven (1983) have identified and classified a number of schools, including 
'classical theory', 'population ecology' and 'contingency theory', in terms of their degree 
of environmental determinism and the level of analysis to which they refer. Other writers 
stress the appropriateness 
* 
of certain metaphors in organisation theory to reflect the ways 
that the various perspectives perceive organisations. MacKechnie and Donnelly-Cox 
(1996), for example, have identified 'rare skill' and 'anthropological' metaphors in the 
organisation theory approaches, while Morgan (1997), going even further, provides a 
series of metaphors, such as 'machine', 'organism', 'brain' and so on, to reflect how the 
various organisation theory authors have conceptualised organisations. While Carper and 
Snizek's (1980) and Astley and Van de Ven's (1983) approaches are certainly dated, a 
metaphor perspective could be helpful for this review. However, although Grant and 
Oswick (1996) suggest that metaphor is an inevitable feature of our lives, and hence our 
study of organisations, the ability of a metaphor perspective to increase our knowledge 
and understanding of organisational phenomena has been criticised (e. g. Tsoukas, 1993). 
Also, a wider metaphor categorisation, such as this suggested by MacKechnie and 
Donelly-Cox (1996), would tend to position many schools of thought under a single 
label, thus failing to identify minor differences among them, while a detailed metaphor 
categorisation, such as that suggested by Morgan (1997), would tend to overcrowd some 
categories, while leaving some others relatively empty, thus risking an overemphasis on 
some schools of thought at the expense of others. 
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Here, we will follow Reed's (1999) theorising, who has categorised schools of 
organisational thought in relation to the central problematic around which they were 
developed, coupled with the socio-historical context in which they were articulated. 
While a discussion of the latter is beyond the scope of this chapter, it was felt that by 
using these two criteria, our review of the organisation theory literature could benefit in 
two main ways. Firstly, by using major issues of organisational concern as points of 
reference, commonalities among schools of thought can be marked, simultaneously 
enabling the identification of the shifts of concern between subsequent groups of schools 
of thought. Secondly, by referring to the socio-historical context in which schools of 
thought were developed, a chronological order is sustained, thus facilitating our 
understanding of the development of organisational theorising throughout the years. 
Drawing largely from Reed's (1999) theorising, the following sections provide a critical 
review of the organisation theory literature, grouped under four categories. These are 
presented under the labels 'focus on order: from nightwatchman state to industrial state', 
'focus on integration: from entrepreneurial capitalism to welfare capitalism', 'focus on 
market liberty: from managerial capitalism to neo-liberal capitalism', and 'focus on 
power and justice: from modernity to po st-modernity'. 
3.1.1 FOCUS ON ORDER: FROM NIGHTWATCHMAN STATE TO INDUSTRIAL 
STATE 
In the course of the formative decades of the twentieth century, the economic, social and 
political changes that capitalist-led modernisation brought in its wake created a world that 
was fundamentally different from the relatively small-scale and simple forms of 
production and administration which dominated earlier phases of capitalist development. 
Effectively, western societies transformed into developing industrial societies, as the role 
of the industrial-based economy became dominant. As a result, the early twentieth 
century witnessed the growing dominance of large-scale organisational units in 
economic, social and political life, as the complexity and intensity of collective activity 
moved beyond the administrative capacity of more personal and direct forms of co- 
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ordination (Reed, 1999). The rise of the industrial state essentially symbolised a new 
mode of governance in which rational, scientific organisation transformed human nature. 
The needs of a rapidly developing industrial society generated a stream of literature that 
was concerned with corporate management (Clegg and Hardy, 1999). This body of 
literature, which is often referred to as 'classical organisation theory', was primarily 
influenced by the work of Max Weber and his analysis of bureaucracy ("The Theory of 
Social and Economic Organisation", 1924). As a social theorist, Weber observed the 
relationship between the mechanisation of industry and the rise of bureaucratic forms of 
organisations, being especially interested in the social consequences of bureaucracy 
(Weber, 1947). His work has been popular for the identification of ideal types of 
societies and organisations as 'patrimonial', 'feudal' or 'bureaucratic'. Weber (1947) has 
claimed that effective societies, hence organisations, should be characterised by rational 
and legal forms of domination and make use of bureaucratic administrative apparatuses 
(Weber, 1947). In his work, one can find the first comprehensive defirtition of 
bureaucracy as "a form of organisation that emphasises precision, speed, clarity, 
regularity, reliability, and efficiency achieved through the creation of afixed division of 
tasks, hierarchical supervision, and detailed rules and regulations " (Weber, 1947, p. 8). 
The concept of bureaucracy dominated organisation studies mainly through the 
contribution of the works of Frederick Taylor (1947) and Henry Fayot (1949). These 
management theorists provided the basis for the 'scientific management' and 'classical 
management theory' respectively. They were both advocates of bureaucratic forms of 
organisations and they identified detailed principles and functions through which a 
formal organisation could be achieved (Morgan, 1997). Taylor's (1947) concern with 
scientific management focused on the systematic design and management of individual 
jobs, through, for example, task specialisation and functional supervision, incentive wage 
systems and so on, thus recommending the permanent monopolisation of organisational 
knowledge through the rationafisation of work performance and job design (Reed, 1999). 
Fayolls (1949) principles of organisation, although focused on the design of the 
organisation as a whole with a perceptive awareness of the need for contextual adaptation 
and compromise, were driven by the need to construct an architecture of co-ordination 
and control to contain the inevitable disruption and conflict caused by 'informal' 
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behaviour (Pfeffer, 1997). As such, the concepts of 'division of work' and 'unity of 
command' remain the central focus. 
This stream of literature advocated the orderly nature of organisations captured in the 
idea that management should be a process that involves detailed planning, command, co- 
ordination and control. As Slack (1993) has suggested, the organisation was 
conceptualised as "a series of interrelated parts, each of which performs a narrow set of 
activities in a rigid, repetitive, and impersonal manner in order to achieve a particular 
end" (p. 190). Under the rubric of classical organisational thinking, the organisation is 
seen as a rationally constructed artifice, where human beings become raw material 
transformed by modern organisational technologies into well-ordered and highly 
productive members. Reed (1999) has maintained that this approach prescribed a 
blueprint for an authority structure where individuals and groups were required to follow 
certain laws, and it also provided a universal characteris ation of the organisational reality 
irrespective of time, place and situation. As such, classical organisation theory was 
founded on the underlying belief that organisation provides a principle of structural 
design and a practice of operational control, which can be rationally determined and 
formalised in advance of actual performance (Reed, 1999, p. 30). Effectively, 
organisational analysis was based on the concept of 'bounded rationality' (Perrow, 1986), 
which reduces the often interpretive work done by organisational actors to a purely 
cognitive process, dominated by standardised rules and operating programmes. Thus, a 
cognitive research agenda was established rendering the organisation knowable (Perrow, 
1986). 
The ideas derived from the classical school have been heavily criticised for their lack of 
concern for individual needs and ideologies (e. g. Morgan, 1997; Frisby, 1995; Reed, 
1999; Pfeffer, 1997), that is, the human aspect in organisations. Although the classical 
theorists recognised that it is important to achieve harmony between the human and 
technical aspects in organisations, their main focus was to make humans fit the 
requirements of what they often refer to as 'mechanical' organisation (Morgan, 1997). 
This bureaucratic approach had the potential to routinise and mechanise almost every 
aspect of human life, eroding the human spirit and capacity for spontaneous action (Reed, 
1999). Such ideas, however, which aimed to promote a rational and routinised way of 
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managing an organisation with a particular focus on efficiency, proved incredibly 
successful for managing organisations in the early post-war period (Pugh, 1997). Also, 
the premises of the classical school of thought lifted the theory and practice of 
organisational management from an intuitive craft into a codified and analysable body of 
knowledge that "traded on the immensely powerful cultural capital and symbolism of 
'science "' (Reed, 1999, p. 30). Moreover, the theorising of the classical school has been 
useful in setting future organisational research, since organisational elements underlined 
by the classical school, such as the specialisation of work tasks and the concentration of 
decision making, have been the focus of many subsequent studies (e. g. Durkheim, 1964, 
Pugh et al, 1968,1976). Elements of the classical approach have proved successful even 
in the management of contemporary organisations, such as that of McDonalds restaurants 
(Daft, 1997) and public schools (Meier et al, 2000). As Du Gay (2000) maintained very 
recently, the benefit of a bureaucratic organisational form is that it removes an 
organisation's dependency on the personal moral propensities of its staff. He goes on to 
argue that thanks to bureaucracy it is assured that everything from the delivery of the 
mail to legal decisions, will be carried out impersonally, without regard for personal 
characteristics, such as religious and political beliefs of economic status, since 
bureaucratic office holders will display an antipathy towards those relations that open up 
the possibility of corruption through, for example, the improper exercise of personal 
patronage, indulging incompetence or betraying confidences (Du Gay, 2000, pp. 56-57). 
However, the failure of formal organisational design theorising to address the problem of 
social integration and its ignorance of the impact of the external environment on 
organisations in a continuously unstable and uncertain world, has formed the basis for 
alternative organisational theorising and research. Particularly the 'human relations 
school', the 'systems theory' and the 'contingency theory' have placed considerable 
attention on these missing elements of the classical organisation theory. These schools of 
thought are presented below under the label of 'integration' to denote their common 
concern for integrating the missing concepts of the classical school of organisational 
thought in their theorising. 
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3.1.2 FOCUS ON INTEGRATION: FROM ENTREPRENEURIAL CAPITALISM TO 
WELFARE CAPITALISM 
HUMAN RELATIONS SCHOOL 
The failure of the rationalistic model, as suggested by the classical school, to deal with 
the dynamism and instability of organisations and its inability to address the problem of 
social integration (Williamson, 1990), gave rise to a new stream of organisational 
theorising commonly known as the 'human relations school'. The whole thrust of the 
human relations perspective is "a view of social isolation and conflict as a symptom of 
social pathology and disease " (Reed, 1999, p. 3 1). It attempted to improve on classical 
theory by focusing on uncertainties generated by the work group and workers' social 
needs (Shenhav and Weitz 2000). Under this perspective, the organisation is seen as a 
social system, which ought to facilitate the integration of individuals into the wider 
society in order for the organisation to adapt to changing socio-technical conditions 
(Reed, 1999). As Thompson and McHugh (1990) have informed us, this conception of 
organisations as the intermediate social units which integrate individuals into modem 
industrial civilisation under the auspices of a kind and socially skilled management, 
became institutionafised in such a way that it began to replace the predominant position 
held by exponents of the classical school. 
Therefore, the main focus of the theorists that fbHowed the human relations school of 
thought has been the human element in organisations. Elton Mayo (1949), the founding 
father of the human relations movement, employed a social approach to organisational 
theory with a primary concern with employees. His research at the Hawthorne Plant of 
the Western Electric Company in Chicago in the 1920s and the 1930s, also known as 
'Hawthorne Studies', became famous for stressing the importance of social needs and of 
group norms in the work place (Morgan, 1997). Mayo (1949) drew particular attention to 
employees' motivations for work, and that turned the focus of organisation theorists to 
the needs of the workforce. 
Inspired by the Maslow's (1943) hierarchy of human needs, which presented the human 
beings as a kind of psychological organism struggling to satisfy its needs in a quest for 
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full growth and development (Morgan, 1997), organisational psychologists (e. g. 
Herzberg, 1966; McGregor, 1960) entered the arena of organisational theory providing 
alternative forms of organisational management. The idea of giving employees more 
autonomy and more responsibilities combined with a democratic, employees-foc used 
style of leadership emerged as an alternative way to manage organisations compared to 
the authoritarian and dehumanising style of the classical school approach. It was agreed 
that a focus on the needs of employees will result in more motivated and committed 
workforce, in other words a feeling of job satisfaction that in turn will lead to increased 
productivity, improved work quality, and reduced employee absenteeism and staff 
turnover (Herzberg, 1966). 
Although the human relations school gave another dimension to the study of 
organisations, away from the rigid and authoritarian ideas of the classical school, it is not 
without limitations. First, it fails to recognise or at best marginalises the existence of an 
external environment to organisations (Williamson, 1990), and second, it ignores the 
political aspect of the organisation that is. monitored by different interests, conflicts and 
relations of power (Morgan, 1997). It was rather seen as management-oriented, and its 
focus on the employees' needs as a way to increase employees' involvement and 
commitment to the organisation without paying them any more money (Pugh, 1997). 
The objectives of this managerial approach, therefore, remain to be productivity and 
efficiency, the main objectives of the classic school, yet with a more humanistic profile. 
SYSTEMS THEORY 
The acknowledgement of organisations as social systems by the human relation school 
can be seen as the starting point of systems theory. Systems theory, also known as 'open 
systems theory', draws on the idea that an organisation is a systemic entity of a wider 
socio-technical system, that is, its organisational environment. Systems theory maintains 
that all organisations, regardless of the sector, are situated in an environment which 
comprises other organisations, such as suppliers, customers, competitors, and even 
powerful individuals (Williamson, 1990). As a result, the acceptance of an organisational 
environment turned the interest of organisational theorists to the relationship between 
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organisations and their environments. The work of Parson (1956) and Katz and Kahn 
(1966), are the most representative. Both theorists have regarded organisations as 
'organisms'. (Morgan, 1997), in the sense that organisations are open to their environment 
in order to survive, and consequently they need to show an awareness of the needs of this 
environment. 
Parson's (1956) views represent an early but limited form of open systems theory, in that 
it attempts to tie the organisation to the environment through the activities that the former 
performs for the latter (Carper and Snizek, 1980). He proposed four different types of 
organisations according to the primary goals that each serves for the society (i. e. oriented 
to economic goals, oriented to political goals, integrative, and pattern-maintenance) 
(Parson, 1956). Despite the obvious limitation of Parson's approach, namely the 
argument that organisations exist to serve the larger society and do not have goals of their 
own, his work developed the notion that organisations should be studied as part of their 
sociological 'ecosystem'. Following Parsons' (1956) functional typology Katz and Kahn 
(1966) saw the organisation as a set of interacting subsystems, that is, 'managerial', 
'strategic', 'technological', 'human-cultural', and 'structural'. According to the type of 
interaction of these subsystems with the environment, they identified four 4genotypical 
classes' of organisations, namely 'product ive/econo mic', 'maintenance', 'adaptive' and 
'politicaVmanagerial' (Katz and Kahn, 1966). 
The open systems approach is not without weaknesses. By focusing on organisational 
needs as a determinant of its relationship with its environment, it ignores the significant 
role of the people within the organisation, since it essentially claims that an organisation 
will be functionally effective if it achieves explicit goals, which are formally defined 
through rational decision-making. However, different power holding groups in 
organisations often perceive the organisational environment in various ways and it is their 
choice how to act toward it. One manager, for example, could see a rapid technological 
evolution in the industry as giving opportunities for long-term investment and potential 
growth of market share, while another manager could perceive this environmental change 
as the best timing for the organisation to diversify its operations to other markets or 
industries. However, the open systems theory contributed in the field of organisational 
studies by moving away from bureaucratic means of thinking, which prevailed in 
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organisation theory until then, toward a way that meets the requirements of the 
environment. According to Morgan (1997), these insights were marshalled under the 
perspective known as 'contingency theory', which was to dominate the theoretical 
development and empirical research within the field between the 1950s and 1970s. 
CONTINGENCY THEORY 
As Checkland (1994) has suggested, systems theory provided considerable conceptual 
inspiration for the subsequent development of contingency theory, often referred to as 
'socio-technical systems theory' (Reed, 1999), or 'structural contingency theory' 
(Donaldson, 1999). Contingency theory constitutes a structural- funct io na list 
interpretation of the systems Approach, as it provides an 'internalist' focus on 
organisational design elements combined with an 'externalist' concern with 
environmental uncertainty. The key research issue which emerges from this synthesis of 
structural and environmental concerns is to establish those combinations of internal 
designs and external conditions which will facilitate long-term organisational stability 
and growth (Donaldson, 1999). Therefore, under the theorising of contingency theory, 
organisations are considered open systems, which need to achieve a balance between 
their internal needs and the environmental circumstances. The advocates of contingency 
theory, although using different determinants of organisational design and environment, 
commonly agree that there is no one-way of managing organisations, but rather that the 
appropriate organisational. form would depend on the kind of task or environment with 
which an organisation is dealing, and thus, management should be concerned with 
alignments and 'good fits' (Miles and Snow, 1984; Thompson, 1967; Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967; Pugh and Hickson, 1976; Woodward, 1965). 
Bums and Stalker (1961) were the first rese , 
archers to empirically examine the 
relationships between the organisation and its environment. By giving extensive 
illustrations from qualitative case studies, they developed the patterns of adaptation to 
technological and commercial changes exhibited by 20 firms in the UK. They devised a 
scale of organisational responses whose polar extremes were defmed as 'organic' (e. g. a 
small mill) and 'mechanistic' (e. g. an electronics firm) organisational structures (Bums 
51 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG CHAPTERIH 
and Stalker, 1961). Their work highlighted the limitations of formal bureaucratic 
organisational forms, which, they have claimed, are only appropriate to stable 
environmental conditions. They went on to argue that changing environmental 
conditions require organic systems of management, that is, flexible authority, task 
allocation and communication, as opposed to the rigid procedures of bureaucracy (Burns, 
1963). Bums and Stalker's approach received support from other researchers who 
focused on the technological changes of the organisational environment (e. g. Woodward, 
1965, Perrow, 1967, Thompson, 1967). Woodward, for example, (1965) after studying 
British industries, provided a typology in which work organisations were classified 
according to the kind of production technology they used, 'that is, 'unit/batch process', 
"large batch/mass production' and 'continuous process'. Woodward (1965) and his 
advocates considered that the nature of technological variables could present important 
implications for the design of effective organisational structures. Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967) continued the exploration of the relationship between an organisation's structure 
and the environment that it faces. They examined high and low performance 
organisations in different industries and they analysed the degree of structural 
differentiation necessary for a firm to function effectively in a particular technological 
environment (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). 
Contingency theory has been utilised as an empirical tool to establish relationships 
between 'contextual variables', such as organisational size, age, technology and 
environment and structural features of organisations, such as levels of decentralisation of 
decision-making, job specialisation and formalisation of tasks. Based on such variables 
Pugh, Hickson, Hinings and Turner (1969a, 1969b, 1968), commonly known as the 
Aston Group, produced one of the most influential studies, which also developed the first 
taxonomy of organisational structures. Their analysis was based on a study of 52 
organisations of 250 or more employees, in the Birmingham area. Highly influenced by 
the Weberian literature on organisations, they constructed 64 component variables, which 
reflected the bureaucratic characteristics of organisations, in order to operationalise five 
primary variables of structure, namely 'specialisation of functions', Istandardisation of 
procedures', 'formalisation of documentation', 'centralisation of authority', and 
4configuration of positions' (Pugh et al, 1969b). These variables reflected a large part of 
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the concepts used in the literature of organisational structure at that time, and provided 
the basis for much future research in organisational structure (e. g. Drazin and Van de 
Ven, 1985, Alexander and Randolph, 1985; Donaldson, 1987; Palmer et al, 1987). 
Moreover, based on three dimensions of organisational design, that is, 'structuring of 
activities', 'concentration of authority' and 'line control of workflow, they developed 
clusters of organisations, thus establishing a seven-fold taxonomy of organisational 
structures. Their purpose was to produce homogenous groups of organisations that will 
represent alternative forms of the 'Weberian' bureaucracy. These were identified as 'full 
bureaucracy', 'nascent full bureaucracy', 'workflow bureaucracy', 'nascent workflow 
bureaucracy', 'pre-workflow bureaucracy', 'personnel bureaucracy', and 'implicitly 
structured organisations' (Pugh et al, 1969b). The overall conclusion of their research 
was that "a single bureaucratic type of organisations is no longer useful, since 
bureaucracy takes differentforms in different settings" (Pugh et al, 1969b, p. 115). 
Despite obvious methodological limitations of their study, that is, a small population of 
organisations was defined geographically, no voluntary organisations; were included, and 
only relatively large firms were considered relevant to the research (Carper and Snizek, 
1980), the work of the Aston Group provided the first empirical framework for 
examining organisations based on structural design parameters and contextual variables. 
Contingency theory, however, has been criticised for its determinism in that contingency 
causes structure. Under the rubric of contingency theory, the organisation bows to the 
imperative of adopting a new structure that fits its new level of the contingency factors in 
order to avoid loss of performance from misfit (Donaldson, 1999). Some authors reject 
such situational determinism asserting instead that organisational managers have a free 
choice (Whittington, 1989) and some speak of free will (e. g. Bourgeois, 1984). Child 
(1972) argues more elaborately that the contingencies have some influence but that there 
is a substantial degree of choice, which he terms 'strategic choice'. Child (1972) 
explained the connection of environment and structure to effectiveness as the result of 
decisions taken by 'dominant coalitions' in organisations, that is, "the strategic decisions 
of those who have the power of structural initiation " (Child, 1972 p. 16). He went on to 
claim that an analysis of decision-making could offer a more useful way to understand 
relationships among organisational parameters than the contingency theorists, who 
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focused on the establishment of structural forms ignoring the essential political process 
"whereby power-holders within organisations decide upon courses ofstrategic action" 
(Child, 1972, p. I). 
Child's (1972) theorising gave rise to a body of literature, often referred to as 'strategic 
contingency theory. This literature is concerned with the missing value of contingency 
theory, that is organisational strategy, and examined its relationship with organisational 
structure. Much of this work was influenced by the work of Chandler (1962). Chandler 
(1962), saw strategy not only as goals and objectives, but also as the means by which 
they are to be achieved. His work focused on the strategy-structure relationship. He 
looked at strategic changes that had occurred in American corporations over a period of 
50 years, and how these changes affected organisational structure. His main conclusion 
was that a new organisational strategy, such as diversification, required a new structure if 
the company was to operate efficiently. This meant that strategy could influence 
structure in organisations, and replications of his work (e. g. Channon, 1973) confirmed 
his general findings. Moreover, Mintzherg's (1973) theoretical work identified three 
modes of strategy formulation, namely 'planning', 'entrepreneurial' and 'adaptive'. He 
has claimed that organisational conditions such as size, leadership,. and the degree of 
competition and stability within the envirownent favour one mode of strategy 
formulation over another. Following the same line of argument, Miles and Snow's 
(1978) work on the relationship between strategy and structure derived a strategic 
taxonomy of organisations. Specifically, they identified 'defenders', 'prospectors', 
4 analysers, and 'reactors' organisations. Like Mintzberg (1973), they have claimed that 
certain organisational conditions, such as the level of competition, favoured one strategic 
type over another. 
Much of the literature on the strategy-structure relationship has followed Chandler's 
(1962) view that structure follows strategy. A number of writers, however, have 
suggested that structure, under certain conditions, can determine strategy (e. g. Scott, 
1973), or that they both evolve simultaneously (e. g. Fredreckson, 1986). With a more 
elaborate argument, Mintzberg (1990) has claimed that the relationship is a co-ordinated 
one. He has stated that "the structure follows strategy as the leftfootfollows the right in 
walking. In effect, strategy and structure both support the organisation. None takes 
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precedence: each always precedes the other andfollows it" (M intzberg, 1990 p. 183). 
Strategic contingency theory provided alternative thinking for contingency theorists; 
however, itý over-reliance on strategy as determinant of structure has rendered it 
deterministic as well (Williamson, 1990). In an attempt to overcome the limitations of 
contingency theory, but largely drawing from its theorising and firidings, a small body of 
literature emerged under the appellation of 'configuration approach'. 
CONFIGURATION APPROACH 
Most of the approaches that have been reviewed within the perspective of contingency 
theory have attempted to classify organisations. Bums and Stalker (1961), for example, 
identified 'organic' and 'mechanistic' forms of organisation, Woodward (1965) classified 
organisations as 'small batch', 'large batch' or 'continuous process' according to the type 
of technology utilised, and the Aston Group (Pugh et al, 1968,1969a, 1969b) constructed 
seven different types of organisational bureaucracies with regard to a series of structural 
and contextual organisational variables. As Carper and Snizek (1980), have claimed, the 
field of organisational theory has a research tradition rife with conceptual attempts at 
classifying organisations, and Meyer et al (1993) inform us that this has been at the root 
of organisation theory since Weber's (1947) notions of 'charisma', 'traditionalism' and 
'bureaucracy'. The contribution of such attempts is that by classifying organisations into 
homogeneous groups one can be helped to identify commonalties as well as differences 
across organisations. Besides, solid findings about a narrow population are more 
beneficial to the field than marginal findings generalised to the broader population 
(McKelvey, 1978). 
The term 'organisational configuration' is used to denote any multidimensional 
constellation of distinct organisational characteristics that commonly occur together 
(Meyer et al, 1993). As such, organisational configurations are clusters of organisations 
that share a common profile along important characteristics such as strategy, structure 
technologies, processes, and so on. Miller (1987) has claimed that there are four 
imperatives behind the generation of organisational configurations, namely environment, 
structure, leadership and strategy. Although some writers have used dimensions from 
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more that one of the aforementioned imperatives to derive configurations, such as 
Mintzberg (1979) who used structure and environment, it is mostly common that a single 
dominant imperative will underlie and organise a configuration (e. g. Miles and Snow, 
1984, Duberly and Bums, 1993; Gastrogiovani and Justis, 1998). Much of the work on 
organisational configurations has been focused on identifying structural commonalities 
among organisations. It has been argued that the structure of an organisation influences, 
among others, the flow of information and the human interactions within the organisation 
(Meyer et al, 1993). Moreover, Miller (1987) argues that structure is channelling 
collaboration, specifýýg modes of co-ordination, allocating power and responsibility, 
and prescribing levels of formality and complexity. In simpler terms, Mintzbcrg (1979) 
sees organisational structure as "the sum total of the ways in which [an organisation] 
divides its labour into distinct tasks and then achieves co-ordination among them " (p. 2). 
The configuration approach could be seen as an evolution of the contingency theory but 
not as alike. According to Meyer et al (1993), contingency theory has been preoccupied 
with abstracting a limited set of structural concepts, such as, centralis4tion, specialisation, 
standardisation and so on, and measuring their relationships with a limited set of 
abstracted situational concepts such as size and technology. The 'configuration approach, 
on the other hand, claims a holistic synthesis of organisations, which means that certain 
situations or elements of organisations are explained as parts of the organisation as a 
whole and not in isolation. Moreover, non-linearity is acknowledged, and therefore 
variables that are found to be causally related to one configuration may be unrelated or 
even inversely related to another. In effect, that means that there is more that one way for 
organisational success, a notion that is referred to as 'equifinality' to imply that multiple 
organisational forms can be equally effective (Meyer et al, 1993). 
The organisation theory literature indicates a debate between the classifications of 
organisations that are originated in the concepts and intuitions of theorists, commonly 
known as 'typologies', and those that have been derived as empirical evidence and have 
relied to advanced statistical analyses or multivariate techniques, that is 'taxonomies. 
Although writers such as Carper and Snizek (1980) have made a clear separation between 
empirically-based and theoretically-based classifications of organisations, we will be in 
line with McKelvey (1978) and Meyer et at (1993) who view typologies and taxonomies 
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as equally valuable. Their central argument is that although taxonomies are empirically 
examined, they are theoretically grounded, and typologies are using multiple attributes 
that are empirically grounded. Among the limited work done on organisationat 
configurations, Mintzberg's (1973) configuration approach constitutes one of the most 
significant and influential. Although a typology by nature, it has been very influential in 
the field of organisation theory because as Meyer et at (1993) have stated "itgoes beyond 
a two-fold distinction yet remains the essential elegance and simplicity that is the 
hallmark of typologies" (p. 1182). However, Mintzberg (1979) has been criticised for 
failing to incorporate the issues of culture and strategy in his otherwise comprehensive 
approach (Doty et at, 1993). 
With determinism as the main problem of organisational theory and research alternative 
views of organisations, emerged in the 1980's. Before we consider these perspectives, 
however, we need to review of market-based theories of organisation. 
3.1.3 FOCUS ON MARKET LIBERTY: FROM MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM To NEO- 
LIBERAL CAPITALISM 
The realisation of a liberal global economic market in the 1970s and 1980s initiated a 
focus on the impact of this new order in organisations. The basis of theorising is that 
through globalisation nations and organisations engage in an expanding economic 
struggle which will be won by those organisations and economies that will manage to 
adapt themselves to market demands (Du Gay, 1994). Under this concept, new theories 
of organisations emerged drawing primarily from the disciplines of economics, social 
sciences, and even biology. These approaches, which are often referred to as 'market- 
based theories', treat an organisation as constituting a unitary social and moral order in 
which individual and group interests and values are simply derived from highly 
influential market interests and values that are irrelevant to conflict and power struggles 
(Perrow, 1986). As Reed (1999) has argued, this concept of organisations is entirely in 
keeping with a wider ideological and political context dominated by neo-liberal theories 
of organisational and societal governance, which raise impersonal market forces to the 
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analytical status of ontological universals, determining the chances of individual and 
collective survival (P. 34). 
From the field of economics this theorising has taken the form of two main perspectives, 
namely 'transaction cost analysis' and 'agency theory'. Transaction cost theory concerns 
itself with the adaptive adjustments which organisations need to make in the face of 
pressures with the aim of maximising efficiency in their internal and external transactions 
(Williamson, 1990). Its basic assertion is that markets and hierarchies are alternative 
instruments for completing a set of transactions. In particular, it suggests that market 
forms of governance rely on prices, competitions and contacts to keep all parties to an 
exchange informed of their rights and responsibilities. Hierarchical forms of governance, 
on the other hand, bring parties to an exchange under the direct control of a third party, 
typically called the 'boss' (Williamson, 1993). Effectively, the focus of the transaction 
cost theory is on the micro. economic impacts of such exchanges on organisations, since it 
supports the idea that organisations are increasingly sensitive to the institutional 
constraints within which economic transactions are conducted (Williamson, 1990). 
However, it understates the cost of organising and neglects the role of social relationships 
in economic transactions (Barney and Hesterly, 1999). Moreover, while acknowledging 
that the parties involved in such transactions may have conflicting interests, it does not 
attempt to understand the causes of such conflicts. 
Conversely, by attempting to understand the causes of disagreement or conflict among 
parties in such transactions, 'agency theory' has focused on the analysis of agency 
relationships including such issues as the role of the board of directors and top 
management, with an emphasis on the risk attitudes of 'principals' and 'agents'. 
According to Arrow (1985), agency relationships occur whenever one partner in a 
transaction, the 'principal', delegates authority to another, the "agent', and the welfare of 
the principal is affected by the choices of the agent (Arrow, 1985). A typical example is 
the relationship between outside investors in an organisation and its managers. In this 
case, the investors delegate management authority to managers who may or may not have 
equity ownership in the organisation. The delegation of decision-making authority from 
principal to agent is seen as problematic in that the interests of principal and agent will 
typically diverge, and the principal will not perfectly and costlessly monitor the actions of 
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the agent (Arrow, 1985). Therefore, agency theory suggests that the economic 
transactions between the market and the organisation involve agency problems which 
lead to costs, and by identifying the sources of such problems suggests the best ways to 
reduce the subsequent costs (Barney and Hesterly, 1999). Therefore, the economic 
theories of organisations attain the goal of profit maximisation through the elimination of 
transaction and agency cost, and assume that organisations that do not put concern on 
such costs will have little chance of survival. 
Although economic market-based theories of organisations, have brought the aspects of 
the new conditions of the economic market into the field, they have not attracted much 
attention from organisational theorists and researchers probably because such theories 
often involve rational economic research agendas in a primarily sociologically dominated 
field. The market-based theories that have attracted more attention are 'population 
ecology theory' and 'resource dependence theory', which are briefly presented below. 
POPULATION ECOLOGY THEORY 
Heavily influenced by the biological literature, the population ecology approach 
originated with the work of Hannan and Freeman (1977). The basic notion of this 
approach is that organisations are like living things, which survive if they are able to 
exploit their environments for resources (Ulrich, 1987). As Baum (1999) has suggested, 
the research agenda of the population ecology research begins with three observations: a) 
diversity is a property of aggregates of organisations, b) organisations often have 
difficulty devising and executing changes fast enough to meet the demands of uncertain, 
changing environments, and c) the community of organisations is rarely stable, since 
organisations arise and disappear continually (p. 71). Therefore, unlike other 
environmental approaches to organisations, the population ecology approach does not 
look at individual organisations but at populations of orga'nisations which exist in the 
same industry, geographical market, and so on. The basic idea is that the fittest 
organisations within specific populations will survive while the others will not. The 
number of organisations within a sector is considered predetermined, and thus under 
environmental pressures some organisations perish. By employing theories of 
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competition and fitness-set and by supporting the notion that certain organisational 
classes experience very strong inertial pressures, Hannan and Freeman (1977) have 
argued that. the organisational. environment is the critical factor in determining which 
organisations are fit and which are not, selecting the stronger and eliminating the weaker. 
The central lines of inquiry of ecological research have been the effect of organisational 
aging and size on failure (e. g. Freeman et al, 1983), the effect of the dynamics and 
density of organisational. populations on failure (e. g. Carroll et al, 1993; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1989) and the effect of institutional pressures on failure (e. g. Barnett and 
Carroll, 1993). 
RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 
The central notion of the resource-dependence approach is that organisations do not exist 
in isolation but they depend on their environments for resources. The starting point of 
this approach can be identified in Emerson's (1962) 'power-dependence theory' of social 
relations, which argues that there is a mutual power dependence or interdependence in 
any relitionship. Emerson (1962) believed that a symmetric dependence between two 
actors implies a balanced power relationship, and where the relationship is asymmetric, 
the actor that is less dependent will have considerable power over the other (Emerson, 
1962). 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and Pfeffer (1982) extended Emerson's (1962) theory to the 
examination of the organisation-environment relationship. They have claimed that 
resource-dependence is proportional to the extent to which the resource is important to 
the organisation's functioning, the relative magnitude of the resource exchange, and the 
extent to which it is not available from alternative sources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
They identified managerial attitudes which are used to reduce environmental uncertainty 
and caused by the organisation's resource dependence, namely 'symbolic', 'responsive' 
and 'discretionary'. Further, they stressed designing techniques of organisations 
according to the ways they depend on their environment, such as 'scanning systems", 
'loosening dependencies' and so on (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The idea here is that in 
order to control the uncertainties created by resource supplies, dependent organisations 
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attempt to 'enact' their environment in order to reduce this uncertainty. In practice, that 
would involve attempts to empower individuals to act on the organisation's behalf and to 
regulate the use, access and allocation of organisationally generated resources (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) have claimed that "survival comes when 
the organisation adjusts to and copes with its environment, not only when it makes 
efficient adjustments" (p. 19). This perspective, therefore, has also paid attention to 
decision-makers' concerns for maintaining organisational autonomy and power over 
other organisations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Unlike population ecology, it places 
considerable emphasis on the managerial action in the relationship between organisations 
and their environment and has stressed the potential for better understanding of this 
relationship. 
While there are significant theoretical differences between the aforementioned market- 
-based approaches, particularly in the degree of environmental determinism in which they 
engage, both subscribe to a set of assumptions that unify internal administrative forms 
and external market conditions by means of an evolutionary log. ic, which subordinates 
collective and individual action to efficiency and survival imperatives largely beyond 
human influence (Reed, 1999, p. 33). As Thompson and McHugh (1990) suggest, these 
approaches ignore the concepts of power, conflict and domination which are absent from 
frameworks of analytical vision and empirical concern, since they remain silent on the 
power structures and struggles in and through which organisations respond to 
environmental pressures. Such critics have generated a new focus of organisational 
theorists away from macro-level, deterministic perspectives and towards micro-level 
approaches in order to comprehend the hidden aspects of organisational reality. 
3.1.4 FOCUS ON POWER AND JUSTICE: FROM MODERNITY TO POST- 
MODERNITY 
Organisation theory in its early development focused on the structure and design of 
organisations, while later approaches, such as the contingency theory, recognised the role 
of the environment in shaping organisational structures and processes. Organisational 
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theorists, however, have paid little attention to individual needs, organisational ideologies 
and broader sociological issues, such as power and justice. In view of this deficiency, in 
the last fifteen years or so, the traditional approaches to organisation theory have been 
heavily criticised. Steffy and Grimes (1986) and Argyris et al (1985), for example, have 
criticised the traditional approaches for giving inadequate definitions of organisational 
concepts, focusing on controlling individual behaviour, assuming gender neutrality, and 
paying inadequate attention to the consequences of managerial action. Besides, as Frisby 
(1995) has pointed out, there was also a need for alternative perspectives in organisation 
theory in order to overcome problems that have arisen due to an over-reliance on 
traditional approaches. 
Moreover, new forms of organisation emerged, which were sufficiently different from the 
bureaucratic features of modem organisation to suggest the appellation of the 'post- 
modem' organisation. As Galbraith et al (1993) maintain, the post-modem organisation 
is primarily deccritralised, internal communication is achieved through modem 
information technology, and hierarchies are premised less on jobs and job requirements 
and more on competencies. In addition, on the outside, the boundaries that formerly 
constrained organisations are breaking down, as individual entities merge in chains, 
clusters, networks, and strategic alliances questioning the relevance of an internal 
organisational focus (Cooper and Burrell, 1988). The newly found fluidity in the external 
appearance of organisations rests on the assumption that the inter-organisational relations 
into which an organisation enters may be a more important source of capacity and 
capability than internal features, such as size and technology (Alvesson and Deetz, 1999). 
As a result, the conception of a contingent relation between organisational aspects, such 
as size, and its structural characteristics is challenged if, for instance, an organisation is 
multi-headed or networked. 
The changing organisational forms coupled with the general need for novel 
organisational theorising have brought the concerns of Marxist thinking to organisational 
studies that focus on conflict, power and resistance. That was seen as the early stage of a 
change in social and political thought, which was taking place under the rubric of 
'postmodemism, (Clegg, 1990). At the core of this theoretical project was 'class 
struggle' as the essential turning point on which social and econon-dc development 
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occurred. As such, individuals were visible only in so far as they were carriers of 
identities that their class position either ascribed or denied (Alvesson and Deetz, 1999, p. 
186). Essentially, post-modern thought has certain implications for organisational 
research since it challenges the position of the researcher and the status of the subject. As 
Clegg and Hardy (1999) have claimed, under the rubric of post-modernism, the research 
subject is acknowledged not as a stable constellation of essential characteristics, but as a 
socially constituted category of analysis. Consequently, the status of the researcher is 
challenged as well; "No longer all-knowing, all-seeing, objective, the researcher is 
forced to re-examine his or her relation to the research process and the knowledge it 
produces" (Clegg and Hardy, 1999, p. 2). 
Under post-modem theorising, a new stream of organisation studies emerged, which, 
although it stresses different organisational elements, has often come under the label of 
'critical. organisation theory'. As Reed (1999) suggests, these approaches in their 
different ways attempt to reforrnulate the concept of organisation as a socially 
constructed and sustained order necessarily grounded in the localised stocks of 
knowledge, practical routines and technical devices mobilised by social actors in their 
everyday interaction and discourse (Reed, 1999, p. 36). Clegg (1994) has maintained that 
such approaches aim to reinforce a view of lorganisations as "the condensation o local 
cultures of values, power, rules, discretion andparadox " (p. 172). Therefore, the focus 
is shifted again back to the local aspects of organisational ffe in order to critically 
redefine the mission of organisation theory away from ethical universals and conceptual 
abstractions towards cultural relativities and interpretive schema that are inherently 
resistant to historical and theoretical generalisation (Alvesson and Deetz, 1999). 
However, the turn towards the 'local' in organisation analysis has been marked with 
theoretical attempts to redirect the study of organisations back towards institutional forms 
such as the 'new institutionalism' (e. g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, Scott and Meyer, 
1994). The 'new institutionalism', although focused on organisational structures and 
practices by looking outside the organisation, it is often attached to post-modemism, 
since, away from rational approaches, it acknowledges the existence of a power struggle 
in the organisational environment. As such, before embarking on a discussion of critical 
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organisation theory, we will identify and review the main premises of 'new 
institutionalism'. 
NEW INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
New institutional theory constitutes a revisiting of the classic institutional theory that was 
conceptualised by the work of Meyer and Rowan (1977). As Scott (1994) has suggested, 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) have offered a radical departure from conventional ways of 
thinking about formal structure and about the nature of organisational decision-making 
through which structure was produced. They have claimed that formal structures have 
symbolic as well as action-generating properties, that is that the adoption of a formal 
structure can occur regardless of the existence of specific problems of coordination and 
control of members' activities that an organisation may face (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 
340). As Tolbert and Zucker (1999) have suggested, this novel premise directed attention 
to external influences, which are not linked with actual production processes, such as the 
passage of legislation and the devel6pment of strong social norms within. an 
organisational network (Tolbert and Zucker, 1999, p. 172). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) have extended institutional theory to argue for a new 
organisational theory that entails a "rejection of rational-actor models, an interest in 
institutions as independent variables, a turn towards cognitive and cultural explanations, 
and an interest in properties ofsupra-individual units ofanalysis that cannot be reduced 
to aggregations or direct consequences of individuals' attributes and motives" (p. 8). 
They emphasise factors which penetrate organisational practices and processes, such as 
the state, social class, professions and sector procedures, in order to reveal the strategic 
role played by power actors in the formation and reformation of rule systems that guide 
political and economic action (p. 28). Organisational. reality is seen as neither internally 
directed, nor externally determined; rather special emphasis is placed on the socially 
constructed nature of organisational realities, and on the creation of shared knowledge 
and belief systems (Shenhav and Weitz, 2000). Therefore, the new institutional theory 
has as its central concern the cultural and political processes through which 
organisational actors and their interests are institutionally constructed and mobilised in 
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favour of certain organising logics rather than others. A major contribution of the new 
institutional theory is the introduction of the concept of 'institutional isomorphism', that 
has been conceptualised as the constraining process that forces an organisation to 
resemble other organisations that face the same set of environmental conditions 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). The three mechanisms through which institutional 
isomorphism occurred are identified as 'coercive', which stems from political influence 
and the problem of legitimacy, 'mimetic' resulting from standard response to uncertainty, 
and 'normative', which is associated with professionalisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991, p. 67). 
Although the 'new institutional theory' perspective has suggested a comprehensive 
framework for looking at the organisational. structure-environment relationship, it has not 
yet been clearly operationalised, and this is its major limitation. As Tolbert and Zucker 
(1999) have claimed, there is very little consensus on the definition of key concepts, 
measures or methods within this theoretical tradition, as it has developed no central set of 
standard variables, nor is it associated with a standard research methodology. 
CRITICAL ORGANISATION THEORY 
Critical theory is often given a broad meaning to include all works taken from a critical 
stance on contemporary society with an orientation towards investigating "exploitation, 
repression, unfairness, asymmetric power relations, distorted communication, andfalse 
consciousness" (Alvesson and Deetz 1999, p. 186). As such, through critical thinking, 
researchers are encouraged to go beyond the assumptions, ideologies and norms that 
remain uncritical of social bias, including the world of organisations. It has been 
suggested that much of critical organisation theory derives from Marxist roots, which in 
organisational studies takes the form of a critique which argues that organisational 
structures are not rational systems for performing work but rather power systems 
designed to maximise control and profits (Scott, 1992, p. 115). As Alvesson and Deetz 
(1999) have suggested, the central issue for critical organisational theorists is that 
contemporary society, as a result of science, industrialisation and information 
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technologies, has developed positive capacities but also dangerous forms of domination, 
which are reflected in contemporary organisations (p. 188). 
As a result, critical theory in the field of organisation studies serves as an ideological 
critique with a central concern with the themes of domination and exploitation by owners 
and managers in the workplace. A considerable amount of such critical work has 
addressed management and organisation theory as expressions as well as producers of 
ideologies, which legitimise and strengthen specific societal and organisational relations 
and objectives (e. g. Alvesson and Willmott, 1996; Ogbor, 2000). Critical organisation 
studies, therefore, focus on the perspective of those who work for the organisation in 
contrast to those who own or control them, and extends our understanding of 
organisations by considering the social, political and cultural contexts in which 
organisations and individuals are situated. As such, the central objective of critical 
organisation theory is "to create societies and workplaces which are free from 
domination, where members have an equal opportunity to contribute to theproductionof 
systems, which meethuman needs and lead to progressive development ofall" (Alvesson 
and Deetz, 1999, p. 192). In other words it aims to determine how dominant ideologies 
create systems of power and privilege within organisations, and try to transform existing 
social inequalities and injustices (Macintosh and Whitson, 1990). 
Critical organisational research has shown that the norms within which the organisation is 
legitimised mirror those of the dominant group in the larger society (e. g. Grubbs, 2000; 
Kersten, 2000; Ogbor, 2000; Nkomo, 1992). It has opposed the perceived hegemony and 
domination of the powerless, emphasising as bases of difference and oppression of 
employees' class (e. g. Davies and Thomson, 1994), gender (e. g. Acker, 1990; Martin, 
1995; Mumby and Putnam, 1992), and more recently sexuality (e. g. Humphrey, 1999; 
Parker, 2002). Ogbor (2000) suggests that the overall contribution of such studies is the 
examination and exposition of situations of domination and repression within 
organisations and the central point in their analysis of organisational practices is the 
promotion of emancipation and freedom from managerial and administrative means of 
employee domination and repression. 
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As was mentioned above, critical organisational theorists often have a clear research 
agenda, which is focused on the interests of specific identified groups in organisations, 
such as women or people of colour, but usually address general issues of norms, values, 
forms of consciousness and communicative distortions within corporations. The latter 
often stresses the concept of what is referred to as 'corporate culture, which as Shein 
(1985) has suggested, is "the deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs which are 
shared by members ofan organisation, which operate unconsciously, and define in basic 
taken-for-grantedfash ion an organisation's view of itsetf and its environment" (Schein 
1985, p. 6). 
The issue of corporate culture was initially conceptualised from a non-critical 
perspective. It was seen as just another instrument for the control of the non-rational 
aspects of employees. Peters and Waterman (1982), for example, saw corporate culture 
as a set of commonValues and beliefs, which can serve as a regulatory mechanism, when, 
for instance, an organisation faces transaction costs or communication problems. It has 
been argued that managers can build a culture by articulating a set of values and then 
reinforcing them with formal policies, informal norms, language, stories and rituals 
(Peters and Waterman, 1982). Recently, however, it has been suggested that it is more 
appropriate to examine organisational culture through a critical perspective. Ogbor 
(2000), for example, has claimed that, if uncritically examined, corporate culture remains 
an ideology which is socially constructed to reflect and legitimise the power relations of 
managerial elites within an organisation. A critical perspective on corporate culture, 
therefore, can help to expose situations of domination, disempowerment, and 
undemocratic practices in organisations (Ogbor, 2000, p. 591). 
From a critical perspective, Schein (1990) has identified three layers in organisational 
culture, namely 'artifacts', such as physical layout of facilities and dress code of 
employees, 'organisational values', which can be found in organisational statements of 
goals and objectives, and tunconscious', the taken-for-granted beliefs, traditions and 
habits of organisational members that underlie decision-making and managerial action 
(Schein, 1990). Schein (1990) has also referred to organisational sub-cultures to describe 
informal groups within an organisation that share same beliefs, experiences, views or 
problems. Moreover, Siehl and Martin (1989) went deeper in examining organisational 
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culture by distinguishing 'espoused values'. such as social responsibility, financial 
concerns and so on, and 'values in use', such as social inequality, resistance to change, 
and the like. Recent critical research on corporate culture has argued that through the 
active participation of individuals in organisations, the identity of the individual is 
reconstructed to fit into the norms and values prescribed by the culture of the organisation 
(e. g. Carr, 2000). Also, it has been shown that the norms by which the organisation is 
legitimised mirror those of the dominant group of the larger society (e. g. Grubbs, 2000; 
Kersten, 2000). As such, corporate culture is seen as a social 'artifact', which reflects the 
social relations and power order of the wider society. 
The concept of corporate culture has attracted much attention in contemporary 
organisational studies, and its inclusion in theoretical frameworks is often seen as 
absolutely essential (Ogbor, 2000). However, although Willmott (2000) has recently 
demonstrated that culture can be theorised in the same way as structure, possessing 
irreducible powers and properties that predispose organisational. actors towards specific 
courses of action, its intricacies and the consequent difficulty of examining it, using life 
histories, analysis of archival materials and so on, is probably its basic limitation. Clegg 
and Hardy (1999), for example, have noticed that although organisational culture 
constitutes a 'hot' topic in organisational sWdies, much of the research interest has been 
rather prescriptive. Moreover, in an organisational world in which a high proportion of 
the workforce works part-time or as independent contractors with limited attachment to 
firms, the issues of culture and cultural control may be seen as almost irrelevant (Handy, 
1995). 
In general, critical organisation theory provides insights into the ways in which power 
and authority becomes institutionalised in organisational practices (Ogbor, 2000). 
Moreover, it enables us to examine assumptions embedded in taken-for-granted 
managerial practices, and"question the role of organisations and their accountability to the 
community (Rusaw, 2000). Also, it helps to reject existing modes of social imperialism 
and cultural domination, and as a result, researchers are encouraged to go beyond the 
assumptions, ideologies and norms that remain uncritical to social bias (Alvesson and 
Deetz, 1999). However, if one assumes that the political, social and cultural contexts 
within organisations reflect the wider societal status quo, then suggestions for changes in 
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the micro level would be ignored, unless changes in the macro level are achieved. 
Indeed, as Alvesson (1991) has claimed, when the product of critically minded theorists 
diverges from that offered by the status quo, especially when the knowledge offered does 
not function to legitimise the societal bases of power and domination, such knowledge is 
seen as heretical. 
3.2 CHOICE OF CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: MINTZBERG'S 
CONFIGURATION APPROACH 
This review of organisation theory has stressed the main perspectives of the field, each of 
which has contributed in its own way to the evolution of organisational analysis. The 
various schools of thought have marked with their presence the terrain of organisation 
theory by providing novel theorising yet sustaining continuity, in the sense that they were 
investing their work in previous literature. Within this constellation of perspectives two 
central debates can be identified. First, there has been a general theoretical debate 
concerning the concepts of 'structure' 'and 'agency' as they are employed for Ahe 
explanation of organisational features. Those who emphasise 'structure' highlight the 
importance of the objectified external relations and patterns that determine or constrain 
social interaction within specific organised systems; while those who emphasise 'agency' 
stress an understanding of the social and organisational order, and focus on the social 
practices through which human beings create and reproduce organised systems (Reed, 
1999). Therefore, schools of thought, such as 'systems theory' and 'contingency theory' 
as well as the market-based theories, are in favour of the structural conception of 
organisation, while post-modem schools of thought support the agency conception of 
organisation. Secondly, there has been an epistemological debate between 'positivism' 
and 'constructivism, with regard to the nature of knowledge that organisation studies 
produce. The former tr eats an organisation as an entity existing in its own right, which 
can be explained in terms of general principles that govem its operations, while the latter 
conceptualises an organisation as a socially constructed and dependent entity which can 
only be understood in terms of highly restricted and localised methodologies that are 
open to revision and change (Donaldson, 1996). As such, the rational, integrationist and 
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market-based schools of thought are in favour of a positivist epistemology, whilst the 
post-modern perspectives have been developed on the basis of a constructivist 
epistemology. 
Given the above, the choice of a theoretical and epistemological stance and the 
subsequent decision on a specific conceptual framework for the examination of 
organisations is not an easy task. Clegg and Hardy (1999) claim that organisational 
researchers decide what empirical sense they wish to make of organisations by deciding 
how they wish to represent them in their work. Representation involves a choice 
concerning what aspects of the organisation a researcher wishes to represent, and how he 
or she represents it. Consequently, a representation of an organisation is achieved in 
particular terms addressing certain ways of seeing, and therefore acknowledging certain 
organisational attributes. However, at the same time such a representation entails certain 
ways of not seeing, thus failing to acknowledge other possible organisational attributes. 
As such, the employment of a particular perspective for the study of SOCOG would 
inevitably entail the risk of not addressing certain aspects of the organisation. However, 
given that the aim of this study is to identify the range and nature of organisational 
formations in SOCOG's life cycle, a prime concern of this project is to address structural 
characteristics of SOCOG. Therefore, the employment of a critical stance is abandoned, 
since, although it could stress issues such as the internal politics or the corporate culture 
in SOCOG, it would fail to reveal its structural nature. Moreover, a market-based 
perspective would focus on the external conditions of SOCOG, thus underemphasising its 
internal setting. As such, it was felt that an integrationist perspective would be 
appropriate to capture the structural characteristics of SOCOG, since, away from classical 
approaches, such a stance would focus on the internal nature of the organisation, yet 
simultaneously acknowledging the dependence of its internal condition on external 
factors. Among the integrationist perspectives 'contingency theory' appears as the most 
profound approach for the examination of organisational structures (Donaldson, 1999). 
Most of the work on organisational structures has advocated the premises of contingency 
theory as much in mainstream organisation studies (e. g. Donaldson, 1987; Miller and 
Droge, 1986; Pugh et al, 1968,1969) as in studies of sport organisations (e. g. Frisby, 
1986; Kikulis et al, 1989; Slack and Hinings, 1987; Thibault et al, 1991; TheodorakL 
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1996). However, as was mentioned earlier, contingency theory has been criticised for 
employing limited structural concepts and measuring their relationship with a limited set 
of abstracted situational concepts. A better conceptual tool for the capturing of 
organisational structures and formations is provided by configuration theory, which is 
often seen as an extension of contingency theory (Donaldson, 1999; Slack, 1997). It has 
been claimed that configuration theory's capacity to combine broad patterns from 
contingency theory's fragmented concepts, grounding them in rich, multivariate 
descriptions can help consolidate the gains of contingency theory (Meyer et al, 1993, p. 
1176). Therefore, a configuration perspective was seen as the most appropriate for 
examining the organisational formation of SOCOG. In particular, the conceptual 
framework of this study is largely drawn from Mintzberg's (1979) approach, which 
constitutes the most prominent configurational perspective (Meyer et A 1993). 
Mintzberg's (1979) approach was seen as a comprehensive, multidimensional structural 
model, which does not capture structural characteristics in relation to isolated external 
factors, but rather in relation to each other and the organisation as a whole. However, 
Mintzberg's (1979) model is defective mainly because of its claim of its appropriateness 
for the study of any organisation, of any sector. As a result, this study has considered the 
particularities of SOCOG as well as of the -industry in which operates, and has adjusted 
Mintzberg's configuration model to fit the study of SOCOG. In the following sections 
Mintzberg's (1979) configuration approach will be presented in detail as well as its 
modified version, which has been used for the examination of SOCOG. 
3.2.1 MINTZBERG'S CONFIGURATION APPROACH 
With his book 'The Structuring of Organisations' (1979), Mintzberg has provided us with 
a structural typology of organisations. Starting from his assumption that effective 
organisations achieve coherence among their component parts, and that they do not 
change one element without considering the consequences for all of the others (1979, p. 
7), he has argued that organisations fall into natural clusters, what he called 
6configurations'. Specifically, he has claimed that organisational elements such as spans 
of control, forms of centralisation, planning systems and so on, should not be chosen at 
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random, rather they should be selected according to internally consistent grouping, which 
in turn should be consistent with the situation of the organisation, the conditions of the 
industry in which it operates, and its production technology (Mintzberg, 1981). As a 
result, Mintzberg (1979,1981) has identified five main organisational configurations, 
each of which constitutes a combination of certain elements of structure and situation, 
namely the 'simple structure, the 'machine bureaucracy', the 'professional bureaucracy', 
the 'divisionalised form', and the 'adhocracy' (see Appendix IV). Mintzberg has treated 
his configurations as ideal types, in the sense that he presents a series of arguments that 
result in specific predictions about organisational effectiveness as a function of the degree 
of similarity between an actual organisation and one or more of the identified 
configurations. In that sense, we agree with Meyer et at (1993), who claimed that 
Mintzberg presents not only a typology but a theory as well. 
In order to synthesise his configurations, Mintzberg (1979,1981) identifies five basic 
parts of the organisation, six basic co-ordinating mechanisms, nine essential parameters 
of design and four situational factors. The, selection of the basic part of the organisation, 
which represents its basic functioning part, using the most appropriate 'co-ordination 
mechanism' to co-ordinate organisational activities, together with the appropriate 'design 
parameters', which specify the organisational structure, are put against characteristics of 
the internal and external organisational environment, (i. e. the 'situational factors'), and 
eventually produce an effective organisational form, that is a 'configuration'. 
Five Basic Parts of the Organisation 
Mintzberg (1979) identifies five parts of the organisation: a) the 'strategic apex', that is, 
the top management. Here are found those people charged with the overall responsibility 
for the organisation such as the Chief Executive Officer and any other top-level 
managers; b) The 'operating core', which encompasses those organisation members who 
perform the basic work related directly to the production of products or services; c) The 
'middle line', which comprises the middle-line managers and acts as the connector 
between the strategic apex and the operating core; d) The 'technostructure', which 
consists of the control analysts, such as accountants, and those who focus their attention 
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directly on the design and functioning of structure; e) The 'support staff, which 
comprises all the organisational units that provide support to the organisation but which 
are not part. of the operating core, such as the payroll staff. Finally, Mintzberg (1983) 
sees the organisation as being surrounded by what he calls 'ideology' (Figure 3.1). 
Although it is not explicitly stated, Mintzberg attempts to incorporate in the term 
'ideology' the cultural characteristics of an organisation, what is commonly known as 
6corporate culture'. As was mentioned earlier, corporate culture has attracted much 
attention in contemporary organisational studies (e. g. Schein, 1990; Siehl and Martin. 
1989; Ogbor, 2000), nevertheless Mintzberg fails to emphasise on this issue, and this has 
been one of the main criticisms on his approach (e. g. Doty et al, 1993). 
(Source: Mintzberg, 1979, p. 20) 
Six Basic Co-ordinating Mechanisms 
Mintzberg (1979) deffies the structure of an organisation as "the sum total of the ways in 
which [the organisation] divides its labour into distinct tasks and then achieves co- 
ordination among them" (p. 2). These co-ordinating mechanisms are considered as the 
most essential elements of the organisational structure, "the glue that holds organisation 
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together " (p. 3). These are identified as 'mutual adjustment'. where co-ordination is 
achieved by informal communication; 'direct supervision, when one individual directs 
the work of others through instructions and orders, 'standard isat ion of work processes', 
when contents of the work are specified, 'standard isat ion of outputs', when the results of 
the work are specified, 'standardisation of skills', when the kind of training or knowledge 
required to perform the work is specified, and 'standardisation of norms', when people in 
the organisation share the same set of beliefs in order to perforrn the work (Mintzberg, 
1979,1981). 
Nine Essential Parameters of Structural Design 
According to Mintzberg (1979) organisational structure encompasses formal and 
semiformal means that organisations use to divide and co-ordinate their work in order to 
establish stable patterns of behaviour. These are the following design parameters: a) 'job 
specialisation', the horizontal and vertical in the hierarchy specialisation of tasks; b) 
'behaviour formalisation', achieved through job descriptions, rules, - regulations and so 
on; c) 'training', which refers to the process by which job-relatFd skills and knowledge 
are taught, such as formal training programmes); d) 'indoctrination, the process by 
which the organisation socialises its members to achieve standardisation of beliefs; e) 
4unit grouping', the selection of the criteria by which the organisations is separated into 
different unit groups, usually grouped by market or function; 0 'unit size', which is 
similar to what is called 'span of control' and specifies the number of positions into a 
single unit; g) 'planning and control systems', such as action planning and performance 
control systems which are used to standardise outputs; h) 'liaison devices', mechanisms 
used to achieve mutual adjustment between as well as within units, such as committees 
and task forces, and i) 'decentralisation', which determines the diffusion of decision- 
making power within the'organisation. 
Situational Factors 
As a 'structurist' (Pugh, 1997, p. 11), Mintzberg (1979) claims that effective 
organisations require effective structuring. He has argued that effective structuring 
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requires a consistency among the design parameters and situational factors. In other 
words, the situational factors we are presenting here are contingency factors that 
influence the choice of the design parameters. Mintzberg (1979), therefore, provides us 
with a series of hypotheses based on the nature of the situational factors that 
organisations are dealing with. 
Age and Size. According to Mintzberg, the age and size of the organisation will mostly 
affect its formalisation of behaviour. Moreover, the larger the organisation, the more 
specialised its tasks, the more differentiated its units and the more developed its 
administrative component. Mintzberg (1979) puts particular attention on organisational 
age and size and claims that these situational factors determine structural transitions 
attested as the organisation grows. More specifically, he has argued that organisations 
have initially a 'craft structure', which after passing the stages of 'entrepreneurial', 
'bureaucratic', and -divisionalised' structures it will end up with a 'matrix structure. 
The above seem arbitrary but Mintzberg (1979,1981) explains that such structural 
transitions are not continuous or linear, rather that they are only hints of the relationship 
between organisational growth and structural development. 
Technical System. Mintzberg supports that the production technology utilised by 
organisations affects its structural formation. In particular a regulating technical system 
would formalise the operating work, and in effect would bureaucratise the structure of the 
operating core. However, when the technical system utilised by the organisation achieves 
automation of work processes the structure within the operating core transforms to an 
organic one (Mintzberg, 1981, p. 116). Moreover, a complex technical system, such as 
advanced computing technology, would require a large and professional support staff, 
which would essentially require selective decentralisation of decision making within the 
operating core, usually achieved with the use of liaison devices (i. e. committees, expert 
groups etc. ). 
Environment. In line with contingency theorists, Mintzberg supports that the 
environment of an organisation affects its formation. He identifies four dimensions of 
organisationa. enviromnent. That is, 'stability', which can range from stable to dynamic, 
4complexityl, which can range from simple to complex, 'market diversity', which can 
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range from integrated to diversified, and 'hostility' which can range from munificent to 
hostile. Based on these dimensions he maintains that the more dynamic the 
organisational environment, the more organic the organisational structure and the more 
complex, the more decentralised the structure. Moreover, he argues that hostility in the 
organisational environment centralises its structure, while environmental disparities 
encourage selective decentralisation of decision making in order to differentiate work 
constellations (Mintzberg, 1979,1981). 
Power. Mintzberg (1979) identifies 'external control', 'power needs' of organisational 
members, and 'fashion' as the major organisational power factors. He has argued that the 
greater the external control of the organisation the more centralised and formalised its 
structure. With regard to power needs of organisational members, he has claimed that 
they tend to create excessively centralised structures. Finally, he supports that 'fashion' 
favours the structure of the day and of the culture. However, he points out that when a 
new structure comes along it is not appropriate for all organisations. 
3.2.2 MINTZBERG'S STRUCTURAL CONFIGURATIONS 
As was mentioned earlier, a major contribution of Mintzberg's approach to the field of 
organisation theory is the identification of five main configurations, that is organisational 
types that are shaped according to the structural and situational elements that 
organisations exhibit. A brief presentation of these configurations is presented below. 
The Simple Structure 
The name tells a lot about this configuration. The organisational structure is simple 
comprising not more than one large unit which consists of one or a few top managers and 
a group of operators who do the basic work. It has little or no 'technostructure', few 
4 support staff, a loose division of labour, and a small managerial hierarchy. In effect, 
little of its behaviour is standardised or formalised, and minimal use is made of planning, 
training, or 'liaison devices'. According to Mintzberg (1979) co-ordination is achieved at 
the 'Strategic apex' by direct supervision and consequently, power of decision making is 
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centralised in the hands of the CEO who usually is the owner of the organisation. Such 
organisations must be flexible because they operate in dynamic environments but in order 
for the chief executive to retain control simple environments are required as well. 
Centralised control favours rapid and flexible innovation; however, when complex forms 
of innovation are required the 'simple structure' falters because of its centralised 
management (Mintzberg, 1979). Mintzberg (1979) believes that almost all organisations 
begin their lives as 'simple structures', granting their founders the latitude to establish 
them and retain this structure in their formative years. 'Simple structures' will normally 
fail to bureaucratise after their formative years, since bureaucratic forms of structure 
require power control to move away from the entrepreneur to the 'technostructure' or the 
6operating core', and a CEO is expected to resist to such changes. Mintzberg (1979) 
claims that when an organisation experiences extreme pressure or hostility in its 
environment, and therefore needs to act urgently and effectively, it reverts to 'simple 
structure', no matter what its usual structure. That is, systems and procedures are 
suspended and the power returns to the CEO to give him or her the control to face the 
situation directly. 
The Machine Bureaucracy 
This configuration falls close to what the Aston Group (Pugh et at., 1969) has described 
as 'workflow bureaucracy'. Its emphasis is on 'standard isation of work processes' for 
co-ordination, and as a result it requires many analysts, that is strong involvement of the 
'technostructure', to design and maintain its systems of standardisation. As a result the 
expert staff possesses a certain degree of informal power, which results in a certain 
amount of horizontal decentralisation of decision making. 'Machine bureaucracy', 
however, tends to be vertically centralised because formal power is usually concentrated 
at the top (Mintzberg, 1979). Since machine bureaucracies seek functional stability, 
achieved through 'standardisation of work processes', they also seek simple and stable 
environrnents. The work of complex environments cannot be rationalised into simple 
operating tasks, and that of dynamic environments cannot be predicted. Mintzberg 
(1979) suggests that a large 'support staff secures this stability; the organisation supplies 
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its own support services wherever possible so it can closely control them. Having a large 
'support stafr, a large 'operating core', a large 'technostructure' and a large 'middle line' 
as well, one would expect a very large organisation. Indeed Mintzberg's 'machine 
bureaucracies' are large so that they can achieve repetition and standard isatio n. The 
'technical systems' utilised are expected to fulfil a regulating function, since they 
routinise work and consequently enable that work to be standardised. According to 
Mintzberg (1979), this passion for standardisation and tight control systems is usually 
encouraged in externally controlled organisations, such as those controlled by 
governments (Mintzberg, 1979). 
The Professional Bureaucracy 
The basic co-ordinating mechanism employed by this configuration is the 
'standard isation of skills'. Such organisations rely for their operating tasks on trained 
professionals whose skills are usually standardised out of the organisation, such as in a 
university or a training camp (Mintzberg, 1979). The highly skilled specialists, who 
constitute the 'operating core' of the organisation, have considerable control over their 
own work. There is, therefore, little, if any, 'technostructure' in such organisations since 
the professionals have the adequate knowledge and ability to perform their jobs without 
the support of specialist staff. In effect, professional staff possesses considerable power 
and autonomy, which consequently decentralises the organisational structure. Moreover, 
the 'support stafr is large in order to back up the professionals, dealing with simple and 
routine jobs. Mintzberg (1979) claims that 'professional bureaucracy' is most effective 
in, stable yet complex environments. Complexity requires the decision-making power to 
be decentralised to the 'operating core', while environmental stability enables those 
individuals to work with a good deal of autonomy. While organisational age and size are 
not of particular interest in professional bureaucracies, the technology utilised is of 
importance only for what it is neither regulating, nor sophisticated, nor automated. 
Essentially, Mintzberg claims that the aspect of 'technical system' should not restrict the 
freedom of the specialists in performing their complex tasks in Professional 
Bureaucracies (Mintzberg, 1979,1981). 
78 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG CHAPTER III 
The Divisionalised Form 
This structure can be described as market-based, with the 6 strategic apex' being a central 
headquarters overseeing a set of parallel divisions, each charged to serve its own markets. 
According to Mintzberg, the divisionalised structure is not a complete structure but rather 
a partial one, in the sense that structure is imposed by the headquarters to the divisions. 
Therefore, each division has its own structure and possesses considerable autonomy to 
operate its own business. However, the headquarters usually employ performance 
control systems in order to ensure 6 standardisation of outputs', what is often the basic co- 
ordinating mechanism for such organisational structures (Mintzberg, 1979). 
Consequently, a sma 11 6 technostructure' as well as a small 'support staff is required. 
Such central control to the divisions, which is used to standardise their outputs, 
encourages bureaucratisation within the divisions. Moreover, standardisation is achieved 
through the control of the divisional manager who would centralise the power on the apex 
of the division. Consequently, one would expect the divisions to have a 'machine 
bureaucratic' structure. Alternatively, one could see the headquarters as acting as the 
external controller with the divisions structured as 6 machine bureaucracies'. According 
to Miller and Friesen (1984), the Idivisionalised form' has emerged as a means for 
'machine bureaucratic' organisations to adapt themselves to new conditions and spread 
their risks by overlaying another level of administration that could add and subtract 
divisions. 
The Adhocracy 
Mintzberg (1979) has claimed that when sophisticated innovation is the case, another 
configuration is required, that is, the 'adhocracy'. This organisational type requires 
experts who are formed into smoothly functioning project teams achieving co-ordination 
through 'mutual adjustment'. In that case, extensive horizontal job specialisation is 
required which is achieved through formal training. Many 'liaison devices' are also 
essential in order to ensure co-ordination between these teams. Decision-making power 
is selectively decentralised to the teams which are usually located in different parts of the 
organisation. Matrix structures are often required, in the sense that the support stafr and 
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the 'technostructure' would be absorbed into the different project groups. Mintzberg 
(1979) identifies two types of adhocracies, namely the 'operating adhocracy, where the 
innovation takes the form of direct services to external clients, such as consulting firms 
that form multidisciplinary teams to deal with others organisations' issues, and the 
'administrative adhocracy', where the project work serves the organisation itself, such as 
with chemical firms and space agencies. In any 'adhocracy' type the decision making 
power is evidenced within the project teams from where it is emerged. Mintzberg claims 
that flexible, organic structures with a great deal of decentralisation of decision-making 
are appropriate for organisations seeking sophisticated innovation. 'Adhocracy'. 
therefore, is an organisational formation that favours environments that are both dynamic 
and complex. Usually 'adhocracies' are young organisations because, as Mintzberg 
(1979) claims, time encourages an organisation to bureaucratise. 'Technical systems' in 
'adhocracies' are expected to be sophisticated as well as automated. Specialists of the 
'technostructure' hold the power of decisions concerning the sophistication of the 
technology utilised, while the automation is achieved by standard isation, which is 
designed and built right into the machines, and is controlled by the specialists in the 
'operating core'. Finally, according to Mintzberg (1979,1981) 'adhocracies' seem to be 
fashionable as organisational types since they combine some sense of democracy with the 
absence of bureaucracy. Effectiveness, however, is usually achieved through 
inefficiency, since project teams are formed with highly paid specialists and separate 
secretarial support. Consequently, such organisational forms can only be found in 
extremely innovative industries, such as in the industries of electronics and genetics 
(Mintzberg, 1979). 
3.2.3 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF SOCOG 
As was shown above, Mintzberg's configuration approach provides a description of two 
sets of organisational dimensions: the parameters of structural design and the situational 
factors. The former refers to the internal organisational attributes that synthesise the 
structure of an organisation, while the latter refers to the main external factors that 
represent the context in which an organisation operates. In addition, Mintzberg stresses 
the basic manner with which work is co-ordinated within an organisation (i. e. basic co- 
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ordinating mechanism) as well as the part of the organisation with the most significant 
contribution to an organisation's operations (i. e. basic part of the organisation). 
According to Mintzberg (1979) the combination of these organisational attributes 
synthesises the structural profile of an organisation, namely a structural configuration. 
However, Mintzberg (1979) treats his confligurations as ideal types, in the sense that any 
effective organisation of any sector should fall in one of the identified organisational 
types. Earlier we have stressed that different sectors carry different organisational design 
requirements (Child and Smith, 1987), and therefore when a particular organisation is 
examined, the notion of 'sector specificity' should be taken into account. Consequently, 
the application of this conceptual framework for the examination of an organisation like 
SOCOG requires a consideration of the unique organisational interactions and the context 
in which the organisation has been developed (Child, 1988). For this reason, Mintzberg's 
approach has been modified for the examination of SOCOG. This meant that some of the 
elements of Mintzberg's approach were excluded from the conceptual framework, as they 
were seen to exhibit little relevance to the organisational peculiarity of SOCOG, while 
new SOCOG-specific variables were added (see Table 3.1). An additional consideration 
with regard to the conceptual fi-amework was that Mintzberg (1979,1981) often provides 
a weak explanation of the manner in which each variable should be measured. 
Consequently, the operationalisation. of SOCOG's characteristics under investigation was 
based partly on Mintzberg's theorising and mostly on studies that have employed similar 
organisational attributes. The framework that was used for the examination of SOCOG 
and the operationalisation of its variables is discussed below: 
Situational Factors 
Mintzberg identifies four main factors that form the context in which an organisation 
operates, namely 'size', 'technical system', 'environment' and 'power'. With regard to 
'size', Kimberly (1976) has suggested that four important aspects should be considered: 
the physical capacity of the organisation; the personnel available to the organisation; the 
volume of organisational input or, occasionally, the volume of its output; and the 
discretionary resources available to the organisation. Kimberly (1976) has claimed that 
although these four aspects are distinct, they are often inter-correlated. Organisational 
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studies often use a single measurement of organisational size, that is, the number of staff 
available to an organisation. Pugh et al (1968,1969) and Robbins (1990), for example, 
have measured size in terms of numbers of staff as they claimed that this is a fairly 
accurate measure across organisations, and is highly related to other measures of size. 
Similarly, Child (1973) has empirically supported 'numbers of employees' as the 
strongest indicator of organisational size. Consequently, in line with major 
organisational studies the organisational size of SOCOG will be measured with regard to 
the numbers of staff available to the organisation. 
The situational factor of 'technical system' was excluded from the theoretical framework 
of this study. In Mintzberg's (1979) terms, the organisational attribute of 'technical 
system' refers to the levels of influence that the technology used by an organisation has 
on operational tasks (i. e. regulation of technical system), and to the levels of difficulty of 
this technology for staff, (i. e. sophistication of technical system) (Mintzberg, 1979, pp. 
250-251). Although it has been empirically proven that the technology utilised affects 
the organisational structure (e. g. Woodward, 1965; Thomson, 1967; Perrow, 1967), much 
of that research has been focused on manufacturing and machine-production firms, where 
production technology is the central operating issue. Moreover, the impact of technology 
on structure has generated considerable debate. The Aston Group, for example, found 
only weak relationship between technology and various measures of organisational 
structure (Hickson et al, 1969a). Similarly, Child and Mansfield (1972) replicated the 
Aston Group's work to examine the technology-size-structure relationship and rejected 
the technological imperative, by concluding that "size has a much closer relationship to 
the aspects of structure measured than does technology" (p. 3 83). Also, in recent 
organisational research it has been claimed that traditional studies that examine 
relationships among technology and structure fail to tell a true story and are not 
particularly helpful in managing processes in the post-industrial age (Roberts and 
GrabowskL 1996, p. 415). Roberts and Grabowski (1996) have suggested that different 
sectors carry different relationships between technology and structure, and that in some 
sectors technology does not directly affect structure. They went on to claim that in 
'system design, studies, such as this study, which examine an organisation as a whole and 
in relation to its environment, consideration should be placed on the levels of correlation 
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between technology and structure. Therefore, for the case of SOCOG. which is 
predominantly a 'service provider' organisation, technology has been seen as not directly 
affecting its, corporate structure. The structure of some areas in SOCOG may be affected 
by the technology used such as Broadcasting or Accreditation but it has been considered 
that single SOCOG's organisational units such as the aforementioned cannot significantly 
affect the structure of SOCOG as a whole. 
The dimension of 'environment' can be confusing since the term itself can be defined in a 
variety of ways. Most commonly, a distinction is drawn between the 'external' and 
'internal' environment of an organisation. The key element of the internal environment is 
the corporate culture, that is, values, beliefs, understandings and norms shared by the 
members of the organisation (Schein, 1992), which is beyond the scope of this study. On 
the other hand, the external environment includes all elements existing outside the 
boundary of the organisation that have the potential to affect the organisation (Daft, 
1997). The general external environment includes international, political, socio-cultural, 
technological and economic factors and affects the organisation indirectly (Daft, 1997). 
The focus of this study is on the part of the external environment that directly affects an 
organisation; that is its 'task environment". This can include owners, customers, 
suppliers, associates, competitors and so on (Morden, 1996). In the case of SOCOG, it 
could be considered that the owner is the IOC and the NSW government; customers are 
the National Olympic Committees (NOCs), which represent the athletes of their 
countries, the spectators, and the IFs which represent the Summer Olympics' sports. 
Suppliers are the IOC, the taxpayers and NSW government, as well as the sponsors and 
the television rights holders who are also customers at the same time. Other entities of 
SOCOG's task environment could be the citizens of the Sydney and Australia as well as 
special public groups, such as environmental and indigenous groups. The term 
6environment', therefore, is used here as synonymous with 'task environment'. For the 
needs of this study, SOCOG's environment has been separated in four different 
categories: the 'Olympic Movement', the 'Commercial Sector', the 'Public Governance", 
and the 'Public Groups. The Olympic Movement includes the IOC, the International 
Federations (IF), the National Olympic Committees (NOC), and the athletes. The 
Commercial Sector includes the sponsors, the media and partner organisations. The 
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Public Governance consists of all levels of Public Governance involved in the 
organisation of the Games such as the host city, the state government, and the Federal 
Australian government. Finally, the Public Groups category is comprised of the citizens 
of the host City and visitors as well as established public groups, which could affect the 
organisation of the event. 
The conditions of an organisation's environment are seen by Mintzberg to be affected by 
the factors of 'complexity', 'stability', 'market's diversity' and 'hostility'. This study, 
however, utilises only the first two factors. 'Complexity' refers to the extent to which the 
environment is 'simple' or 'complex' and is measured by the number and heterogeneity 
of external elements influencing SOCOG's operations, while 'stability' refers to the 
extent to which an organisation's enviromnent is 'stable' or 'dynamic' and is measured 
by the levels of prediction of the needs of external elements influencing SOCOG (e. g. 
Duncan, 1972; Dess and Beard, 1984). The factor of 'market diversity' was excluded, 
since it was seen to be incorporated in the factor of 'complexity', which stresses the 
heterogeneity (i. e. diversity) of the environmental entities. The 'hostility' factor was also 
excluded from the conceptual framework, since SOCOG operated in a 'competition-free' 
industry, in the sense that it virtually held a monopoly with regard to the organisation of 
the Sydney Olympics. However, external organisations, which were involved in the 
Games' preparations, such as the IOC or the NSW government, could create a degree of 
hostility towards SOCOG. Though, the interests of the organisations of SOCOG's 
environment are more likely to create a rather hospitable condition for the organisation, 
since they mostly operated in co-operation with SOCOG, and to a degree their success 
depended on the performance of SOCOG. For example, the Olympic Movement seeks 
the smooth transaction of the event and the best possible presentation of the Olympic 
sports, the public governance seeks among others financial efficiency of the organisation, 
and the commercial sector wishes their best possible presentation during the event. As 
such, SOCOG is unlikely to face hostility from external entities but rather support for a 
common purpose. 
According to Mintzberg; (1979), the situational factor of 'power' mainly refers to the 
extent of external control of an organisation by other powerful organisations or 
individuals. Such a concept, however, is difficult to measure, since the ways through 
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which an organisation can be externally controlled can be various. For example, an 
organisation which is dependent on external financial resources could be controlled by its 
financial suppliers through strict budgetary control mechanisms, while a public 
organisation could be controlled by the state through the enforcement of a undesirable 
legal framework. This study measures the "power' dimension by determining the degree 
of representation of external actors on the decision-making bodies of SOCOG, a 
measurement which is grounded on the Aston Group's operationalisation of the 
situational factor of 'ownership and control' (Pugh et at, 1968,1969a). In doing so, it is 
aimed not only to measure the number of external individuals involved in the decision- 
making processes in SOCOG, but also to identify external factors and agencies that 
influenced the decision-making of the organisation. 
In previous chapters it was shown that one of the main characteristics of SOCOG was 
that a great deal of its operation was, by its very nature, dependent on externally held 
resources. Consequently, it was felt that issues of SOCOG's resource dependence should 
be incorporated into the theoretical framework of the study. The bulk of research on 
organisational resource dependence is grounded in Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) 
theorising which has stressed the internal and external strategies that organisations 
develop in order to minimise the uncertainty arising from dependence on the environment 
for resources. In effect, the work of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) is mainly a strategic 
management theory focused on organisations' strategies towards environments which 
hold essential for their operations resources. Much of recent empirical work on 
organisational resource dependence is based on Pfeffer and Salancik 's (1978) theorising, 
and naturally falls into the field of strategic management (e. g. Schmid, 2001; Hillman et 
al., 2000; Froelich, 1999), which is beyond the scope of this study. However, the starting 
point, as much in Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) work as in the bulk of the recent research 
on organisational resource dependence, is the assessment of the levels of importance of 
external resources for the organisations under investigation. Consequently, in order to 
enrich the situational factors of the theoretical framework, the attribute of 'resource 
dependence' was added to indicate the levels of importance of externally held resources 
for SOCOG. By employing the attribute of 'resource dependence' it is not intended to 
add another factor to Mintzberg's approach but rather to give greater emphasis to the 
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context within which SOCOG operated. In other words, it was felt that by identi6(ing the 
importance of external resources to SOCOG's operations throughout its life cycle, a 
fuller understanding of SOCOG's organisational condition could be achieved. Following 
Johnson and Scholes' (1997) classification of organisational resources, SOCOG's 
resources were categorised as: a) Financial Resources, including financial assurance, b) 
Human Resources, including IFs' experts, volunteers and contractors' staff, c) Physical 
Resources, such as sport venues and equipment, and d) Intangibles, which according to 
Hall (1992b) include the brand name and the corporate status of the organisation. The 
attributes of the latter were seen to be incorporated into the term of 'legitimacy resources' 
(Hall, 1992b), in the sense that SOCOG received its Olympic essence and its legal status 
by external agencies, namely the IOC and the NSW government respectively. 
Parameters of Structural Design 
Mintzberg's configuration approach describes an organisation's structural design with 
reference to nine factors, namely 'job specialisation', 'behaviour formalisation" 
'decentralisation', 'training', 'indoctrination', 'unit grouping', 'unit size', 'planning and 
control systems, and 'liaison devices'. 
Mintzberg's 'job specialisation' refers to the specialisation of tasks within an 
organisation. The term 'specialisation' often falls under the notion of 'complexity', 
which refers to horizontal and vertical differentiation in an organisation (Hall, 1991). 
This has been measured with regard to the number of major sub-divisions in an 
organisation and the number of sections per unit (e. g. Blau and Schoenherr, 1971; Price, 
1972). Similarly, Hall et al (1967) and Pugh et al (1968) have focused on the number of 
major divisions or departments in an organisation to measure organisational 
specialisation. This study has followed the theorising above, and operationalised 
6specialisation' as the number of major divisions and programmes in SOCOG. The 
number of divisions and departments in organisations is also referred to as 
'departmentation', and it has been claimed that it is one of the most critical aspects of 
organisational structure (Hollenbeck, 2000). 
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'Behaviour formalisation' refers to the standardisation of work processes by the 
imposition of operating instructions, job descriptions, rules, regulations and the like 
(Mintzberg, 1989, pp. 103-104). This organisational attribute is usually termed 
'standard isatio n' to describe the extent to which rules, procedures, instructions and 
communication are written (e. g. organisational charts, employee handbooks etc. ) (Pugh et 
al, 1969a). Hage and Aiken (1970) have measured 'standard isatio n' with reference to 
both written and unwritten rules that govern an organisation. This is in fine with Hall 
(1982), who has suggested the use of perceptual measures for 'forinafisation', which also 
allows the identification of informal procedures in an organisation; something that cannot 
be obtained if only official records are used. Most of the work in sport organisations, 
however, has measured 'formalisation' with reference to the existence of written 
documentation (e. g. Frisby, Slack and Hinings 1987; Thibault et al, 1991, Kikulis et al, 
1995; TheodorakL 1996). This study endorses Hall's (1982) notion that an organisation 
can be standardised (i. e. formalised) not only through written, official instructions, but 
also through non-written, informal procedures. As such, 'formalisation' has been 
operationalised as the levels of adherence of SOCOG's staff to both formal and informal 
instructions. 
'Decentralisation' refers to the diffusion of decision-making within an organisation 
(Mintzberg, 1989, p. 105). Mintzberg suggests that "when allpowerfor decision making 
rests at a single point in the organisation we shall call the structure centralised; to the 
extent that the [decision-making] power is dispersed among many individuals we shall 
call the structure decentralised" (1979, p. 181). This concept has been used by the vast 
majority of studies in organisational structure, and it usually comes under the label 
&centralisation' to refer to the extent that the decision-making power is concentrated 
(Hollenbeck, 2000). The Aston group has measured 'centralisation' with regard to the 
locus of authority to make decisions affecting the organisation. This point in the 
hierarchy was determined by asking "who was the last person whose assent must be 
obtained before legitimate action is taken-even ifothers have subsequently confirmed the 
decision " (Pugh et at, 1968, p. 76). This approach to centralisation has been used in 
several studies of sport organisations (e. g. Kikulis et at, 1989,1995; Slack and Hinings, 
1987; Thibault et al, 1991; Morrow and Chelladurai, 1992; Frisby, 1986; TheodorakL 
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1996). Consequently, in line with the bulk of the relevant literature, this study has 
operationalised 'centralisation' as the level in the hierarchy of SOCOG where final 
decisions were made. 
'Training' and 'indoctrination' refer to the formal programmes that are used to establish 
and standardise the skills and attitudes respectively of staff in an organisation (Mintzberg, 
1989, p. 104). Mintzberg sees 'training' and 'indoctrination' as alternatives to the 
concept of 'formalisation' in the sense that both contribute to the standardisation of the 
performance of an organisation's staff, hence to the overall organisational 
standard isat ion. Indeed, the 'training' attribute is often incorporated in the 
'formalisation' or 'standardisation' design factor both in the organisation theory literature 
and the literature on sport organisations, (e. g. Pugh et al, 1968,1969a, 1969b; Kikulis et 
al, 1995), while 'indoctrination' is omitted. As such, these design parameters could be 
seen as part of the 'formalisation' factor and get excluded from the conceptual 
framework. However, in order to be as close as possible to Mintzberg's model, this study 
has included the 'training' variable, which has been operationalised as the levels of 
training required for the staff avaiIable to SOCOG. 
'Unit grouping' refers to the choice of bases by which positions are grouped together into 
units in organisations, (Mintzberg, 1989, p. 104). Mintzberg (1979,1981) suggests two 
main bases through which positions are grouped in organisations: the function performed 
and the market served. The latter is partly related to what is often referred to as 'spatial 
dispersion" to denote the degree of geographical dispersion of organisational units (e. g. 
Hall et al, 1967; Hall, 1991). However, Mintzberg has extended this concept to include 
the various criteria utilised by organisations to divide their units. These can include work 
processes, products or services, customers and area (Mintzberg, 1989, p. 104). Following 
Mintzberg's conception, in this study the 'unit grouping' dimension has been 
operationalised as the type of criteria used to break down organisational units. 
Related to the 'unit grouping' is the structural dimension of 'unit size', which refers to 
the number of positions or sub-units, contained in a single unit. Mintzberg uses this term 
as equivalent to 'span of control' or 'span of authority', which refer to the extent that a 
particular job is supervised (e. g. Pugh et at, 1968,1969a). This factor, however, is 
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usually included in organisational studies as a dimension of 'centralisation', since the 
degree of supervision is seen as a factor which is closely related to the decision-making 
structure in organisations (Hall, 1991). Similarly, Hollenbeck (2000) has claimed that the 
'span of control' dimension fails to reveal the authority structure in organisations, and 
that it more accurately achieved through the examination of 'centralisation'. Therefore, 
the 'unit size' factor was seen as a weak dimension of organisational structure and it was 
excluded from the conceptual framework. 
The design factor of 'planning and control systems' refers to the action planning and 
performance control mechanisms that are utilised by organisations to standardise their 
outputs (Mintzberg, 1989, p. 105). Although Mintzberg treats this factor as a distinct 
variable, he fails to exemplify its difference with the 'formalisation' factor. As it was 
shown earlier, 'formalisation' is used to describe the levels of adherence of an 
organisation's staff to formal and informal mechanisms that are used to standardise its 
operations, and naturally includes planning and control mechanisms. Whether they are 
formal or informal, the existence of procedures which aim to direct and control the 
performance of an organisation's staff fall under the 'formalisation' attribute. As such, 
the 'planning and control systems' variable was excluded from the conceptual framework 
as it was seen to be incorporated into the 'formalisation' design variable. 
Mintzberg (1979) also identifies 'liaison devices' as a design parameter that refers to the 
mechanisms used by organisations to co-ordinate work among organisational units. 
According to Mintzberg (1979) such mechanisms usually take the form of standing 
committees, which bring together individuals from different organisational units on a 
regular basis to decide on specific issues, or task forces, which are formed for a certain 
period of time to perform a specific task. Mintzberg sees the existence of such devices as 
an essential factor for identifying the manner that complex and multi-divisional 
organisations achieve do-ordination of operatioris among their various organisational 
areas. Therefore, the 'liaison devices' variable has been operationalised as the number of 
standing committees and task forces in SOCOG. 
Organisation theory literature claims close association between strategy formation and 
structure, and Mintzberg's approach has been criticised for lacking such strategic features 
89 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG CHAPTER III 
(Doty et al, 1993). Strategic contingency theorists such as Channon (1973) and Miles 
and Snow (1978) examined the strategy- structure relationship based on the levels or 
degree of competition an organisation faces. They went on to claim that the rivalry of the 
industry in which an organisation operates affects the nature of its strategic formation, 
and that its structure is formulated accordingly. In the organisation of the Olympic 
Games, however, competition exists only when cities bid to host the event and therefore, 
when an OCOG is established it operates under a 'monopolistic' state of competition. 
That is, an organisation operates alone in an industry, in our case the industry of the 
organisation of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, and hence there is no competition from 
within the industry (Sloman and Sutcliffe, 1998). At a business level, therefore, which 
refers to how an organisation competes within its industry for customers (Daft, 1997), an 
OCOG does not formulate strategies because there is no competition that will force the 
organisation to diversify, for instance, or radicaUy relocate its pricing policy. Strategy 
formulation for OCOGs, therefore, is bounded at a functional level which concerns with 
independent strategies for each operational area (Daft, 1997) such as marketing, finance, 
planning, and so on. OCOGs' operational-level strategies, however, are constrained by 
external organisations such as the IOC which makes the marketing arrangements on 
behalf of OCOGs, the IFs which set the rules for the competitions or the government 
which establishes the financial boundaries of an OCOG. The major strategic issue for the 
organisation of the Olympics, therefore, is whether an OCOG has enough scope to exert 
operational-level strategies. This strategic feature of OCOGs has been operationalised as 
6strategic capacity' and it refers to the degree that SOCOG can formulate operational- 
level strategies. 
The conceptual framework adapted from Mintzberg's (1979) approach and the 
operationalisation of the variables is presented in table 3.1 along with the key study or 
studies that have operationalised the respective variables in the same manner. Effectively 
an organisational model is produced which will be used for the examination of SOCOG. 
In particular, Mintzberg's (1979) modified approach will be applied throughout the life 
cycle of SOCOG rather than in a specific point in its organisational life. The main 
assumption behind the choice of this process is that SOCOG's organisational 
characteristics will tend to change as the organisation progressed through its operational 
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life primarily due its dramatic growth. This in turn raises the necessity for stressing some 
basic issues with regard to organisational change. These issues and their relevance to the 
study of SOCOG are presented in the following chapter. 
Table 3.1: The Conceptual Frameworkfor the Study ofSOCOG 
7 
Contextual 
Characteristics 
Size The Number of Staff available to SOCOG (Kimberly, 1976, Hall, 1972) 
Environment The number and heterogeneity of external elements influencing 
SOCOG (Complexity); The levels of prediction of the needs of external 
elements influencing SOCOG (Stability) (Duncan, 1972) 
Resou rce- Dependence I The levels of importance of resources possessed by external actors to 
SOCOG (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) 
Power 
[-gree 
of representation of external actors on the decision-making The de 
bodies of SOCOG (Pugh et al. 1968,1969a) 
Structural Design 
Parameters 
Specialisation The number of operational areas (major divisions, departments and 
Programmes) in SOCOG (Hall et al, 1967; Kikulis et al, 1989; 
Hollenbeck, 2000) 
Formalisation The levels of adherence of SOCOG's staff to both formal and informal 1 
instructions, and procedures (Hall, 19 82) 
Centralisation The level in the hierarchy of SOCOG where final decisions are made 
(Pugh et al, 1969; Kikulis et al, 1989; Theodoraki, 1996) 
Training The levels of training required for the staff available to SOCOG 
(Mintzberg, 1979) 
Unit Grouping 
ýe ;e 
of criteria used to break down organisational units (Mintzberg, 
FT 
1979) 
1 IGICA" n-A. - 
ýF 
'U- e-Ammice; r%ne anA #*cL- f, %r, -#-c in ýOco 
Mintzberg, 1979) 
BASIC PART OF THE The part of the organisation which makes the most significant 
I ORGANISATION contribution to SOCOG's operations (Mintzberg, 1979) 
BASIC CO-ORDINATING The fundamental ways in which SOCOG achieves co-ordination among 
MECHANISM its divisions and programmes (Mintzberg, 1979) 
STRATEGIC CAPACITY 
[ 
The degree that SOCOG can formulate strategies at operational-level. 
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The aim of this study is to undertake an analysis of the organisational configurations 
evident in the life cycle of the Sydney 2000 Organising Committee for the Olympic 
Games (SOCOG). Effectively, by using the conceptual framework presented in the 
previous chapter, this study aims to examine the nature of a set of SOCOG's contextual 
and structural elements, in order to provide a holistic analysis of its organisational 
formation throughout its life cycle. SOCOG, however, like any Organising Committee 
for the Olympic Games (OCOG), exhibited a changing character, since it experienced 
dramatic growth in its size, and subsequent death within approximately seven years. The 
organisation theory literature suggests that changes in an organisation's size affect the 
status of its structural elements (e. g. Pugh and Hickson, 1976, Kimberly, 1976, 
Mintzberg, 1979; Meyer and Tsui, 1993). Consequently, it would be mistaken to apply a 
structural examination of SOCOG without considering the time aspect, as it is unlikely 
for the organisation to exhibit the same kind of characteristics throughout its life cycle. 
Therefore, it was felt that in order to examine the organisational formation of SOCOG it 
would be appropriate to consider whether it was possible and analytically useful to 
separate its life cycle into distinctive chronological stages and apply Mintzberg's (1979) 
modified approach on each of these separately. This offers the prospect of identi6eing the 
range of organisational formations in SOCOG, thus providing an evolving, time-specific 
picture of the organisation. 
The idea of examining SOCOG at distinctive phases of its operational life rather than at a 
random point in time, and the consequent requirement to chronologically separate its life 
cycle, necessitates the consideration of aspects of the organisational change literature. In 
particular, in order to achieve an appropriate 'periodisation' of SOCOG's life cycle, there 
is firstly a need for a thorough understanding of the sources of change in organisations 
and the associated patterns of change identified by the literature. This chapter, therefore, 
aims to provide an understanding of how organisational change is conceptualised in the 
relevant literature, and effectively to provide guidance for the selection of a theoretical 
framework which would be suitable for identifying change in SOCOG. It consists of 
three parts, the first of which concerns the nature of organisational changes and the forces 
behind such changes. The second part reviews different perspectives for classifýing 
change in organisations. Finally, the third part draws on the particularities of SOCOG, 
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and provides support for the selection of a 'life cycle' perspective for understanding its 
changing character. 
4.1 THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE 
Contemporary organisations are in a constant state of change as new people enter 
organisations, new production technologies are introduced, new products and services are 
launched, new divisions are often created, decision-making processes are altered, links 
with other organisations, are developed, plans are redirected and even organisational 
objectives are diversified. Change, therefore, is a phenomenon which is attached to 
virtually every organisation and its study has generated a great deal of analysis. 
Organisation theorists have attempted to describe organisational change in various ways 
which often reflect their particular perspective on' organisations and the specific 
organisational aspects that they investigate. As such, four main types of organisational 
change are often identified, namely 'processual', 'structural', Icultural' and 'political' 
(Cao et al, 1999). 
A 'processual' view sees organisational change in terms of alterations in the ways that 
organisations operate both internally and externally, whether it concerns the manner that 
related tasks are grouped within an organisation to produce a certain outcome or the 
interaction of an organisation with customers, suppliers and other organisations (e. g. 
Hammer, 1996). A 'structural' view sees change in terms of organisational functions 
such that the basis for grouping activities, the individual roles and responsibilities, the 
decision-making processes, the mechanisms for co-ordination and control and so on (e. g. 
Greenwood and Hinings, 1993). A 'cultural' view stresses changes in values, beliefs, 
understanding, and norms shared by the members of the organisation (e. g. Milliken and 
Martins, 1996). Finally, a 'political' view puts emphasis on changes in the power 
distribution and the manner that this power is exercised by groups or individuals in 
organisations (e. g. Pfeffrey, 1993). 
Each of these four types constitutes a different perspective on organisational change as it 
refers to a particular dimension of an organisation. However, despite this diversity, these 
different perspectives are often seen as interrelated and interdependent (Lancourt, 1994). 
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DeLisi (1990), for example, has claimed that shifts in the wider societal culture influence 
individuals who influence organisational culture, which in turn affects organisational 
structure. Moreover, Burnes (1996) suggests that changes in the power distribution in an 
organisation (i. e. 'political change') affect the authority structure and the decision- 
making processes, and often the overall organisational culture. In the same line of 
argument, Nadler (1988) has claimed that a significant and lasting change in 
organisational behaviour needs structural change, task change, change in the social 
environment, as well as changes in the individuals themselves. As such, organisational 
change is seen as a dynamic process, where change in any one organisational dimension 
often results in compensatory change in others. 
What are, though, the forces behind the generation of change in organisations? The 
organisational change literature often emphasises the role of the external environment as 
a trigger for organisational change. The external environment includes all elements 
existing outside the boundary of the organisation that have the potential to affect the 
organisation (Senior, 1997). These often fall under the PEST acronym (Bourgeois, 
1980), which is used to refer to the political, economic, socio-cultural and technological 
factors that have a potential to affect an organisation. Changes, for example, in taxation, 
in lifestyle or in currency exchange rates are expected to affect markets and industries 
and, at least indirectly, the organisations that operate within them. Organisations are 
directly affected by their customers and suppliers as well as by associate and competitor 
organisations (Daft, 1997). Therefore, the environmental factors that can generate 
change in organisations include customers, suppliers, governmental and regulatory 
bodies, trade unions, competitors, labour supply, and technological advances (Senior, 
1997, p. 13). 
The view that sees organisational change initiated in the external organisational 
environment draws largely from mainstream organisation. theory perspectives, such as 
6population ecology', 'resource dependence, 'contingency theory' and 'institutional 
theory' (see a discussion of these perspectives in chapter 111). Although these 
perspectives differ, primarily in the degree to which they see environment affecting 
organisations, they all subscribe to the notion that when environmental change occurs, 
organisations need to change in order to adapt to the new conditions. An 'organisation- 
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adjusting-to-the environment' view of organisational change, however, is often seen as 
deterministic as it overemphasises external causes of change over internal dynamics for 
change. Burnes (1996), for example, has argued that organisations often find that the 
dominant internal view of how they should operate is out of step with what is required to 
align or realign them with the environment. Consequently, organisations may face a 
number of choices ranging from whether to attempt to change their structures, cultures or 
styles of management to accommodate the environment, or whether to attempt to 
manipulate the environment and other constraints so as to align them more closely with 
the dominant view within the organisation. It is, therefore, the choice of key 
organisational members which determines the attitude of an organisation towards an 
envirorunental change, and consequently the nature and range of organisational change. 
Internally, change is often initiated by 'change agents', that is, people whose job it is to 
ensure that an organisation makes the necessary changes to maintain or increase its 
effectiveness (Child, l9t). Change agents can introduce changes in strategy, operations 
and management or adopt a new leadership style. A new chief executive officer, for 
example, a revision of the administrative structure, the redesign of a group of jobs, the 
introduction of a new strategy, staff redundancies and so on, are changes that are 
nonnally internally triggered (Senior, 1997,. p. 18). 
Therefore, although organisational change can be the result of either external or internal 
factors, internal and external forces for change are often seen interrelated. This is in line 
with Child's (1972) theorising, which has identified decision-making as the link between 
environment, organisation and effectiveness. Child (1972) has explained the connection 
of environment and structure to effectiveness as the result of decisions taken by 
'dominant coalitions' in organisations, that is, "the strategic decisions of those who have 
the power of structural initiation" (Child, 1972, p. 16). Therefore, the mechanisms of 
organisational decision-making exert great influence on the manner in which 
organisations change. Mintzberg and Waters (1990), and Kimberly and Rottman (1987), 
for example, have claimed that decision-making structures are strongly linked to the 
strategic direction of an organisation, and therefore, when organisational change occurs, 
decision-making structures are the central point. In a similar vein, Huber and Glick 
(1995) maintain that organisations change in a manner which reflects how organisational 
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key actors perceive environmental changes. In particular, they claim that key 
organisational members can influence change in four important ways: a) through their 
belief systems-their values, ideologies, and mental models of cause-effect relationships; 
b) as inhibitors of change; c) as interpreters of the environment-they may perceive an 
environmental stimuli as problem or opportunity; and d) as manipulators of the 
environment-they may advertise, lobby or educate to make environments more hospitable 
to the organisation (Huber and Glick, p. 7). 
Consequently, when looking at changes in organisations both the conditions of the 
organisational environment as well as the choices of the key organisational members 
should be considered. Moreover, it is essential for the researcher to comprehend that 
evidence of organisational change cannot be objectively examined as it depends on how 
organisational actors perceive change. For example, from a researcher's perspective a 
new post or a new job description may be seen as change, whilst from the perspective of 
managers this may seem insignificant. However, the same phenomena can often be 
perceived as evidence of either change or, stability depending upon the perspective that is 
taken, and on how the boundaries of the system within which the change is taking place 
are defined (Cao et al, 2000). For example, a change in the diff-usion. of decision-making 
of an organisation may occur to enhance stability. However, such an action constitutes a 
significant structural change, which, regardless of the perception of organisational 
members, needs to be analysed, especially when organisational structure is examined. 
Overall, therefore, a comprehensive approach to organisational change would have to be 
based on a thorough understanding of all aspects of the organisation, namely "Its 
organisational objectives, its structure, its social interactions, its individual members and 
its environment" (Druhl et al 2001, p. 385). 
4.2 CATEGORIES OF ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE 
Given that organisational change is a complex phenomenon (Senior, 1997), many authors 
have attempted to categorise changes in organisations in order to shed more light on how 
change should be understood. In doing so, authors tend to emphasise particular 
organisational aspects. Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1996), for example, categorised 
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change as being either 'strategic' or 'no n- strategic', while others, stress the organisational 
level in which change occurred, such as Burnes (1996), for example, who has identified 
change at . 
'individual'. 'group'. 'inter-group' or 'organisation' levels. Moreover, the 
scale of organisational change is often the point of reference, where organisational 
change is categorised as 'incremental' and 'radical' (Goodstein and Warner, 1997), 
'evolutionary' and 'revolutionary' jushman et al, 1988), or as 'incremental' and 
'quantum' (Greenwood and Hinings, 1993). However, most authors have drawn upon 
the notion that the environment triggers internal changes (e. g. Felkins et al, 1993; Burnes, 
1996; Ansoff and McDonell, 1990; Wilson, 1992), and have categorised organisational 
change as being mainly 'planned' or 'emergent'. 
Bumes (1996) suggests that most of the literature on the planned approach to change has 
derived from the practice of 'organisation development', which has been described as 
"[the] systemic application ofbehavio ural science knowledge to the planned development 
and reinforcement of organisational strategies, structures andprocessesfor improving 
an organisation's effectiveness" (Cummings and Huse, 1989, p. 1). The concept of 
planned change relies heavily on the assumption that the environment is known, and 
consequently, there is one way that change ought to be achieved, that is, deliberately and 
carefully thought through and then implemented (Wilson, 1992). This notion is in 
contrast to a great number of writers who claim that organisational change is more of a 
continuous and open-ended process than a set of discrete events (e. g. Stacey, 1996; 
Cummings and Huse, 1989). On a similar note, planned change has been criticised for its 
emphasis on incremental and isolated change and its inability to incorporate radical and 
transformational change (Dunphy and Stace, 1993; Miller and Friesen, 1984). Planned 
change also assumes that common agreement can be reached and that all parties involved 
in a particular change project have a willingness and interest in doing so (Burnes, 1996). 
The drawbacks of the planned approach to change have given rise to the 6emergent, 
approach. Emergent change has been given a number of different labels, such as 
4continuous improvement' and 'organisational learning' and stresses that change is an 
open-ended and continuous process of adaptation to changing conditions and 
circumstances. It also sees the process of change as a process of learning and not just a 
method of changing organisational structures and practices (Overmeer, 1997; Burnes, 
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1996). Writers such as Pedler et al (1991), Wilson (1992) and Clarke (1994) have 
advocated emergent change by challenging the appropriateness of planned change in a 
business environment that is increasingly dynamic and uncertain. As such, emergent 
change stresses the unpredictable nature of change. Burnes (1996) maintains that the 
main premise of the emergent approach is that organisational change is considered a 
continuous process of experience and adaptation aimed at matching an organisation's 
capabilities to the needs of a dynamic environment and it is achieved through a multitude 
of small-scale incremental changes (Bumes, 1996, p. 189). The emergent approach to 
change, however, assumes that all organisations operate in dynamic and unpredictable 
environments and this is its major weakness. Although most organisations operate in 
environments with some degree of unpredictability, not all organisations face the same 
degree of environmental turbulence. As a result, some organisations may find planned 
approaches to change both appropriate and effective in their particular circumstances. It 
is, therefore, a matter of how the organisation wishes to operate and the character of its 
environment. 
The planned-emergent distinction of organisational change provides an understanding of 
the nature of change- that organisations may experience; however it fails to address the 
aspect of time. Organisations often undergo continuous change, and therefore theories of 
change ought to explain continuity within specific timescales (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1996; Orlikowski, 1996). As such, a search for general patterns of change requires 
considerable focus on the temporal context, as generalisations are hard to sustain over 
time (Pettigrew et al, 2001). The concepts of continuity and temporality are the focus of 
a body of literature which aims to describe the stages through which organisations go as 
they grow and develop over time, commonly known as 'organisational life cycle models' 
(e. g. Greiner, 1972; Kimberly and Miles, 1980; Quinn, 1980; Quinn and Cameron, 1983). 
Much of the literature of organisational life cycles draws on Greiner's (1972) theorising. 
Greiner (1972) has argued that as organisations grow in size their activities go through 
the following phases each of which is associated with a different growth period in an 
organisation's life: 'entrepreneurial stage', where the founders define organisational 
culture, mission and goals; 'collective stage', where departments and functions begin to 
be defiried; 'formalisation stage, where systems of communication and control become 
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more formal; and 'elaboration stage' which occurs when the organisation has reached a 
plateau in its growth curve and it is time for strategic change. 
The orderly nature of organisation evolution has been also highlighted in the work of 
Kimberly and Miles (1980), Quinn (1980) and Quinn and Cameron (1983). The main 
premise of this literature is that changes that occur in organisations follow a predictable 
pattern, which can be characterised by developmental stages. Kimberly and Miles (1980) 
identified different organisational life stages with reference to organisational 
development. However, although they claimed that organisations experience 'creation', 
'transformation' and 'decline', they stressed that the length of time that organisations 
spend in each stage may vary considerably, and every organisation will not necessarily go 
through every stage. In line with Kimberly and Miles (1980), Quinn (1980) and Quinn 
and Cameron (1983) have claimed that organisations follow sequential stages of 
development that occur as a hierarchical progression that is not easily reversed and 
involves 'birth', 'growth', 'maturity', and 'diversification' or 'decline'. Although this 
literature provides important clues concerning the manner that organisations develop, it 
emphasises a single developmental sequence that is expected to pertain to most 
organisations irrespective of the industry or market in which they operate. 
Opposing the argument above, Miller and Friesen (1984) have argued that organisational 
stages of development will vary as a function of leadership, strategy and industry. Some 
organisations, therefore, may spend more time in the 'birth' or 'growth' phase while 
some may remain small and simple forever. Miller and Friesen (1.984) have maintained 
that an initial key event or decision causes an imbalance that either requires or facilitates 
a series of subsequent environmental, organisational or strategy-making changes. They 
also claimed that there is "a package of changes that occur between the onset of the 
imbalance or stress and the time when the equilibrium or tranquil interval is reached"; 
what they have termed-as organisational 'transition' (Miller and Friesen, 1984, p. 129). 
Thus, critical incidents or decisions that may cause an organisational transition may 
involve "the replacement of a top Executive, the introduction of a new produalmarket 
strate, gy, an adoption of a significantly different production technology, a major change 
in distribution, promotion orpricing strategies, modifications oforganisational structure 
and the distribution of authority, change in the environment caused by competitors 
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strategies, acquisitions, mergers or the addition o new departments and the like " (Miller f 
and Friesen, 1984, p. 131). In the same line of argument, Tushman's et al (1988) 
described 'frame-breaking change' in an organisation's life cycle as a major change in 
strategy, structure, people or processes. They have argued that causes of 'frame- 
breaking' can include sharp changes in legal, political or technological conditions which 
shift the basis of competition, and internal dynamics such as a new management style, 
change in size with implications for new management design and so on (Tushman et al, 
1988, pp. 712-713). 
Kimberly and Quinn (1984) inform us that there are three main types of organisational 
transitions. These are: a) 'restructuring', which refers to major changes in structure such 
as shift from a functional to a product or matrix form of organisation and it involves 
changes in reporting relationships, distribution of authority and roles of key individuals; 
b) 'repositioning', which Kefers to major changes in strategy and may involve adding new 
product lines, eliminating old ones, or may even involve getting completely out of one or 
more business altogether or getting into new ones; and c) 'revitalising', which refers to 
major changes in how an organisation defines its operations and it may involve change 
from a less-to-a-more centralised decision-making structure, from a less-to-a-more- 
participatory managerial structure, or from a more-to-a-less-formal style of operations 
(Kimberly and Quinn, 1984, p. 5). Such a classification, however, stresses change in 
individual organisational aspects which, as was mentioned earlier, are often interrelated. 
As such, organisational change should be considered holistically rather than as a 
collection of disparate elements (Kimberly and Rottman, 1987; Hinings and Greenwood, 
1988). While individual organisational elements may change over time, it is the 
patterning of change in these elements that is important (Miller and Friesen, 1984). 
Therefore, organisations should be considered as composed of tightly interdependent and 
mutually supportive elements such that the importance of each element can be best 
understood by making reference to the whole organisation (Miller and Friesen, 1984, p. 
1). 
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4.3 ORGANISATIONAL LIFE CYCLES AND THE STUDY OF SOCOG 
I 
The life cycle theorising and the concept of organisational transition can be helpful for 
understanding the changing patterns in SOCOG. It is known that SOCOG was formed as 
a small organisation, which gradually grew in size, and after an operational climax of 17 
days promptly died. It is, therefore, certain that SOCOG went through developmental 
stages, which however could not be precisely predicted in terms of the time of either their 
occurrence or their magnitude and significance. Moreover, the organisational 
environment of SOCOG could be viewed as both known and dynamic in the sense that 
the nature of involvement of environmental elements such as the IOC, governments and 
sponsors is given yet not absolutely predictable. In the course of the seven-year period of 
SOCOG's life, changes in the sport competition schedule, for example, the appointment 
of new administration or changes in the financing of certain areas of the event could not 
be predicted, yet could trigger organisational changes. 
Therefore, Miller and Friesen"s (1984) claim that critical events or decisions in an 
. 
yin organisation's life trigger organisational transitions, can be helpful for identiý g 
organisational transitions and subsequent life stages in SOCOG. This assumes that the 
life cycle of SOCOG experienced long periods of stability, which were interrupted, by 
short periods of radical change. This notion has also been supported by Laughlin (1991), 
who has claimed that organisational change is not incremental but rather involves 
stability marked by periods of rapid change. Such transitions however, may not be solely 
triggered by SOCOG's environment but may also have internal triggers. Besides the fact 
that the external triggers for change are likely to be filtered by the perceptions of 
members of the organisation, SOCOG might need to make internal changes, independent 
from its environment, to facilitate its operations within a tight timescale. For example, 
SOCOG had planned to reposition part of its operations into the sporting venues at a 
certain period of its life'cycle. This change was largely internally rather than externally 
driven, since SOCOG had to move its operations to the sporting venues in order to 
achieve better control of the event during its execution. Consequently, in SOCOG's life 
cycle, we would expect periods of relative tranquillity to be punctuated with Irame- 
breaking' caused by critical external incidents or internal decisions. 
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This notion was central to the work of Greenwood and Hinings (1988) and Kikulis et al 
(1992,1995) on the Canadian National Sport Organisations, which was based on the 
evolution-revolution model of change. According to Tushman et al (1986) evolutionary 
change applies when an organisation makes incremental adjustments in strategy, structure 
and/or processes while revolutionary change occurs in response to major environmental 
or strategic changes that require a "simultaneous and sharp shift in strategy, power, 
structure and controls" (Tushman et al, 1986, p. 3 1). In line with this, Greenwood and 
Hinings (1988,1996), and Kikulis et al (1992,1995) have found that change is not a 
linear process and that organisations do not clearly move from one phase to the next. 
They went on to suggest that the concepts of 'archetypes' and 'tracks' are central to 
understand the process of organisational change. 
Archetypes are related to Mintzberg's (1979) notion of structural configurations, 
extended to include the underlying values and beliefs that hold these configurations in 
place. Archetypes, therefore, can be identified by isolating the distinctive ideas, values 
and meanings pervasively reflected in, and reproduced by, clusters of structures and 
systems (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988, p. 18). By identifying sector-specific design 
archetypes, therefore, one can identify how far any particular organisation is moving 
from one archetype to another, that is, 'revolutionary change' or within an archetype, that 
is 'evolutionary change'. The extent to which organisations remain over time within the 
assumptions of a given archetype or move between archetypes can be assessed by 
identifýing the various 'tracks' that organisations, follow. According to Kikulis et al 
(1995), when an organisation experiences change but continues to evolve within the same 
archetype, it follows an 'inertial track'. Organisations may also experience changes in 
their structures and systems in the direction of an archetype to which they aspire but have 
not yet reached. Such organisations follow a 6convergent track. When organisations 
experience revolutionary changes moving from one archetype to another, then they 
follow a 'reorientation track'. Some organisations may make revolutionary changes but 
having assessed these changes decide to revert to their initial organisational design, 
following a 'reversal track. Finally, when a change is externally imposed on an 
organisation, it is more likely that structure and systems will change but values and 
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beliefs will not. In that case organisations follow an 'unresolved track' (Kikulis et al. 
1995). 
The literature on the Canadian National Sport Organisations provides us with two main 
arguments which can inform this study. Firstly, it stresses the significance of considering 
the concept of sector-specificity when examining a particular set of organisations, and 
secondly, it underlines that organisational design must be understood in terms of a 
holistic approach in the sense that many organisational elements need be taken into 
account. Greenwood and Hinings (1988), for example, have argued that organisations 
display patterns of interdependent elements, and that it is the manner in which these 
elements interact that demonstrates the viable design configurations for a set of 
organisations. Therefore, by identifying different structural designs in SOCOG's life 
with reference to a holistic, sector-specific set of variables, we would be able to comment 
on the pattern as well as on the extent of the changes from one structural design to 
another. It is, however, also important for the purposes of this study to identify the 
reasons behind a potential shift from one structural design to another. Mintzberg (1991) 
identifies seven forces that drive the organisation to adopt particular structures 
acknowledging that such forces are results of both the influence of organisational 
members on the environment and the tolerance of the environment for alternative 
organisational forms. These are: 'direction', which is related to an organisation's 
strategic vision, 'efficiency', which encourages standardisation and formalisation, 
'proficiency' which emerges when an organisation has to carry out tasks with high levels 
of knowledge and skills, 4 concentration', which encourages particular units or divisions 
to concentrate their efforts on serving particular markets or areas, and 'innovation' which 
encourages adaptation and learning. Mintzberg (1991) also identifies 'co-operation' 
which refers to the establishment of ideology or organisational culture that has the 
capacity to "knit a disparate set of people into a harmonious, co-operative entity" 
(Mintzberg, 1991, p. 55), and 'competition' which refers to the pulling apart of politics in 
the sense of politics as the non-legitimate organisational behaviour. Mintzberg (1991) 
claims that each of these forces drives the organisation to its corresponding form. 
Therefore, 'direction' will favour simple organisational structures (i. e. 'simple 
structure'), 'efficiency' will favour mechanistic structures (i. e. 'machine bureaucracy), 
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'proficiency' will favour professional bureaucratic structures (i. e. 'professional 
bureaucracy'), *concentration' will favour divisionalised designs (i. e. 'divisionalised 
form'), and 'innovation' will favour ad hoc organisational forms (i. e. adhocracy). 
Finally, 'co-operation' will favour an ideology-driven organisational form, while 
4competition' will favour a politics-driven organisational form (Mintzberg, 1979,1991). 
To conclude, here we argue that aspects of the organisational change literature can 
provide significant theoretical foundations for this study. In particular, change in 
SOCOG is understood as a phenomenon which can be initiated from both external and 
internal forces, and concerns with alterations in its processes, structure, culture or power 
relations. Such changes are considered interrelated in the sense that a change in a 
particular attribute of SOCOG affects the organisation as a whole. Moreover, by 
advocating a life cycle approach to change, SOCOG is seen to exhibit an evolving 
operational life, which is characterised by long periods of stability that are interrupted by 
short periods of transformation. Effectively, SOCOG's organisational elements are 
expected to experience long periods of stability, which are interrupted by externally or 
internally triggered episodes of change, forcing the organisation to exhibit multiple 
formations. This theorising can benefit the study of SOCOG in two main respects. 
Firstly, it can assist the identification of different life stages in SOCOG's life cycle. By 
identifying key incidents or decisions within SOCOG's life cycle one would be able to 
locate organisational transitions, and subsequently separate its life cycle into distinctive 
organisational stages. Secondly, by capturing SOCOG's structural formation in various 
phases of its fife cycle, this study can derive with different structural configurations and 
assess the degree of structural alteration from one phase to the next. It is important, 
however, to acknowledge that critical events or decisions cannot be objectively observed, 
since their significance as triggers for change would be dependent on the perceptions of 
SOCOG members. This in turn holds important implications for the methodological 
approach that will be followed to identify SOCOG's life-stages, and this will be the 
concern of the following chapter. 
los 
CHAPTER V 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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The aim of this study is to identify and analyse the nature and range of organisational 
formations that the Organising Committee for the Sydney Olympic Games (SOCOG) 
exhibited throughout its life cycle. The Main objectives of the study are as follows: 
9 To identify and evaluate the structural and contextual features of SOCOG 
throughout its life cycle, using a modified version of Mintzberg's configuration 
analysis; 
e To investigate the role and operation of SOCOG in the organisation of the 2000 
Olympic Games; 
* To explore the applicability of the life cycle periodisation for the study of 
SOCOG; and 
* To review and evaluate the utility of the modified Mintzberg's approach with 
regard to the examination of SOCOG. 
In order to attain these objectives, one case study was designed to examine the 7-year 
operational fife of SOCOG, which operat6d in the period 1993-2000. This chapter aims 
to provide an understanding of the methodological stance of the study and describe the 
process of data collection and analysis. The chapter is structured in three main parts. 
The first part provides the philosophical grounds upon which this study was designed. 
The second part offers the justification of this research design, and the third part presents 
in detail the implementation phase of the research, including its implications for data 
analysis. 
5.1. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
First of all, there is a need to outline the general methodological issues that informed the 
formulation of the research design of this study given that the underlying philosophy of 
the research problem affects the choice of the research methods. The social sciences 
research literature identifies two basic research philosophies which challenge each other 
as they contribute their own particular insights into the terrain of acceptable knowledge, 
namely 'positivism' and 'constructivism'. The schools of thought contained within the 
positivist approach are closely associated with philosophical realism while the 
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constructivist or 'interpretive' position is closely associated with philosophical idealism 
(Eisner, 1990, p. 88). These approaches to social research are also referred to as 
philosophical paradigms (e. g. Burrell and Morgan, 1979, Bryman, 1989, Sparks, 1992, 
Denzin and Lincoln, 1998, Guba and Lincoln, 1998), in the sense that they can provide 
particular sets of lenses for seeing the social world. Consequently, differences in 
paradigm assumptions cannot be set aside as mere philosophical differences, since, 
explicitly or implicitly, these positions have important consequences for the practical 
conduct of a research project, as well as for the interpretation of its findings. According 
to Guba and Lincoln (1998) a paradigm may be viewed as "a set of beliefs that deals with 
lultimates'or first principles' It represents a 'world view' that defines, for its holder, 
the nature of the 'world' " (p. 200). It has been argued, therefore, that research 
paradigms defme for researchers what it is they are about and what falls within and 
outside the limits of legitimate inquiry (Guba and Lincoln, 1998). In effect, the 
researcher, having determined the underlying philosophy of the research, is restricted to 
the use of those data collection methods which are associated with the respective 
paradigm. 
The basic beliefs that define research paradigms can be summarised by the examination 
of certain assumptions regarding questions of 'ontology' and 'epistemology'. 
Ontological assumptions revolve around questions regarding the nature of existence, that 
is the social world. Interconnected with ontological issues are a set of assumptions of an 
epistemological kind that refer to questions of knowing, and particularly the relationship 
between the knower and what can be known (Guba and Lincoln, 1998, p. 201). The 
answers to these questions can be classified in a number of ways. As was mentioned 
earlier, the most common classification distinguishes between 'positivist' and 
6constructivist' (or interpretive) positions or traditions. Researchers in the positivist 
tradition focus upon identifying the causes of social behaviour, with an emphasis on 
explanation. In contrast, the adherents of the constructivist tradition focus upon the 
meaning of behaviour, emphasising understanding, rather than explanation (Donaldson, 
1996). The basic problem with this classification is that it tends to incorporate post- 
Positivist positions such as 'critical realism' within the positivist tradition, and alternative 
constructivist positions such as 'critical theory' and 'feminism' within the constructivist 
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tradition. Here, 'positivism' and 'constructivism' are treated as the opposite ends of a 
continuum within which the social sciences research literature has placed alternative 
philosophical positions such as 'post-positivism' and 'critical constructivism". The latter 
is termed here as 'critical theory et al' to incorporate all the theories and approaches 
which fall within a critical stance (see Table 5-1). Consequently, a 'realist' (or 'naive 
realist') ontological position indicates that the reality to be investigated is external to the 
researcher and comprehendable, while a 'critical realist' position assumes that reality is 
external but can only be imperfectly comprehended because of basically flawed human 
intellectual mechanisms and the fundamentally intractable nature of phenomena. A 
'historical realist' ontological position assumes a comprehendable reality consisting of 
historically situated structures that are as limiting and as conflicting as if they were real 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1998, p. 208). In contrast to realism, a 'relativist' ontological 
position indicates that reality is a product of individual consciousness and cognition, 
which is "apprehended in theform of multiple intangible mental constructions, socially 
and experientially based, local and specific in nature "(Guba and Lincoln, 1998, p. 206). 
Table 5.1: Basic Beliefs of Research Paradigms 
POSITIVISM POST- 
POSITIVISM 
CRITICAL 
THEORY et al 
CONSTRUCTIVISM 
Historical 
Critical realism- realism-virtual 
Greal' reality but reality shaped 
by 
Ontology 4 
NaTve realism. 
real' reality but only 
imperfectly social, political, 
ethnic, cultural, 
Relativism-local specific 
comprehendable and economic, and constructed realities probabilistically gender values; comprehendable crystallised over 
I time 
Modified Dualist/ Transactional/ 
Episternoto gy 
Dualist/ 
Objectivist* Objectivist; Subjectivist ; 
Transactional/ 
Subjectivist; created 
findings tru 
findings probably value-mediat d findings true findings 
Modified Experimental/ Experimental/ 
Methodology 
Manipulative; 
chiefly 
Manipulative; 
may include 
Dialogic/ 
Dialectical Hemeneutical/Dialectical quantitative qualitative methods methods 
Source: Guba and Lincoln (I g9s, p. 203) 
109 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG CHAPTER V 
In terms of epistemological assumptions, an 'objectivist' view regards knowledge as 
something which can be acquired, and therefore, the investigator is able to determine a 
problem or phenomenon without influencing it or being influenced by it, while a 
'modified objectivist' view rejects pure objectivity of knowledge apprehension and is 
mainly concerned with judging findings in respect to pre-existing knowledge. A 
'transactional' and 'subjectivist' epistemological position, in turn, considers knowledge 
as something which has to be personally experienced, hence findings are value mediated 
(critical theory) or literally created (constructivism) (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). It has 
been argued that the ontological and epistemological positions that a researcher adopts in 
a study direct the choice of strategy. for data collection (Guba, 1990). Therefore, an 
'experimental' approach to data collection will set the research upon a systematic 
protocol and technique which favours quantitative techniques such as surveys, 
questionnaires, personality tests and so on. On the other hand, a 'hermeneutical' (or 
'ideographic') approach to data collection suggests that there is a need to gain first-hand 
knowledge of the subject under investigation and therefore qualitative techniques, such as 
observation and interviewing, should be utilized (Sparks, 1992, p. 14). 
However, the argument that researchers are obliged to employ the research methods 
indicated by the underlying philosophy of the research has been challenged. Bryman 
(1989) for example, has claimed that social science research could encompass aspects of 
many philosophical positions. He has stated that a method will be good or bad only in 
relation to the problem under investigation, and that the arguments about the 
epistemological distinctiveness of quantitative and qualitative research is not, and should 
not, be taken to be a barrier to such integration (p. 254). The nature of the problem under 
investigation, therefore, plays an important role in the selection of the type of research 
methods. Yin (1994) for example, has argued that besides philosophical arguments, there 
are other factors that influence the research design of a study. These are the research 
objectives, the background to the research, and practical constraints imposed upon the 
researcher by external factors. Further, Blaikie (1993) claims that besides the nature of a 
particular research problem, the choice of the methodological strategy can also be made 
in terms of how the ontological and epistemological approaches relate to the worldview 
of the researcher or in terms of both discipline and academic institution that naturally 
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influence a researcher's exposure to and experience of particular approaches and 
strategies (Blaikie, 1993, p. 202). 
After considering the above, this study adopts the main premises of the 'post-positivist' 
philosophical position, or what has also been termed 'critical realism' (e. g. Donaldson, 
1996, Guba, 1990, Marsh and Smith, 2001). Critical realism acknowledges that the 
world is, to an extent, socially constructed. Consequently, the study adopts the notion 
that the way institutions or processes are socially constructed affects outcomes, but the 
extent and resonance of that social construction is constrained by deeper social relations. 
That is, some crucial structural effects cannot be directly observed, and such evidence 
does not speak for itself, it has to be interpreted (Marsh and Smith, 2001, P. 530). 
Effectively, the study holds that many organisational characteristics in SOCOG, such as 
the 'organisational size' or the levels of 'specialisation', can be directly observed and 
examined, for example through analysis of organisational documents. However, 
organisational aspects, such as 'power', which refers to the levels of external control, or 
'centralisation', which refers to the diffusion of decision-making in SOCOG, cannot be 
directly. observed so confidently, and therefore they need to be qualitatively interpreted. 
Also, it is believed that quantitative techniques would impede the full understanding of 
the context in which SOCOG operates, and particularly the manner in which this context 
is perceived by organisational members. There is a need to take account of the 
interpretations that are offered by managers regarding the nature of their organisation and 
therefore, interview-based qualitative methods were seen as the most appropriate for this 
study. In doing so, the researcher would be able to capitalise on chance remarks or 
unreported events that could indicate a new line of investigation, a flexibility that can 
only be achieved via qualitative techniques. The nature of links between an OCOG and 
the International Olympic Committee or the International Federations, for example, are 
difficult to identify since they are described in a secretive manner in Games-related 
documents. It is sensed, therefore, that SOCOG's managers would be able to provide 
additional information about such relationships, which could reveal new organisational 
aspects for investigation. As a result, this study rejects the positivist contingency 
research into organisational structure, which holds that organisations, are to be explained 
by scientific laws, in which the shape taken by organisations, is determined by material 
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factors such as their age and size, and these laws hold generally across organisations; of 
all types and national cultures (e. g. Pugh et al, 1969a, 1969b; Donaldson, 1996). It is 
rather considered that modem organisations, such as SOCOG, are also shaped by 
complex processes produced by organisational members, and therefore organisational 
reality is seen as being, partially at least, socially constructed. Moreover, sector- 
specificity is acknowledged, and as a result, tentative hypotheses can be proposed with 
regard to other OCOGs. 
The background to the research suggests that the study should be of an exploratory, as 
well as an explanatory, nature. The lack of research on the organisational nature of 
OCOGs indicates the need to firstly portray the nature of SOCOG's structural and 
contextual characteristics throughout its life cycle. However, there is secondly the need 
to fully understand how the context of SOCOG is perceived to affect its structural 
characteristics. For example, in line with the premises of organisation theory SOCOG's 
changing size, age and environment are anticipated to affect certain organisational 
aspects such as the diffusion of decision-making. This study, therefore, needs to explain 
how the change in the size of SOCOG, for example, is perceived by managers and 
consequently how managers translate this change into managerial action. Consequently, 
there is a need for the use of qualitative research methods, and interviewing has been 
selected as the most appropriate source of primary data. An additional source of data 
derives from analysis of documents, which serves a dual role. Firstly, information 
contained in documents can inform the organisational elements under investigation which 
can only be quantitatively examined, such as SOCOG's 'size, measured in numbers of 
staff, or SOCOG's levels of 'specialisation', measured in numbers of operational areas. 
Secondly, the simultaneous analysis of documents and interviews supports the 
triangulation of data, which, as will be shown later, enhances the validity of the study. 
5.2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
As was mentioned earlier, this study constitutes a case study of SOCOG. The primary 
data of the study is based on qualitative research interviews with SOCOG's senior 
managers. By using a modified model of Mintzberg's (1979) configuration approach as 
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the conceptual framework (see Table 5.2), the research interviews aimed to identify the 
nature of SOCOG's organisational characteristics in order to enable the synthesis of the 
organisation's formation. In particular, with strong support from document analysis, the 
interviews sought to reveal the perceptions of SOCOG's managers with regard to the 
structural and contextual elements of the organisation throughout its seven-year fife 
cycle. Before embarking on a detailed description of the case study design, however, a 
consideration of the issues of 'validity' and 'reliability' in qualitative research is firstly 
presented, along with the manner that these issues were tackled in this study. 
Table 5.2: The Conceptual Frameworkfor the Study ofSOCOG 
SOCOG's OPERATIONALISATION DIMENSIONS 
Size The Number of Staff available to SOCOG (Kimberly, 1976, Hall, 1972) 
F_ 
The number and heterogeneity of external elements influencing SOCOG 
Environment (Complexity); The levels of prediction of the needs of external elements 
influencing SOCOG (Stability) (Duncan, 1972) 
Resource- he levels of importance of resources possessed by external actors to SOCOG 
Dependence (Pfleffer and Salancik, 1978) 
aree of renresentatinn of extemal actors on the decision-making bodies of 
rower SOCOG_ (Pugh e't al, 1968,1969) 
The number of operational areas (major divisions, departments and 
Specialisation programmes) in SOCOG (Hall et al, 1967; Kikulis et al, 1989; Hollenbeck, 
2000) 
Formalisation levels of adherence of SOCOG's staff to 
both formal and informal I % 
in ctions, and procedures (Hall, 1982) s 
e level in the hierarchy of SOCOG where final decisions are made (Pugh et 
F 
Centralisation 
al, 1969; Kikulis et al, 1989; Ileodoraki, 1996) 
Training 
J 
The levels of training required for SOCOG's staff (Mintzberg, 1979) 
Unit Grouping The type of criteria used to break down organisational units (Mintzberg, 1979) 
Liaison Devices The number of standing committees, commissions and task forces in SOCOG 
(Mintzberg, 1979) 
Fe 
part of the organisation which makes the most significant contribution to Basic Part 
C SOCOG's operations (Mintzberg, 1979) 
Basic Co-ordination The fundamental ways in which SOCOG achieves co-ordination among its 
Mechanism divisions and programmes (Mintzberg, 1979) 
Strategic Capacity 
-he 
degree that SOCOG can formulate strategies at operational-level. 
_FT 
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5.2.1 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE STUDY 
The questions of validity and reliability are principal in any research study, since they 
essentially challenge the quality of the research fuldings. Effectively, the issues of 
validity and reliability constitute the criteria for assessing the procedure and results of a 
research study. Here, a brief discussion of these notions is presented, particularly with 
regard to qualitative social inquiry. In doing so, it is intended to provide a basic 
understanding of the concepts of validity and reliability and essentially demonstrate the 
manner in which they were applied as criteria for assessing the quality of the research 
design of this study. 
In qualitative research validity often receives more attention than reliability (Mason, 
2002), and it refers to "the extent to which an account accurately represents the social 
phenomena to which it refers" (Hammersley, 1990, p. 57). In other words, validity 
challenges the essence of a research study, as it questions whether the researcher 
examines or measures what he or she wants to examine or measure. According to Kirk 
and Miller, (1986) three errors may occur in relation to the concept of validity: to see a 
relation, a principle, and the like, where they are not correct (type I error); to reject them 
where they are indeed correct (type 2 error); and finally ask the wrong question (type 3 
error) (Kirk and Miller, 1986, pp. 29-30). ihe question of validity in qualitative research, 
therefore, turns into the question of how far the researcher's constructions are grounded 
in the constructions of those whom he or she studied as well as how far this grounding is 
transparent for others (Flick, 1998, p. 225). As a result, validity challenges not only the 
production of data but also the presentation of the results of a study. In effect, the 
validity of a study holds implications for two main issues, often referred to as 'internal' 
and 'external' validity (e. g. Silverman, 2000; Flick, 1998; Bryman, 1989). The former, 
'internal validity,, refers to the central notion of validity and ensures that the researcher 
measures the topics under investigation and not something else; in other words the study 
is valid on its own. However, internal validity presupposes that the topics under 
investigation are appropriately operationalised. In effect, if the operational definitions 
are inadequate, the meaning of the ensuing internally valid findings will be unclear and 
misleading (Bryman. 1989). The latter, 'external validity', is concerned with the extent 
to which the findings of research can be generalised beyond the specific limits of the 
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setting in which the study is undertaken (Silverman, 2000). As Stablein (1999) 
maintains, external validity is concerned with the degree to which the results of a study 
may be both be justified as representative of the situation in which they were generated 
and have claims to generality (Stablein, 1999). However, according to Bryman (1989), 
this depends on a number of factors, including' the aims of the study, the methodological 
techniques utilised and the size of the research sample. 
Accordingly, the aim of this study suggests that the issue of external validity is of minor 
importance. As was mentioned earlier, this study aims to examine a particular 
organisation, i. e. SOCOG, within a particular context, i. e. the organisation of the 2000 
Sydney Olympics, and assess the utility of a particular conceptual framework, i. e. 
Mintzberg's modified approach. Therefore, questions of external validity are 
insignificant, insofar as generalisations; of the findings from SOCOG's case for other 
OCOGs or sport organisations are beyond the scope of this study. Consequently, this 
study is primarily concerned with answering the questions of internal validity, which 
essentially challenge the conceptual and ontological clarity of the study and the success 
with which the author has translated these into a meaningful and relevant epistemology 
and methodology (Mason, 2002, p. 188). In other words, the study should provide a clear 
operationalisation of the phenomena under investigation (SOCOG's organisational 
characteristics in this study), as well as demonstrate that the research strategy employed 
is appropriately designed on these elements, that is ensuring the validity of data 
generation methods. With regard to the former, this study has provided a clear 
operationalisation of SOCOG's elements under investigation, which is based both on 
Mintzberg's (1979) theorising and on previous organisational studies that have examined 
these elements (see section 3.2.3 in chapter III and Table 5.2 in this chapter). With 
regard to the research strategy employed it was shown earlier that this study adopted a 
critical realist stance and utilised quafitative research methods. In particular, semi- 
structured interviews with SOCOG's senior staff and analysis of organisational 
documents were seen as the most appropriate methods to provide a valid account of 
SOCOG's organisational nature throughout its life cycle. It was explained that interview- 
based qualitative methods would allow the researcher to capitalise on SOCOG's 
managers' perceptions of the nature of the organisational elements under investigation, 
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and with support from organisational documents would be able to provide a legitimate 
explanation of the organisation's reality. 
In qualitativý research literature the concept of validity is often misinterpreted or even 
omitted, and as a result, many qualitative studies fail to stress validity issues and often do 
not mention validity at all (Silverman, 2000). It is true that often the term itself seems 
confusing, especially when various aspects of validity are examined by researchers who 
attempt to test a study's validity. Researchers, for example, refer to 'face validity' when 
they attempt to examine the correspondence between a measure and the concept in 
question (Eden and Huxham, 1999). Moreover, 'criterion validity' is often tested, when 
the researcher aims to connect a measure with a relevant criterion (Bryman, 1989). 
6 Construct validity' is also tested, which involves the drawing of hypotheses about the 
likely connection between the concept of interest and another concept (Stablein, 1999). 
For the establishment of aspects of validity, various methods are suggested, which range 
from the usage of the assessment of panels of judges and experts to the employment of 
theoretical deduction techniques. However, the bulk of literature in qualitative research 
in general, and in organisational research, in particular, supports the view that the 
answers to questions of validity are primarily tackled through the use of 'triangulation' 
(e. g. Silverman, 1993,2000, Flick, 1998, Shaw, 1999, Bryman, 1989). In short, 
triangulation refers to the combination of different methods, study groups and different 
theoretical perspectives in dealing with a phenomenon. Denzin (1989) refers to four 
types of triangulation: 'data triangulation', which refers to the use of different data 
sources; 'investigator triangulation', which refers to the use of different observers or 
interviewers; 6 theory triangulation', which refers to the employment of different 
theoretical points of view; and 'methodological triangulation', which refers to the use of 
different research methods (Denzin, 1989, pp. 237-24 1). 
As wi shown in the following sections in detail, triangulation was utilised to enhance 
the validity of this study. In particular, 'data triangulation' was achieved through the 
generation of data both from semi-structured interviews and document analysis. Both 
sources of data were analysed simultaneously, thus enabling the researcher to evaluate 
the validity as much of the interviewees' responses as of the information reported in the 
documents. In this time-constrained study 'investigator triangulation' was impossible to 
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achieve. However, the interview data was further evaluated by senior academics at 
Loughborough University who acted as external judges and effectively provided a critical 
eye for the subsequent data analysis. Moreover, the interviewees were involved in the 
further research process by confirming their responses and providing clarifications on the 
interview data. Effectively, the interviewees agreed with the contents of their statements, 
and therefore the validity of the data was further enhanced through what is commonly 
known as 'communicative validation' (Flick, 2002, p. 223). 'Theory triangulation' was 
not applicable for this study, since one of the study's objectives was essentially to test the 
utility of a particular theoretical framework, namely Mintzberg's (1979) modified 
approach. However, given that the theoretical framework utifised comprises elements of 
different organisation theory perspectives, this study virtually achieved theory 
triangulation. Finally, 'methodological triangulation' was not achieved although, as will 
be shown later, a number of SOCOG's elements under investigation were quantitatively 
examined. Effectively, this study adopted a qualitative research design as it was argued 
that a solid explanation of SOCOG's organisational nature could be more confidently 
achieved through qualitative analysis of its characteristics. It was explained earlier that 
this study abandons the positivist perspective which pertains to much of previous 
organisational research, and therefore the use of qualitative research methods was seen as 
the most appropriate to acquire SOCOG's organisational reality. 
Reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the 
same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions 
(Silverman, 1993). Measures of reliability are more comfortably associated with 
quantitative research where standardised. research instruments are used. In that sense 
reliability is often measured by observing the consistency with which the same methods 
of data collection produce the same results. The logic is that, if a researcher measures the 
same phenomenon more than once with the same instrument, then he or she should get 
the same measurement. Reliability is therefore being conceptualised in terms of how 
reliable, accurate and precise the research tools or instruments are (Mason, 2002, p. 187). 
All of this is premised on the assumption that methods of data generation can be 
conceptualised as tools, and thus can be standardised. In qualitative researching, 
however, the non-standardisation of many methods for generating data renders the 
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researcher unable to perform simple reliability tests because the data that is generated 
will not take the form of a clearly standardised set of measurements (Flick, 2002). 
According to Mason (2002), an obsession with reliability in qualitative researching could 
inappropriately overshadow more important questions of validity, resulting in a 
nonsensical situation where a researcher may be not at all clear about what he or she is 
measuring, i. e. validity, but can nevertheless claim to be measuring it with a great deal of 
precision, i. e. reliability. 
Despite these criticisms of conventional measures of reliability, it is essential for the 
qualitative researchers to deal with overall questions of accuracy in their methods and 
research practices. As with validity, reliability is often taken to comprise two elements: 
6external' and 'internal' reliability (Bryman, 1989). The former refers to the degree to 
which a measure is consistent over time, while the latter refers to the degree of internal 
consistency of a measure with implications in the context of multiple-item quantitative 
measures, when the question is whether the constituent indicators cohere to form a single 
dimension (Bryman, 1989, p. 56). In qualitative research, the focus is primarily on 
external reliability and it mainly pertains to the process of sorting and analysing the data. 
According to Kirk and Miller (1986) reliability receives its importance as a criterion for 
assessing qualitative research only against the background of a specific theory of the 
issue under study and about the use of methods (p. 50). Effectively, the quality of 
recording and documenting data becomes the central basis for assessing the reliability of 
a qualitative research and that of successive interpretations. In other words, the 
researcher needs to establish the logic behind the approaches used for the data collection 
and analysis so that if it were the same data to be analysed, it would provide the same 
findings. for the qualitative researcher, therefore, the main concern with regard to the 
issue of reliability is the establishment of appropriate thematic categories when collecting 
and analysing data (Silverman, 2000). In effect, a clear thematic plan ensures that the 
data can be categorised appropriately by multiple researchers, or by the same researcher 
in different periods of time. 
In this study the issue of reliability was of major importance for two main reasons. 
Fkstly, the reliance on research interviews required the conventionalisation of the 
interview notes in order to increase the comparability of the perspectives which have led 
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to the corresponding data (Flick, 2002, p. 220). For that reason, all interviews were tape- 
recorded and fully transcribed, thus allowing the separation of concepts of the 
interviewees from those of the interviewer, which in turn made reinterpretation and 
assessment by different analysts possible. Secondly, due to the large amount of data 
generated both from the research interviews and document analysis a clear thematic plan 
was required. For that reason, an initial thematic template was devised, which 
corresponded to SOCOG's elements under investigation. However, given the flexibility 
of responses allowed by semi-structured interviews, the template was constantly modified 
according to new topics of interest aroused by the interviewees. As a result, a final 
template was devised, consisting of fourteen thematic categories (see appendix V), and 
data was sorted accordingly. Moreover, the process of sorting and analysing both the 
interview and documentary data was closely supervised and consulted by experienced 
researchers at Loughborough University, thus ensuring that the interviewees' statements 
and documentary information were appropriately categorised. Finally, in order to 
enhance the reliability of the study and broadly facilitate the process of data analysis 
individual rating scales were developed for each of SOCOG's dimensions under 
investigation. This process ensured a degree of standardisation of measurements for 
SOCOG's structural and contextual elements and largely reduced the subjectivity of the 
data interpretations by the researcher. 
5.2.2 CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
A case study implies the study of a single case, SOCOG in this study. Case study is not a 
methodological choice, but. rather a choice of object to be studied (Stake, 1998). Yin 
(1994) has deffied case based methodology as "an empirical enquiry that investigates 
phenomena within their real-life context, when the boundaries between phenomena and 
context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence arc used" (P. 
13). In our case, a case study methodology would allow us not only to identify the nature 
of SOCOG's structural and contextual elements but also to discover and investigate 
issues that may appear insignificant to other organisations but which are of significance 
for the study of OCOGs, and SOCOG in particular. Indeed, this is achieved through 
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multiple sources of evidence, namely semi-structured interviewing and document 
analysis. The study of SOCOG, therefore, is employed in an exploratory as well as 
explanatory manner since it aimed to achieve insights into the previously uncharted area 
of OCOGs as sport organisations, but also to explain how contextual factors and 
structural elements are perceived by key actors in a particular OCOG. Moreover, the 
study of SOCOG held a meta-evaluative application (Yin, 1994), in the sense that the 
researcher was able to go back to the theoretical framework employed, that is 
Mintzberg's modified approach, and critically evaluate it with regard to its application in 
the case of SOCOG. 
Case studies have attracted criticisms, primarily with regard to their validity. As was 
mentioned earlier, validity is concerned with ensuring that the researcher measures what 
it is intended to measure, and as a result establishes the domain in which the findings of a 
study can be generalised (Shaw, 1999). Bryman (1989) has argued that accusations about 
the limited generalisability of case studies may be based on an erroneous application of 
statistical notions, which treat the case as a sample of one. Moreover, Yin (1994) 
claimed that such concerns arise from confusion as to the type of generalisations to be 
made from case study research. He has argued, for example, that the aim of a case study 
is not to infer the findings from a sample to a population but to engender patterns and 
linkages of theoretical importance (Yin, 1994). 
To overcome such concerns Yin (1994) suggests that a theory should be tested in 
comparable contexts to see whether it fits in with other cases. Yin (1994) calls this 
approach a 'replication logic' and argues that it is a more appropriate framework within 
which to judge the generalisability of case study evidence than in terms of sampling 
notions. Bryman (1989) argues that case study research that examines more than one site 
often comprises its own replication logic. In this time-constrained research project, the 
selection of a single casestudy, that of SOCOG, was essentially a natural process since at 
the time of the empirical data collection (November 2000-May 2001) SOCOG was the 
OCOG which had just delivered the Games but was still in operation. That allowed the 
researcher to have access to key organisational members as well as to a wide range of the 
organisation's documents, while having a clear view of the organisation's life cycle time 
boundaries. It would be extremely difficult to attempt to investigate OCOGs for earlier 
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Games, as key informants would have disposed and moved on to other positions, and 
organisational documents would be difficult to request and acquire. Moreover, the next 
operational OCOG, that is the Organising Committee of the 2004 Athens Olympic 
Games (ATHOC), had not completed its task at the time of the research, and therefore a 
holistic view of the organisation's life cycle could not be obtained. A solid replication 
strategy could have involved the examination of ATHOC after the completion of the 
2004 Games. However, as was mentioned earlier, the generalisation of the findings from 
SOCOG's examination for other OCOGs is beyond the scope of this study, although it is 
broadly aimed to establish a foundation for comparative research based on future 
OCOGs. Effectively, the study aims to draw conclusions with regard to the 
organisational nature of SOCOG, and ultimately to consider the theoretical implications 
of Mintzberg's (1979) modified approach for the study of OCOGs. Consequently, 
although this study provides the basis for future replication only some limited and 
tentative theoretical generalisations might be made. 
5.23 CASE STUDY DESIGN 
According to Yin (1994) there are two basic concerns when considering a case study 
design. First is the choice of single or multiple case design. Although single case design 
has informed much research in social sciences (Bryman, 1989), there is a major weakness 
associated with this type of case study design; that is, its poor validity. According to 
Stake (1998), single case design is only appropriate when testing well-formulated 
theories or when multiple cases do not exist. In our case it was the latter that led to a 
single case design, since, as was mentioned earlier, multiple cases, that is many OCOGs 
in operation, did not exist at the time of investigation. Analysis of documents of previous 
OCOGs, however, has informed the empirical design of the study. In particular, by 
analysing official reports and pubUcations of former OCOGs, the researcher acquired a 
solid understanding of the key organisational issues of these organisations, which in turn 
formed the basis for embarking on the examination of SOCOG. Connected with the 
notion of 'replication logic' mentioned earlier, it is often argued that a case must be 
selected in such a way as to ensure 'literal' or 'theoretical' replication (Yin, 1994). This 
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is in line with what Stake (1998) terms as 'intrinsic' and 'instrumental' case studies. In 
effect, an 'intrinsic' case study design draws the researcher toward an understanding of 
what is important about the case within its own world, not so much the world of 
researchers and theories. In contrast, an 'instrumental' case study design draws the 
researcher toward illustrating how the concerns of researchers and theorists, that is the 
underlying theory, are manifested in the particular case (Stake, 1998, p. 99). In this 
study, the selection of the case serves both intrinsic and instrumental interests. As was 
mentioned earlier, it aims to use the case of SOCOG to explore the particular 
characteristics of an OCOG, but also to inform the theory for the study of such 
organisations through the evaluation of the modified Mintzberg's (1979) approach, thus 
serving theoretical interests as well. 
A second concern when considering case study design is whether the case studies should 
be 'holistic' or 'embedded', which implies the number of units of analysis to be used in 
each case study (Yin, 1994). Holistic case studies rely on a single source of evidence and 
are usually used when a study aims to generate a general picture of the case under 
investigation or when it is difficult to identify different units within a case (Yin, 1994). 
Obviously such a design undermines the emphasis on the triangulation of data, which is a 
key feature of case based studies since there is a single source of primary evidence 
(Bryman, 1989). Conversely, embedded case design fitvours the collection of evidence 
from various units within a case. Yin (1994) claims that researchers using this type of 
design occasionally fail to extrapolate from the units of analysis to provide an overall 
picture. This design, however, enhances the capacity for triangulation and thus the 
validity within cases, since evidence is obtained from different sources. In this study 
evidence was obtained both through interviews and document analysis (two units). These 
data collection techniques were used on SOCOG (one case), and consequently, this case 
study research adopted a single case, embedded design. 
5.2.4 METHODS AND CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
As was said earlier, this study makes use of qualitative research methods. Bryman (1989) 
has suggested that there are three main sources of data associated with qualitative 
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research: 'observation', 'unstructured interviewing' or 'semi-structured interviewing' and 
the examination of documents, which is commonly known as 'document analysis'. 
Although observation could contribute to this study, interviewing and document analysis 
have been selected as the most appropriate methods for the case based study. The 
purpose of this case study is to examine SOCOG for a period of approximately seven 
years and therefore it would be extremely difficult to observe SOCOG operations for 
such a long period of time. 
This study, therefore, makes use of interviews as the tool for empirical data collection. 
Out of the two types of qualitative interviewing, the semi-structured has been selected as 
the most appropriate for this study. As was mentioned in previous chapters, the topics of 
enquiry for this study have been guided, but not prescribed, by configuration theory and 
particularly by a modified version of Mintzberg's (1979) approach. Therefore a topic 
structure in the interviews was seen as appropriate, since unstructured interviews would 
risk taking the respondents to the main topics of investigation. When using semi- 
structured interviews the researcher makes use of a schedule but recognises that 
departures will occur if interesting themes emerge from what the respondents say 
(Bryman, 1989). This type of interviewing, therefore, allowed the researcher to address 
the main lines of inquiry, derived from Mintzberg's modified approach, while giving 
considerable latitude to the interviewees to bring up other issues of importance in relation 
to SOCOG. However, in line with Brewerton and Millward's (2001) arguments, the 
researcher was not tempted to spend too long on peripheral subjects, as there was the 
danger of losing the control of the interview, thus reducing the reliability of the 
technique. 
When using interviewing to exan-tine organisational phenomena, however, caution should 
be exercised in interpreting the responses of the interviewees. Bryman (1989) suggests 
that organisational reality is actively devised by the people in the organisation and 
therefore one would expect the responses of the interviewees to be filtered by their 
experiences and knowledge of the organisation, their past experiences of organisations 
and so on. Similarly, King (1994) has argued that when you ask people to explain a 
phenomenon (organisational nature in this study), it is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve objectivity of response. In this study, however, the triangulation 
123 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG CHAPTER V 
of data through the use of document analysis reduced the subjectivity of the responses 
since the researcher interpreted the interview-based data with the support of relevant 
documentary information. 
The collection and examination of documents, which is also referred to as 'archival 
analysis', is seen by Bryman (1989) as an integral element of qualitative research. He 
has argued that such materials are non-reactive, that is, they are not the product of 
investigations in which individuals are aware of being studied, and therefore can fulfil 
several functions for the qualitative researcher. For example, they can provide 
information on issues that cannot be readily addressed through other methods, and also 
check the validity of information deriving from other methods such as interviewing. In 
this study, the analysis of SOCOG's documents directly informed four main attributes of 
the theoretical framework, namely, 'size', 'specialisation', 'training' and 'liaison 
devices'. As will be shQwn later, the aforementioned attributes have a quantitative 
nature, that is they are operationalised in quantitative terms, and therefore they could be 
more accurately addressed from SOCOG's official reports rather than from the 
interviewees. Moreover, the analysis of official reports of SOCOG, previous OCOGs 
and the IOC, as well as press cuttings of Australian and British newspapers and 
magazines, provided a background for the'formation of the questions of the interviews, 
and also checked the validity of the interviewees' responses. The most valuable 
contribution of the analysis of documentary information to this study, however, was that 
such analysis enabled the researcher to check the gap between reported policy and actual 
practice within SOCOG. For example, interviewees often reported the diffusion of 
decision-making power within SOCOG in a different manner than it is reported in the 
organisation's official documents. Moreover, since the purpose of this study is to 
examine SOCOG over a period of seven years, documents provided historical 
information in the conduct of the interviews. This was essential for the process of 
interviewing, since it both refreshed the memory of interviewees on particular subjects 
and prompted them to embark on in-depth discussions of issues that are not weU 
documented. 
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5.3 DATA COLLECTION 
A major consideration of this study was the selection of individuals to participate within 
the case. Brewerton and Millward (200-1) clairn that the selection of individuals drawn 
from a target population should reflect the population's characteristics in all significant 
aspects. Thus, there was a need to ensure that the sample selected from SOCOG would 
be able to provide a faithful representation of the organisational elements under 
investigation. The individuals that qualified for this research were the senior executives 
of SOCOG who were responsible for organising and delivering the Sydney Games. The 
main reason for this selection was that only senior staff could provide solid information 
for a number of the topics under investigation. For example, the nature of SOCOG's 
organisational environment, which refers to the organisation's relationships with external 
actors such as the IOC or the NSW government, could only be clarified by people who 
had a holistic understanding of the role and operations of SOCOG. Moreover, the senior 
staff of SOCOG were often directly involved in particular dimensions and processes 
under investigation such as in distributing authority within the organisation (i. e. 
6centralisation') or in formulating the strategic direction of the organisation (i. e. 'strategic 
capacity'). That type of sample selection is termed as 'purposive sampling' since 
individuals were selected from a population according to the underlying interest of 
particular groups (Brewerton and Millward, 2001, p. 114). Apart from SOCOG's senior 
staff, a short interview was conducted with Mathew Moore, the leading Olympic editor of 
Sydney Morning Herald. It was fek that the views of a journalist, who had constantly 
reported SOCOG's operations from a critical perspective, would be helpful, particularly 
with regard to issues that the interviewees would feel reluctant to reveal or comment in 
detail, but also in senshising the researcher to key issues, actions and events in the life 
cycle of SOCOG. 
For organisational studies a major problem is to obtain access to the organisation under 
investigation (King, 1994). Bryman (1989) suggests that it is often difficult for 
researchers to get access to organisations for in-depth studies. With the above problem in 
mind, Crompton and Jones (1988) have suggested that if the researcher has a contact 
within the organisation under investigation he or she should secure entry through this 
route and if not, entry should be sought at the top of the organisation since access often 
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has to be approved at this level in any case. In the case of SOCOG the access problem 
was evident early in the design of the research since this organisation was located in 
Sydney, Australia. The researcher sought contact with senior staff of the organisation by 
e-mail communication in April 2000, and in May 2000 the researcher met the Chief 
Executive Officer of the organisation, Mr Sandy Hollway, in Olympia, Greece. Through 
this contact the researcher secured a number of interviews with senior officials of 
SOCOG, including the CEO, in Athens, where they would travel after the end of the 
Sydney Games to debrief the organisers of Athens 2004 Olympics. As planned, in 
November 2000 seven face-to-face interviews were conducted with SOCOG's senior 
staff and an additional interview with Sydney Morning Herald's Olympic editor (Table 
5.3). 
Table 5-3: The Samplefor Semi-Structured Interviews 
o Sandy Hollway-SOCOG's CEO 
* David Richmond- SOCOG's Director General 
*- Bob Elphinston-SOCOG's Head of Sports 
* Bob Leece-SOCOG's Head of Transport 
o Michael Eyers-SOCOG's Deputy CEO 
e Jim Sloman-SOCOG's Chief Operation Officer 
* Linda Hindson-SOCOG's Sports Division Executive 
* Kristine Toohey-SOCOG's Head of Records and Documentation 
* Mathew Moore-Olympic Editor (Sydney Morning Herald) 
SOCOG, however, was not dissolved until the end of 2000, and therefore additional 
information was needed for the period after the Games and until its closure. For that 
reason, additional e-mail contacts were made with the interviewees in the period 
December 2000-March 2001. Moreover, another face-to-face interview was conducted in 
May 2001, in Manchester, England with SOCOG's Head of Records and Documentation, 
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Christine Toohey, who was one of the last individuals to leave the organisation. 
Interviewees were contacted yet another time (various dates within 2001) in order to 
clarify some of their responses but also to provide additional information in particular 
issues under investigation. Effectively, when gaps in the data aroused in the course of 
sorting and analysing both the interviewees' transcripts and documentary material, the 
interviewees were of substantial support. During that process and in order to acquire 
specific information on SOCOG's staff training, an additional e-mail communication was 
conducted with James Riodan, Olympic Training Director of SOCOG's official training 
agency, TAFE NSW (Technical And Further Education). Overall, therefore, the data 
collection of this study was an ongoing process which essentially was extended 
throughout the year 2001. 
All interviews were conducted based on an interview guide (appendix II), which listed 
nine main topics that were under investigation. These topics, upon which the interview 
questions were based, were mainly derived from Mintzberg's modified approach but also 
through informal discussions with various academics with Olympic interests as well as 
through e-mail communication with employees of SOCOG and ATHOC. Kidder (1981) 
has argued that semi-structured interviews elicit the personal and social context of beliefs 
and feelings of the interviewees. He went on to claim that such interviews achieve their 
purpose to the extent that the subject's responses are "spontaneous rather than forced, are 
highly specific and concrete rather than diffuse and general, and are self-reveafing and 
personal rather than superficiar' (p. 187). With the above in mind and in order to 
enhance the validity of the data in terms of obtaining honest questions, interview data 
was pursued by underlining to the interviewees the academic nature of the study and the 
promise that the data would only be used for these purposes. Moreover, during the 
interviews the researcher tried to explain and clarify questions which were 
misunderstood, while avoiding wording them in such a way that might have led the 
interviewee to particular answers (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). The interview questions 
were asked to all interviewees in the same manner and, when it was sensed that the 
interviewee had more things to say about a topic, follow-up questions with additional 
probing and exploration were used, so as to obtain the maximum response from each 
question. Moreover, at the beginning of each interview a brief overview of the scope and 
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objectives of the study was given in order to familiarise the interviewee with the topics 
under study. 
The interview guide was continuously revised through consultation with experienced 
researchers at Loughborough University in order to ensure that the focus of the interview 
questions was appropriate. This was seen as essential in order to ensure the validity of 
the interview questions. After permission was given by the interviewees, all interviews 
were tape-recorded and then transcribed. This increased the reliabUity of the process 
since data was then explicated in such a manner that made it possible to check what q 
statement on a subject was and where the researcher's interpretations began. As was 
mentioned earlier, the transcription of interviews has been seen as an important aspect of 
ensuring the reliabifity of the interview process, a practice which is also termed as 
6procedural reliability' (Flick, 1998, p. 223). In addition, the interview transcripts were 
sent back to the interviewees by e-mail in order to vaUdate their responses. This process, 
which has been termed as 'communicative validation' (Flick, 2002) or 'respondents 
validation' (Mason (2002), is seen as the main mechanism for ensuring the validity of the 
interview data. 
5.4 ANALYSIS OF DATA 
In this study, a major consideration was the analysis of data since the reliance on 
interview transcripts and documentary material generated a huge amount of infortnation. 
Brewerton and Millward (2001) have argued that there are no'clear and universally 
accepted techniques for the analysis of evidence from case studies. They maintain, 
however, that the ultimate goal of the case-study researcher is to treat the evidence fairly, 
to produce compelling analytical conclusions and to rule out alternative interpretations. 
Yin (1994) has suggested two strategies for analysing case study evidence. The first 
relies on the theoretical propositions of the research and the second suggests the 
development of a case description. The first strategy was seen as the most appropriate for 
this study, since the propositions of Mintzberg's (1979) modified approach assisted the 
formation of the research questions and consequently shaped the plan of data collection 
from the interviews. 
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The analysis of the interview data was conducted simultaneously with the analysis of 
related documents and press cuttings to ensure triangulation of data, although a 
preliminary examination of some documents was also conducted (Table 5.4). Both sets 
of data were sorted according to a thematic template consisting of fourteen categories 
relevant to the research questions (appendix V). Each category carried a code under 
which all the pertinent information, meanings and quotes were placed. In the course of 
this coding, inadequacies in the initial template were revealed and as a result the number 
and nature of codes were periodically revised. This method of text data analysis has been 
termed as 'template analysis' (Crabtree and Miller, 1992). According to King (1994), its 
main difference from 'content analysis' is that the template can be revised, perhaps many 
times, through exposure to the textual data, and also the pattern of themes emerging is 
interpreted qualitatively rather than statistically (p. 24). 
Table 5.4: Major Documents Analysed 
" SOCOG's Annual Official Report, 1996 
" SOCOG's Annual Official Report, 1997 
" SOCOG's Annual Official Report, 1998 
" SOCOG's Annual Official Report, 1998 
" SOCOG's Annual Official Report, 1999 
SOCOG's Sport Commision Official Report, 1996-2000 
OCA's Official Report, 1999 
* SOCOG-ATHOC Debriefing Proceedings, 2000 
9 Sydney 2000 Host City Contract 
An additional consideration in the course of analysing the data was the genuineness of the 
information derived from documents and press cuttings. The major limitation of such 
documents is that they are rarely neutral entities because they are written for a specific 
purpose and audience. Calvert (1991) suggested that the researcher should assess the 
suitability of documents for the study by trying to identify the relation of the authors to 
the event as well as the actual meaning of the documented information. When 
documentary information was brought into the template, attention was paid to the 
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position and relevant knowledge of the author as well as to the intended readership of the 
document so as to assess the quality of the information. The triangulation of the data, 
however, ensured that interview and document data would challenge each other on 
conflicting interpretations for a specific topic. 
5.4.1. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 
In the course of analysing the data a major concern was the rating of SOCOG's 
dimensions under investigation, a process which was essential for providing a reliable 
account for each of SOCOG's characteristics, and broadly for enhancing the reliability of 
the study. Effectively, in order to identify possible changes to the nature of SOCOG's 
dimensions during the organisation's life cycle, there was a need to establish the 
boundaries of change for the elements under investigation. This process was a difficult 
task given that previous organisational studies examining structural and contextual 
elements were of minor assistance, as, in contrast with the present study, the majority of 
such studies take account of large samples of organisations and utilise quantitative 
research methods. Effectively, in order to determine the boundaries of organisational 
dimensions, measures of variation are primarily used, such as standard deviations (e. g. 
Kikulis et al, 1995), mean standard scores (e. g. Pugh et al, 1968), z-scores (e. g. 
Theodoraki, 1996) and the like. Moreover, this study essentially aims to assess the utility 
of Mintzberg's theorising for the study of SOCOG, and therefore there was a need to 
provide accounts that would correspond to Mintzberg's descriptions of organisational 
elements. In other words, the rating patterns for SOCOG's dimensions under 
investigation had to be established in such a manner that would produce accounts that 
would effectively fall into Mintzberg's explanations of the organisational elements in 
question. 
Consequently, given that the purpose of the data analysis was to identify the nature of the 
organisational elements of a single organisation over its fife cycle, that is SOCOG, while 
maintaining a comparability of the accounts provided for each of the elements with the 
respective accounts provided by Mintzberg (1979), the rating patterns of SOCOG's 
dimensions and the subsequent determination of threshold points were directed by two 
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main considerations. Firstly, the description attached to each of SOCOG's dimensions 
under investigation had to be SOCOG-specific, in the sense that it had to make sense 
within the specific boundaries exhibited during SOCOG's life cycle. For example, with 
regard to SOCOG's levels of 'specialisation, i. e. the number of operational areas in the 
organisation, the rating pattern devised was based on the upper and lower numbers of 
operational areas established by SOCOG throughout its life cycle. Secondly, the rating 
patterns had to be formulated in a manner that would ensure that the number of different 
accounts provided for a specific dimension under investigation would be consistent with 
the number of accounts provided by Mintzberg (1979) for the respective dimension. For 
example, in order to describe SOCOG's levels of 'specialisation' three accounts were 
established, namely 'low specialisation', 'some specialisation' and 'much specialisation', 
which are in be with Mintzberg's description of the 'specialisation' dimension. 
Therefore, given that the determination of thresholds had to be both SOCOG-specific and 
Mintzberg-specific, the process was often assisted by external data assessors, a practice 
which has also been adopted by Doty et al (1993), who have empirically tested 
Mintzberg's approach. Effectively, when the boundaries of a dimension were difficult to 
set, exp erienced researchers from Loughborough University were involved in the process 
by reassessing the data. This helped to maintain a consistency of descriptions of the 
dimensions under investigation across the life cycle of SOCOG, and essentially enhanced 
the reliability of the study. 
Rating patterns were devised for the majority of SOCOG's dimensions under 
investigation, yet not for all of them. In particular, the dimensions of 'basic part' (i. e. the 
part of the organisation which makes the most significant contribution to SOCOG's 
operations) (Mintzberg, 1979), 'basic co-ordinating mechanism' (i. e. the fundamental 
ways in which SOCOG achieves co-ordination among its divisions and programmes) 
(Mintzberg, 1979), and 'unit grouping' (i. e. the type of criteria used in SOCOG to break 
down organisational units) (Mintzberg, 1979) were excluded from this process, as the 
data analysis of these dimensions was entirely based on the specifications provided by 
Mintzberg's (1979,1981) approach. The 'basic part' of SOCOG was primarily identified 
through analysis of the interview data, and was assessed in view of SOCOG's managers' 
perceptions of the people who produced the bulk of work in the organisation. 
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Consequently, when the bulk of work in SOCOG was produced by its senior staff, the 
basic part would be its 'strategic apex'; when the bulk of work was produced by the staff 
located in the middle level of SOCOG's hierarchy, such as the leaders of the departments 
and programme areas, the basic part would be its 'middle line'; when the bulk of work 
was produced by staff located in the lower level of SOCOG's hierarchy, the basic part 
would be its 'operational core; when the bulk of work was produced by specialist staff, 
such as analysts and accountants, the basic part would be its 'technostructure'; and finally 
when the bulk of work was produced by the staff that provided complementary support to 
SOCOG's operations, such as secretarial and payroll staff, the basic part would be its 
6support staff'. Similarly, the data analysis concerning the 'basic co-ordination 
mechanism' in SOCOG was based on the interviewees' perceptions of the manner that 
work was co-ordinated in the organisation. As such, 'mutual adjustment' would be 
SOCOG's basic co-ordination mechanism when co-ordination was achieved by informal 
communication, 'direct supervision' when a limited number of individuals directed the 
work of others through instructions and orders, 'standard isat ion of work processes', when 
contents of the work were specified, 'standardisation of outputs', when the results of the 
work were specified, 'standardisation of skills', when the kind of training or knowledge 
required to perform the work was specified, and 'standard isat ion of norms', when people 
in the organisation shared the same set of beliefs in order to perform the work. With 
regard to the element of 'unit grouping', the analysis of data was based both on interview 
data and documentary information, and aimed to identify whether the grouping of 
SOCOG's operations was based on functional responsibilities or geographical place, a 
distinction which is grounded on the theorising of major organisational analysis and 
research literature (e. g. Hall et al, 1967; Hall, 1991; Pugh et al, 1968,1969) and is also 
adopted by Mintzberg (1979,1981). Therefore, when operations were primarily grouped 
in terms of the responsibilities of SOCOG's divisions, departments and programmes, its 
unit grouping would be 'functional-based', while in the case that SOCOG's operations 
were grouped according to the responsibilities of the venues of the Games, its unit 
grouping would be 'place-based'. 
With regard to two dimensions under investigation, namely SOCOG's 'formalisation' 
(i. e. the levels of adherence of SOCOG's staff to both formal and informal instructions 
132 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG CHAPTER V 
and procedures) (Hall, 1982), and SOCOG's 'training', (i. e. the levels of training 
required for SOCOG's staff) (Mintzberg, 1979), both sources of data proved insufficient 
on their own as a basis for defining thresholds. With regard to 'formalisation, 
interviewees' replies were not wholly consistent in speci6ting the degree of adherence of 
SOCOG's staff to formal procedures throughout the life cycle of the organisation, while 
in relation to the 'training' dimension, the volume of SOCOG's staff training could not 
be precisely calibrated from either the interviewees or from the information contained in 
the organisation's official documents. In order to clarify the data concerning these two 
dimensions and consequently enhance its validity, additional contacts were made with the 
interviewees as well as with James Riodan, Olympic Training Director of SOCOG's 
official training agency TAFE NSW, via e-mail communication. Those surveyed were 
asked to rate SOCOG's formalisation in different periods of its life cycle that were 
developed according to the interview data. A simple rating scale was used (i. e. I= few 
formal procedures, 2= some formal procedures, 3= many formal procedures) (Appendix 
111), which was based on Mintzberg's (1979) rating criteria of the 'formalisation" 
dimension. All interviewees replied, thus providing a further set of assessments of 
SOCOG's level of formalisation in different periods of its fife cycle. The replies were 
not statistically analysed but rather used to enhance the validity of the interviewees' 
responses. Consequently, when there were 'few' formal procedures in SOCOG the 
organisation would experience 'little formalisation', when there were 'some' formal 
procedures in SOCOG, the organisation would experience 'some formalisation', and 
when 'many' formal procedures was the case, SOCOG wouldý experience 'much 
formalisation'. Similarly, TAFE NSW's Olympic Training Director was asked to rate the 
level of job training of SOCOG's staff in the periods of the organisation's life cycle 
identified earlier, using a three-level scale (i. e. I= little staff training, 2= some staff 
training, 3= much staff -training) 
(Appendix 111), which was also based on Mintzberg's 
(1979) rating criteria of the 'training' dimension. His replies were based on TAFE 
NSW's numerical data, which could not be provided to the researcher at the time of the 
data collection. Effectively, according to the volume of training that SOCOG's staff 
went through, SOCOG's levels of training were characterised as 'little', 'some' or 
'much'. 
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With regard to SOCOG's organisational '*size' (i. e. the number of staff available to 
SOCOG) (Kimberly, 1976; Hall, 1972), a three-level rating scale was devised to 
determine whether the organisation was 'small', 'medium' or 'large'. This separation is 
consistent with Mintzberg's description of organisational size and also pertains much of 
previous organisational research (e. g. Pugh et al, 1968,1969a; Kimberly, 1976; Roberts 
et al 1989). The rating boundaries for SOCOG's size followed a widely accepted 
definition of organisational size, which has been adopted by the majority of recent 
organisational research (e. g. Ghobadian and Gallear, 1997; Germain and Spears, 1999), 
and suggests that a 'small' organisation employs up to 50 staff, a 'medium' organisation 
employs up to 300 staff, and a 'large' organisation employs more than 300 staff (World 
Bank Group, 2002). 
The dimension of 'organisational environment' was synthesised by the analysis of two 
measures, namely 'complqxity' (i. e. the number and heterogeneity of external elements 
influencing SOCOG), and, stability' (i. e. the levels of prediction of the needs of external 
elements influencing SOCOG) (Duncan, 1972). With regard to SOCOG's environmental 
6complexity' a four-level rating scale was devised, which was based on Mintzberg's 
(1979) descriptions of the 'complexity' dimension, and aimed to identify whether 
SOCOG's environment was 'simple', `relatively simple', 'relatively complex' or 
'complex'. Firstly, using both interview data and documentary information, thirteen 
external organisations that influenced SOCOG throughout its fife cycle were identified 
and grouped into four broadly homogeneous categories, namely 'Olympic Movement', 
6public governance', 4commercial sector', and 'public groups'. Then, SOCOG's 
&complexity' was rated according to the impression that was built up by the interviewees 
and in co-operation with external assessors as foflows: 'simple'. when the number of the 
organisations influencing SOCOG was small (i. e. three or less) and homogeneous (i. e. 
from one or two of the categories); 'relatively simple', when the number of the 
organisations influencing SOCOG was relatively small (i. e. four to six) and relatively 
homogeneous (i. e. from two or three of the categories); 'relatively complex', when the 
number of the organisations influencing SOCOG was relatively large (i. e. seven to nine) 
and relatively heterogeneous (i. e. from three of four of the categories); and 'complex' 
when the number of the organisations influencing SOCOG was large (i. e. ten or more) 
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and heterogeneous (i. e. from all the categories). With regard to SOCOG's environmental 
"stability' an additional four-level rating scale was devised which aimed to identify 
whether SOCOG's environment was perceived by its senior staff as 'stable', 'relatively 
stable', 'relatively dynamic', or 'dynamic'. SOCOG's environmental 'stability' was 
rated as: 'stable", when the needs of SOCOG's environment were substantially defined 
by SOCOG's staff; 'relatively stable', when the needs of SOCOG's environment were 
relatively defined by SOCOG's staff-, 'relatively dynamic', when the needs of SOCOG's 
environment were relatively unknown to SOCOG's staff, and 'dynamic', when the needs 
of SOCOG's environment were substantially unknown to SOCOG's staff. 
The dimension of 'power' was rated by determining the degree of representation of 
external actors on the main decision-making bodies of SOCOG (Pugh et a], 1968,1969a). 
As was mentioned in previous chapters, SOCOG was by its very nature an externally 
controlled organisation as much by the IOC as by the state government of the New South 
Wales. Consequently, the analysis of the 'power' dimension did not aim to identify 
whether SOCOG was externally controlled. or not, but rather to determine to the extent to 
which the decision-making bodies of the organisation were controlled by external 
organisations or individuals. Therefore, a three-level rating pattern was devised, namely 
, low external control', 'moderate external control' and 'high external control', which is 
also in line with Mintzberg's description of the 'power' dimension. Having identified the 
main decision-making bodies of SOCOG, the 'power' dimension was initially considered 
with regard to the analysis of a quantitative factor, that is the number of individuals from 
external organisations in the main decision-making bodies of the organisation. 
Effectively, when the number of externally controlled individuals in the decision-making 
bodies of SOCOG was proportionally smaller than that of SOCOG's executives, SOCOG 
was considered 'least externally controlled', while in case the number of externally 
controlled individuals in the decision-making bodies of SOCOG was proportionally 
bigger than that of SOCOG's executives, SOCOG was considered 'highly externally 
controlled'. Finally, when SOCOG's administration and external organisations were 
equally represented in the main decision-making bodies of SOCOG, the organisation was 
considered 'moderately externally controlled'. However, given the multiple exchange of 
decision-making authority between SOCOG and external organisations, the 'power' 
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dimension was also considered by qualitatively analysing the extent to which the 
officially reported decision-making bodies of SOCOG actually took the major decisions 
for the organisation. In other words, SOCOG's 'power' was also measured through the 
analysis of a qualitative factor, that is the degree to which the established decision- 
making bodies of SOCOG were directed by external organisations or individuals. This 
analysis was based on the interviewees' perceptions of the power distribution in SOCOG, 
and essentially aimed to identify whether the organisation had the adequate power to put 
forward their own decisions. For example, when the main decision-making body in 
SOCOG was a committee that primarily comprised SOCOG's executives, that is the 
organisation was 'least externally controlled', attention was placed on the influence of 
external organisations or individuals on the members of the committee and on their 
subsequent decisions. 
The dimension of 'resource dependence' was measured by determining the levels of 
importance of resources possessed by external organisations to SOCOG (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Given that SOCOG was formed as a resource-dependent organisation, 
the types of resources which were essential for the organisation's operations , were 
firstly 
identified through analysis of both interview and documentary data, and grouped into 
four categories, namely 'financial resources', 'human resources', 'physical resources' 
(i. e. sport venues, equipment and the like), and 'intangibles' (i. e. the brand name and the 
corporate status of the organisation), following Jonhson and Scholes' (1997) 
classification of organisational resources. Then, the rating of the 'resource-dependence' 
dimension was based on the interview data and was measured on a three-level rating 
scale, in order to determine whether SOCOG operated under 'low resource dependence' 
Gmedium resource dependence' or 'high resource-dependence. Effectively, when the 
utilisation of externally held resources was perceived by interviewees as not essential for 
SOCOG's operations, that is the organisation could utilise alternative internal resources, 
its resource-dependence was considered 'low'. In the event that the utilisation of 
externally held resources was moderately essential for SOCOG's operations, that is the 
organisation could utilise a moderate amount of alternative internal resources, its 
resource-dependence was considered 'moderate'. Finally, when the utilisation of 
externally held resources was absolutely essential for SOCOG's operations, that is the 
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organisation could not utilise alternative internal resources, its resource dependence was 
considered 'high'. 
With reference to the 'specialisation' dimension, that is the number of operational areas 
(major divisions, departments and programmes) in SOCOG (Hall et al, 1967; Kikulis et 
al, 1989; Hollenbeck, 2000), a three-level rating scale was devised to determine whether 
there was 'little', 'some' or 'much' specialisation in the organisation, thus ensuring 
consistency with the accounts of 'specialisation' provided by Mintzberg. The 
establishment of thresholds and the subsequent assessment of this dimension was a two- 
step process. Firstly, using data from SOCOG's official documents the total number of 
operational areas established by the organisation throughout its life cycle was identified, 
that is 95, and it was divided into three equal portions (i. e. 32 operational areas) to 
correspond to the three levels of 'specialisation'. Consequently, a quantitative indicator 
of SOCOG's 'specialisation' was established. In particular, when SOCOG operated with 
31 or less operational areas its level of 'specialisation' was considered 'little'; when 
SOCOG operated with 32 to 63 operational areas, its level of specialisation was 
considered 'some'; and when SOCOG operated with 64 or more operational areas its 
level of 'specialisation' was considered 'much'. Having the rating pattern above as a 
basis, the second step involved analysis of the interview data which was related to 
'specialisation'. Specifically, SOCOG's level of 'specialisation' was further assessed in 
view of the interviewees' perceptions of the quantity of operational areas in the 
organisation. For example, if SOCOG were found to operate with 20 operational areas at 
a given period of its life cycle, that is there was 'little' specialisation in the organisation 
according to the quantitative indicator, it would be also assessed whether the impression 
that was build up by the interviewees suggested that indeed the organisation experienced 
low levels of specialisation during that period. 
The evaluation of the - dimension of 'liaison devices' (i. e. the number of standing 
committees, commissions and task forces in SOCOG) (Mintzberg, 1979) followed a logic 
similar to the evaluation of 'specialisation'. In particular, based on Mintzberg's 
description of 'liaison devices' a three-lcvel rating scale was developed to identify 
whether there were 'few', 'some' or 'many' standing committees, commissions and task 
forces in SOCOG. Initially, a quantitative indicator was developed by identifying the 
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maximum number of committees, commissions and task forces with which SOCOG 
operated, that is 14, and by dividing it into three equal portions. As such, SOCOG's 
'liaison devices' were firstly considered as follows: 'few', when they were five or less, 
6 some" when they were between six and ten, and 'many' when they were eleven or more. 
In view of the indicator above further analysis of the interview data was subsequently 
conducted in order to evaluate the interviewees' perceptions of the quantity of 'liaison 
devices' under which the organisation operated. Effectively, on the assumption that some 
of the committees or commissions established by SOCOG would have lost their 
significance or become inactive during the organisation's life cycle, further assessment of 
the dimension was required to identify whether the number of 'liaison devices' suggested 
by the quantitative indicator corresponded to SOCOG's organisational reality. For 
example, if SOCOG was found to operate with seven 'liaison devices' in a certain period 
of its life cycle, that is the organisation operated with 'some liaison devices' according to 
quantitative indicator, attention would be placed on the interviewees' perceptions of the 
role and significance of each of the reported 'liaison devices' in that particular period. 
The dimension of 'centrafisation' was measured by determining the level in the hierarchy 
of SOCOG where the bulk of final decisions were made (Pugh et al, 1969; Kikulis et al, 
1989; Theodoraki, 1996). Following Mintzberg's (1979) approach, a four-level rating 
pattern was devised, namely 'centralisation', 'limited decentralisation'. 'decentralisation' 
and 'selective decentrafisation9. Effectively, when the authority for final decisions was 
rested at the top of SOCOG's hierarchy, that is the Board of Directors or the senior 
management, SOCOG was considered 'centralised'. In case the decision-making 
authority was mainly vested in the middle line management, SOCOG was considered 
'limited decentralised9. SOCOG was considered 'decentralised' when final decisions 
were primarily made by the staff at the lower levels of SOCOG's hierarchy, that is its 
6operational core'. Finally, SOCOG was considered 'selectively decentralised', when the 
authority for final decisions was selectively delegated to its 'operational core9 at the 
lower levels of the organisation's hierarchy. 
Finally, the dimension of 'strategic capacity' was considered by determining the degree 
to which SOCOG could formulate its own strategies at operational level. In particular, 
the analysis of this dimension aimed to identify whether SOCOG had the adequate 
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authority to draw its own strategic direction with regard to its operational activities, such 
as its marketing and financial strategy, and consequently to discover the extent to which 
SOCOG's operational strategies were constrained by external organisations or 
individuals. A three-level rating pattern was devised, namely 'low strategic capacity', 
'medium strategic capacity' and 6high strategic capacity'. By assessing the interviewees' 
perceptions of the extent that the organisations' strategies were externally constrained, 
the 'strategic capacity' dimension was evaluated as follows: when SOCOG was found to 
have limited space to operate its own strategies, the organisation's 'strategic capacity' 
was considered 'low'. In case that SOCOG were found to have extensive space to 
operate its own strategies, its 'strategic capacity' was considered 'high'. Finally, when 
SOCOG was found to have considerable space to operate its own strategies, yet to a 
degree it was constrained by external factors, the organisation's strategic capacity was 
considered ' medium'. For example, if the impression that was built up by the 
interviewees suggested t6t the majority of SOCOG's operational strategies were 
considerably hindered or refonned by external organisations, such as the IOC or the 
NSW goverment or by powerful individuals, such as the president of an organisation or 
a politician, the organisation's 'strategic capacity' would be considered 'low. 
To conclude, the process of analysing the -data was guided by two main considerations. 
Firstly, the issues of validity and reliability of the data were of central importance during 
the data analysis. With regard to the former, by sorting the data according to a research 
template, the analysis of the interviews' transcripts and the documentary material 
occurred simultaneously, and was assisted by the interviewees' feedback, in order to 
achieve triangulation of data, and consequently enhance the validity of the data. With 
regard to the latter, SOCOG's dimensions under investigation were analysed on the basis 
of individual rating patterns, and often with the contribution of external assessors, which 
essentially enhanced the reliability of the data. Secondly, to a great extent the analysis of 
data was guided by Mintzberg's (1979) configuration approach to organisational analysis. 
In particular, the evaluation of SOCOG's dimensions was largely based on the rating 
criteria used in Mintzberg's approach, in order to allow comparison between the 
descriptions of SOCOG's organisational characteristics and those provided by Mintzberg 
for the elements of the organisational types he identifies. It was felt that this practice 
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would enable the researcher to comment on the usefulness of the conceptual framework 
utilised for the study of SOCOG, and consequently fulfil one of the main objectives of 
this study. 
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In previous chapters it was shown that the conceptual framework for this study is a 
configuration model, which consists of fourteen main elements. These elements have 
formed a research template (Appendix V) upon which SOCOG's organisational reality is 
examined. The information that informs the research template is primarily derived from 
the semi-structured research interviews but is also supported by secondary documentary 
sources. This chapter, therefore, extracts information both from primary and secondary 
data and aims to present a synthesis of evidence for SOCOG's organisational life with 
regard to the topics of the research template. 
The chapter contains two main parts. The first part constitutes an analytical chronology 
of SOCOG's operational life, which also serves as an introduction to the organisational 
analysis of the organisation, and highlights key events in SOCOG's seven-year life cycle. 
The second part draws evidence mainly from the research interviews and presents the 
organisational condition of SOCOG with reference to its contextual characteristics and 
structural design parameters. This bipartite framework for the presentation of results is 
designed not only to illuminate the organisational structure and processes of SOCOG 
from a variety of differing perspectives but also to provide a rich and comprehensive 
basis for the analysis of results, which follows in chapter VIL 
6.1 AN ANALYTICAL CHRONICLE OF SOCOG 
This section aims to provide an analytical chronology of the operations of SOCOG. 
Firstly, SOCOG's institutional setting and main organisational responsibilities are 
presented. Secondly, significant internal events that characterised the operational life of 
SOCOG are highlighted as well as external events that affected the organisation's 
operations. Further, and for a fuller understanding of SOCOG's organisational progress, 
a chronology is presented. The section ends with a summary of the key events of 
SOCOG's seven-year life cycle. 
The organisational structure of the Sydney Olympics was based upon a cooperative 
arrangement between the Australian public sector, particularly the state of the New South 
Wales (NSW), which underwrote the Games, the local and international business 
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community and the Australian and international Olympic and sporting movements. 
SOCOG was one of the three key organisations that delivered the Sydney 2000 Olympic 
Games, together with the Olympic Co-ordination Authority (OCA) and the Olympic 
Roads and Transport Authority (ORTA), which were NSW government's agencies. All 
three organisations were interdependent, and over time their interaction and integration 
progressed to the point where the Games' organisation was undertaken under a single 
body, i. e. 'Sydney 2000', which effectively merged the operations of the three 
aforementioned organisations. 
SOCOG was established in 12 November 1993 as a statutory corporation under the 
Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games Act 1993 by the NSW 
Parliament, and became part of the Host City Contract (HCC), which involved the IOC, 
the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC) and the City of Sydney (NSW, 1993, Section 
10). Under its charter, SOCOG's responsibilities in relation to the Games were: 
* To implement the sports programme, including preparing and operating all venues 
and fhcilities for the Games; 
* To organise the cultural programme; 
9 To establish a marketing programme in consultation with the IOC and the 
Austmlian Olympic Committee (AOC); and 
* To arrange and make available host broadcaster and television and radio facilities 
and other information services (SOCOG, 2001a). 
In effect, SOCOG responsibilities included the areas of sport competition, the Olympic 
Village, ticketing, sponsor servicing, ceremonies, licensed products, press operations, 
protocol, the torch relay, arts festivals and the entire Olympic broadcasting arrangements 
(SOCOG, 1996). Therefore, SOCOG's operations involved a wide range of 
responsibilities which were central to the successful organisation of the event. 
Organ isationally, SOCOG was established in the form of a private corporation under a 
Board of Directors which was, however, appointed by the Governor of the NSW. This 
meant that SOCOG was essentially established as a blend of a private enterprise and a 
public authority, since the responsibility for the appointment of the leadership of the 
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organisation lay in the hands of the NSW government. A major implication of such an 
institutional setting for SOCOG was that the structure and, to a degree, the operations of 
the organisation were affected by the political conditions of the time, particularly those 
within the State of NSW. For example, SOCOG was formed under a Conservative Party 
State government which appointed Gary Pemberton as President of SOCOG's Board. In 
July 1994, Mr Pemberton was granted the position of Executive President of SOCOG, 
holding also responsibilities of a CEO. At the NSW State elections of March 1995, the 
Conservative government was succeeded by a new Labour Party government which in 
turn replaced Mr Pemberton with John Illife, and appointed Mal Hernmerling as CEO of 
the organisation. The new State government established a new Cabinet post of Minister 
for the Olympics, a position which was awarded to MP Michael Knight. In September 
1996, in a controversial move, Michael Knight replaced John Illife to take also the 
Presidency of SOCOG, a position that Michael Knight would hold until the end of the 
event (SOCOG, 1997). 
During its formative years, therefore, SOCOG experienced several changes of its 
leadership primarily as a result of the political alteration in the State of NSW- Such 
changes combined with the inexperience of SOCOG as an Olympic agency, resulted in a 
slow development of the organisation in terms of establishing its functional areas 
(SOCOG, 1997). In effect, the formative years of SOCOG constituted the initiation of 
the organisation into the Olympic project. Like most OCOGs, SOCOG embarked on the 
Olympic Project with limited detailed information about the preparation and running of 
the Olympic Games, and consequently during that period, SOCOG was trying to 
comprehend its position within the organisation model of the Sydney Olympics. In the 
course of its formative years, therefore, SOCOG was rather a small organisation that was 
primarily concerned with understanding its role with regard to the organisation of the 
event and establishing. its key strategic relationship with the state government 
(Elphinston, 2000a). 
A milestone for SOCOG's operations was the execution of the 1996 Atlanta Games. A 
group of SOCOG's staff observed the running of the event and was also debriefed on the 
organisational aspects of the Games through formal and informal meetings with key staff 
of the Atlanta organising committee (ACOG). In addition, SOCOG purchased Games- 
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. related information from ACOG in the form of written documents which covered aspects 
of the preparation and execution of the event (SOCOG, 2001 a). As a result, the end of 
the Atlanta Games signified a new era for SOCOG in terms of organisational knowledge, 
since the organisation had then acquired first-hand information and experience of the 
organisation of the Olympic Games. Moreover, the end of the Atlanta Olympics turned 
the focus of the Olympic movement and the world's sport media to the Sydney Games. 
An important consequence was that SOCOG intensified its contact with the entities of the 
Olympic movement, such as the IOC and the EFs as well as with the Olympic sponsors 
and mediaporporations, which together constitute the main elements for the operation of 
every Games (Hollway, 2000). 
In March 1997 SOCOG's CEO, Mal Hemmerling, was replaced by Sandy Hollway. That 
was the last change at SOCOG's leadership that SOCOG would see until the end of the 
Games. SOCOG's leadership structure, mainly with regard to the dual role of MP, 
Michael Knight was constantly subject to severe criticism, not only from the NSW 
political opposition but also from the Conservative Federal Australian government, both 
of which opposed the idea of a politician leading an Olympic agency. The reality, 
however, was that Michael Knight took over the bulk of SOCOG's decision-making 
power, which meant that the NSW government furthered its control over SOCOG 
(Moore, 2000a). Consequently, as the Olympics were coming closer, the Conservative 
Party-controlled Australian Federal government resented the role of the Labour- 
controlled NSW government which was gradually taking all the kudos associated with 
the Games. It is true, however, that although the Sydney Olympics became embroiled in 
political struggle from time to time, in general this was kept to a minimum. This was not 
always easy if we bear in mind that from the date that Sydney launched its bid in 1991, 
the NSW government had been under different political party control to that in office in 
the Federal Australian government. 
From 1997 onwards SOCOG grew rapidly as new functional areas were established in 
order to deal with the increasing number of interest groups involved in the Games. 
SOCOG's next organisational target was the running of the Test Events, a series of sport 
competitions, which were scheduled for September 1999 and designed to test SOCOG's 
procedures and practices under real event conditions (SOCOG, 1999). SOCOG's 
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managerial ability, however, to deal with the complexity of the Olympic preparations was 
subject to criticism from the NSW government, mainly in relation to its ability to deal 
with budgetary planning. SOCOG's budget needed to be bailed out twice by the NSW 
government, which was then keen to take more responsibilities from SOCOG (Moore, 
2000b). In early 1999, SOCOG's reputation was even more tarnished when its ticketing 
policy literally collapsed. The organisers failed to deal successfully with 137,000 pre- 
paid applications for Olympic tickets, and as a result, the Australian public as well as the 
NSW government lost confidence in SOCOG's administrative ability. Ten months 
before the event, SOCOG's performance was presented through the media as inadequate 
for organising the event, a fact that created a negative climate around the organisation of 
the Sydney Olympics as a whole (Hollway, 2000). This resulted in the NSW government 
getting even more involved in the preparations of the Games, mainly by replacing key 
SOCOG staff with NSW civil servants, who took responsibility for some of the most 
important areas of the organisation, but also by imposing stricter budgetary controls on 
SOCOG. In particular, in February 2000, SOCOG's venue operational programs and 
budgets were outsourced to the OCA, including venue acquisition, Games presentation, 
environment, spectator services, catering, cleaning and waste management and venue 
overlay (SOCOG, 2001b). Furthermore, SOCOG outsourced the administration of all the 
sport-related issues of the Games to the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC), and 
consequently the organisation's power was even more diminished. However, SOCOG's 
role was still essential since its central responsibility was to co-ordinate the activities of 
all the constituents of the Games, ensuring the smooth transaction of the event. 
in late May 2000 the Main Operations Centre (MOC) became operational. The MOC 
was the central mechanism of co-ordination and control for all the Games' operations, 
and its launch signified that SOCOG and all the other constituents of the Sydney 
Olympics reached the very last stage of preparations for the Games. As was mentioned 
earlier, SOCOG's main responsibility was to run the event, and therefore after May 2000 
its main concern was to organise and co-ordinate the activities and responsibilities of the 
various agencies involved in order to ensure consistency and effectiveness of operations 
during the Games, which took the form of intensive simulation exercises in what was 
called 'Sydney 2000 Technical and Operational Readiness Exercising' (STORE) 
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(Sloman, 2000b). Therefore, four months before the event, the testing of the Games' 
operations became the main task for SOCOG. Another area of major concern for 
SOCOG was the recruitment and training of the Games' workforce. Within the four 
months preceding the Games, SOCOG's paid staff numbers were doubled and 
approximately 41,000 volunteers were recruited and trained (Sloman, 2000d). 
In terms of organisational structure, SOCOG changed significantly after May 2000. In 
June 2000 the Board of Directors was virtually replaced by the Games Co-ordination 
Group (GCOG) (Buckle, 2000). The GCOG was established in December 1999, bringing 
together top executives of the key agencies responsible for the Games. It was headed by 
NSW Minister for the Olympics, Michael Knight and AOC President John Coates 
(SOCOG, 2001 a). GCOG was formed as a co-ordination body, yet from June 2000 it 
held considerable decision-making power since it would decide on matters that could not 
be resolved at a senior management level (Eyers, 2000). During the event, the 
responsibilities of the Board of Directors were officially vested in the GCOG, and 
particularly in Michael Knight and John Coates who formed a'Games-time Commission' 
to make decisions at short notice (SOCOG, 2000b). Moreover, a few months before the 
Games, OCA, which was formed to act as the co-ordination body between SOCOG and 
the NSW government, and was also responsible for delivering the entire new Games- 
related infi-astructure, and ORTA, which was responsible for co-ordinating all ground 
transport services for the event, merged their operations with SOCOG under a common 
co-ordinating entity, commonly known as 'Sydney 2000'. 'Sydney 2000' was headed by 
OCA's Director General David Richmond, who also became Director General of 
SOCOG in August 2000 (SOCOG, 2000a). A few weeks before the Gaines, therefore, 
SOCOG was assimilated into a new organisational scheme, which essentially gave the 
NSW government further control over the Games' delivery. 
The actual period of Olympic Games competition took place from September 15,2000 to 
October 1,2000. The sport competitions were executed by 40 venue teams which were 
located at the sporting and non-sporting venues, under the supervision of the GCOO and 
in co-ordination with the MOC which was acting as the main co-ordination body of the 
Games. Right after the Gaines, a group of SOCOG's staff moved to the organising 
committee of the 2000 Paralympic Games (Sloman, 2000c), and the organisation was 
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preparing for its dissolution, which was officially achieved at the end of the year 2000. 
After the Games, SOCOG's main task was to make the appropriate actions, in order for 
the organisation to finalise its operations. That involved a series of legal arrangements, 
particularly with regard to SOCOG's obligations to the Host City Contract and to the 
state of NSW, which was the underwriter of the organisation (Eyers, 2001). Moreover, 
SOCOG undertook the responsibility to record and transfer the organisational knowledge 
acquired during the Sydney Olympics to future Olympic Organising Committees. 
Effectively, SOCOG became an integral part of the Transfer of Olympic Knowledge 
(TOK) programme, a joint initiative of SOCOG, IOC and the Athens 2004 Organising 
Committee (ATHOC), which aimed to gather key documents and data from the Sydney 
Olympics, which could then be used by ATHOC but also by future OCOGs. This 
process involved the filing of a series of Olympic organisational manuals, a task which 
was undertaken by record specialists in SOCOG, as well as numerous debriefings from 
key SOCOG's staff to their counterparts in other OCOGs (Toohey, 200 1). 
The period after the Games was marked by the resignation of the President of SOCOG, 
Michael Knight. That occurred a week after the Games, in October 2000, and as a 
response to this the responsibility for SOCOG was transferred to the NSW Treasurer, 
Michael Eagan (SOCOG, 2001a). One month after the Games, legislation was passed by 
the NSW Parliament to allow OCA to take full responsibility of the wind-up process and 
to effectively succeed SOCOG after the end of 2000 (Sydney 2000 Games 
Administration Act 2000). SOCOG eventually dissolved in December 31,2000. 
Specifically, from January 1,2001 the Director-General of OCA, David Richmond, took 
over the responsibilities of the Board and CEO of SOCOG. Moreover, a special Wind- 
Up Steering Committee was established which met fortnightly to review and receive 
reports on the financial and legal affairs of SOCOG. Financial management of all 
Olympic agencies from this date was brought under the overall supervision of OCA's 
Executive Director (SOCOG, 2001 a). 
To summarise, SOCOG was by its very nature a peculiar organisation both institutionally 
and operationally. With regard to the former, SOCOG was formed not only as a 
temporary Olympic agency but also as a statutory authority of the NSW government. 
This meant that the organisation was subject to regulation by the permanent bodies of the 
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Olympic Movement, such as the IOC and the IFs, as well as by the NSW government's 
authorities, such as OCA, which were involved in the preparations for the Sydney 
Olympics. With regard to the latter, and often interrelated to its institutional position, 
SOCOG went through several organisational changes. In particular, the election of a new 
Labour Party State government triggered consequent changes on the leadership of the 
organisation. Significant changes also occurred with regard to the nature and intensity of 
NSW government's involvement in the Games with the creation of OCA, which 
incorporated the entire NSW responsibilities for the Games, and with the appointment of 
NSW Minister for the Olympics, Michael Knight, as President of SOCOG in September 
1996. 
SOCOG faced financial difficulties and the loss of confidence of the NSW government, 
particularly after the failure of its ticketing programme in February 1999. From that 
point onwards SOCOG underwent further changes as it started losing vital operational 
responsibilities as well as significant elements of its authority for the management of the 
event as a whole. In particular, the establishment of the GCOG in December 1999, which 
excluded SOCOG's CEO from its leadership, and the outsourcing of the bulk of venue 
operations and budgets to OCA, in February 2000, undermined SOCOG's authority and 
essentially weakened its role in the Games. After May 2000 SOCOG experienced further 
organisational changes. Specifically, the bulk of its staff moved to the venues in the form 
of Venue Teams under the supervision and control of a single body, the MOC. Further, 
in June 2000, the merger of OCA and SOCOG under the leadership of OCA's Director 
General, David Richmond, and his subsequent appointment as Director General of 
SOCOG further reduced SOCOG's sphere of responsibility for the running of the event. 
SOCOG continued to change after the Games. President Michael Knight resigned and 
OCA took full responsibility of managing the dissolution of SOCOG, which effectively 
dissolved in December 2000. Overall, therefore, SOCOG's life cycle was marked by a 
series of events and decisions which often triggered organisational changes. Table 6.1 
provides a chronology of SOCOG through an extensive summary of the key events which 
marked its seven-year life cycle. 
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Table 6.1: The Chronology ofSOCOGs Life Cycle. 
-SOCOG is established by a NSW Parliament Act. 
November 1993 -A 14-member Board of Directors is formed under the Presidency of Gary 
Pemberton. 
July 1994 -Gary Pemberton is appointed as CEO of SOCOG. 
-A ne Labour Party government is elected in the NSW state and MP 
Michael Knight is appointed as Minister for the Olympics. 
March 1995 The Olympic Co-ordination Authority Act 1995 merges the NSW 
government's responsibilities in the Games into one statutory authority, the 
Olympic Co-ordination Authority (OCA). 
-Gary Pemberton is replaced by Mal Hernmerling as CEO of SOCOG. August 1995 
March 1996 
August 1996 
-Gary Pemberton is replaced by John Illife as President of SOCOG. 
-SOCOG delegations observe the running of the 1996 Atlanta Games. 
-SOCOG President John Illife is replaced by the NSW Minister for the September 1996 Olympics Michael Knight. 
-The Olympic Roads and Tmnsportation Authority (ORTA) is established March 1997 with the role of co-ordinating the Olympic transport services. 
September 1997 -SOCOG CEO Mal Hernmerling is replaced by Sandy Hollway. 
SOCOG's Ticketing Programme fails to satisfy pre-paid applications. February 1999 SOCOG faces financial difficulties. 
September 1999 OG runs a series of Test Events. 
-The Games Coordination Group (GCOG) is established, bringing together 
December 1999 the top executives of the key agencies responsible for staging the Sydney 
2000 Games. 
-Following SOCOG's continuing financial difficulties, SOCOG outsources February 2 000 to OCA a package of venue operational programs and budgets. 
-The -Venue Tcams move to the venues. The Main Operations Centre 
becomes the central co-ordination body of the Games. 
May 2000 
-The STORE programme is launched to test readiness and co-ordination of 
activities of the agencies involved in the Games. 
-SOCOG's Board of Directors responsibilities are moved to the GCOG. 
June2000 -SOCOG, OCA and ORTA are merged under the 'Sydney 2000' headed by 
OCA Director General David Richmond. 
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1 -OCA's Director General, David Richmond is appointed Director-General of August 2000 SOCOG. 
-The Sydney Olympics are executed by 40 Vcnue Teams under the co- September 2000 ordination of the MOC. 
-The Sydney Olympics finish. 
October 2000 
SOCOG's President Michael Knight resigns. 
-OCA takes full responsibility of the wind-up process of the Games and December 2000 SOCOG is dissolved. 
6.2 THE ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCOG 
This section presents the organisational characteristics of SOCOG based on the 
conceptual framework developed for the study. As was mentioned in previous chapters, 
the theoretical fi-amework which was utilised to examine SOCOG, constitutes a modified 
version of Mintzberg's (1979) configuration approach (Table 6.2). In particular, 
SOCOG's organisational condition is analysed with respect to its contextual 
characteristics and its structural design parameters. The former includes its size, the 
conditions of its organisational environment (complexity and stability), the level of its 
dependence on externally held resources (resource dependence), and its level of control 
by external entities (power). The latter comprises the level of formalisation, 
specialisation, centralisation and staff training in the organisation as well as the criteria 
used for its unit grouping, and the number of its liaison deviceý. This synthesis of 
SOCOG's organisational condition incorpomtes the presentation of three additional 
elements, namely, the basic mechanisms utilised for co-ordination in SOCOG (basic co- 
ordination mechanism), the parts of the organisation with the most significant 
contribution to its operations (basic part of the organisation), and its capacity for strategic 
formation (strategic cap' acity). The time aspect is central to this presentation, since 
SOCOG's organisational characteristics are not captured at a specific point in time but 
rather in the course of its seven-year life cycle. As such, particular attention is placed 
upon the fluctuations that the organisational elements under investigation exhibited 
across SOCOG's organisational time. 
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Table 6.2: SOCOG's Organisatiemat Flemoits undcr lnvestigatiw7 
CONTEXTUAL STRUCTURAL DESIGN 
CHARACTERISTICS PARAMETERS 
size Specialisation 
Environmental Complexity Formalisation 
Environmental Stability 
Resource Dependence 
Power 
Centralisation 
r 
Unit Grouping 
1 Liaison Devices 
rraining 
Basic Co-ordination Mechanism 
I Basic Part ofthe Organisation 
Strategic Capacity 
6.2.1 SOCOC's ORGANISATIONAL SIZE 
CI IA I'll RVI 
SOCOG was established as a small organisation, whose size increased gradually up until 
the time of the Games and decreased rapidly right after the end of the event. In terrns of' 
paid staff, SOCOG started its operations with 16 mernber% of' the Sydney 2000 Bid 
Committee, who joined SOCOG on its tormation, and by the time ofthe Games, its staff 
figures reached 3341 employees. As figure 6.1 depicts, SOCOG's growth rates were not 
linear throughout its seven-year life cycle, since in its forrnative years the organisation 
developed very slowly. In particular, within the first three years of' its operations, 
SOCOG grew from 16 to 113 members of staff(Sydney 2000-ATHOC, 2000). 1 lowever, 
four years before the Games, and particularly after the Atlanta 1996 Games, SOCOG's 
growth rate started to soar, as the organisation was almost doubling its staffevery year 
(Table 6.3). Three years before the Games SOCOG employed 374 stall'I 742 staff two 
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years before the Games while one year before the Games SOCOG's staff increased to 
1252. 
Figure 6.1: Evolution of SOCOG's Paid Staff Numbers 
Evolution of Socog's Size 
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(Source: Sydney 2000-ATHOC, 2000) 
SOCOG's organisational growth increased substantially after the Main Operations Centre 
(MOC) became operational, in May 2000. The establishment of the MOC was an 
indication that SOCOG was moving closer to a structure suited to the running of the 
Games. Venues became the focal point for the organisation of SOCOG which was now 
functioning under a single co-ordinating body, the MOC. As such, the Venue Teams had 
to be fully recruited in order to experience real time conditions and test their operations. 
Consequently, within five months SOCOG almost doubled its size employing 
approximately 1500 more staff and reaching a total number of 3341 staff at the time of 
the event. The vast majority of the staff employed during that period was hired 2-3 
months before the Games and was pfimarily allocated to existing Venue Teams (Sloman, 
2000d). 
Table 6.3: SOCOG's Staff Evolution after the 1996 Atlanta Games 
September September September September May September 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2000 
F 
113- 374 742 1252 1800 3341 
(Source: Sydney 2000-ATHOC, 2000) 
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Out of the 3,341 SOCOG's staff in post in September 2000,24 held executive positions 
such as CEO, Deputy CEO, Business Group Managers and General Managers, only four 
of whom were women. Overall 60% of SOCOG's total paid staff were men while 12,2% 
were people from racial, ethnic and ethno-religious groups, 1,6% were Aboriginals and 
2,1% people with a disability (Sydney 2000-ATHOC, 2000). It is worth mentioning that 
in addition to SOCOG's paid staff, almost 41,000 volunteers worked for the Sydney 
Olympics as well as more than 100,000 people who were associated with the event 
through their employment with companies to which the organisers had outsourced Games 
services, such as catering, cleaning and so on (Fable 6A). 
Table 6-4: Sydney 2000 Games-time Workforce Statistics as in September 2000 
: Z: - -, ii 
ýaid Contractors TOTAL P-, 
_711, 
F3.341 
103 - 190 
147.444 
(Source: Sloman, 2000d) 
6.21 SOCOG's ORGANISATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
As was mentioned earlier, SOCOG was formed as the central organisational body of the 
Sydney Olympics. Therefore, it naturally became an interlinked part of a multiple group 
of entities whose input into the preparation and running of the event was essential. That 
included Olympic agencies, private corporations as well as Australian public agencies 
and organisations. Further, due to the strong appeal that the contemporary Games have to 
the host community, SOCOG also interacted with independent groups and organisations 
which represented public interests related to the event. As a result, SOCOG was 
operating within a heterogeneous organisational environment, which, for the purposes of 
this study, has been divided into four main categories, namely the Olympic Movement, 
the Commercial Sector, the Public Governance, and the Public Groups categories. The 
Olympic Movement includes the International Olympic Committee QOC), the 
International Federations (IF), the National Olympic Committees (NOC), and the 
athletes. The Commercial Sector includes the sponsors, media corporations and partner 
organisations of the Sydney Olympics. The Public Governance consists of all levels of 
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public governance involved in the organisation of the Games, namely the City of Sydney, 
the NSW state government, and the Federal Australian government. Finally, the Public 
Groups category comprises the Australian general public as well as established public 
groups such as indigenous groups and Green organisations (Figure 6.2). 
Figure 6.2: SOCOG's Organisational Environment 
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The entities of the Olympic Movement and the Commercial Sector affected SOCOG in a 
manner similar to previous OCOGs. The support of the Olympic Movement was 
essential as with every contemporary Games. For example, the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) made most of the marketing arrangements on behalf of SOCOG 
providing the organisation with approximately 60% of its budget (Preuss, 2000). Further, 
through its Co-ordination Commission, the IOC monitored the progress of the Olympic 
preparation and advised SOCOG on organisational matters. The International 
Federations (IFs) provided the technical support for the sport competitions, such as venue 
specifications and requirements for their respective events, and the National Olympic 
Committees (NOCs) represented the athletes' interests in the Games, as the Olympic 
Charter suggests (IOC, 1999, rule 31 § 3). A significant role in the Sydney Games was 
played by the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC), especially in latter stages of the 
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event's preparations, as it was awarded the responsibility for the bulk of the sport-related 
issues of the event. 
As with the Olympic Movement, the Commercial Sector constitutes an integral part of 
every contemporary Olympics, since it is the main financial supplier for the event mainly 
through media royalties and sponsorship fees. The IOC has established a long-term 
sponsorship programme with international corporations, commonly known as 'The 
Olympic Partners' (TOP), and also negotiates the media arrangements on behalf of each 
OCOG. In the case of Sydney 2000 Games, the IOC provided SOCOG with US$ 536 
million from sponsors and US$ 1.3 billion from media royalties, which as was mentioned 
earlier covered 60% of SOCOG's budget. In addition to the above, private organisations 
contributed to the organisation of the event as a whole by providing a wide range of 
goods and services for the Games (SOCOG, 1997). 
The role of the Public Governance for the Sydney Olympics was also very important. 
After the failure of the privately funded Olympics in Atlanta, the IOC encouraged more 
public sector involvement in Sydney Olympics (Associated Press, 1998), and as a result, 
the role of all levels of governance (i. e. City of Sydney, NSW government, and Federal 
Australian government), was crucial for SOCOG's operations. As was mentioned earlier, 
the most important role was held by the NSW government which underwrote SOCOG, 
and was also responsible for the construction of the entire Games-related infrastructure, 
spending approximately US$ 2.9 billion (1995 prices) (Preuss, 2000). The NSW 
government also provided a range of support services particularly in the areas of transport 
and security. The Olympic Co-ordination Authority (OCA) was the link between the 
NSW government and SOCOG. OCA was responsible for the design and construction of 
the Olympic venues and for co-ordinating the entire NSW government's involvement in 
the event (SOCOG, 1999). 
Finally, the importance of Public Groups in the organisation of the Sydney Olympics was 
primarily manifested through the involvement of the citizens of Sydney, Aboriginal 
groups and the Australian Green movement. Although their involvement was 
predominately consultative, their role was essential for the planning and organisation of 
the Games, since their voice was represented by the media which were often critical to 
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SOCOG's operations creating a negative profile for SOCOG, and the organisation of the 
Games as a whole (Hollway, 2000). Aboriginal groups, for example, attempted to use the 
global platform of the event to raise awareness of their history and they were constantly 
claiming greater involvement in the organisation of the Games (McDougall, 1998). 
Green Peace Australia, however, was the most influential Public Group, particularly in 
the early stages of the preparation of the Games mainly through its involvement in the 
design of the Olympic infrastructure, such as the Olympic Village and the majority of the 
sporting venues (Brogan, 1996). Further, Green Peace Australia assisted OCA to set the 
environmental guidelines for the development of the Olympic venues and for the 
establishment of an environmental policy for the Games as a whole. The Aboriginal 
groups and Green Peace Australia were significant elements of SOCOG's environment, 
since they were both highly profiled in the Australian media, and they were often 
concerned with issues with considerable potential to embarrass the practices of SOCOG, 
the IOC and the NSW government. 
SOCOG's Environmental Complexity 
As was mentioned above, SOCOG was opFrating within an organisational environment 
comprised of diverse entities. However, not all these entities were influential throughout 
SOCOG's life cycle. In the course of its formative years, for example, SOCOG 
established strong relationships primarily with the Public Governance and to a lesser 
extent with the Olympic Movement and the Commercial Sector. At SOCOG's formation, 
the NSW Government's Olympic responsibilities, in terms of coordination of services 
and construction of facilities, were undertaken by four government ministers and five 
separate government agencies. The Government's Olympic entities included: the Office 
of Olympic Co-ordination, in the Premier's Department; the Olympic Construction 
Authority, housed in the Public Works Department; the Homebush Bay Development 
Corporation, which was responsible for providing most Olympic venues; part of the 
Department of Sport and Recreation, which had responsibility for delivering certain other 
new Olympic facilities such as the rowing course and Velodrome; and part of the 
Department of Planning, which was responsible for securing venues for equestrian and 
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mountain bike events (SOCOG, 200 1 a). In 1995, the election of a new State government 
in NSW and the appointment of a Minister for the Olympics saw the merger of the five 
departments previously undertaking Olympic work into one statutory authority known as 
the Olympic Co-ordination Authority (0 CA). From 1995 onwards, therefore, SOCOG's 
links with the NSW government achieved through its relationships with OCA. 
OCA acted as the permanent venue provider to SOCOG and therefore, SOCOG had to 
specify to OCA its venue needs. The venue requirements and specifications would be set 
by the IFs, and SOCOG together with OCA would agree upon the final designs. OCA's 
Managing Director, David Richmond explains: 
The OCA built the permanent venues [ ... I to meet SOCOG's requirements. The way 
we did that was that in the early stages, we worked with SOCOG to get agreement on 
the initial designs, and at the same time with the IFs on the sports to get the agreement 
on the final design (Richmond, 2000). 
SOCOG, therefore, established close links with the Ts early in its operations. 
Commenting on the nature of involvement with the IFs, Bob Elphinston stated: 
So, if it is a new venue they [IFs] have been involved in the design: how many 
spectators seats will be, how big the field of play should be, and other requirements like 
the air conditioning and things like that (Elphinston, 2000a). 
SOCOG's relationships with the Olympic Movement also took the form of formal 
interaction with the IOC, through executive meetings with the IOC Coordination 
Commission, which monitored the Olympic preparations, and regular reporting to the 
IOC Executive Board (SOCOG, 2001a). The IOC co-ordination commission officially 
met with SOCOG's officials every six months and more regularly as the time progressed 
towards the Games. Unofficially, however, SOCOG's communication with the IOC was 
very frequent, sometimes even on a daily basis. SOCOG's Head of Sports, for example, 
said: 
In a formal sense the IOC Co-ordination Commission was coming to Sydney every six 
months but with an ongoing basis in between. I talked with the IOC Sports Department 
almost every day (Elphinston, 2000a). 
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In early stages, SOCOG also paid considerable attention to its marketing programme in 
order to raise private money. Jim Sloman explained "due to thefact that SOCOG started 
ftom scratcb, its initialfocus was very much on marketing, in order to raise money" 
(Sloman, 2000a). SOCOG's links with sponsors and media corporations were created 
through the IOC, which negotiated and set the international Olympic sponsors and media 
arrangements for the Games on behalf of SOCOG. Within the first two years of 
SOCOG's operation, the initial arrangements with the first group of Olympic partners 
and licensees were made, although most of the major-level sponsorships were confirmed 
shortly after the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games (SOCOG, 2001b). In 1995, however, 
SOCOG received the first television rights money from the North America television 
rights holder, NBC (SOCOG, 1996). 
In summary, at the start of its operations, SOCOG's was influenced by a limited 
number of external organisations. As SOCOG's CEO, Sandy Hollway, said: 
In the beginning we [SOCOG] did not have many relations with all the constituent 
groups apart from the NSW government with concern to the delivery of the permanent 
venues, the Ts with concern to the sporting venues, and the IOC that was co-ordinating 
our agreements with the sponsors and the media (Hollway, 2000). 
However, this changed after the 1996 Atlanta Games as the attention of the Olympic 
Movement turned to the forthcoming Sydney Olympics. The various constituent groups 
of the Olympics (i. e. sponsors, media, IFs, etc) began to get more involved with the 
preparations for the Games in order to promote their interests and get some of the diverse 
benefits that the Olympic Games can provide. As such, from 1996 onwards, SOCOG 
developed strong relationships with virtually all the elements of its organisational 
environment, but also experienced certain pressures which had a considerable impact on 
its operations, particularly on its decision making structure and its organisational criteria 
for grouping its operational areas. The involvement of the Public Governance in the 
Games, for example, considerably increased after the Atlanta Games and particularly 
after the appointment of the NSW Minister for the Olympics, Michael Knight, to the 
presidency of SOCOG (Moore, 2000a). In effect, the NSW government's OCA took 
more responsibilities for the Olympic preparations, establishing strong links with 
SOCOG. OCA, which was initially responsible for building the permanent venues, was 
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also granted the responsibility for the delivery of the venues overlay in December 1996. 
Venues overlay refers to the provision of all the temporary facilities for the venues such 
as temporary seats, temporary structures as well as all services needed to support the 
venues (SOCOG, 1997). This resulted in shifting the functions and personnel of the 
SOCOG Facilities Division to OCA. Moreover, OCA, in addition to its responsibility for 
monitoring SOCOG's budgets, co-ordinated NSW government's services to the Games, 
such as transport, security and health care (SOCOG, 1997). The range of relations 
between OCA and SOCOG during that period were described by OCA's General 
Director as follows: 
In the overlay process, we jointly scoped the overlay, SOCOG and OCA people, and 
then it was handed over to the QCA to deliver the overlay. That was one linkage. The 
other linkage is where we facilitated all of the provisional [e. g. transport, security, 
health etc. ] from the government services. Our job was to make sure that for example, 
the security services, the transport services and so on were being provided to SOCOG 
and at budgets that were within the governmental budget. [ ... ] The other thing that we 
did was that we monitored on behalf of the government the budgets. So, we had a lot 
of linkages (Richmond, 2000). 
A further linkage between SOCOG and the State government was established in early 
1997, when the NSW government formed the Olympic Roads and Transport Authority 
(ORTA) to co-ordinate planning and delivery of integrated roads and transport services 
for the Games, in accordance with specifications determined by OCA, but primarily by 
SOCOG. SOCOG provided ORTA with specifications with regard to the delivery of the 
transport services for the Olympic Family members, including athletes, officials, 
accredited media, workforce and paid, volunteer and contract staff. As a result, SOCOG 
created several links with ORTA, mainly through areas whose operations were affected 
by transportation issues. 
- 
These included the areas. of IOC Relations arýd Protocol, Press 
Operations, Venue and Competition Management, Accommodation, Ticketing, Sports 
Competition Programme, Security, and Accreditation (SOCOG, 2001 a). 
After the Atlanta Games the Olympic Movement's involvement was mainly manifested 
through the increasing involvement of the lFs. The IFs assisted SOCOG to complete the 
full Olympic competition schedule as well as the schedule for the Test Events, and they 
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constantly consulted SOCOG on various sport-specific issues such as the provision of 
facilities for the sporting and training venues, for the field-of-play and the like 
(Elphinston, 2000b). Commenting on the role of the lFs during that period, SOCOG's 
senior Executive Bob Leece said: 
The most dominant and influential group is the lFs. The only chance they get to 
exercise their power is the Olympic Games because they have done these Games after 
Games and year after year in regional and world championships. They get the power 
and the money from the IOC for the Olympic Games period and they try to get more 
and more out of this. lFs were very influential from the early stages but particularly 
after the Atlanta Games (Leece, 2000a). 
As was mentioned earlier, the IFs also played a significant role during the Test Events 
period, which took place one year before the Games and involved 14 events (Sloman, 
2000c). David Richmond, for example, said: "[ ... ] when we 
did the test events, they 
[IFs] were a critical part of that and we tookfeedback then about things that worked or 
did not work. So, there was a constant sense of involvement" (Richmond, 2000). The 
IFs, therefore, constituted an additional external force influencing SOCOG's operations. 
Private organisations also had an increasingly significant impact on SOCOG as the time 
of the event drew closer. More than 60 per cent of sponsorship revenue money was 
committed or was at the table by June 1997, and one year before the Games, SOCOG had 
signed contracts or had Memorandums of Understanding in place for 80% of the 
sponsorship deals and 96% of the television rights (SOCOG,. 1999). SOCOG's 
agreements with sponsors and television rights holders were formally finalised within the 
six months preceding the event (Eyers and Read, 2000). The Olympic sponsors appeared 
to be the most influential actors within the Commercial Sector. SOCOG's Director 
General, for instance, said: "I think that from about 12 months before the Games it 
becomes difficult because, for example, the sponsors started exercising their rights. They 
started getting closer to the Games" (Richmond, 2000). 
After the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, the sponsors of the Sydney Games substantially 
increased their usage of SOCOG's intellectual property, such as the Olympic logo, in 
marketing their products. Particularly, two years before the event the sponsors took full 
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advantage of the sponsorship 'value chain', which set out the benefits of sponsorship at 
different levels of investment. Rights included access to Olympic emblems, designations, 
symbols such as the official pictograms of the 2000 Olympic Games, imagery such as the 
'Look of the Games' and other Sydney 2000 properties. Approved designations varied 
from generic ones, such as 'Official Worldwide Sponsor for the 2000 Olympic Games' 
and 'Team Millennium Olympic Partner', to more specific ones such as 'Official 
Banking Partner of the 2000 Olympic Games' and 'Official Supplier of Tennis Balls to 
the Australian Olympic Team' (SOCOG, 2001b). Further, a number of Olympic 
marketing properties were developed by SOCOG to offer sponsors incremental marketing 
opportunities and create a secondary revenue stream. They were known as 
6complimentary properties' or 'core assets'. These included: the 'Olympic Journey 
Tour', the 'Olympic Arts Festivals', the 'National Olympic Education Program', the 
'Volunteers Program', the 'Test Events', the 'International Youth Camp' and the 
'Olympic Torch Relay'. Each core asset had its own Olympic emblem, and sponsors 
could use the emblem to market themselves in association with that asset (SOCOG, 
2001b). 
The Australian Public Groups also became significant constituent elements of the Sydney 
Olympics as the Games neared. The Aboriginal community was keen to get involved in 
the Games in order to promote themselves through the media exposure that the Olympics 
provide (Elphinston, 2000a). In December 1998, for example, the Aboriginal authorities 
exerted considerable pressure on SOCOG, and particularly on its President, to support an 
indigenous candidate to fill a vacancy that emerged in SOCOG's Board. This did not 
fulfilled, and SOCOG was under severe criticism from the press for excluding 
Aboriginals from SOCOG's main decision-making body (Clarey, 2000). The Australian 
Green movement was also influential not as much in SOCOG as in OCA, which was 
responsible for constructing the Olympic venues. Commenting on the role of the Green 
Australian movement Bob Leece said: "OCA was set up to develop new standards in 
environmental initiatives through the development of the facilities and the Greens 
contributed a lot. It was an important criterion for the selection of contractors and 
consultants " (Leece, 2000a). The Green Movement also put pressure on OCA 
concerning its environmental policy. Green Peace Australia, for example, sued OCA in 
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1999 for going against environmental regulations with regard to the issues of ozone 
destroying and gas air conditioning in the Super Dome venue. The case was eventually 
settled out of court after months of legal manoeuvring by OCA and the NSW government 
(Green Peace, 2000). 
Although it was not represented by a formal organisation the most influential public 
group for SOCOG was the Australian public, which one year before the event started 
associating itself with the Games, primarily as potential ticket holders. Commenting on 
the role of the Australian public, David Richmond said: 
What happened 12 months out was that you have engaged for the first time the public 
in a very strong way because they are actually putting in for tickets. So, they suddenly 
get a sense of ownership so that becomes the largest constituency (Richmond, 
2000). 
The Australian public put considerable pressure on SOCOG's operations, especially 
when SOCOG failed to deal effectively with thousands of pre-paid ticket applications. 
According to Mathew Moore, Olympic editor of a leading Australian newspaper, 
Australian public's pressure on SOCOG came mainly through the media and the NSW 
government. The ticketing problems directly affected the public. and also stimulated 
interest within the media. The media saw this episode as a chance to scrutinise SOCOG's 
operations and they were severely critical of its practices (Moore, 2000a). In the words 
of SOCOG's CEO, the public's reaction "was fuelled by a very intense and critical 
media " (Hollway, 2000). 
Therefore, as the time of the event was coming closer, and particularly after the end of 
the 1996 Atlanta Games, SOCOG experienced considerable complexity in its 
organisational environment, as both the number and the diversity of external 
organisations influencing the organisation gradually increased. As the nature of demands 
and exchange relationships became more complex, the entities that comprised SOCOG's 
organisational environment were effectively the essential constituents for the delivery of 
the Games. Consequently, their links with SOCOG were becoming closer and stronger 
as time progressed, since both sides aspired to achieve co-ordination of activities that 
would lead to the smooth transaction of the event. As such, SOCOG's organisational 
163 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG CHAPTER VI 
environment became even more complex a few months before the Games as the various 
constituents of the groups integrated their operations under a single organisational model. 
Particularly. after the establishment of the Main Operations Centre (MOC), SOCOG's 
role was to co-ordinate the operations and tasks of OCA, IFs, sponsors and so on, and test 
their effectiveness as a whole so as "to run the show", in the words of SOCOG's Head of 
Sports (Elphinston, 2000a). 
Thus, a few months before the Games, SOCOG's links with the Public Governance 
became very strong, particularly through the increasing involvement of OCA in the 
organisation of the event. In particular, OCA played a major co-ordination role in 
ensuring the efficient operation of the Games' sites as well as in providing essential 
venue operations and services, such as environment operations, spectator services, 
catering, cleaning and waste management (OCA, 2000). In addition, OCA's 
Development Managers, who were responsible for delivering the venues overlay, became 
Venue Operators (Sloman, 2000b). Their main responsibility was to provide the 
necessary facilities for each venue and assist the Venue Manager with the venues 
operations. Commenting on OCA's involvement in the Games during the Games-time 
period Bob Leece said: 
Coming to the Games-time, my staff [OCA] became from development managers to 
help develop the facilities and do the overlay, the subordinates to the Venue Manager 
in SOCOG, the sub-managers in SOCOG. They provided the site facilities and the 
back up on the resources. The government could provide us an honour of the facilities 
to help them put on their events, as you would do as if you were hiring a theatre on a 
show (Leece, 2000a). 
OCA's involvement in the venues operations was seen as essential, since OCA was 
responsible for the operations of the Common Domain, the areas surrounding the venues, 
and therefore its presence in the venues was considered necessary for ensuring effective 
communication between the inside and outside of the venues. David Richmond, for 
example, said: 
In Sydney there was total integration. There was a sense in which the organisation 
worked for the customer for the moment. [ ... ] The only way to achieve that was with 
integration. Integrate the communications so we do not just get messages about what 
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you do when you get to the venue. You get messages in the same format of 
communication right through. Integrate the movement of people; integrate the 
transport and so on. [ ... ] There had to be much more integration, otherwise you would 
not have got the successful Games that we got. We looked at things in a very holistic 
way (Richmond, 2000). 
Apart from the strong links that SOCOG had established with the NSW Government, 
primarily through the role of OCA and ORTA, a few months before the event the 
organisation established closer relationships with local government authorities as well as 
with the Federal Australian Government. These links were based on early-established 
relationships in the form of Memorandums of Understanding, joint committees and 
forums between SOCOG and the Federal and local government tiers. The Sydney of 
City, for example, which was a major local government authority, was co-operating with 
SOCOG's Cultural Commission for the organisation of Olympic-related cultural 
activities in Sydney such as parades, festivals, exhibitions and so on (Leece, 2000b). 
Further, SOCOG created close links with other local authorities with regard to the 
provision of training sites, and a series of other issues ranging from joint ventures on city 
improvements to co-ordination for local business opportunities forthe Games-time period 
(SOCOG, 2001 c). 
The Australian Federal Government was also communicating with SOCOG through the 
Sydney 2000 Games Coordination Task Force, which was located in the Department of 
Prime Minister & Cabinet. With the provision of a fund of A$ 30,79 million to SOCOG, 
the Federal government allowed SOCOG to purchase services, facilities and the like from 
federal agencies or other organisations such as the Department of Immigration, the 
Department of Health, as well as the Australian Custom Services, the Capital City 
Airports and so on (Sydney 2000-ATHOC, 2000). Further, a number of commitments 
were obtained from the. Federal government to SOCOG including the facilitation of entry 
to Australia by members of the Olympic Family, the extension of Medicare benefits to 
members of the Olympic Family, the admission of goods for use at the Games using 
simplified customs procedures and without the payment of sales tax or customs duty, and 
exemption from income tax for non-residents working at the Games (SOCOG, 200 1 c). 
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The role of the Olympic Movement was naturally very significant a few months before 
the event, mainly because it represented the needs of the athletes who, quite sensibly, 
became the central part of the Games. The IFs were very influential during that period 
because they directed the entire organisation for their sports and they also had the 
responsibility for selecting and appointing the technical officials for the competitions 
(AOC, 2000). The Australian National Federations also played a vital role at that time 
because they provided technical support and guidance to SOCOG, and assisted the 
organisation to recruit and train national technical officials and volunteers for the sport 
competitions (Elphinston, 2000b). Moreover, the NOCs became a key part of the Games 
during that period since they were responsible for all matters concerning their athletes. 
They appointed Attaches who acted as intermediaries between SOCOG and the NOCs in 
order to assist in solving travel, accommodation and other problems as well as Chefs de 
Mission who liased with the IOC, the EFs and SOCOG to deal with issues concerning 
their athletes and officials (Elphinston, 2000b). 
The Commercial Sector's involvement in the Games a few months before the event as 
well as during the event was mainly represented by the role of the sponsors and the 
media. The association of the sponsors with the Games became very intense during that 
period since they got great benefit during the six months preceding the Olympics. 
SOCOG's Director General said: 
They [sponsors] get enormous benefit for the last 6 months. Therefore, their interests 
are much more focused on their image, their advertising and their asspciation with the 
Games. Plus, they are looking very much at what kind of presence they will have 
around the Games, and how people will know that they are part of it (Richmond, 
2000). 
According to SOCOG's Head of Sports, Bob Elphinston, the main benefit for Olympic 
sponsors is publicity and therefore, during that period, when the public interest for the 
Games is intense, sponsors start exercising their rights in order to increase awareness of 
their association with the event (Elphinston, 1999b). For that reason, SOCOG 
established a Sponsors Operations Centre to coordinate sponsors' activities, which 
became operational four weeks prior to the Games (Eyers and Read, 2000). The most 
influential commercial group during the actual Games-time period, however, was the 
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mass media. SOCOG's CEO explains: "President Samaranch always reminded us that 
the mass media would be the ones to determine whether we would be successful or not. 
Their view ofthe Games would be very important so we understood the need to took after 
them " (Hollway, 2000). Of the mass media, television was seen as the most significant 
medium for SOCOG, and particularly the North America television-rights holder, NBC. 
Bob Leece, for example, said: "The second most influential group [after the lFs] of 
course happens to be the television, andfor Sydney andATHOC is NBC. It is the biggest 
and most infantile sponsor; you have to look after them " (Leece, 2000a). SOCOG had to 
provide the television-rights holders with the best possible facilities because, as Mr Leece 
stated, their experience of the Games would be reflected on the coverage of the event. 
As the time of the event was approaching, the importance of the Public Groups for 
SOCOG was primarily manifested through their role as Olympic ticket-holders whether 
they were Australian citiýens or visitors. Nowadays, the Olympics constitute probably 
the most prestigious sport spectacle, and therefore SOCOG had to ensure a great 
experience for the spectators. This involved provision of high quality services within the 
venues as well as ensuring their smooth movement in the common areas among the 
venues (Barraclough and Gallagher, 2000). 
As the above discussion suggests, in the few months before the Games as well as during 
the event, SOCOG was operating within a very complex organisational environment. It 
was not only the great number and heterogeneity of external elements influencing 
SOCOG, but also the intensity of their involvement and the diversity of their needs, 
especially during the sixteen days of the sport competitions. However, SOCOG's 
organisational environment radically changed right after the end of the Sydney 2000 
Games. SOCOG retained links only with the NSW government since the other 
constituents of the Olympics (i. e. IOC, IFs, sponsors, the public and so on) did not have 
any involvement after the Games were over. The NSW government's involvement after 
the event was again the responsibility of OCA. In particular, one month after the Games, 
legislation was passed by the NSW government to allow OCA to lead the process of 
winding up the Games (Sydney 2000 Games Administration Act 2000), and as a result 
SOCOG's operations were strongly influenced by OCA, which had the ultimate control 
167 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG CHAPTER VI 
over the post-event operations (Eyers, 2001). SOCOG's CEO saw this as a natural 
organisational evolution; he said: 
That is very sensible in effect that the government will be around for a long time and 
therefore, it should lead the process of tidying up the Games: the financial reporting, 
the ultimate financial resolution, the selling of the remains of the Games, the assets 
disposal and all of that (Hollway, 2000). 
This, however, was seen as an extension of what had started nine months before the 
games, when OCA started taking over tasks that were under SOCOG's control such as 
catering, cleaning, communications and so on (Toohey, 2001). SOCOG's staff had to 
report to people from OCA, and this created a culture of 'us' and 'them' inside the 
organisation. Kristine Toohey explains: 
[After the Games] there was certainly a culture of an "us" and "'them". If you came 
from OCA you would be the "us". I came from SOCOG and SOCOG was the "us"'. I 
think that people in both, it did not matter which agency you were from, thought that 
this was the one important agency (Toohey, 2001). 
OCA therefore was the sole element in SOCOG's environment which was influencing the 
organisation after the Games. SOCOG's relationships with other environmental groups 
such as the sponsors, the media and the Australian public naturally ended when the 
Games were over. We would expect, however, the elements of the Olympic Movement 
and the IOC in particular to provide SOCOG with some post-Games guidance to assist 
the smooth dissolution of the organisation. This was not the case in Sydney. Kristine 
Toohey, for example, said about the role of the IOC after the Sydney Games: 
After the Games was over the IOC basically thanked us for the success of the Games 
and then vanished. I believe that the TOC does not care about what is happening with 
an OCOG after the Games; at least this is what we experienced in Sydney. There was 
not guidance for the wind-up process (Toohey, 200 1). 
After the Games, therefore, SOCOG had relationships only with the Public Governance, 
and particularly with the NSW's OCA. As such, the organisation was operating within a 
simplified organisational environment, which solely comprised OCA. 
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Overall, therefore, although SOCOG was, by its very nature, operating within a multiple 
organisational environment, the number of the entities in its environment influencing the 
organisation was not constant throughout its life cycle (Figure 6.3). 
Figure 6.3: Changes in SOCOG's Environmental Complexity 
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As was shown earlier, up until the Atlanta Olympics, SOCOG had created close links 
only with the IOC, which was co-ordinating the international media and sponsorship 
arrangements and through its Co-ordination Commission was monitoring the Olympic 
preparations, the lFs which set the requirements for the sporting venues, and the NSW 
government with regard to the construction of the Olympic venues and the provision of a 
series of support services for the Games. After the 1996 Atlanta Games, the complexity 
of SOCOG's environment increased significantly. In particular, media and sponsor 
companies turned their attention to the Sydney Olympics creating closer links with 
Authoritics 
(City of Sydney) 
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SOCOG, and the Federal Australian government started negotiating its involvement in 
the event with regard to the provision of Games-time services. Further, the Green 
Movement furthered its co-operation with SOCOG with respect to environmental issues, 
and Aboriginal groups, in the light of the Games' global appeal, claimed considerable 
involvement in the event. The general public also became a significant element of 
SOCOG's environment primarily as potential ticket holders. 
In the course of the four months leading up to the Games, and particularly after the 
establishment of the MOC, which co-ordinated the operation of all the constituents of the 
event, SOCOG experienced the greatest complexity in its environment. More entities 
started co-operating with SOCOG, and the involvement of those previously influencing 
the organisation was intensified. Additional elements in SOCOG's environment included 
the NOCs, which were representing the officials and the participants of the sporting 
competitions, local public authorities, which primarily contributed to celebrating events 
surrounding the Games as well as contractor companies with regard to the provision of 
services in kind. Finally, after the end of the event the majority of the elements in 
SOCOG's environment naturally stopped influencing the organisation. In view of 
SOCOG's dissolution, it was only the NSW government stilf co-operating with the 
organisation through its OCA, which was awarded the full responsibility for the 
organisation's wind-up process. 
SOCOG's Environmental Stability 
As was shown above, SOCOG was operating within a diverse organisational environment 
which consisted of public authorities, commercial organisations, public groups and 
sporting organisations. As a new and temporary Olympic authority, SOCOG experienced 
difficulties in dealing with its environment, since it mostly comprised people who had not 
organised Olympic Games in the past, and particularly in the beginning, had only limited 
information about the particularities of the task they were undertaking. As a result, the 
quality of prediction about the needs of the entities in SOCOG's organisational 
environment was limited in the early stages of its operations. There was not much 
information available to SOCOG, from the IOC, for example, about the potential scope of 
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involvement of external organisations, and there was also limited knowledge about their 
needs. Jim Sloman, for example, said: 
It is very hard to predict their [external organisations] needs especially in the 
beginning. It was very hard for us because there was not very much information. 
When you went in, you do not get handed a book on 'this is how you do it'. There is 
no manual for that. All we basically had was the Host City Contract (Sloman, 
2000a). 
SOCOG, therefore, began the preparations of the Olympics having as its initial guidance 
the Host City Contract (HCC), which only specified the legal status of SOCOG and its 
legal relationships with the IOC, the NSW government and the City of Sydney (HCC, 
1992). There were no specific guidelines from the IOC or the lFs concerning the 
organisation of the Games. The IOC Co-ordination Commission for the 2000 Olympics, 
which was set up* to monitor the progress of the Olympic operations and to provide 
guidance to the organisers, visited Sydney only twice a year. In the beginning, the 
commission's main concern was to get agreement with the organisers on the organisation 
model that would deliver the Games, by encouraging intense involvement of the NSW 
government (Moore, 2000a). 
The needs of the various entities external to SOCOG became fairly precisely defined only 
after SOCOG's staff visited Atlanta in 1996 and had a first-hand experience of the 
organisation of the Olympics and the particularities of the Olympic project (Elphinston, 
2000a). SOCOG's staff observed the Atlanta Games, but also purchased paper-based 
files of the Atlanta Organising Committee (ACOG) and incorporated them into a library 
in SOCOG to supplement the tacit knowledge of its staff (Toohey, 2000). This material 
became the basis for much of Sydney's early operational planning (Toohey and 
Halbwirth, 2001). As a result, SOCOG's knowledge about the needs of the various 
actors of its organisational environment was improved in later stages and particularly 
after the 1996 Atlanta Games. SOCOG's Head of Sports, for example, stated: "I think 
that the needs of the different clients werefairly well identyled especially after Atlanta" 
(Elphinston, 2000a). 
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SOCOG. however, probably overestimated its knowledge of some external players who 
in turn put pressure on the organisation's managerial practices. The IOC bribery scandal 
in 1998, for instance, in which some IOC members had been involved in corrupt practices 
in the evaluation of Salt Lake bid for the 2002 Winter Olympics, triggered bad publicity 
for the IOC and a loss of public confidence. In effect, potential sponsors for the Sydney 
Olympics were discouraged from associating themselves with the Games, such as the 
case of Texaco-Caltex. an American Oil Company, which pulled out of a US$ 6,3 million 
sponsorship deal (Associated Press, 1999). This came at the time when SOCOG was 
trying to raise almost A$ I billion to cover a projected revenue shortfall (Washington, 
1999). Commenting on this SOCOG's CEO said: 
Certainly when we needed the revenue to be pulled in, throughout 1999 and especially 
the first half of 1999, it was a very bad climate in which to be going out to a company 
and say 'here, come and support the Games' because the IOC was facing such a 
difficulty (Hollway, 2000). 
During the initial months of 1999, SOCOG's Sponsorship Division was affected by the 
controversy surrounding the IOC. Some sponsors claimed compensation or, at a 
minimum, IOC-driven marketing activity to address perceived damage to the Olympic 
brand and consequently their own investment. Therefore, attracting Olympic sponsors 
was a great problem for SOCOG, which in an attempt to regain sponsors confidence 
about the Olympics took out paid advertisements in Australian newspapers to promote 
IOC's reforms, which were launched in the first quarter of 1999 (Associated Press, 1999). 
SOCOG's response to the IOC scandal was seen also as an attempt to regain the public's 
confidence, since an Australian IOC member, Phil Coles, was caught up in the whole 
bribery affair (Washington, 1999). 
A similar, but local, problem affecting the public's perception of the Games arose in 
relation to the arrangements for the allocation of tickets for the event. From 1998 
onwards, the general public became an essential part of the event since SOCOG launched 
its ticketing sales campaign. Ticketing sales was SOCOG's major financial linkage with 
the general public. Later in 1999, however, SOCOG's ticketing programme nearly 
collapsed. SOCOG managed the whole process in secrecy and significant public 
discontent arose concerning the number of tickets being made available to the general 
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public, and with the way in which information was communicated to the public. Even 
greater controversy arose as it was realised that a limited number of tickets had been 
offered for some events. Speculation grew that the best tickets had been held back for 
sale to 'the rich' at premium prices (Moore, 2000b). The immediate result of the 
breakdown in SOCOG's ticket sales program were an administrative shake-up adopted 
by SOCOG's Board in November 1999 which suggested the replacement of a number of 
personnel and no further ticket sales to the public until May 2000 (SOCOG, 2001b). 
Commenting on SOCOG's ticketing problems David Richmond said: 
So, you had a new constituency of people who had made their applications. Some of 
them had been unsuccessful and they were unhappy generally at that point. So, they 
were quite difficult to deal with because they were represented at the media. Every one 
of them represented a viewer, a reader. So, in the local context they became very 
powerful. SOCOG was not really geared to deal with it. So, that pressure from that 
group for the last 12 months became very strong (Richmond, 2000). 
When the ticketing crisis developed, it triggered severe criticism by the Australian press 
to SOCOG's ticketing practices, primarily because the ticketing mismanagement created 
a A$ 76 million shortfall in SOCOG's budget (Moore, 2000b). SOCOG's CEO said: 
We did have a period of great, great, great stress and difficulty which was in the last 
quarter of 1999, and this is when the issues of ticketing, as you know had become very 
controversial and there was widespread criticism of us. [ ... ] And this whole set of 
issues became extremely controversial and became the source of almost daily, 
prominent criticism of the SOCOG in the media both printed media and on radio and 
television. So, that was a very tough time that we had to battle through and pass. 
By the end of 1999 this was clearly our biggest, single problem (Hollway, 2000). 
OCA's Director General attributed SOCOG's inability to deal successfully with the 
public to the structural formation of contemporary OCOGs; he said: 
One of the problems with OCOGs is that they are not actually set up to deal with those 
customers. They are set up to deal with the IFs, the sponsors, the NOCs but not very 
well until right at the end to deal with the retail customer, if you like. So, that was a 
huge pressure (Richmond, 2000). 
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Therefore, although, as the time progressed, SOCOG significantly developed and 
enhanced its knowledge of the needs of its organisational environment, the quality and 
accuracy of its prediction of those needs remained at a relatively low level. The actual 
days of the competitions, however, required SOCOG to have solid knowledge about the 
needs of the entities involved in order to satisfy their needs effectively but also 
immediately. A smooth transaction of the Olympics requires an OCOG to be very well 
prepared and sometimes to be proactive, especially with regard to issues concerning the 
athletes' needs such as appropriate training services, accurate transportation to venues 
and so on. For that reason, SOCOG went through an ongoing exercise during the four 
months leading to the Games, which aimed to create Games-time conditions and test the 
readiness of the organisation. Commenting on that, David Richmond said: 
We did a lot of work on what we call 'operational readiness': are you really, really 
ready? We tested everybody, we quizzed everybody and we went through all our 
plans. You are 4-5 months out; are you really ready? How are you going to do specific 
things on specific days? That kind of analysis, I believe, was fundamental to the 
success of the Games because we discovered so many things that were not right and we 
had to fix them (Richmond, 2000). 
SOCOG's Operational Readiness exercises actually started a year before the event, when 
SOCOG carried out the Test Events, which gave to SOCOG an initial understanding of a 
real event-time situation. A few months before the Games, SOCOG's Operational 
Readiness took the form of intensive contingency planning and simulated exercise 
programmes. Confingency planning was implemented by the Venue Managers on a 
fortnight basis, and was aimed at the Venue Teams planning for the unforeseen based on 
an extensive list of contingency planning subjects, such as spectators services, security, 
catering, accreditation as well as utility failures, health incidents, personnel contingencies 
and so on. The contingency plans were subject to a regular three-weekly fon-nal review 
from the competent agencies with the final review to take place in July 2000. The 
simulated exercise programme started in late May 2000 and involved venue-based 
simulated exercises and a major multi-agency simulation. The venue-based exercises 
involved real time simulations for each Venue Team on a standardised set of scenarios 
and aimed to provide a venue-by-venue review of operations. After the completion of the 
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venue-based simulations a multi-agency simulation took place two months before the 
Games. That was a 60-hour exercise on a number of'surprise' scenarios which aimed to 
invoke the Games-time structure and operations (Sloman, 2000b). 
A few months prior to the event, therefore, SOCOG adopted a proactive approach in 
dealing with the diverse needs of its organisational environment. The Head of Sports of 
the giant American network NBC, Dick Ebersol, for example, praised SOCOG for its 
readiness at his arrival in Sydney, one month before the Games. In particular he stated: 
"I am extremely satisfied with Sydney organisers. In terms oftelevision, we co uld do the 
Games right now " (Australian Associated Press, 2000b). In effect, SOCOG had rendered 
its environment more predictable, especially if we consider the generally acknowledged 
success of the execution of the Sydney Olympics. 
After the execution of the Games, OCA was the only external agency influencing 
SOCOG's operations. However, OCA's practices in relation to the Games, and to 
SOCOG in particular, were fairly well known by SOCOG since the two organisations 
were in a close relationship throughout the preparations for the event and speciflcally 
during the nine months preceding the Games. Kristine Toohey, for example, said: 
In terms of relationships I think that nothing changed. If you like people before the 
Games you like people after the Games. If you did not like them before the Games you 
did not like them after the Games. I do not think that the Games made a change on 
that. We in SOCOG knew OCA's staff quite well and we knew what to expect from 
them. As I said it was something that we have been experiencing since the beginning 
of 2000 (Toohey, 2001). 
Therefore, after the event and until its resolution, SOCOG was operating within a 
relatively known organisational environment, since organisational members were highly 
aware of the nature of OCA's involvement, not only at an organisational level but also at 
an organisational actors level. 
The discussion above shows that SOCOG's knowledge of its environment changed 
significantly in the course of its life cycle. As a new Olympic agency, in its formative 
years the knowledge available to SOCOG with regard to the needs of the entities of its 
environment was limited. However, this knowledge substantially improved after 
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SOCOG's staff observation of the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, as much due to the first-hand 
experience acquired as due to the detailed formal information purchased regarding the 
role of external agencies in the Atlanta Games and their interaction with the local 
organising committee. With the exception of some isolated incidents in its environment, 
such as the IOC bribery scandal and the failure of communication with the general public 
through the tickets sales programme, after 1996 SOCOG's knowledge of the entities in its 
environment gradually increased. Particularly after May 2000, when the STORE 
programme started, in order to test the co-ordination of activities of all the agencies 
involved in the delivery of the event, SOCOG tested its interaction with the other 
constituents of the Games, and consequently its environment was rendered considerably 
stable. SOCOG's environment was considerably known after the Games, since the 
organisation maintained links only with OCA, an organisation the needs of which were 
fairly well known, as the two organisations were in close co-operation throughout the 
years of the Olympic preparations. 
6.23 SOCOG's RESOURCE DEPENDENCE 
Throughout the years of the Olympic preparations, SOCOG created links with various 
external organisations, which often constrained its operations. However, SOCOG would 
not be able to effectively perform its tasks without the existence of such organisations, 
since they possessed essential resources for the successful delivery of the Games. In 
particular, SOCOG was in need of financial resources from the IOC, the NSW 
government and the Olympic sponsors, human resources from Australian Trade Unions 
and the general public in the form of staff and volunteers, expert knowledge from the Ws 
as well as physical resources provided by the NSW government in the form of Olympic- 
related infrastructure (Figure 6.4). 
Moreover, corporate legitimacy, although intangible in nature, was an essential externally 
held resource for SOCOG. Corporate legitimacy is used here to refer to the legal 
arrangements made as much by the IOC as by the NSW government in order to provide 
SOCOG with the appropriate legal status and authority for operating as an Olympic 
organising committee. Such arrangements do not only include the Host City Contract, 
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which specified the broader legal framework of SOCOG, but also a series of legal 
agreements primarily between SOCOG and the NSW government which was responsible 
for establishing the legal framework of the organisation. Overall, therefore, resources 
held by external actors were important to SOCOG throughout its life cycle. 
Figure 6.4: SOCOG's Dependence on Externally Held Resources 
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in early stages of its operation, SOCOG's main concern was to establish its legal 
framework which would set the nature of collaboration of the organisation with other 
Olympic agencies and consequently determine the areas of its direct responsibility 
(Hollway, 2000). In effect, during the first years of its operations, SOCOG was 
concerned with negotiating the arrangements with NSW governmental agencies, and later 
with OCA primarily in relation to the delivery of the Games-related public works and 
services (SOCOG, 1997). Moreover, considerable focus was on raising money because 
in the words of SOCOG's CEO, "it [SOCOG] had to estimate its revenues and adjust its 
budgets " (Sloman, 2000a). Early in its organisational life, SOCOG received its share 
from the international Olympic sponsorship (i. e. TOP IV Programme), which was co- 
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ordinated and negotiated by the IOC. Moreover, in 1996, SOCOG gained further 
financial security from the NSW government, whose underwriting commitment was 
formalised in an Endorsement Contract struck between the Australian Olympic 
Committee (AOC), the Lord Mayor of Sydney and the Premier of NSW (SOCOG, 
2001b). This contract established an A$140 contingency fund from the NSW 
government to support future financial shortfalls in SOCOG's budgets (Moore, 2000b). 
In later stages, externally held financial resources were again of major importance for 
SOCOG's operations, particularly after the ticketing problems in 1999, when SOCOG's 
budget showed an overall deficit of A$ 193 million (Moore, 2000b). Having already 
received most of its revenues from the commercial sector, SOCOG had to rely on NSW 
government's funding to balance its books, and particularly on the A$ 140 million 
contingency fund. As such, the NSW government was absolutely essential for SOCOG's 
financial viability as it was underwriting the organisation. SOCOG's CEO, for example, 
said: "In terms ofthefinancial security, obviously it is highly desirable to have rightftom 
the beginning a government as the underwriter ifyou were running a deflcit at the end, 
and we had that with the NSWgovernment " (Hollway, 2000). 
As the organisation was moving towards the time of the event it became necessary for 
SOCOG to outsource certain services due to lack of capacity and resources. The most 
important supplier of services was the NSW government's OCA, which was co- 
ordinating NSW government's services to the Games, and ORTA. OCA was co- 
ordinating, among others, security services, and ORTA transportation services for the 
Games with SOCOG paying A$ 120 million and A$ 35,8 million respectively for these 
services (SOCOG, 1999). Moreover, in 1998, SOCOG signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Australian Federal Government paying AS 32 million for the 
provision of services from Federal Government agencies, including the Department of 
Health, the Department of Foreign affairs, the Department of Defence, the Australian 
Custom Service and the Department of Immigration (SOCOG, 1999). 
SOCOG continued to be heavily dependent on resources held by external organisations, 
even a few months before the event. Financial resources were again needed, since in 
June 2000 the NSW Government had to boost SOCOG's contingency fund with an 
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additional AS 70 million to help meet projected shortfall from ticket sales and 
sponsorship revenues (SOCOG, 200 1 b). However, the most important resources needed 
by SOCOG. in the course of the six months leading to the Games were human resources. 
if we consider that more than 97% of the Games workforce was contractors' staff and 
volunteers (Sloman, 2000d), we can understand the enormous numbers of human 
resources that SOCOG required during that period. For example, SOCOG faced 
significant uncertainty in May 2000, when the organisation's long-estab Ii shed 
relationships with the Australian Trade Unions deteriorated, threatening to paralyse 
public transportation during the Games, due to disagreements on the Unions' claim for 
special payment for Olympic workers. This issue, however, was solved in time by the 
NSW government in consultation with SOCOG (Associated Press, 2000). Volunteer 
attrition during the Games was also an issue of concern, for SOCOG but the organisation 
managed to keep the attrition rate low at approximately 5% (Sloman, 2000d). Games' 
Chief Operations Officer's statement shows the importance of the volunteers during the 
Games. He said: "Biggest issues during the Games became resource-based Issues. You 
know Y do not have enough volunteers today, they have not turned up' or 'something 
changed and I need transport at a different time, and so on " (Sloman, 2000a). 
When the Games were over, SOCOG's main task was to arrange the last operational 
details in order for the organisation to dissolve smoothly. As was mentioned earlier, this 
involved the selling of the remaining assets of the Games, the financial resolution of the 
organisation, and the like. Consequently, SOCOG's operations after the Games did not 
require additional external resources. However, SOCOG was in need of state support on 
legal matters since the unique institutional nature of the organisation required particular 
legal arrangements for its dissolution. This task was undertaken by OCA (OCA, 2000). 
Moreover, to some extent, SOCOG was in need of human resources for two reasons. 
Firstly, SOCOG relied on the volunteerism of some members of staff who continued to 
work for the organisation in order to finish their tasks even though their contracts were 
over (Toohey, 2001). Secondly, the nature of some tasks undertaken during that period 
required the knowledge of expert staff. In particular, one of the most complex tasks for 
SOCOG was the gathering and storage of the organisation's records. This required the 
expertise of record-specialists since organisational records, such as reports, plans and 
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correspondence, were kept in different departments in the organisation's Headquarters 
but also in the Games" venues. As a result, SOCOG employed 10 archivists to deal with 
a task that involved the gathering and filing of 40,000 reports and 50,000 other records 
(Toohey and Halbwirth, 200 1). 
Overall. therefore, SOCOG's dependence on externally held resources was at a high level 
throughout the life cycle of the organisation. It was shown above that SOCOG was 
essentially a powerless organisation in terms of resources, as the vast majority of the 
resources required to perform its task was provided by external organisations. Besides, 
SOCOG's institutional status, which required SOCOG to operate in co-ordination both 
with the Olympic Movement and the NSW government, coupled with the uniqueness of 
its task, rendered the organisation dependent on external resources. For example, 
technical staff for the sporting competitions could only be obtained by the IFs, as with 
financial resources the majority of which could only be provided by the IOC through its 
Olympic sponsorship and media arrangements. After the event SOCOG's operated 
relatively autonomously, since its main task, i. e. to make the final arrangements for its 
dissolution, did not require many external resources. However, as the organisation was 
preparing for its closure, it required legal support from the NSW government in order for 
the post-event responsibilities to be. arranged, particularly those which concerned 
SOCOG's relationships with OCA, as well as some human resources to deal with the 
storage of the organisation's records. As such, SOCOG's dependence on external 
resources was also essential after the end of the event; yet due to the relatively small 
amount of resources required, its resource dependence was rather moderate. 
6.2.4 EXTERNAL POWER IN SOCOG 
The discussion above shows that the organisations that operated in SOCOG's 
organisational environment contributed significantly to SOCOG's operations throughout 
the life cycle of the organisation, mainly as providers of various resources. However, the 
links that were established between SOCOG and external organisations were not only 
resource-based but also took the form of representation in SOCOG's policy and decision- 
making bodies. Particularly in early stages, this was the case of the NSW government, of 
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which SOCOG constituted a statutory authority, and was naturally involved in the set-up 
of the organisation. In the beginning, the sole policy-making and decision-making body 
in SOCOG was its Board of Directors (SOCOG, 1996). At the time, SOCOG's main 
concern was to understand its position within the Olympic project and its relationships 
with the various entities involved in the organisation of the Games. Sandy Hollway 
explains: 
In the beginning [ ... I our main concern was to establish the frameworks and policies 
for the organisation by taking into consideration the long-term relationships of SOCOG 
with the various constituents of the Games; this was actually responsibility of the 
Board (Hollway, 2000) 
The NSW government had the prime role in setting SOCOG's Board of Directors, since 
its members were initially appointed by the NSW Governor, and after 1995 on the 
recommendation of the NSW Minister for the Olympics (SOCOG, 1996). The Board 
consisted of 14 members, three of whom represented the Australian Olympic Committee 
(AOC), six represented the different levels of governments (City of Sydney, NSW, and 
Federal Australian) and four came from the Australia's corporate sector, appointed, 
however, on the recommendation of the NSW Minister for the Olympics. The sole 
representation of SOCOG in the Board was its CEO (SOCOG, 1996). Therefore, 
SOCOG was effectively formed as an externally controlled organisation, as much by 
Olympic agencies as by the NSW government which had the authority for appointing the 
members of the Board. The majority of the interviewees argued that in early stages of its 
operations SOCOG was highly externally controlled predominantly by the NSW 
Government. For example, SOCOG's Head of Sports, Bob Elphinston said: "In the 
beginning, I believe that the NSWgovernment exerted considerable power over SOCOG 
mainly by appointing the members in the Board" (Elphinston, 2000a). 
The main policy-making and decision-making body in SOCOG remained its Board of 
Directors, even in later stages. In 199 8, the number of its members increased to 15,11 of 
whom were representing the different levels of governments, three were representing the 
Olympic Movement, and one position held by SOCOG's CEO (SOCOG, 1999). The 
NSW government alone was represented at SOCOG's Board with seven members with 
the President of the Board being the NSW Minister for the Olympics. That denotes even 
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further control by the NSW government over SOCOG, although it was not seen as a 
drawback. Bob Leece, for example, stated: "Well, the NSW government underwrites 
SOCOG. Who has the money should be the person that should have the control " (Leece, 
2000a). 
NSW government's control over SOCOG became even more evident after SOCOG's 
ticketing problems in 1999. The President of SOCOG brought into the organisation a 
group of NSW public servants to deal with the ticketing issue. This action was seen as 
the result of an increasing loss of confidence by the NSW government over SOCOG's 
management processes (Moore, 2000b). SOCOG's staff, in turn, felt at the time that the 
organisation was gradually moving under the control of the NSW government and 
particularly of its Minister for the Olympics. SOCOG's Deputy CEO, Michael Eyers 
who was brought in SOCOG in November 1999 to deal with the ticketing issue, said: 
Well, increasingly SOCOG has become subject to the direction and control of the NSW 
government. That has been a gradual process which really started in November 1999 
when I joined, and my appointment was one of the first steps in the take-over process. 
They [SOCOG's stafT] felt that the Minister was interfering in the way that 
SOCOG was doing its job. They felt that this was not a good thing. My attitude was 
that SOCOG had not done its job very well and it was lucky that this interference only 
went as far as it did. I would have been very happy to take it further (Eyers, 2000). 
SOCOG's CEO agreed that the development of the relationship between SOCOG and the 
NSW government was a gradual process that went through four stages. He said: 
[ ... ] Stage one was co-operation, stage two was collaboration, stage three was 
integration and stage four was joint operations during the Games. In the beginning we 
discussed common issues and we tried to understand each other's plans. I am talking 
3-4 years out of the Games. The collaboration stage was where, for example, we had 
outsourced to the government some important functions like organising the transport 
for the Olympic Family, and we really became quite operationally close. Then it was 
the integration which I think only really started with the development of tight, common 
structures in about January 2000,9 months out from the Games. Creation also of 
common committees to jointly drive the project and then of course at Games-time 
everybody was just into a joint operation (Hollway, 2000). 
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In addition to SOCOG's Board, the Sports Commission constituted a vital decision- 
making body in the organisation. The Sports Commission was established in 1996 as a 
permanent commission of SOCOG's Board and was granted the sole responsibility to 
deal with all sport-related matters. The Sports Commission was chaired by Australian 
Olympic Committee's (AOC) President, John Coates, and involved one more AOC 
official, two IOC members in Australia, an ex-SOCOG Board member, one SOCOG 
Board member and one SOCOG's Senior Executive (SOCOG, 2000a). The Sports 
Commission was an autonomous body, since its functions could not be altered or 
abolished by SOCOG's Board of Directors, unless the decision to do so was supported by 
both the President of SOCOG and the President of AOC (SOCOG, 2000a). Therefore, 
after 1996, AOC, and particularly its President, emerged as a powerful entity within 
SOCOG's environment. SOCOG's Chief Operating Officer, Jim Sloman, said: 
The Australian Olympic Committee [AOC] had a very strong involvement at the end of 
the day. In the beginning, SOCOG was structured in that the Board was all-powerful 
but within there was a Sports Commission that became the Board in terms of sports, led 
by John Coates, senior vice President of SOCOG and also President of AOC (Sloman, 
2000a). 
One can understand from the above that as the time progressed, SOCOG was increasingly 
becoming more externally controlled primarily by the NSW government and to a lesser 
extent by the AOC. That was not only manifested through the strong representation of 
the aforementioned entities on SOCOG's main policy making bodies, but also through 
the direct appointment of people nominated by the NSW government to SOCOG. 
As the time of the Games was coming closer, the power of the Board was declining and it 
held its last pre-Games meeting in late August 2000. John Valder, for example, 
Australian Prime Minister's appointee to SOCOG's Board, said in June 2000 that often 
he found out about key decisions taken for the Games by reading about them in 
newspapers (Buckle, 2000). In reality, a new decision-making body, the Games Co- 
ordination Group (GCOG) took over from SOCOG's Board around June 2000 holding 
regular but unpublished meetings (Buckle, 2000), although officially it took control of the 
Games in August 2000 (Sydney 2000-ATHOC, 2000). The GCOG was established in 
late 1999, initially as a co-ordination. mechanism, comprising the key actors of the 
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various agencies involved in the delivery of the event. It was headed by the Board's 
President Michael Knight and AOC President John Coates and included II other senior 
executives from SOCOG, OCA, ORTA, the Olympic Security Command Centre (OSCC) 
and the Sydney Olympic Broadcasting Organisation (SOBO) (Figure 6.5). 
Figure 6.5: Sydney 2000 Games Co-ordination Group (GCOG) 
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(Source: Sydney 2000-ATHOC, 2000) 
Of the 13 members of the GCOG only two were SOCOG's Executives while the rest 
were OCA's senior staff or NSW Government's appointees. This new organisation 
model aimed at bringing all the key agencies from SOCOG and the NSW Government 
involved the Games under a common structure. This new structure, however, meant that 
SOCOG's role was undermined in favour of the NSW Government and OCA in 
particular. This became even more evident two weeks before the Games when SOCOG 
and OCA merged into a new organisation, the 'Sydney 2000', whose Director General 
was the Director General of OCA, David Richmond and not SOCOG's CEO. The 
creation of 'Sydney 2000' under OCA's leadership was mostly seen as SOCOG's take- 
over by the NSW government rather than a merger. Michael Eyers, for example, said: 
The establishment of GCOG [Games Co-ordination Group], which was the group that 
ran the Games from August 2000 onwards, meant that a lot of decisions that impacted 
across all of 'Sydney 2000' agencies were taken by the key players in that group. The 
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key players were Knight, Coates and Richmond. That meant that Richmond was 
further in control of SOCOG than he had been before. Then, shortly before the Games, 
Richmond was appointed as Director General of 'Sydney 2000' in order to give him 
specific direct authority to some people in SOCOG. [ ... ] So. there has been a steady 
process of take over. I do not think you can call it a merger; I would rather say it was a 
take-over (Eyers, 2000). 
SOCOG's CEO, however, claimed that 'Sydney 2000' was a necessary merger between 
OCA and SOCOG which had to operate in close collaboration with each other. He 
stated: 
I have never seen it ['Sydney 2000] in terms of conflicts of power, but one comment I 
would make is that you will see some Australian press reports that say that OCA or the 
government took over. The right description is that it was a merger if you want a 
business parallel ( ... ] because of two reasons. One was that even in the areas where we 
were operating together, We were operating as a merger not as take-over and the second 
reason is that the vast majority of the things SOCOG did it led itself (Hollway, 2000). 
SOCOG's Head of Sports gave his own explanation for'Sydney 2000'. He stated: 
They [NSW Government] wanted to ensure the success of the Games and they had 
absolute confidence in the Minister for the Olympics who ultimately was responsible to 
the parliament. He in turn had absolute confidence in David Richmond who was 
Director General of OCA and he felt it was important to have one single leader at the 
time (Elphinston, 2000a). 
Games' Chief Operating Officer, Jim Sloman, gave a more elaborate explanation for the 
creation of 'Sydney 2000'. He said: 
The 'Sydney 20001 was a merger but also a struggle for power. To be frank, the public 
sector did not Re SOCOG and it took over a number of things they thought they 
should have been doing [ ... ]. So, a lot of governmental departments were jealous of the 
role SOCOG had. [ ... I Yes it was a matter of jealousy and that made it difficult. [ ... ] 
You had the OCA who would be delivering all the venues and they were playing a very 
key role. Clearly as the Games came closer the venues were delivered. So 'what do we 
do next'? Suddenly, you had SOCOG whose power is rising, its staff is rising, its 
profile is rising, it is running test events. So, suddenly OCA said: 'we have done all the 
185 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG CHAPTER VI 
work; we delivered the venues so give us something to do'. So, there was a great 
tendency to criticise and a desire to take over, if you like (Sloman, 2000a), 
Despite whether 'Sydney 2000' was a merger or a take-over, although later it will be 
argued that it was primarily the latter, it is clear that from two months before the event 
onwards, SOCOG was further under the control of the NSW Government, remaining 
therefore, a highly extemally controlled organisation. 
NSW government's control over SOCOG extended after the Games. Legislation (Sydney 
2000 Games Administration Act 2000) rendered OCA the successor of SOCOG after the 
Games and particularly after December 31,2000, when OCA would take over the 
exclusive responsibility of the wind-up process and SOCOG effectively would dissolve 
(NSW, 2000). OCA officially succeeded SOCOG in December 31,2000 as was planned 
but OCA's control over SOCOG was a gradual process which was developed 
substantially right after the Games. Michael Eyers, for example, explains: 
There has been a steady process of take-over. [ ... ] And the take-over process continues 
after the Games. If you were now [November 2000] in the organisation you could see 
that OCA has the control. There are some [SOCOG's] teams left which have to report 
to OCA. OCA people have to sign off on virtually all SOCOG's operations (Eyers, 
2000). 
OCA's control over SOCOG after the Games implied further control of the NSW 
government over the organisation. SOCOG's Board of Directors, which was the most 
powerful decision-making body in the organisation, virtually lost its power after the 
Games since it held only two meetings in order to review the Games' operations 
(November 16,2000), and to dissolve (December 14,2000) (Eyers, 2001). After the 
Games, the decision-making power was rested on OCA's senior staff, which was leading 
the wind-up process (Toohey, 200 1). 
Consequently, with respect to the degree of representation of external actors in its main 
decision-making bodies, SOCOG was subject to a high degree of external control 
throughout its life cycle, primarily by the NSW government. The NSW government was 
responsible for appointing the members of SOCOG's Board of Directors, which in the 
early stages of SOCOG's operations was the main decision-making body in the 
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organisation. Moreover, the President of SOCOG"s Board was the NSW Minister for the 
Olympics. After 1996, SOCOG's Board delegated the decision-making power for 
sporting issues to the Sports Commission, which was mainly controlled by AOC's 
officials, and later, in 1999, the GCOG gradually took over the decision-making authority 
of the Board. The GCOG was mainly controlled by OCA and AOC's officials. As a 
result, the main policy-making and decision-making bodies in SOCOG were effectively 
controlled by external authorities throughout the organisation's operational life. 
6.2.5 SOCOG's STRATEGIC CAPACITY 
The discussion above has shown that SOCOG was operating within a highly influential 
organisational environment, which held fundamental resources for its operations. 
Besides, SOCOG constituted a unique organisational authority, since it was established 
by the NSW government to fulfil the obligations of the Host City Contract, and its prime 
responsibility was to deliver the Olympic Games, a sporting institution owned by the 
IOC. Consequently, with regard to the capacity to formulate its own strategic direction, 
SOCOO was by its very nature constrained by its organisational environment. SOCOG's 
CEO, however, believed that contemporary OCOGs have considerable space for strategic 
formulation. He said: 
I think that an OCOG does actually have a leadership role and there are turning points 
on the track, which it can lead to different directions. I think that it is an important role 
for an OCOG to help establish what the vision of the Games is, as well as to make the 
right choices along the way of how to get there. So, I do not see it as just a mechanical, 
technical exercise of organising the Games because point one, I think there are different 
kinds of Games you can organise with different character and legacy and image, and 
secondly there are different ways you can get there (Hollway, 2000). 
SOCOG, however, was operating under certain legal obligations. It was not only 
committed to the Host City Contract but also to a series of contracts, primarily with the 
IOC, with regard to issues ranging from the sponsorship arrangements with Australian 
companies to the usage of Olympic symbols (SOCOG, 1997; SOCOG, 1998). SOCOG's 
Deputy Chief Executive Officer, for example, said: 
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Certainly it is true that OCOGs are fairly substantially constrained by what the IOC 
delivers to them, not only the Host City Contract but more importantly the specific 
arrangements with sponsors, the sets of rules that the lFs are entitled to adhere to, the 
requirements for establishing financial boundaries and a whole series of things from 
accreditation to various sorts of merchandising (Eyers, 2000). 
Moreover, SOCOG, as any OCOG, did not have power over the focal issue of the Games, 
that is the sports programme, with concern to the number of Olympic sports or the 
number of participating athletes. SOCOG, therefore, from its formation had to adjust its 
operations within the boundaries established by the permanent Olympic agencies such as 
the IOC and the lFs. In the case of the Sydney Olympics an additional source of strategic 
constraint for SOCOG was the role of the NSW government. Having the sole 
responsibility for delivering, and in later stages for operating, the entire permanent 
Games-related venues as well as determining the authority of SOCOG for key 
organisational areas of the Games, the government of NSW practically created a platform 
upon which SOCOG had to operate. However, this was not necessarily a drawback, 
since SOCOG could not manage effectively the Olympic venture on its own, given the 
proliferation of the Games' complexity. Jim Sloman, for example, said: 
You can say that an OCOG should follow specific guidelines to deal with specific 
things but at the end of the day it receives benefits from that: money from the IOC, 
technical expertise from the IFs and venues from the government in order to facilitate 
its operations. If you consider the magnitude and complexity of the project and the 
various interests involved, I think that SOCOG had to collaborate with external 
organisations whatever the 'strategic' cost. SOCOG's aim was to deliver the best 
Games ever and that was achieved with the contribution of several other organisations 
(Sloman, 2000a). 
SOCOG, therefore, was operating within a -strategy-determined fmmework whose 
boundaries were mainly set by the IOC, the IFs and the NSW government. The 
involvement of these organisations in the organisational. model of the Sydney Olympics 
was seen by SOCOG's executives as essential for the delivery of the event; however, it 
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denotes that SOCOG's ability to formulate its own strategies was limited throughout its 
life cycle. 
6.2.6 DIVISION OF OPERATIONS IN SOCOG 
When the complexity of tasks that SOCOG had to perform is considered, the task of 
separating the organisation into different operational areas is naturally a complex task. In 
effect, the division of SOCOG's operations into an appropriate number of specialised 
areas for the delivery of the event was a gradual process, which underwent several 
changes. These changes were not only related to emerging organisational needs which 
often required the creation of additional operational areas, but also to the fact that 
SOCOG had ultimately "to run the Games ftom the venues" (Hollway, 2000), which 
implies the shift of its operations to the Games' venues in order to deliver the event. 
Consequently, it was of equal importance to SOCOG as much to decide on the number of 
operational areas in the organisation as to choose the time to move its operations to the 
venues. 
Figure 6.6: SOCOG's Main Operational Areas: 1993-1996 
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In early stages and particularly within the first three years of its operations, SOCOG had 
not established the frameworks for all of its operational areas, and therefore it had created 
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only eight operational divisions (Sports, Marketing, Finance, Human Resources and 
Administration, Corporate Affairs, Technology, Facilities and Games Services), and two 
programme areas (Cultural and Ceremonies), each of which was headed by a Director 
reporting to the President (SOCOG, 1996) (Figure 6.6). SOCOG was claimed to be in 
anticipation of more detailed information to come into the organisation mainly from 
members of its staff, who observed the Atlanta Games and acquired valuable knowledge 
about an OCOG's operations. For example, SOCOG's Head of Sports stated: 
"[SOCOG's] experience in Atlanta was very useful for dealing with our structure" 
(Elphinston, 2000a). Therefore, in the beginning SOCOG, in the words of its Chief 
Operating officer, "established a limited number ofoperational areas " (Sloman, 2000a), 
although conceptual operational plans were in place for most of SOCOG's functional 
areas (Sloman, 2000c). 
After the 1996 Atlanta Games, and the establishment of a solid leadership under the 
Presidency of the NSW, Minister for the Olympics, SOCOG developed rapidly 
establishing the frameworks for all its operational areas. As a result, the number of its 
divisions and programmes increased dramatically. In particular, in the period 1996-1997, 
SOCOG was operating under 5 Business Groups reporting directly to the CEO, 
comprising 16 divisions and 5 programmes (SOCOG, 1997). Further, in the period 1997- 
1999 SOCOG increased even more its operational areas to 74 programmes operating 
under 21 divisions and 6 business groups (SOCOG, 1999). As was mentioned earlier, in 
the period after the Atlanta Games SOCOG experienced increasing complexity in its 
organisational environment, and therefore it had to rationalise its knowledge and 
expertise by breaking it down into different divisions and programmes. The 
establishment of such a great number of operational areas in such a short period of time, 
however, was seen as problematic. SOCOG"s Senior Executive, Bob Leece, said: 
[After Atlanta] SOCOG established a lot of different programs in different areas [ ... ] 
but there was lack of communication between those areas, lack of accountability within 
the areas. [ ... ] SOCOG, in the management and development of its program areas with 
the managers were not given any discipline or control of how to appoint and select 
management programs. These program areas were a lot at the expense of their wishes 
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and a lot of people felt a lot of power by employing a lot more people. [ ... ] They 
employed a lot of people far too early (Leece, 2000a). 
Figure 6.7: SOCOG's Main Operational Areas: Games-time 
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Despite the criticism of SOCOG's selection of its functional areas, it is a fact that 
SOCOG established very early its Games-time functionality, as it reached the actual 
Games-time period with a minor increase in the number of programmes, that is, 95 
programmes under 20 divisions (SOCOG, 2001 d) (Figure 6.7). During the six months 
leading to the Games, however, the operations and responsibilities of the various 
divisions and programmes gradually integrated into each of the 40 Olympic venues. That 
meant that representatives of SOCOG's divisions and programmes moved to the venues 
and reported to their respective leaders, which were located in the organisation's 
Headquarters (Sloman, 2000b). In effect, SOCOG's divisions and programmes that 
represented functional areas of the organisation became part of an integrated 
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organisational model, which as was mentioned earlier, brought together all the 
constituent agencies of the Sydney Games. As a result, in the course of the actual 
Games-time. period, the functional responsibilities of the divisions and programmes 
became venue-specific. 
After the Games, SOCOG's dissolution gradually started. One month after the Games 
(October 30,2000) the vast majority of programmes had been dissolved with the 
remaining programmes incorporated into their respective divisions. From that point 
onwards, SOCOG's divisions were gradually dissolved, and by December 15,2000, the 
organisation was operating with four major divisions: Finance, Legal, Technology and 
Procurement (Eyers, 2001). The dissolution of each division was signified by the 
departure of the respective General Manager since in most of the cases people left the 
organisation together with their General Managers. Kristine Toohey explains: "[In] quite 
aftw cases they askedpeoplefrom the divisions to go with the General Managers [ ... ] so 
in many cases whether a functional area was still operating depended on whether the 
General Manager was in house (Toohey, 200 1). 
The dissolution of SOCOG's divisions and programmes was based on a detailed plan, 
which aimed to terminate the unnecessary functional areas of the organisation within 
certain periods of time after the end of the event (Eyers, 2001). Throughout the short 
post-event period of SOCOG's operations the main divisions of the organisation were 
Finance, Legal, Procurement and Workforce (Toohey, 2001). Moreover, roles that were 
the responsibility of divisions that had been dissolved were being covered by contractors 
or by former employees working as-sometimes part-time contractors (Eyers, 200 1 ). 
Therefore, the operational structure of SOCOG changed throughout the life cycle of the 
organisation since new operational areas were created as the time of the Games was 
coming closer. In the course of the seven years of its operations, the establishment of the 
various operational areas was related to the criteria that were used to break down the 
organisational units (i. e. 'unit grouping'). In particular, SOCOG started its operations as 
being a functional-structured organisation. That is, its organisational units were broken 
down according to basic organisational functions. Jim Sloman explains: "we started off 
with SOCOG as being very much a corporate structure. You would be in finance; you 
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would be in marketing, in sports, in technology and so on. It was allfunctional-based' 
(Sloman, 2000a). In later stages, however, SOCOG's structure underwent significant 
changes as the Venue Teams were established, and naturally the organisation was 
gradually moving from a functional to a venue-based structure. In effect, from 1997 
onwards, SOCOG went through a transition period where there were two structures 
working in parallel, a functional-based and a venue-based, which ended on May 
2000 
when SOCOG eventually adopted a solid venue-based structure (Figure 6.8). 
Figure 6.8: The Evolution of SOCOG's Structure 
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As is depicted in figure 6.8, in 1997 SOCOG established the concept of its operations, 
which refers to time-specific strategic plans with respect to the gradual transfer of its 
operations to the venues (Sloman, 2000b). In early 1998 SOCOG developed a detailed 
generic plan for one venue, thus creating a model which was used as a template and then 
rolled out across all venues. SOCOG's Chief Operating Officer described the evolution 
of SOCOG's structure as follows: 
We basically had to shift this [functional structure] to a venue-based model and we did 
that by taking one venue as the generic venue, the Aquatic Centre, and doing an 
operating plan for that. When we were happy with that we then migrated that into a 
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whole of other venues. So, we went from sort of one group doing the generic plan; we 
then went to 4 groups which had a caste of venues to look after; we then went to 9; we 
then went to 14 and a year out of the Games we appointed 40 venue managers who 
then did their own, but they took the model that has been developed (Slornan, 2000a). 
In the course of the year 1999, the organisational focus was on integrating the Venue 
Teams within the existing functional-based structure. The Venue Teams were operating 
still at SOCOG's Headquarters but they had their own individual structure under the 
direction of the Venue Managers. The Venue Managers were appointed one year before 
the Games in order to test the command and control mechanisms of the Venue Teams 
during the test events. During the test events, for example, Games-time reporting and 
simulated meetings took place in order for the Venue Teams to get familiar with a multi- 
event atmosphere (Sloman, 2000b). SOCOG, therefore, was gradually adopting a matrix 
structure in the sense that the functional areas within the Venue Teams were reporting to 
the venue manager but also to the respective functional area at SOCOG's Headquarters 
(Figure 6.9). Commenting on that Jim Sloman said: 
In reality you have to force the pace and it becomes a matrix organisation. [ ... 1. So by 
the time we were running Test Events you have the people work for the venue 
manager. They did not work for a functional area. Yes, they had a secondary report 
which was a secondary report to the functional area (Sloman, 2000a). 
Figure 6-9: SOCOG's Structure: Dual Reporting 
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In effect, from early 1999 until the middle of 2000, SOCOG was operating under two 
structures: a functional and a venue-based structure. As such, during that period, the 
criteria used to group the organisation's operations were based both on functional 
responsibilities and geographical place. This period of structural transition for SOCOG 
practically ended in late May 2000, when the Main Operations Centre (MOC) became 
operational (Sloman, 2000b). That meant that the leaders of the functional areas became 
part of the MOC through which they were co-ordinating their respective competencies in 
the venues. From that time onwards, therefore, SOCOG was operating under a venue- 
based structure, within which SOCOG's functional responsibilities were integrated in the 
form of functional representatives in each of the venues, who in turn were reporting to 
their respective leaders in the MOC. Under this structural model, SOCOG would embark 
on the delivery of the sportý competitions at the actual Games-time period. 
After the Games, the venue teams naturally dissolved and most of the staff left the 
organisation. The remaining staff returned to their initial posts in the Headquarters to 
temporarily re-form the functional areas, in order to review their operations and 
eventually dissolve. As a result, after the Games SOCOG returned to its initial 
functional-based structure. Kristine Toohey, for example, said: "[after the Games] you 
still hadyourfunctional areas, whoeveryou reported to you still reported to, and when 
they had leftyou had somebody else; there was still a structure " (Toohey, 200 1). 
The division of SOCOG's operations, therefore, changed significantly in the course of the 
seven years of its life, since, as the time passed, the increasing number of SOCOG's 
responsibilities required the establishment of various operational areas, initially in the 
organisation's Headquarters and in later stages in the sporting venues as well. In the 
initial three years of its operations, SOCOG operated with a functional-based structure 
establishing only a few of its operational areas. After 1996 and until the creation of the 
MOC in May 2000, the organisation experienced considerable growth establishing most 
of its operational areas while operating under both a functional and venue structure. 
After May 2000 and until the end of the Games, SOCOG underwent further growth 
reaching a total of 95 programmes under 20 divisions and 5 business groups. During that 
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period, SOCOG was almost exclusively operating from the venues, apart from a small 
group of senior staff, which was located in the MOC to co-ordinate the venue operations. 
Finally, after the Games SOCOG returned to a functional structure, and its operational 
areas gradually dissolved, apart from four divisions, which dissolved concurrently with 
the closure of the organisation in December 2000. 
6.2.7 INTERNAL CO-ORDINATION IN SOCOG 
As was shown above, SOCOG established various operational areas throughout its life 
cycle, which naturally increased the complexity of its operations. Although these 
operational areas were representing diverse competencies, in the form of different 
divisions, departments, programs and, at Games-time, Venue Teams, it was essential for 
the organisation to achieve co-ordination among these areas in order to reduce internal 
complexity and produce a solid outcome, that is the successful execution of the Games. 
Thus, SOCOG had to develop internal mechanisms of co-ordination, which would enable 
the organisation to work as a cohesive entity. Such mechanisms included practices that 
standardised the organisation's processes and outputs, as well as the creation of internal 
relationships in the form of committees and commissions, which aimed to co-ordinate 
information and ideas from different organisational areas for particular tasks. 
in the beginning, the main way that SOCOG was achieving co-ordination among its 
operational areas was through official monthly Board meetings, but also through informal 
meetings between the leaders of the functional areas and the Board. Commenting on the 
manner in which tasks were co-ordinated in early stages, Bob Elphinston said: "We 
[Heads of Divisions] would sit down and place our views and experiences and through 
thorough discussion we would come up with a decision" (Elphinston, 2000a). 
Consequently, besides the Board meetings, internal co-ordination in SOCOG was also 
achieved through informal interactions of its senior executives. Besides, in early stages, 
SOCOG had not established many committees which could facilitate internal co- 
ordination. In particular, within the first three years of its operations, only two standing 
committees were established, namely Audit Committee and Remuneration and Retention 
Committee, as well as a Stadium sub-committee, which provided advice in the selection 
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of the tender for the Olympic Stadium and was dissolved in January 1996 (SOCOG. 
1996). 
As time progressed, SOCOG established formal mechanisms for co-ordinating work 
among its divisions and programmes in the form of various standing committees, 
commissions and sub-committees. In particular, between 1996 and early 2000 SOCOG 
established 12 more committees and commissions reaching a total of 14 (SOCOG, 
2001d). Along with these committees and commissions, SOCOG formed various sub- 
committees, which acted as task forces, in the sense that they undertook a speciric task 
and when their job was done they dissolved. Moreover, under the matrix structure (i. e. 
functional/venue) SOCOG established formal plans and procedures, which pertained 
across all operational areas to ensure consistency of processes. Bob Elphinston, for 
example, said: "we had developedformal operational plans across all programmes to 
achieve consistency of operations and to co-ordinate our work " (Elphinston, 2000a). 
After May 2000, when SOCOG was operating under the Main Operation Centre (MOC), 
its functional areas were incorporated into the Venue Teams and co-ordination among 
those areas was achieved within each venue under the control of a powerful Venue 
Manager. In particular, each Venue Team held daily informal turnover sessions, which 
involved its key managers and then an official report of each session was forwarded to 
the MOC (Sloman, 2000b). Co-ordination within each venue, therefore, was primarily 
achieved through informal communication, while the MOC was responsible for 
consistency of. operations across all venues, through direct communication with the 
Venue Managers. Although Venue Managers had formal responsibilities to the MOC, 
most of such communication was in the form of informal telephone communication 
(Sloman, 2000a). As such, co-ordination between the venues and the MOC was also 
achieved through informal interaction. Moreover, after the establishment of the MOC, 
the various standing committees and commissions, which were previously essential co- 
ordinating tools, lost their significance. Bob Elphinston, for example, said: "We had 
many committees and commissions along the way that were making recommendations 
and decisions and then as we were getting closer to the Games-time they became less 
necessary " (Elphinston, 2000a). In effect, the committees, commissions and task forces 
in SOCOG were not active after May 2000 (Sloman, 2000a). These groupings aimed to 
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bring together people from different constituencies involved in specific tasks, having a 
co-ordinating but mainly advisory role. In the course of the three months leading to the 
Games as well as during the event, this responsibility was taken over by the Games Co- 
ordination Group (GCOG), which comprised people from all the constituent groups of 
the Games. As was mentioned earlier, the Executives of the GCOG had distinct 
responsibilities acting all together as a standing committee holding daily meetings. 
SOCOG's Chief Operating Officer explains the role of the GCOG during the actual 
Games-time Period: 
Basically what happened is that the GCOG was a group of people who had specific 
tasks to do: how to run the event was my role; Hollway's role was really to look after 
the Olympic Family and the diplomacy into the business. Eyers' role was to look after 
the sponsors and the stakeholders and their issues. Richmond's role was really to look 
after the city and the urban domain. Bob Leece's role was to look after the transport 
and so on. We were all set in this Games Co-ordination Group. We met every 
morning. I ran my meeting at 6: 30 at the MOC, then at 7: 30 we had the GCOG 
meeting and at 9: 30 we had the IOC Co-ordination Commission (Sloman, 2000a). 
After the Games, each operational area worked relatively autonomously as they mainly 
reviewed their operations and prepared to dissolve. Although co-ordination among the 
operational areas was not required, the top of the organisation had set speciric deadlines 
by which divisions had to be terminated (Eyers, 2001). Therefore, there were no specific 
mechanisms for internal co-ordination. but rather time-specific plans for tasks that had to 
be accomplished. In terms of committees and commissions, only the Finance Committee 
and the Audit Committee re-grouped and met regularly during that period in order to 
provide consultation for the financial resolution of the organisation. The Sports 
Commission and the Contingency Committee met also once after the Games but only for 
reviewing their operations and then dissolved (Eyers, 2001). 
SOCOG's internal co-ordination and communication, therefore, was an essential 
organisational process, which involved different mechanisms during the life cycle of the 
organisation. A wide variety of tasks had to be performed often in detail, which in turn 
required SOCOG's staff to adhere to detailed formal instructions and procedures. In 
early stages, however, formal mechanisms for work co-ordination were limited 
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(Richmond, 2001; Sloman, 2001). Each division and programme would have its own 
plans, policies and procedures manuals and the like, but since only some of them were 
operational at that stage, the bulk of formal paperwork produced in the organisation was 
restricted to strategic plans and primarily to a general Master Plan. That would list all 
SOCOG's tasks, and project individually the time of their completion (SOCOG, 1996). 
In later stages, the diversity and complexity of SOCOG's tasks resulted in the 
establishment of many formal mechanisms in the form of formal plans, policies and 
procedures manuals and detailed job descriptions. In 1998, for example, SOCOG 
developed various human resources-related plans such as a Code of Conduct, 
Occupational Health and Safety plans, Disability plans, an Ethnic Affairs Statement and 
Agreement as well as well-established processes for planning, managing and reviewing 
staff's performance against key result areas and agreed objectives (SOCOG, 1999). 
Moreover, as SOCOG was reaching the Games-time period, detailed job descriptions for 
its staff were established as well as minute-by-minute daily-run schedules (Sloman, 
2000c). That increasing formality of SOCOG's operations became a subject of criticism 
primarily because that was seen as lingering its decision-making processes. Bob Leece, 
for example, said: 
Up to this year [2000] SOCOG was extraordinarily bureaucratic producing loads of 
paper work which did not mean anything because SOCOG had a lot of young 
enthusiastic people, highly motivated, highly energetic young people but they were 
desperate for leadership, which did not exist because SOCOG did not have a solid 
framework in which to operate. The decision-making processes were long (Leece, 
2000a). 
David Richmond shared Mr Leece's views and illustrated the reasons behind SOCOG's 
bureaucratisation. He said: 
I think the source of bureaucratisation was the fact that you had an organisation, which 
was very much based on functional responsibilities and technical skills. And the way 
which the organisation worked was that every technical skill had to sign off on every 
decision, and there was very little management on the programmes (Richmond, 
2000). 
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After the establishment of the Games-time structure, in May 2000, the plans, policies and 
procedures of all functional areas were integrated in the Venue Teams. Moreover, formal 
protocols were formed in order to ensure that messages across all venues were consistent 
(Sloman, 2000b). As a result, SOCOG's staff followed detailed formal instructions, 
which in turn affected its decision-making processes. SOCOG's Deputy CEO, Michael 
Eyers, illustrated that with an example as follows: 
In SOCOG we had this issue where sports wanted to take extra seats in the SuperDome 
and the ticketing said: 'this is a problem because we want to be able to take a high price 
for those tickets'. We must resolve that. [ ... ]. SOCOG would produce 
loads of 
paperwork, make inefficient meetings, and the problem would be still unresolved. So 
[ ... ] there were some sorts of problems tending to go on for too long unresolved 
(Eyers, 2000). 
SOCOG's operational systems, however, were subject to an external audit, in July 2000, 
which was conducted by external independent auditors on behalf of OCA and the NSW 
Government (SOCOG, 2001 a). In relation to the external audit process, OCA's Director 
General said: "We had a thing called STORE exercising [Sydney 2000 Technical and 
Operational Readiness Exercise] early July 2000 where we tested their [SOCOG] 
management systems very well. We tested their weaknesses and so they were not so 
bureaucratic. Anyway, they had to befastflexible " (Richmond, 2000). 
Under the Games-time structure, therefore, SOCOG's operations were conducted in a 
less formalised manner (Hollway, 2001; Elphinston, 2001; Sloman, 2001; Richmond, 
200 1), since the increased operational complexity of the Games-time conditions required 
the organisation to act in a flexible and time-efficient manner. After the Games, formal 
plans, policies and procedures manuals and the like, which previously aimed to 
standardise work processes were not in use, since most of the work was co-ordinated in 
an informal manner. People in SOCOG were not given any formal guidelines to 
accomplish their tasks, apart from a time span within which a functional area had to be 
dissolved and consequently its tasks to be accomplished. Commenting on this Kristine 
Toohey said: 
Well, there was a succession plan, which specified when certain people would go, and 
who would be the person from OCA to report to if you were still employed by 
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SOCOG. But apart from that I think that we were working at our own pace. Our team 
for example was autonomous in terms of setting our own plans because the job that had 
to be done was relying on our expertise. I think that this was the same with other teams 
in SOCOG. I do not think that any area in SOCOG was following any plans (Toohey, 
2001). 
After the Games, therefore, SOCOG operated in a flexible manner, without formal plans 
and instructions, apart from a general plan, which specified the lines of authority in a 
period that the organisation was transformed in order to dissolve. 
Overall, therefore, SOCOG utilised diverse methods for the achievement of internal co- 
ordination in the course of its life cycle. In the early stages of its operations, and 
particularly until 1996, when limited organisational growth had occurred, internal co- 
ordination was mainly achieved through informal interactions among the operational 
areas at an executive level. Formal plans and instructions were limited during that period 
and only a few committees and commission had been established. In the period between 
1996 and 2000, when SOCOG experienced considerable growth in terms of numbers of 
operational areas, the internal co-ordination took the form of formal mechanisms, which 
primarily aimed to regulate the various organisational functions. This was achieved with 
the creation of several committees and commissions, which brought together the various 
competencies in order to perform particular tasks, as well as with the establishment of 
formal means in the form of detailed plans and instructions, procedures manuals and the 
like. After May 2000 SOCOG's operations were dispersed across the venues under the 
supervision of the MOC, and consequently co-ordination could not be achieved with 
tight, formal mechanisms. The Venue Managers primarily communicated with the MOC 
through informal interaction and meetings, although some formal instructions and 
reporting existed, and the co-ordinating roles of most of the committees and commissions 
were incorporated into a- sole body, the GCOG. After the Games, SOCOG gradually 
became a small organisation with a limited number of operational areas. Internal co- 
ordination was often not required since the organisation was divided into small groups, 
which were mostly working autonomously. However, a general formal plan existed, 
which specified desired outcomes of operations within a specific timetable. 
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6.2.8 DECISION-MAKING IN SOCOG 
As was shown above, SOCOG's employees were often working within a complex 
internal organisational environment where, from time to time, they had to operate within 
formal guidelines, but also flexibly at their own discretion. The manner in which 
SOCOG's staff was operating was closely related to the decision-making structure in the 
organisation, since the level in the organisational hierarchy where decisions were 
finalised, naturally determined the staff's authority boundaries. 
In the early stages of SOCOG's operations, the decisions made in the organisation were 
mostly of a strategic nature and were naturally finalised at the very top of the 
organisation, that is, the Board of Directors. Jim Sloman, for example, said: "In the 
beginning, SOCOG was structured in that the Board was allpowerful " (Sloman, 2000a). 
The Board of Directors would approve the establishment of each operating area and the 
appointment of senior staff to lead those areas. The Board also established the initial 
legal fi-ameworks, such as those which would protect the rights of potential sponsors and 
partners. The 'Sydney 2000 Games Protection Act 1996', for example, provided 
protection for Sydney Olympics words and symbols (SOCOG, 1996). There would also 
be decisions initiated by the Head of a division or a programme but they would be 
finalised at the Board. Commenting on this, Jim Sloman stated: "Usually they [Heads of 
Divisions] would get to the Board and say, for example, 'we need to structure this way 
because of that reason'and the Board would decidefor that" (Sloman, 2000a). 
After the establishment of the Sports Commission in 1996, SOCOG's Board of Directors 
retained the majority of the decision-making power, yet the Sports Commission received 
ultimate decision-making authority for sport-related issues. Specifically, the Sports 
Commission was responsible for making all the decisions concerning the sport 
competitions including the Test Events. These included decisions concerning the IFs and 
NOCs' relations, the Games scheduling, the sport equipment, the freight, such as canoes, 
rowing shells, yachts and horses, the IOC sport relations as well as all the human 
resources issues with respect to the sport competitions, such as volunteers, marketing, 
facilities operations, villages, medical, transport, accreditation, accommodation and so on 
(SOCOG, 2000a). The wide range of responsibilities of the Sports Commission marked a 
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clear shift of a great deal of decision-making authority from the Board to the Sports 
Commission. SOCOG's Head of Sports, for example, said: 
In the case of sport, which was very important, there was a commission of the Board, 
the SOCOG's Sports Commission and it was given the total authority. It was an 
autonomous body that had to work within the budget approved by the SOCOG Board. 
It had total authority in all decisions concerning sport: the athletes, the village and so 
on. That was in the hands of John Coates, the President of the Australian Olympic 
Committee (Elphinston, 2000a). 
Although the Sports Commission had the total authority to decide on sport-related 
matters, it was, however, financially constrained by the Board, since it was operating 
within specific budget allocations that were approved by the Board (SOCOG, 2000a). 
Moreover, in later stages, Board's President, Michael Knight, became even more 
involved in SOCOG's operational decisions, which was seen as an action to ensure that 
SOCOG was placed more tightly under the control of the NSW government (Moore, 
2000c). Commenting on the decision-making structure of SOCOG, Bob Elphinston said: 
"After Atlanta, the decision-making power rested in the Board and particularly in 
Michael Knight" (Elphinston, 2000a). As a result, major decisions were finalised at the 
top of the organisation whether that would be the Board of Directors or the Sports 
Commission. Some major decisions were even finalised outside the organisation, in the 
NSW government's Cabinet sub-committee, which was formed to decide on Michael 
Knight's recommendations (Richmond, 2000). The organisation, however, was in the 
process of establishing the Venue Teams, which would eventually run the Games from 
the sporting venues. The establishement of the Venue Teams in 1999 marked a shift of 
considerable decision-making power to the lower organisational levels, since the majority 
of the competition-related issues were gradually delegated to the Venue Manager 
(Sloman, 2000b). 
SOCOG's decision-making structure changed substantially after May 2000, when the 
organisation adopted a Games-time structure. The vast majority of the Games' decision 
expected to be made inside the venues by the Venue Managers. Operational decisions 
which could not be made by the Venue Managers were transferred to the Main Operating 
Centre (MOC), which was located in SOCOG's Headquarters and run by SOCOG's 
203 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG CHAPTER VI 
Chief Operating Officer. However, strategic decisions, which could affect the Games as 
a whole, such as security issues, were transferred to the leaders of the GCOG, Michael 
Knight and John Coates. SOCOG's Head of Sports explains: 
At Games-time, the total authority was left in the hands of Michael Knight and John 
Coates. So, the President of the Board and the President of the Sports Commission had 
the authority to make decisions at Games-time. On the day-by-day basis, we had the 
Chief Operating Officer for SOCOG [Jim Sloman] who had been the deputy CEO and 
he managed the MOC, which took all the decisions about what should occur. But if the 
decisions were much broader, at a higher level, then it would go to Michael Knight and 
John Coates. Venue managers were expected to resolve all issues at the venue with 
their teams. So, the ideal position was that there were no issues coming to the MOC. 
The reality I suppose was that 90% of the decisions were made at the venue and 10% 
came in the MOC. Of those 10% probably very small percentage less than 10% of 
10% went to Michael Knight and John Coates (Elphinston, 2000a). 
The role of the Venue Managers, therefore, became very significant, during the period 
that SOCOG was operating under a venue-based structure. SOCOG's Chief Operating 
Officer, Jim Stoman, said: 
So, we said the Venue Manager basically is 'king' and decisions were made within the 
venue, if they can, within a certain set of parameters and that only if it is going to have 
a Games-wide effect or political effect or security, or it is obviously a Games-wide 
issue that will be escalated, it should reported to us (MOC). We kept the structure very 
flat [ ... ] So yes, these people [Venue Managers] were delegated responsibilities and 
it 
was a key feature of the model (Stoman, 2000a). 
Therefore, in the course of the three months leading to the Games as well as during the 
event, there was a clear shift of SOCOG's decision-making power to the sporting venues, 
which essentially constituted the organisation's 'operating core', since the vast majority 
of decisions was finalised in the venues by the Vcnue Managers. 
After the Games, SOCOG gave considerable decision-making autonomy to the staff at 
the bottom of the organisation, which, as was mentioned earlier, was structured in various 
teams of experts who were operating within existing departments, programmes or 
divisions. These teams could autonomously decide on operational issues, which were 
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primarily related with the dissolution of their respective departments, programmes or 
divisions. However, the strategic direction of the organisation was vested in OCA's 
executives, who were supervising SOCOG's operations during that period. Commenting 
on this, Kristine Toohey said: 
(After the Games] David Richmond [OCA's Director General] was very powerful. 
Sandy Hollway [SOCOG's CEO] was accounted toward the volunteers so he was 
moved to another governmental department. Surely it was Michael Knight a very 
powerful individual and also Michael Eyers [OCA's appointee as SOCOG's Deputy 
CEO] was very powerful. So between those three people certainly (Toohey, 200 1). 
David Richmond was leading SOCOG after the departure of SOCOG's CEO and together 
with Michael Eyers were the main decision-makers in the organisation. It seems from the 
above, however, that Michael Knight, former President of SOCOG and former NSW's 
Minister for the Olympicý, was also an important decision-maker after the Games, 
although he resigned from his posts right after the end of the event. Kristine Toohey 
illustrated Michael Knight's involvement in SOCOG after the Games. She stated: 
Michael Knight still has to sign off on the Post Games Report [POR]. There is a 
difference you have to understand even if he did not work for the organisation 
does not mean that he did not have influence. Knight had considerable impact on 
individuals working for SOCOG because essentially OCA was the successor 
organisation and most of the people who had an Olympic-related responsibility were 
OCA's staff, not SOCOG's staff. As I told you Richmond and Eyers were very 
powerful (Toohey, 200 1). 
Michael Knight therefore, could affect decisions in SOCOG primarily by influencing its 
main decision-makers, that is David Richmond and Michael Eyers, who were Knight's 
closest subordinates during his terms of office (Moore, 2000a). The power for important 
decisions in SOCOG during that period, therefore, primarily rested in the hands of 
OCA's senior staff. 
Consequently, the decision-making structure in SOCOG underwent considerable changes 
during its life cycle. In early stages, and particularly until 1996, the Board of Directors 
was the main decision-making body in the organisation. However, after 1996 substantial 
decision-making power moved to the Sports Commission, which although it constituted a 
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commission of the Board, it had ultimate authority for decisions on the majority of 
sporting issues. As such, the bulk of decision-making power was vested at the upper 
levels of SOCOG's structure. The decision-making structure in SOCOG changed 
significantly after May 2000, when the organisation moved to a venue-based structure. 
In particular, the bulk of decision-making authority was transferred to the venues, which 
from that point onwards constituted the operating body in the organisation. The Venue 
Managers were powerful individuals who had the authority to make most of the 
decisions. Consequently, from May 2000 until the end of the Games, SOCOG's 
decision-making power was rested in the lower levels of the organisation's structure. 
Finally, after the Games the decision-making authority remained at the lower levels of the 
organisation, since SOCOG retained a small number of operating teams, which worked 
relatively autonomously. However, considerable decision-making power moved back to 
the top of the organisation, and particularly to OCA's staff, who led SOCOG's operations 
until its dissolution. 
6.2.9 STAFF CONTRIBUTION TO SOCOG 
As was mentioned earlier, SOCOG experienced significant increase in'the numbers of its 
staff throughout its life cycle. SOCOG's staff allocated in different divisions or 
departments as well as in different levels of authority within the organisation. However, 
with regard to the authority they were given to contribute to the organisation's operations, 
SOCOG's employees were allocated to different organisational parts, namely the 
6strategic apex', the 'middle line', the 'operating core', the 'technostructure', and the 
'support staff' (Figure 6.10) (Mintzberg, 1979). These parts contributed to the overall 
operations of the organisation, however, some parts had more significant contribution 
than other parts in certain stages of SOCOG's operational life. 
In early stages, for example, SOCOG was a relatively small organisation, where most of 
its operations were undertaken by senior executives or Board members. As was shown 
earlier. particularly until 1996, SOCOG's operations were mainly related to strategic 
issues, primarily with regard to the establishment of the functional areas of the 
organisation. As SOCOG's Chief Operating Officer stated, "in the beginning the bulk of 
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work was produced by the Board and by a limited number o executives who consulted f 
the Board on various issues " (Sloman, 2000a). Consequently, in the beginning, the part 
of SOCOG with the most significant contribution to its operations was the top of the 
organisation, which comprised senior staff, namely its 'strategic apex'. 
Figure 6.10: The Basic Parts ofan Organisation 
As SOCOG was growing bigger, however, and its task was getting more diverse, the 
various functional areas undertook more organisational responsibilities, having more 
signiflcant contribution to its operations. Expertise was essential, and as a result, the 
organisation's expert staff, that is SOCOG's 'technostructure', had a signiflcant 
contribution'to SOCOG's operations. For example, SOCOG's CEO said: "when I came 
in SOCOG [March 1997] my main task was to get the planners work. [ ... ] We had to 
produce plansfor all the areas. [ ... ] We had to plan our structure and budgets until the 
Games ". Moreover, SOCOG employed expert staff of the Atlanta's organising 
committee and also employed consulting firms to deal with diverse issues ranging from 
planning to technology (Moore, 2000b). After 1999, however, the recently established 
Venue Teams acted as its 'operating core', which essentially delivered SOCOG's tasks, 
in the sense that those teams were getting prepared to deliver the sport competitions. As 
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SOCOG progressed towards the time of the event, therefore, its Operating Core gradually 
contributed more significantly to SOCOG's operations. 
Figure 6.11: Typical Venue Structure: The Aquatic Centre 
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After May 2000, when SOCOG was operating under a mainly venue-based structure, the 
bulk of SOCOG's operations were run by 40 Venue Teams each ofwhich comprised 
representatives of SOCOG's functional areas as well as representatives of all the 
constituents groups involved in the running of the event (Figure 6.11 ). As was mentioned 
earlier, the Venue Teams were able to make most of the decisions concerning the running 
of the Games, and delivered this massive event to the many constituents, primarily 
athletes, officials, broadcast and press (Sloman, 2000b). 
As a result, in the course of the three months leading to the Games as well as during the 
event, the Venue Teams had the most significant contribution to SOCOO's operations as 
well as to the event as a whole. After the Games, SOCOG's main task was to make the 
appropriate arrangements in order for the organisation to dissolve smoothly. That was a 
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task, which was undertaken primarily by ad hoe teams, which were working within their 
respective functional areas (Toohey, 2001; Eyers, 2001). However, the contribution of 
some expert staff was also needed during that period, particularly with regard to the filing 
of the organisation's records. This was an essential process for SOCOG, since one of its 
responsibilities to the Host City Contract was to compile a comprehensive Post-Games 
Report (IOC, 1992, Section 46). Moreover, SOCOG undertook the responsibility to 
transfer its managerial expertise to future OCOG's through the Transfer of Olympic 
Knowledge (TOK) programme. This involved the gathering of the key documents and 
data from the Sydney Olympics into manageable manuals, which could be used by future 
Olympic organisers, and therefore a substantial input of record specialists was required 
(Toohey and Halbwirth, 2001). Consequently, after the Games and until its dissolution, 
the bulk of work in SOCOG was produced by members of the lower organisational levels 
(i. e. 'operating core') with considerable contribution from expert staff (i. e. 
'technostructure'). 
Overall, therefore, the organisational parts of SOCOG with the most significant 
contribution to the organisation's operations varied with the period of its life cycle. In 
particular, in early stages the majority of work was undertaken by senior staff, while, as 
the organisation was growing bigger the 'operating core' gradually had the major 
contribution in the organisation. In the period between 1996 and early 2000, when 
SOCOG experienced enormous growth, the contribution of expert staff of its 
, technostructure' was also considerably significant for the organisation's operations. 
After May 2000 and until the end of the Games, the Venue Teams, which represented 
SOCOG's 'operating core', played the prime role in the organisation's operations. 
Similarly, after the event, the staff of SOCOG's 'operating core' was the key player in 
producing the work in the organisation, however, it was considerably helped by a small 
number of experts of the 'technostructure'. 
It is clear from the above that SOCOG's members of staff from different levels of the 
organisational hierarchy significantly contributed to the organisation's operations as a 
whole. The tasks that had to be performed considerably varied, as the organisation was 
eventually operated with a wide range of operational responsibilities. However, the 
majority of jobs in SOCOG were related to the delivery of the sport competitions of the 
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biggest multi sporting event, and therefore, staff training should have been an essential 
parameter for the organisation's operations, as the vast majority of SOCOG's staff 
performed jobs that they had never done in the past. 
Nevertheless, in the early stages of SOCOG's life cycle, there was limited training for its 
staff (Riordan, 2001). The organisation was formed by highly respected professionals 
with sound skills and experience, both from the business and the sporting industry, who 
initially came in the organisation to provide strategic advice and direction (SOCOG, 
1996). These individuals, however, needed to acquire the Olympic-specific knowledge in 
order to identify the key characteristics of the Olympic project. This was not achieved 
through job-specific patterns of training but rather through observation of major sport 
events and attendance of Olympic-related meetings and conferences. David Richmond, 
for example, said: 
We built that knowledge up from the bid process, even I was not involved in that; 
reading the documentation and then the evolution of meetings with IOC over the years, 
attendance of the Atlanta and Nagano Olympic Games, observations at other major 
events, going to conferences of some of the major consistencies like the Association of 
Summer Olympic Games and so on (Richmond, 2000). 
It was not before 1997 that staff training became an essential consideration for SOCOG. 
In particular, in 1997, with the perspective of the vast amount of staff that SOCOG would 
employ in the following years, the training of SOCOG's paid staff as well as of 
volunteers was outsourced to TAFE NSW (Technical And Further Education), a major 
Australian training agency (SOCOG, 1998). TAFE NSW's contribution to SOCOG's 
staff training was limited in the beginning, as SOCOG's paid staff was primarily 
undertaking on-the-job training, and therefore, TAFE NSW's role was to train a pool of 
candidates who would staff SOCOG during the Games (Riordan, 2001). For that reason 
TAFE co-ordinated together with SOCOG various Olympic-related training sessions in 
20 Australian Universities covering a wide variety of expertise such as IT, media, 
competitions management and so on (SOCOG 2000b). Therefore, although a great deal 
of training took place, most of it occurred outside the organisation. 
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The bulk of training for SOCOG's staff but also for volunteers and the rest of the Games 
workforce took place during the three months leading to the Games (Riodan, 2001). In 
particular, between June 2000 and October 2000,36 training sessions took place all 
around Australia which aimed to train approximately 47,000 volunteers and 60,000 paid 
and contract-partner staff (SOCOG, 2000). That was an enormous task, which was 
responsibility of TAFE. All trainees underwent a three-level training programme 
comprising orientation training, venue training andjob specific training. Bob Elphinston 
explains: 
All staff and volunteers trained first of all in the generic requirements of the Olympic 
Games: what was the Olympic Movement about, the Olympic Games' importance and 
so on. Then they had venue-specific training: what they would require to do at the 
venue; and then there was job-specific training (Elph inston, 2000a). 
After the Games, there was naturally no training for SOCOG's staff (Riordan, 200 1). As 
was mentioned earlier, after the Games SOCOG comprised people who had worked for 
the Games as well as experts, whether they were previously working for SOCOG or they 
had been brought in the organisation to accomplish specific tasks. As a result, SOCOG 
did not need to train its staff since most of them were working for SOCOG long before 
the Games, and the new staff that came in the organisation during that period were 
highly-skilled and experienced professionals (Toohey, 2001). 
Consequently, the amount of training undertaken by SOCOG's staff changed 
significantly through the years of the organisation's life. In early stages, limited staff 
training was undertaken primarily in the form of observation of other sporting events and 
attendance of Olympic conferences. In later stages and particularly after 1997 the 
process of planning and delivering SOCOG's staff training was formalised as it was 
outsourced to TAFE NSW, which however, delivered the bulk of training in the period 
between June 2000 and October 2000. Finally, after the Games, staff training in SOCOG 
was not needed as the majority of the remaining staff either was trained in the past or was 
expert staff that employed after the Games to facilitate the wind up process (Toohey, 
2001). 
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This chapter attempted a holistic description of SOCOG's organisational nature, 
following the premises of a modified version of Mintzberg's (1979) configuration 
analysis. This process involved the identification and evaluation of a series of structural 
and contextual characteristics of SOCOG throughout its life cycle, in an attempt to 
provide a sufficient account of the organisation across the seven years of its operation. In 
doing so, it was shown that SOCOG was an evolving organisation, since the majority of 
its organisational dimensions under investigation changed significantly in the course of 
its life cycle. Consequently, it was felt that the development of a single synthesis of 
SOCOG's characteristics, that is one organisational formation, would be inadequate for 
providing the scope of its organisational status. It is rather suggested that a 
comprehensive understanding of SOCOG as an organisational entity requires multiple 
syntheses of its organisational dimensions by capturing their nature at different points of 
its operational life, and consequently deriving multiple organisational formations. 
Therefore, there is a need to identify distinctive periods in SOCOG's life cycle, capture 
the nature of its characteristics in each of the periods, and eventually synthesise the 
respective organisational formations. The process of periodisation of SOCOG's life 
cycle along with a time-specific analysis of its organisational characteristics is presented 
in the following chapter. 
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The aim of this thesis has been to identify and analyse the nature and range of 
organisational configurations evident within the life cycle of SOCOG. Particularly, 
the research has the following objectives: 
To identify and evaluate the structural and contextual features of SOCOG 
throughout its life cycle, using a modified version of Mintzberg's 
configuration analysis; 
To investigate the role and operation of SOCOG in the organisation of the 
Sydney 2000 Olympic Games; 
To explore the applicability of the life cycle periodisation for the study of 
SOCOG; and 
To review and evaluate the utility of the modified Mintzberg's approach with 
regard to the examination of SOCOG. 
The purpose of the present chapter concentrates on the fulfilment of the last three 
objectives, as there has already been a long discussion of the first objective in the last 
part of the previous chapter, and also to provide the final remarks of the thesis as a 
whole. Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is fourfold: firstly, it aims to 
elaborate on the role that SOCOG played in the preparations and organisation of the 
Sydney Games; secondly, it aims to discuss the usefulness of a chronological 
separation of SOCOG's life cycle into distinctive organisational. stages; thirdly, it 
aims to discuss the organisational status of SOCOG with regara to the premises of 
Mintzberg's configuration approach to organisational analysis, and assess the utility 
of Mintzberg's approach for the study of SOCOG. Finally, this chapter aims to draw 
the major conclusions of this study, and provide recommendations for further research 
in the field of the Olympic Games organisation. As a result, this chapter is structured 
in four main sections. The first section comments on the organisational position of 
SOCOG in the Sydney Olympics through an analysis of its status and organisational 
responsibilities throughout its operational life. The second section argues the need for 
a chronological division of SOCOG's life cycle, identifies the key incidents in 
SOCOG's life cycle and ultimately provides a time-specific pattern for the orderly 
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structuring of its organisational elements. Subsequently, the third section discusses 
the organisational formations identified in SOCOG, particularly in relation to 
Mintzberg's (1973) organisational configurations (appendix IV), while commenting 
on the usefulness of Mintzberg's modified approach as the conceptual framework for 
the study of SOCOG. Finally, the fourth section of this chapter constitutes the 
concluding part of the thesis. It presents the main conclusions of the study, states its 
main implications for academics and practitioners, and suggests areas and 
methodologies for further research. 
7.1 THE ROLE OF SOCOG IN THE ORGANISATION OF THE SYDNEY 
OLYMPICS 
In accordance with the Olympic Charter (rules 39,40), SOCOG was established by 
the Australian Olympic 'Committee (AOC) and became an integral part of the Host 
City Contract, of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Like every contemporary OCOG, 
SOCOG was formed as the central constituent of the organisational, model of the 
contemporary Olympics with specific organisational. responsibilities. According to its 
charter SOCOG was responsible for the following: 
e To implement the sports programme, including preparing and operating all 
venues and faciUties for the Games; 
e To organise the cultural progranune; 
* To establish a marketing programme in consultation with the IOC and the 
Australian Olympic Committee (AOC); and 
* To arrange and make available host broadcaster and television and radio 
facilities and other inforniation services (SOCOG, 2001 a). 
Effectively, SOCOG was formed as a private organisation wMch would hold the sole 
responsibility for the core part of the Olympic project, while the building of the 
Olympic infrastructure and other peripheral responsibilities, such as the security and 
the transportation of the Gaines, were undertaken by public organisations of the state 
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government of the New South Wales (NSW). Therefore, SOCOG had, to co-operate 
not only with the NSW government on a number of supporting services to the event 
but also with the constituent organisations of the Olympic Movement, namely, the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC), the International Federations (IFs) and the 
National Olympic Committees (NOCs) with regard to a variety of event related issues 
ranging from the arrangement of the marketing deals to the planning and delivery of 
the sporting competitions. 
Therefore, although SOCOG held the appellation of the organiser of the Sydney 
Olympics it was in fact, in view of its organisational position, the co-ordinator of the 
event. In effect, SOCOG was a temporary organisation with limited resources, whose 
main responsibility was to bring together the resources of other organisations and co- 
ordinate their operations for a particular period of time, and subsequently to dissolve. 
As was shown in the previous chapter, in order to deliver the event SOCOG was in 
need of a number of externaUy held resources. As with every OCOG the main 
financial supplier to SOCOG wiii the IOC, ' which provided SOCOG with 
approximately 60% of its budget through its international sponsorship deals. In the 
case of the Sydney Olympics, however, the contribution of the host government, that 
of NSW, was also substantial. Apart from the building of the entire new Olympic 
ffiftastructure, the NSW government underwrote SOCOG, and also assumed the 
responsibility to provide a wide range of facilities and services which were essential 
for the effective delivery of the event. , Moreover, the NSW government was 
responsible for determining the operational framework of SOCOG, including its legal 
status, and for appointing the leadership of the organisation. 
Therefore, although SOCOG was established as a private organisation, it essentially 
constituted a statutory authority of the NSW government, and effectively from its 
formation its power over the organisation of the Games was significantly restricted. 
From the early stages of SOCOG's operation it was evident that the NSW government 
intended to control SOCOG, particularly by ensuring that any individuals appointed to 
leadership positions in SOCOG were sympathetic to the state government. After the 
1995 state elections, for example, when the Labour Party succeeded the Conservative 
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Party in the government of NSW, SOCOG gradually underwent significant changes as 
much with regard to its leadership as with regard to its links with the NSW public 
governance. The new government replaced the President and CEO of SOCOG, and a 
Ministry for the Olympics was established to co-ordinate the involvement of all the 
government's authorities in the Games' organisation. Moreover, in 1996 the Minister 
for the Olympics, Michael Knight, was appointed President of SOCOG's Board of 
Directors, which essentially meant that the organisation was not only directly linked 
to the NSW government, but was also under its direct supervision. 
Under the presidency of Michael Knight, SOCOG operated with a peculiar leadership 
structure, in the sense that the organisation was virtually controUed by the NSW 
government. SOCOG's budgets and operations came under severe criticism from its 
President, a situation that was often reinforced by the Australian media. SOCOG was 
frequently presented in the media as unable to operate efficiently and effectively and 
generally as an org . ation which would not be able to deliver successful Games. 
The belief that SOCOG was ineffective for performing its task was strengthened in 
1999, when SOCOG mismanaged the Games' ticketing programme creating a 
significant loss of money and public confidence in the organisation. This negative 
profile of SOCOG, coupled with the giv6n desire of the NSW government for further 
control over the Games' organisation, resulted in the appointment of a number of 
NSW's public servants to key positions in the organisation as well as the transfer of a 
number of SOCOG's responsibilities, including the venues operations, to the NSW's 
Olympic Co-ordination Authority (OCA), which was the main organisational fink 
between SOCOG and the NSW government. Moreover, the Australian Olympic 
Committee (AOQ took full responsibility for all the sport-related issues of the 
Games, an area that was the central responsibility of SOCOG. In effect, from the year 
1999 onwards, SOCOG's role with regard to the organisation of the Games was 
gradually weakened as the NSW government and the AOC took over some of the 
organisation's main responsibilities. 
The strong involvement of the NSW government and AOC in the Games' 
organisation became more evident during the last six months of the Olympic 
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preparations, when the organisational power of SOCOG was diminished. In 
particular, a new co-ordination body, the Games Co-ordination Group (GCOG), 
which was headed by the NSWs Minister for the Olympics and AOC's President, 
replaced SOCOG's Board of Direciors, and SOCOG was integrated into a new 
organisational entity, 'Sydney 2000', which incorporated all the organisational 
constituents of the Games under the leadership of the OCA's Director General. 
Practically, during the Garnes-tirne period SOCOG lost the majority of its original. 
responsibilities and significant organisational authority. It was no longer the central 
organisational and co-ordination body of the Games, but rather a powerless 
organisation with only a limited contribution to the delivery of the event. 
Overall, therefore, the significance of SOCOG's role in the organisation of the 
Sydney Games gradually diminished during the organisation's fife cycle. SOCOG 
was never a powerful organisation, yet in the early stages of the Games' preparations 
it held a significant co-ordination position. Its initiative in dealing with prestigious 
international organisations, such as thqý IOC and the IFs as well as media networks 
and multinational corporations, gave the organisation a high profile, which could 
easily be envied by the other constituents of the event's organisation. The research 
findings suggest that as the time of the Games neared, the NSW government, and to a 
lesser extent the AOC, were tempted to get involved in the organisation of the Gaines 
as actively as possible, in order to enjoy the privilege of the Olympic Games' kudos, 
in our view. Besides, the aforementioned entities constituted the prime political and 
sporting bodies respectively around the Sydney Games, and had a noticeable 
aspiration to present the Games as their own product. The NSW govemment, in 
particular, invested considerable funds to build and support a prestigious 'show, 
which would be run by a relatively independent and apolitical organisation. 
Undoubtedly the NSW government aspired to receive the international recognition in 
case of a possible success of the event, which in turn would raise its local 
administrative profile. Conversely, there was a high level of risk of international 
embarrassment involved for the status of the NSW government, if organisational 
problems arose. Moreover, the extensive media attention on the preparations of an 
Olympic Games undoubtedly provides a usefid opportunity for politically ambitious 
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politicians, and in the case of the Sydney Olympics this was presumably an additional 
incentive for stronger political involvement in the event's organisation. However, it 
needs to be acknowledged that SOCOG mismanaged particular areas of the Games' 
organisation, and essentially justified the intense involvement of the NSW 
government in the name of the Games' success. 
The case of SOCOG and its role within the organisation of the Sydney Olympics 
reveals the intensity of power relations in the Olympic management and perhaps the 
need for alternative organisational models in the contemporary Olympics. With 
regard to the former, the peculiar structure of the organisation of the Olympic Games 
allows the involvement of diverse interests, which in turn generates a complex 
network of power relations. The fact that the IOC owns the Games, yet it delegates 
the responsibility for their organisation to an OCOG, which is often dependent on 
governments and commercial organisations, inevitably creates a weak organisational 
model usually enabling more powerful and strategically located interests to prevail. 
In effect, although the IOC's institutional framework concerning the organisation of 
the Games seems solid, it is effectively adjustable to the conditions of the place and 
time in the name of the Games' success. For example, the Sydney Olympics occurred 
after the privately funded Olympic Games in Atlanta, which was in many respects an 
organisational failure. As a result, in the subsequent Olympics in Sydney the IOC 
encouraged the deep involvement of the public sector in order to guarantee the 
success of particular areas of the Games, such as security and transportation, both of 
which substantially failed in Atlanta. Besides, the increasing magnitude and 
organisational complexity of the Olympic Games is naturally beyond the scope of an 
OCOG, and therefore the IOC seeks the involvement of credible agencies, usually the 
host governments, which have the capacity to provide the necessary facilities and 
services for the event and guarantee its financial viability. Therefore, the role of 
OCOGs in the organisation of the Games might be weakened in the future, and 
perhaps we might see the role of the host governments or the National Olympic 
Committees of the host countries to be strengthened. 
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- 7.2 MAPPING SOCOG OVER TIME 
The examination of SOCOG's organisational characteristics in the previous chapter 
has shown that the organisation did not maintain a constant organisational status 
throughout its life cycle. Both SOCOG's contextual characteristics and structural 
design parameters underwent significant changes as the organisation progressed 
towards the time of the event as well as after the end of the event. As a result, an 
orderly presentation of SOCOG's organisational characteristics requires the 
examination of the nature of these characteristics in particular periods of SOCOG's 
operational life. In other words, it was felt that in order to provide a comprehensive 
picture of SOCOG's organisational reality, it would be appropriate to consider the 
nature of its characteristics at distinctive chronological stages rather than as a whole. 
The identification of different stages in SOCOG's life cycle, however, can be 
problematic. The seven years of its operational fife could be separated in terms of 
chronological age, but, as was shown in previous chapters, calendar time and 
organisational time are not necessarily identical. On the contrary, 'it has been claimed 
that organisations often have rhythmsand cycles that are quite independent of their 
chronological age (Kimberly, 1980; Orlikowski, 1996). It is felt, therefore, that it 
would be more appropriate to separate SOCOG's fife cycle with regard to key 
elements that characterise its operations rather than to calendar time. In effect, by 
taking on board Miller and Friesen's (1984) approach to organisational change, one 
could expect that critical events or decisions in SOCOG's life cycle, whether they 
were internally or externally generated, would have triggered organisational 
transitions. As such, by identiýring organisational transitions in SOCOG's life cycle, 
one would be able to locate transitional points in terms of organisational time, and 
consequently mark SOCOG's shift from one. particular organisational. status to 
another. 
The examination of SOCOG's contextual and structural characteristics can provide 
useful insights into the process of identif)ring critical events and decisions, which 
could qualify as transitional points in the organisation's life cycle. Effectively, certain 
events or decisions in SOCOG's life cycle can be classified as 'critical' ones, in the 
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sense that they provoked considerable changes in the organisation as a whole. As was 
shown in the previous chapter, SOCOG's life cycle was marked by a series of events 
and decisions which had the potential to trigger organisational transitions (see chapter 
VI, Table 6.1). However, according to the perceptions of SOCOG's managers and the 
analysis of the relevant document data only a limited number of such events and 
decisions had a transitional effect on the organisation's operations. These include the 
following: 
* The observation of the Atlanta Games by SOCOG's staff, in August 1996. 
ob The appointment of NSW Minister for the Olympics, Michael Knight, to the 
position of President of SOCOG, in September 1996. 
e The shift of SOCOG's operations to the Games' venues under the co- 
ordination of the Main Operations Centre (MOC), in May 2000. 
e The end of the Games, in October 2000. 
The following sections will ultimately justify the significance of the aforementioned 
events as transitional points in SOCOG's seven-year life cycle. Specifically, it will be 
shown that the two initial events, which occurred almost simultaneously, signified the 
transition of SOCOG's operations from a formative stage, which is termed here 
'Start-up Period', to a stage of significant growth and development, namely the 
'BuUd-up Period'. Further, it will be illustrated that the establishment of the MOC in 
May 2000 marked the shift of SOCOG to another organisational phase, that is the 
'Games-time Period', which ended in October 2000, when the event was finished. 
The later event will finally indicate SOCOG's shift to the last stage of its operations, 
the 'Close Down Period', which naturally ended in December 2000 when the 
organisation officially dissolved. 
SOCOG's START-UP PERIOD 
As was mentioned earlier, SOCOG was established on November 12,1993 as a 
statutory corporation under the Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic 
Games Act 1993 by the NSW Parliament, and became part of the Host City Contract 
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(HCC) (NSW, 1993, Section 10). The 'Start-up Period' of SOCOG's life cycle refers 
to approximately the first three years of its operations, that is, until September 1996. 
This separation is justified by two main reasons. The first, a feature likely to be 
common to all OCOGs, was knowledge about the Olympic project, while the second 
was a feature unique to SOCOG and concerned the impact of the change in the 
goveniment of NSW which affected the leadership of the organisation. 
Regarding the first reason, it was shown in the previous chapter that SOCOG 
undertook the organisation of the Olympic Games with limited knowledge about the 
nature and scope of its operations and with little relevant experience and expertise. 
As the Head of Sports in SOCOG said: "Obviously, very early in the time of an 
OCOG you are vulnerable because you know the least about the Olympic Games [ ... ] 
An OCOG is the only 'rookie' in the business. All the rest have been there in every 
Games" (Elphinston, 2000a). Unlike other organisations, which are present in every 
Games, such as the IOC, the IFs, the NOCs as well as the long-time corporate 
sponsors and media corporations, in the case of SOCOG it was only after the Atlanta 
Games that the organisation acquired detailed information about the actual 
organisation of the Games. SOCOG's representatives from all programme areas 
travelled to Atlanta to observe the running of the event and get briefed on key areas of 
the organisation of the Games (SOCOG, 1997). SOCOG's staff observed key 
organisational areas of the event and had debriefing sessions with their counterparts in 
the Atlanta Organising Committee (ACOG). In addition, SOCOG purchased related 
organisational documents and manuals from ACOG, such as strategic and operational 
plans, statistical data, job descriptions and the like, which were utilised as the 
blueprint for SOCOG's operational development (Toohey, 2001). Commenting on 
SOCOG's staff experience in Atlanta, the Chief Operating Officer of SOCOG said: 
"We learned a lot in Atlanta Atlanta was virtually the starting point for SOCOG " 
(Sloman, 2000a). Further, the accumulated knowledge acquired from the case of the 
Atlanta Olympics helped SOCOG to elucidate the nature of involvement of the 
permanent organisations involved in the preparations and delivery of the Olympic 
Games, such as the IOC, the IFs, and the NOCS. Effectively, the needs and role of the 
aforementioned entities, in the words of SOCOG's Head of Sports, "were fairly well 
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identified especially after Atlanta" (Elphinston, 2000a). Consequently, SOCOG's 
experience in Atlanta was a critical event in the organisation's life cycle in that it 
essentially signified the end of a formative phase which was characterised with 
fin-dted knowledge among SOCOG's members of staff-with regard as much to the 
internal functioning of an OCOG as to its relationships with the permanent agencies 
of the Olympic Games' organisation. 
The latter reason, political change, was associated with the significant lack of 
continuity of leadership during that period. The appointment of SOCOG's leadership 
was the responsibility of the NSW Governor and between 1993 and 1996 SOCOG's 
leadership changed several times, primarily as a response to the political alteration of 
the NSW government. Particularly, SOCOG's initial leadership was appointed by a 
Conservative Party ruled NSW government. However, after the 1995 state elections a 
new Labour government took over, which subsequently changed both the President 
and the Chief Executive Officer of the organisation. SOCOG's final leadership 
positions were established in September 1996, when, after the NSW government's 
decision to be directly involved in the Gaines' preparations, the Minister for the 
Olympics, Michael Knight (MP), was appointed as the President of SOCOG. 
Although the initial leadership changes that occurred during that period were naturally 
potential transitional events in SOCOG's life cycle, they were rather perceived by 
SOCOG's managers as incidents solely related to the political instability of the time 
in the state of the NSW. For example, SOCOG's senior executive Bob Leece, 
referring to the political situation under which SOCOG was operating during its first 
three years, stated: 
People [in SOGOC] did not know where they were going due to political 
uncertainty. it was not until 1995 when a new government elected in Sydney and 
Michael Knight appointed as the Minister for the Olympics and particularly when 
Mr Knight appointed the President of SOCOG in September 1996 (Leece, 2000a). 
Therefore, the appointment of Michael Knight in the Presidency of SOCOG was yet 
another critical event in the organisation's life cycle as fiLr as SOCOG's leadership 
stability is concerned. Effectively, despite the criticism on this decision, the 
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appointment of a Minister in the leadership of SOCOG was shown as an event which 
clarified and stabilised the relationships between SOCOG and the local government 
and, in addition to the experience acquired by the Atlanta Olympics, provided the 
organisation with a clear vision of the nature and scope of the Games' organisation. 
The uncertainty and hesitance for growth of the formative years were replaced by 
organisational stability and confidence among organisational members in relation as 
much to the role and operations of SOCOG as to the manner and intensity of 
involvement of external organisational. entities. In the words of SOCOG's Head of 
Sports, organisational members "shared a common understanding [... ] under a solid 
leadership" (Elphinston, 2000a). 
Effectively, the two aforesaid events signified a new start for SOCOG, which 
thereafter intensified its contacts and relationships with the other organisations 
involved in the Games' preparations and grew rapidly in terms of both numbers of 
staff and operational areas. Specifically, within the following year SOCOG tripled its 
numbers of staff and established the vast majority of its operational areas in the form 
of divisions, departments and programme areas. The organisation essentially 
embarked on a period of major organisational development, namely its 'Build-up 
Period'. 
SOCOG's BUILD-UP PERIOD 
After September 1996 SOCOG experienced a long period of stability as much 
internally as in its organisational environment. This period practically ended in 
tebruary 1999, when it was revealed that SOCOG mismanaged its ticketing 
programme, which nearly failed. This was coupled with a series of financial 
problems that SOCOG faced during that period, and as a result the organisation's 
managerial ability was heavily criticised by the media. In response to a general 
disbelief in SOCOG's capacity to deal with the increasing demands of the Games' 
organisation, the NSW government took over a considerable amount of SOCOG's 
responsibilities, mainly in relation to the venues' operations. Although SOCOG's 
managers saw this event as the start of a gradual process which aimed to shift the bulk 
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of SOCOG's operations under the NSW government's control, it was accepted that 
following this event the organisation experienced niinor organisational changes. 
SOCOG's CEO, for example, stated: "I think that nothing changed in SOCOG. We 
were fortunate to have a government that was willing to do things for us. [ ... ] we 
were working closely with the NSW government throughout [the Olympic 
preparations]" (Hollway, 2000). Effectively, NSW government's deeper involvement 
in the event's organisation was not perceived as a significant event but rather as an 
action which supported SOCOG's operations. In a similar he of argument 
SOCOG's Chief Operating Officer said: "they [NSW government] had built the 
venues and knew better how to do the job there. [ ... ]I think that after that we 
[in 
SOCOG] were morefocused on ourjob" (Sloman, 2000a). Therefore, although the 
direct involvement of the NSW government could be a transitional event in SOCOG's 
life cycle, in reality it did not introduce significant changes, since it did not hinder the 
organisation's growth, neither did it challenge the central role of SOCOG in the 
Games' organisation. SOCOG continued to grow as it employed more employees to 
staff the Venue Teams, which were still located at the headquarters of the 
organisation. The Venue Teams ran the Test Events in September 1999, when the 
organisation for the first time tested their operations under real event conditions. 
Although SOCOG mainly operated with a functional-based structure, that is its 
operational units were created around functional responsibilities, such as marketing, 
finance, human resources and so on, its purpose, in the words of its CEO, was "to run 
the Gamesfrom the venues" (Hollway, 2000). As such, until the first half of the year 
2000 SOCOG operated under a functional structure, which was however gradually 
transformed to a venue-based structure. Practically, the establishment of the Venue 
Teams meant that a considerable amount of SOCOG's operations became venue- 
specific. Since 1996 90COG's long-term objecýive was to plan and organise the shift 
of its operations to the venues, which effectively occurred in May 2000. SOCOG's 
CEO explains: 
We were planning that (shift from functional structure to venue structure] since 
1996 [ ... ] The Venue Managers were appointed in September 1999, one year 
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before the Games. [ ... ] People moved into the venues at different times at 
somewhere between 6 months and 3 months out of the Games (HoUway, 2000). 
This process officially ended in May 2000 when the Main Operations Centre (MOC) 
became operational (SOCOG, 2001b). The MOC was the central mechanism of co- 
ordination for all Games operations, and its launch signalled that SOCOG would 
primarily operate from the venues. By May 2000 SOCOG had moved entirely to the 
Gaines' venues apart from a small team of senior executives, which remained in the 
headquarters to co-ordinate the venue operations. Under this structure a substantial 
amount of decision-making power was transferred to the leaders of the venues, the 
Venue Managers, who thereafter held the central role in SOCOG's operations. The 
shift of SOCOG's operations into the venues was seen as a significant event in the 
organisation's ffe cycle. Essentially, SOCOG moved into a new operational phase 
which was characterised by constant testing of its operations, particularly in relation 
to the operations of the other constituent organisat 
, 
ions of the Games' delivery. 
SOCOG's Director General, for example, said: "This was a new stagefor everybody 
[involved in the event]. [ ... ] We had to test our operations as a single body and make 
adjustments where it was required". As such, the initiation of the MOC marked a 
new stage for all the organisations involved in the event, since from then on they had 
to operate in co-ordination with other agencies rather than in isolation. 
Correspondingly, in May 2000 SOCOG's 'Build-up Period' practically finished as the 
organisation moved to a new stage, namely its 'Games-time Period. 
SOCOG's GAMES-TIME PERIOD 
As was explained above, SOCOG adopted the structure with which it would run the 
event after May 2000, - when the MOC became operational. From that time onwards, 
the organisation would primarily operate from the venues, thus establishing a venue- 
based operational structure. SOCOG established such a structure relatively early in 
order to test its effectiveness by performing a series of operational readiness exercises 
in the form of intensive simulations in what was called Sydney Training Operational 
Readiness Exercises (STORE) (Sloman, 2000b). Its main priority was to organise and 
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combine the activities and responsibilities of various agencies in order to ensure 
consistency of operations during the Games, and therefore testing the Games' 
operations became the main task for SOCOG. 
During that period the NSW intensified its control over the Games' organisation, 
which in turn resulted in substantial changes in the organisational model of the event. 
In particular, in June 2000 the responsibilities of SOCOG's Board were transferred to 
the GCOG, which comprised the leaders of all the governmental agencies involved in 
the Games. Furthermore, SOCOG along with the other governmental agencies 
merged their operations under a new organisational scheme known as 'Sydney 2000' 
which was headed by OCA Director General. These changes were seen as a natural 
process of merging the operations of the organisations, that had diverse responsibilities 
regarding the delivery of the Games. In the words of SOCOG's Deputy CEO "there 
were many dispersed responsibilities [ ... ]. It was essential to have a common 
structure" (Eyers, 2000). Indeed, a single structure would ensure the smooth 
transaction of the Games. However, in doing so the overall authority of the Games' 
delivery was virtually taken over by NSW government's OCA. Effectively, this could 
be seen as a critical event in SOCOG's life cycle, since the organisation lost its central 
role in the Games' organisation. However, SOCOG's managers stressed the fact that 
the organisation's central role changed little, as it main task was still to deliver the 
sport competitions. SOCOG's Head of Sports explains: "there were many [event- 
related] issues that were beyond our responsibility. SOCOG had still total authority 
over the competitions. [ ... ] This was the central task of the Sydney Olympics to 
(Elphinston, 2000a). Further, NSW government's control over SOCOG was a gradual 
process which practically started in 1996, when Michael Knight took over the 
Presidency of SOCOG, and intensified after 1999, when OCA took control of a large 
number of SOCOG's responsibilities. Consequently, the establishment of 'Sydney 
2000' was rather the formalisation of a situation that had started long ago. SOCOG's 
Head of Records and Documentation explains: "I think that [after the creation of 
'Sydney 2000] nothing changed We in SOCOG knew OCA's staff quite well and we 
knew what to expectfrom them. It was something that we have been experiencing 
since the beginning of 1999 (Toohey, 2001). 
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Therefore, the events that occurred during that period were perceived as essential 
organisational modifications which mostly affected the overall delivery of the event 
rather than the operations of SOCOG. In fact, despite these changes in its 
environment, SOCOG did not change significantly until the end of the event. The 
organisation retained its structure and operations during the time of the Games' 
execution, which essentially constituted the continuation of a period that started in 
May 2000. Consequently, SOCOG's 'Games-time Period' does not include only the 
16 days of the competitions but also the whole period during which SOCOG was 
operating under a venue-based structure, namely, between June 2000 and October 
2000. In October 2000 the Games ended and subsequently SOCOG's venue teams 
started to dissolve, with people either leaving the organisation or returning to their 
initial positions in the headquarters. As a result, after October 2000, SOCOG 
resumed a functional-based structure as the various functional areas were grouped 
again in the or'ganisation's headquarters (SOCOG, 2001a). In effect, the end of the 
Games was a transitional event in SOCOG's life cycle, since directly thereafter the 
organisation's wind-up process began. Having delivered the Games, SOCOG's main 
task was to finalise its operations. The organisation practically moved into its final 
operational stage, namely the 'Close-down Period. 
SOCOG's CLOSE-DOWN PERIOD 
This stage covers the period after the completion of the sport competitions until the 
wind-up of SOCOG. The end of the Games naturally signified the transition of 
SOCOG into its last operational stage, since having accomplished its task, it gradually 
started to dissolve. As was mentioned above, SOCOG's operations resumed in its 
headquarters and its numbers of employees decreased dramatically. The contracts of 
the staff were gradually terminated as each of its fimctional areas was finalising its 
operations and removing its staff. Only a core of people was kept, who had the task 
of winding up the organisation including the finalising of the organisation's accounts, 
dealing with legal matters, disposing of the equipment and so on (Elphinston, 2000a). 
The IOC required SOCOG to dissolve before March 31 2002 (NSW, 1993, Section 
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53) but SOCOG effectively dissolved on December 31,2000 (SOCOG, 2001a). 
SOCOG's wind-up period lasted a few months, since following legislation (Sydney 
2000 Games Administration Act 2000) the NSW government, and OCA in particular, 
assumed full responsibility of the Games' wind-up process. Therefore, SOCOG's 
final operational stage was relatively short, since SOCOG did not deal with the 
matters that were related with the Sydney Olympics as a whole. EfTectively, when 
matters that were solely related to SOCOG's operations were settled, the organisation 
dissolved. 
A surnmarised break-down of SOCOG's life cycle into specific stages is presented in 
table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: SOCOG's LifiStages 
SOCOG's LIFE CYCLE CHRONOLOGY 
START-UP PERIOD November 1993- 
September 1996 
October 1996- 
BUILD-UP PERIOD 
May'-)000 
June 2000- 
GAMES-TIME PERIOD 
September 2000 
October 2000- CI, OSF-UP 13ERIOD 
December 2000 
TRANSITIONAL EVENTS 
Observation of' the Atkinta 
Games (August 1996) 
i Appointment ot'Michael Knight 
in the presidency of' SOCOG 
(September 1996) 
Establishment ol'thc Main 
Operations Centre (MOC) 
I (May 2000) 
1 
The end Of 
(()Ctobcr 2000) 
7.2.1 SOCOG's CHARACTERISTICS OVERTIME 
The discussion above asserted the need for examining the organisational status of' 
SOCOG in different stages of its life cycle. It was suggested that in the course ofthc 
seven years of SOCOG's operational life, the organisation went through lbur 
organisational periods, namely 'Start-up Period', 'Build-up Period', 'Games-tinic 
Period' and 'Close-down Period'. Therefore, by considering the nature ofSOCOG's 
the Games 
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organisational characteristics in each chronological period we will be able to map 
changes in its organisational status over time. In effect, the information derived from 
the analysis of SOCOG's organisational dimensions can be reconsidered in the 
context of the different periods identified, thus providing a series of organisational 
snapshots, one for each of SOCOG's four periods. In order to achieve this, the status 
of each of SOCOG's elements under examination is briefly discussed below in 
relation to each of the four periods identified. 
SOCOG's Size 
SOCOG's size increased continuously until the end of the Gaines, when it decreased 
dramatically thereafter. In particular, over the 'Start-up Period' SOCOG's size was 
medium (i. e. less than 300 staff) since the organisation employed only 113 staff at the 
end of that period. In the course of its 'Build-up Period' SOCOG experienced rapid 
growth reaching a total of 1800 staff. Its size increased fiuiher during its 'Garnes- 
time Period' when SOCOG employed a total of 3341 staff. As a result, SOCOG's 
size was large (i. e. more than 300 staff) during both its . 'Bufld-up Period' and 
'Games-time Period' FinaUy, after the Gaines SOCOG's size decreased dramaticaUy 
and before the final staff release (15 December, 2000) the organisation employed only 
50 staff. SOCOG's size during its 'Close-down Period, therefore, was small (i. e. 50 
staff or less). 
SOCOG's Environment 
SOCOG started its operations with a limited number of entities in its organisational 
environment, however with very limited knowledge about their needs. Effectively, 
during the 'Start-up Period' the needs of SOCOG's environment were substantially 
unknown by its staff (i. e. dynamic conditions) although the organisation had 
established close relationships only with the IOC and the NSW government (Le. 
simple conditions). As such, in the course of the 'Start-up Period' SOCOG's 
organisational environment was simple, yet dynamic. During its 'Build-up Period' the 
number and heterogeneity of the entities operating in SOCOG's organisational 
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environment escalated, but by then possessing greater understanding of the 
organisation of the Olympics, its knowledge about the needs of the environmental 
entities improved significantly. Specifically, SOCOG established links with all the 
constituent organisations of the Gaines, as well as with the Public Groups which were 
associated with the event primarily as potential ticket holders (i. e. complex 
conditions). Furthermore, besides SOCOG's enhanced knowledge of its environment 
some inci ents occurred, such as the IOC bribery scandal and the failure of the 
communication with the public due to the ticketing problems, which caused 
temporary turbulence in the organisational environment of SOCOG (i. e. relatively 
stable conditions). Consequently, SOCOG's organisational environment during that 
period can best be described as relatively stable and complex. In the 'Gaines-time 
Period', SOCOG naturally experienced great complexity in its environment as the 
organisation was. in close co-operation and co-ordination with all the constituents of 
the Gaines (i. e. complex conditions). SOCOG's knowledge of its environment further 
improved, however given the unpredictability of the environmental needs under the 
real event situation of that period, SOCOG's environmental conditions were rather 
relatively stable. As such, during the 'Gaines-time Period', SOCOG's organisational 
environment was complex but relatively stable. Finally, after the Games the number 
and heterogeneity of external entities influencing SOCOG was limited, since the 
organisation was operating in co-ordination solely with the NSW government's OCA 
(i. e. simple conditions). Moreover, the early-established links between SOCOG and 
OCA meant that the organisation's knowledge of its environment during that period 
was at a high level (i. e. stable conditions). Consequently, SOCOG's organisational 
environment during its 'Close-down Period' was simple and stable. 
SOCOG's Resource-dependence 
As a temporary Olympic agency, SOCOG was by nature dependent on resources held 
by external organisations. These included financial resources from the IOC, sponsor 
companies and the NSW government, physical resources from the NSW government 
in the form of sporting facilities and Games-related infrastructure, human resources, 
231 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG CHAPTER VII 
such as technical staff from the lFs and volunteers, and last but not least 'intangible" 
resources, such as the institutional framework which enabled SOCOG to operate as an 
Olympic agency. Due to its institutional setting, the latter was the responsibility of 
the IOC but also of the NSW government. As a result, its levels of resource 
dependence were high throughout the years of the Olympic preparations, not only due 
to the vast numbers of resources required but also due to the fact that the majority of 
such resources could only be obtained from external sources. However, after the 
event the organisation required a limited amount of externally held resources, 
particularly in the form of expert staff to deal with the sorting of SOCOG's 
organisational records, and a legal framework which would arrange the post-event 
responsibilities and essentially allow the organisation to dissolve. Thus, after the 
Games SOCOG's dependence on external resources can best be described as 
moderate. 
SOCOG's Power 
Whilst being an Olympic agency, SOCOG was established as a statutory authority of 
the NSW government. As a consequence, the organisation served various external 
interests, and it was shown that the degree of representation of external actors on its 
policy-making and decision-making bodies was constantly high. It was shown, for 
example, that during the 'Start up Period' and 'Build-up Period', SOCOG's Board of 
Directors and later the Sport Commission, which were the main policy and decision 
making bodies in the organisation, predominantly comprised external actors (i. e. high 
external control). Similarly, in the 'Gaines-time Period' the GCOG was the main 
policy and decision making body in SOCOG, and it was fornied by individuals that 
served the interests of various external organisations (i. e. high external control). 
Finally, in the 'Close down Period' there was not any established policy and decision 
making bodies in SOCOG, since the organisation's main task was to make the 
appropriate arrangements to dissolve. However, given that SOCOG's operations 
during that period were under the supervision of OCA's staff, who were responsible 
for the wind up of the whole event, SOCOG practically remained highly externally 
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controlled. Therefore, SOCOG was a highly externally controlled organisation 
throughout its life cycle. 
SOCOG's Strategic Capacity 
The discussion of the previous chapter has shown that SOCOG's operations at the 
strategic level were considerably constrained by external organisations. In particular, 
it was suggested by SOCOG's managers that the organisation's operational strategies 
were considerably constrained by the permanent agencies of the Olympic Games' 
organisation, such as the IOC and the IFs, a phenomenon which is likely to be 
common to any OCOG. However, it was stressed that due to the distinctiveness of 
the organisational. model of the Sydney Olympics, where the involvement of the local 
government was substantial, SOCOG's strategic capacity was also limited by the 
NSW government. As a result, SOCOG had limited space to determine and pursue its 
own strategies, and therefore its strategic capacity was rated low throughout its life 
cycle. 
SOCOG's Specialisation 
In the course of its 'Start-up Period", SOCOG established only a small number of 
operational divisions and programmes (i. e. eight divisions and two programme areas), 
and therefore there was little specialisation in the organisation. During its 'Build-up 
Period', however, SOCOG created the vast majority of its operational areas in the 
form of divisions and programmes (i. e. 21 divisions and 74 programme areas), and 
therefore the organisation experienced much speciallsation. After May 2000 SOCOG 
retained the large number of divisions and programme areas established in the 
previous period, and consequently, during the 'Games-time Period' there was still 
much specialisation in the organisation. Finally, after the Games the bulk of 
SOCOG's operational areas gradually dissolved and the organisation operated with a 
limited number of divisions and programmes (i. e. four divisions). Thus, SOCOG's 
specialisation during the 'Close-down Period' was again little. 
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SOCOG's Unit Grouping 
Within 'Start-up Period' the grouping of SOCOG's organisational units was based on 
the various organisational functions, thus SOCOG operated with afunctional-based 
structure. In the course of its 'Build-up Period, SOCOG retained its functional 
structure but also established the Venue Teams, which were representing the 
operational responsibilities in respective geographical locations. Therefore, during 
that period, SOCOG operated with two parallel structures, a functional-based 
structure and a place-based structure. Over the 'Games-time Period', it was shown 
that SOCOG was primarily grouped in regard to the venues' operations, and as a 
result it mainly operated with a place-based structure. After the Games, the Venue 
Teams dissolved and SOCOG re-formed a limited number of its operational areas in 
the organisation's headquarters. Therefore, in 'Close-down Period' the organisation 
resumed afunctional-based structure. 
SOCOG's Liaison Devices 
The analysis of SOCOG's life cycle revealed that in the 'Start-up Period', SOCOG 
establishedJew liaison devices, in the form of two comn-dttees and one task force. In 
the 'Build-up Period', the organisation operated with the maximum number of 
committees, commissions and task forces, reaching a total of fourteen. As such, there 
were many liaison devices in SOCOG during that period. In 'Games-time Period', 
however, the work of the previously established liaison devices was practically 
incorporated in the GCOG, which was the sole liaison device under operation during 
that period. Consequently, in Games-time period SOCOG operated withfew liaison 
devices. After the Games, only two committees re-formed, namely the Finance 
Committee and the Audit Committee, and therefore in 'Close-down Period' SOCOG 
operated yet again withfew liaison devices. 
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SOCOG's Formalisation 
SOCOG's managers revealed that in the course of its 'Start-up Period' SOCOG's staff 
was operating with a limited number of operational instructions, and therefore there 
was little formallsation in the organisation. During the 'Build-up Period', however, 
the great number of operational areas and the increased complexity of the tasks that 
had to be performed required SOCOG's staff to adhere to many formal and informal 
procedures. Thus, in the course of that period there was much formallsation in the 
organisation. In 'Games-time Period', formal plans and instructions were in place but 
it was suggested that SOCOG's staff adherence to them was neither little nor much, 
since flexibility of operations was often required. Therefore, during the 'Games-time 
Period' there was some formal. 1sation in SOCOG. Finally, during the 'Close-down 
Period', SOCOG's staff was working relatively autonomously, and adherence to 
operational instructions was not required. Consequently, there was again little 
formallsation in SOCOG. 
SOCOG's Centralisation 
During the 'Start-up Period', there was centrallsation of decision-making in SOCOG, 
since most of the decisions were finalised at Board level, that is, the organisation's 
Strategic Apex. In the course of its 'Build-up Period' the decision-making power still 
rested within its Strategic Apex, namely its Board of Directors as well as the Sport 
Commission, which assumed ultimate decision-making power over the sporting 
issues. However, there was a gradual shift of authority to the Venue Teams, which 
were established at the end of that period. Consequently, there was limited 
decentralisation of decision-making in SOCOG. Through 'Games-time Period' 
considerable amount of the decision-making p6wer was transferred to the Venue 
Teams, which constituted its Operational Core, and therefore during that period there 
was decentralisation of decision-making in the organisation. In the course of its 
'Close-down Period' the decision-making power remained at the lower levels of the 
organisation, since the bulk of decisions were finalised by ad hoc teams of specialists 
which were working autonomously. However, the authority for major decisions, 
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mainly pertaining to financial and legal matters, rested with the NSW government's 
OCA, which had ultimate control over the organisation's wind-up process. As a 
result, during that period there was selective decentralisation of decision-making in 
SOCOG. 
SOCOG's Training 
During SOCOG's 'Start-up Period' there was little staff training in the organisation, 
which primarily took the form of observation of major sport events and attendance of 
Olympic-related meetings and conferences. Over the 'Build-up Period' there was a 
need for staff training, a task which was undertaken by an external training agency. 
However, before May 2000 no more than a moderate volume of staff training 
occurred, and therefore there was only some staff training in SOCOG. In the course 
of the three months leading to the Games a considerable amount of staff training was 
required, and as a result the vast majority of training took place during that period. 
Therefore, in the course of the 'Gaines-time Period' there was much training in 
SOCOG. Finally, in the 'Close-down Period' SOCOG's staff mainly consisted of 
experienced managers and specialists, and thus only a limited amount of training was 
required. Consequently, there was little staff training in SOCOG during that period. 
SOCOG's B23iC Organi3stional Part 
During the 'Start-up Period, SOCOG's main concern was to establish a solid 
leadership structure and decide on its structural formation with regard to its main 
operational responsibilities. This work was primarily produced by the strategic 
leadership of the organisation, and consequently the part of SOCOG with the most 
significant contribution to its operations was its Strategic Apex. In 'Build-up Period', 
SOCOG was at the process of intensive planning of the event, a task that was 
primarily undertaken by specialised staff. However, the creation of the Venue Teams 
meant that considerable work was produced by the staff of the lower levels of the 
organisation. Consequently, SOCOG's basic organisational parts during that period 
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were its Technostructure and its Operating Core. In the 'Games-time Period', the 
bulk of work in SOCOG was produced in the venues by the Venue Teams, which 
constituted the Operating Core of the organisation. Finally, during the 'Close-up 
Period' the majority of work in SOCOG was produced by teams, which represented 
the various operational areas, but also by expert staff, which were assisting the 
dissolution process, or undertaking other specialised tasks. As such, in the course of 
that period the Operating Core and the Technostructure were again the most 
significant organisational parts in SOCOG. 
SOCOG's Basic Co-ordinating Mechanism 
In the course of the 'Start-up Period, the work co-ordination in SOCOG was 
primarily achieved through informal interactions of its members. SOCOG, therefore, 
was co-ordinating work with mutual adjustment. In the 'Build-up Period', however, 
the great number of operational areas and related responsibilities required SOCOG's 
staff to follow specific guidelines in the form of plans and operational instructions. 
Work was highly standardised and consequently co-ordination was achieved through 
standardisation of work processes. In 'Games-time Period', fast and flexible 
decision-making processes were required, and as a result work in SOCOG was co- 
ordinated mainly through informal means, namely mutual adjustment. During the 
'Close-up Period', SOCOG's main concern was effectively to finalise the operations 
of its functional areas within a strict timetable, and therefore, certain outcomes had to 
be produced at specific dates. Consequently, the dominant process of co-ordination 
can be best described as being achieved through the standardisation of outputs. 
The discussion above has shown that the majority of SOCOG's organisational 
dimensions exhibited -different profiles in each of the four periods identified. 
Consequently, by allocating the status of SOCOG's organisational dimensions in each 
of the periods of its life cycle, it is suggested that the organisation experienced four 
distinct organisational configurations (Table 7.2). The following section provides an 
analysis of each of SOCOG's configurations, and juxtaposes them to Mintzberg's 
(1979) ideal organisational types. 
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Table 7.2: SOCOGs Organisational Characteristics over its Lik CYcle 
Age START-UP BUILD-UP CAMES-TIVIE 
CLOSE-DOWN 
PERIOD PERIOD PERIOD PERIOD 
Size Medium Medium Large Small 
Simplel Comple`x/__ Complex/_ 
j Simple/ 
Environment I Dynamic Relatively Stable Relatively Stable Stable 
Resource- 
Hi h High High Dependence 9 
Moderate 
High External High External High F, xternal High Fxternal Power 
Control Control Control Control 
Strategic Capacity Low Low Low Low 
Specialisation Little Much Much 
Little 
Specialisation Specialisation 1 Specialisation Specialisation 
Functional- Functional and Unit Grouping 
Based 
Ii 
Place-Based 
I'lace-Based Functional-based 
Liaison Devices Few Liaison Many Liaison Few Liaison 
Few Liaison 
Devices Devices Devices Devices 
Forinalisation Little Much Some 
Little 
Formalisation Formalisation Formalisation Formalisation 
Limited i Selective Centralisation Centralisation i Decentralisation Decentralisation Decentralisation 
Training Little Training SomeTraining Much 'I raining Little Vraining 
Technostructure/ I echnostructure/ 
Basic Part Strategic Apex Operating Core Operating Core Operating Core 
Standardisatioi 
Basic Co-ordination Mutual Mutual Standardisation 
Mechanism Adýlustment ol'Work Ad justinent of' Outputs Processes 
7.3 SOCOG's ORGANISATIONAL FORMATIONS AND MINTZBERG'S 
CONFIGURATION APPROACH 
Throughout this study, and particularly in the previous section, it was shown that 
SOCOG, as an organisational entity, constitutes a peculiar phenomenon. This is not 
only justitied by its temporary status, since it was fiormed to undertake the task of 
delivering the 2000 Olympic Games and subsequently dissolved, but also by the tact 
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that the organisation changed significantly throughout its operational life. Effectively, 
it was shown that, although SOCOG was practically always in some sort of formation, 
the organisation went through four distinctive organisational stages, namely 'Start-up 
Period', 'Build-up Period', 'Games-time Period' and 'Close-down Period. As a 
result, with respect to the life stages identified and the organisational characteristics 
under investigation, in the course of its seven-year fife cycle, SOCOG practically took 
four main organisational formations (Table 7.2). This section aims to assess the 
degree of correspondence between SOCOG's configurations and Mintzberg's (1979) 
organisational types, and subsequently to comment on the useftilness of Mintzberg's 
theorising for the study of SOCOG. 
7.3.1 SOCOG'S START-UP FORMATION 
The formation that SOCOG adopted during its 'Start-up Period' indicates the position 
of a young organisation, which embarks on a relatively unknown project. SOCOG's 
prime responsibility was to organise and deliver the Sydney Olympics, while 
operating as a cohesive part of a larger organisational network, which mainly 
involved the NSW government and Olympic authorities. Therefore, it was not only 
the organisation's task that was unfamiliar to SOCOG's members, but also the 
manner of involvement of the other constituents of the Games' organisation, and their 
relationships with SOCOG. The latter was of particular importance to SOCOG's 
operations, since the organisation was, by its very nature, dependent on resources held 
by external organisations. During this period, however, SOCOG had strong 
relationships mainly with the NSW government, and to a lesser extent with the IOC, 
since the other constituents of the Games, such as the IFs and the Olympic sponsors, 
devoted their attention and resources to the approaching 1996 Atlanta Olympics. 
Consequently, SOCOG was operating within a simple, but considerably unknown, 
organisational environment. Moreover, although SOCOG was formed under the Host 
City Contract as the main organisational body of the Sydney Olympics, in reality it 
was subject to NSW government's authority, which was encouraged by the IOC to be 
strongly involved in the Games' organisation. The NSW government was not only 
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responsible for building the entire Games' ffiftastructure, but also for protecting 
SOCOG's financial viability by underwriting its operations. The latter meant that 
essentially the NSW government had ultimate power over SOCOG's operations, and 
during that period this was mainly expressed by the NSW government. 's appointment 
of SOCOG's Board of Directors, which was the main policy and decision-making 
body of the organisation. Consequently, the peculiar institutional status of SOCOG, 
which was virtually formed both as a private corporation and a pubfic authority of the 
NSW government, rendered the organisation highly extemafly controlled, very early 
in its operations. 
The organisational situation of SOCOG during that period is reflected in its structural 
characteristics. SOCOG experienced limited development, establishing only a few 
operational areas, which were based on its main functional responsibilities. 
SOCOG's limited organisational activity did not require many comn-dssions and 
committees, neither the existence of formal plans and instructions for work co- 
ordination. Internal co-ordination was rather achieved through informal interaction at 
Board level, since the bulk of the organisation's operations were related to strategic 
issues. The decision'-making power was also concentrated in the Board of Directors, 
namely the 'Strategic Apex' of the organisation, which was effectively the 
organisational part of SOCOG with the most significant contribution to its operations. 
Finally, staff training was limited, and it mainly took the form of attendance at 
Olympic conferences and observation of the organisation of international sporting 
events. 
When the formation adopted by SOCOG during its 'Start-up Period' is juxtaposed to 
Mintzberg's (1979) structural configurations, a clear correspondence with the 
configuration of 'Simple Structure' can be notiqed. As it is illustrated in table 7.3, 
SOCOG's characteristics during that period are almost in congruence with the 
elements that form Mintzberg's 'Simple Structure'. 'Simple Structure' refers to a 
formation often observed in new and small organisations, which operate within 
dynamic environments and consequently require flexible structuring (Mintzberg, 
1973; 1981). During that period SOCOG was a new organisation, yet it was rather 
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seen as medium-sized. However, given the vast amounts of staff employed in later 
stages, and considering the admittedly subjective definition of 'medium' 
organisations, SOCOG was rather relatively small. Consequently, with respect to 
Mintzberg's general description of 'Simple Structure' SOCOG's situation during that 
period essentially corresponds with this particular organisational configuration. 
Table 7.3: SOCOG al 'Starl-up Period'and Mintzbergs 'Simple Structure' 
SOCOG's MINTZBERG'S SIMPLE 
START-UP PERIOD STRUCTURE 
Age Young Typically Young 
Size Medium Small 
F Environment - Simple/Dynamic - --- ------- - Simple/Dynamic 
Power High Fxternal Control CF0 Control 
Specialisation Little Specialisation Little Specialisation 
Unit Grouping F unctional- Based UsualIN Functional 
Liaison Devices Few Liaison Devices Few Liaison Devices 
Formalisation Little Forinalisation Little Formalisation 
Centralisation Centralisation Ccritralisation 
Training LittleTraining Little Training 
Basic Organisational Part Strategic Ap ex Strategic Apex 
Basic Co-ordinating 
Mechanism Mutual Adjustment Direct Supervision 
(Note: Shading depicts similarities between Mintzberg's Simple Structtire and So('OG's Start-tip 
formation) 
Mintzberg (1991) has claimed that the force that drives organisations to adopt simple 
structures is 'd rection', which refers to the need lbr the organisation to build its 
strategic vision (p. 55). This applies to the situation ofSOCOG during its 'Start-Lip 
Period', when, as was mentioned earlier, the organisation was in the process of' 
realising its role and responsibilities for the organisation of' the Sydney Olympics. 
Mintzberg (1979) also argues that in simple organisational structures the Chiet' 
Fxecutive Officer (CEO) holds ultimate power and personally controls the 
organisation's operations through direct supervision. This, however, ditlýrs ftom 
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SOCOG's status during that period, since the organisation was highly externally 
controlled and work co-ordination was achieved through mutual interaction among its 
members. 
The aforementioned characteristics, which fall in the elements of 'Power' and 'Basic 
Co-ordination Mechanism' respectively, are the main differences that can be 
identified between Mintzberg's 'Simple Structure' and SOCOG's 'Start-up Period". 
These differences can easily be justified, since in the ideal 'Simple Structure' the 
CEO is usually the owner who establishes the strategic direction of the organisation, 
while in the case of SOCOG, the ownership was with the Board of Directors, which 
was mainly controlled by the NSW government, and partly with the IOC which owns 
the institution of Olympic Games. Moreover, as the element of 'Strategic Formation' 
suggests, the ability of SOCOG to determine its own strategic direction was highly 
constrained, not only by. the NSW government, but also by the IOC. That set, for 
example, the platform for SOCOG's behaviour towards the commercial sector, the 
IFs, which in turn set the organisational standards of the sporting competitions, and to 
an extent the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC), which had the second strongest 
representation on SOCOG's Board. Therefore, with the absence of a consolidated 
ownership, SOCOG's work during that period was mutually co-ordinated by a group 
of key individuals at Board level. This minor deviation between SOCOG's early 
formation and Mintzberg's typical 'Simple Structure' could mainly be justified by the 
peculiar institutional status of the former. Effectively, the differences between the 
two formations could not be considered significant, since they did not introduce 
substantial complexity. Thus, it can be claimed that in the course of the 'Start-up 
Period', SOCOG's formation substantially coincides with Mintzberg's ideal 'Simple 
Structure'. 
7.3.2 SOCOGIS BUILD-UP FORMATION 
In the course of the 'Build-up Period' SOCOG's formation changed significantly. 
The organisation imported Games-specific expertise, as much from the experience 
acquired by its staff who had observed the Atlanta Olympics, as from former Atlanta 
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Gaines' staff who were appointed to the organisation. This accumulated knowledge, 
combined with a solid leadership under the Presidency of Michael Knight, also the 
NSW government's Minister for the Olympics, signified a new organisatioml era for 
SOCOG. The organisation experienced significant growth during this period in terms 
of numbers of staff, and established the vast majority of its operational areas in the 
form of divisions, departments, programmes and later Venue Teams. Moreover, 
SOCOG intensified its relations with various external organisations, such as the IFs 
and sponsoring corporations, since, with the 1996 Atlanta Games completed, the 
entire Olympic Games industry naturally turned its attention to the forthcoming 
Sydney Games. Despite this increased complexity in its environment, SOCOG's 
knowledge of its environment improved considerably, as the organisation gradually 
familiarised itself both with the needs and the nature of involvement of the 
constituents of the Sydney Games' organisation. However, the dependence of 
SOCOG on externally held resources remained at high levels particularly in terms of 
Games' services, a great amount of which was outsourced to NSW government 
agencies, such as the Olympic Co-ordination Authority (OCA) and the Olympic Rails 
and Transportation Authority (ORTA), as well as to Federal Australian government's 
authorities. In addition, SOCOG remained highly externally controlled during that 
period, since its main decision-making bodies, namely the Board of Directors and the 
Sport Commission which undertook the full responsibility for all the sport-related 
issues, were controlled by the NSW government and the Australian Olympic 
Committee (AOC) respectively. 
In terms of structural characteristics, SOCOG developed two parallel structures, one 
functionally based and one venue-based, as the organisation was gradually shifting its 
operations to the Venue Teams. The vast majority of the Venue Teams were still 
located in the headquarters, yet their operations were entirely related to the respective 
venues. In addition, due to the wide range of operational areas, SOCOG established 
formal mechanisms to co-ordinate work among these areas, in the form of formal 
Plans and instructions as well as committees and commissions. As a result, during 
that period the organisation's work processes were highly standardised. Moreover, in 
a Period of intensive planning the bulk of SOCOG's work was essentially carried out 
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by the expert staff of its 'Technostructure', although a considerable amount of work 
was gradually being undertaken by the emergent Venue Teams which constituted the 
organisation's 'Operating Core'. Also, the Venue Teams increasingly received 
decision-making authority, particularly on venue-specific issues, although m4jor 
decisions were still finalised at the upper levels of the organisation. Finally, some 
staff training took place during that period, particularly with regard to the people that 
would staff the Venue Teams. 
Table 7A SOCOG at 'Build-up Period' and Mintzherg's Wachine Bureaucracy' anti 
Projessional Bureaucracy' 
SOCOC, 'S MINTZBERC'S MINTZBERC'S 
BUILD-UP MACHINE PROFESSIONAL 
PERIOD BUREAUCRACY Y BUREAUCRAC 
Age Relatively Old Typically Old Varies 
Size Medium Large Varies 
Environment Complex/ Sunple/Stable Complex/stablc 
Relatively Stable 
High External Technocratic and Proficssional Power 
Control External Control Operator Control 
Specialisation Much Specialisation Much Specialisation Much Spec la lisat ion 
Unit Grouping Functional and Usually Functional 
Functionaland 
Place-Based Market 
Liaison Devices Many Liaison Few Liaison Devices 
Some Liaison 
Devices Devices 
FormalisatiOn Much Formallsation Much Formalisation Little Forinalisation 
Centrahsation Limited Limited Decciaralisation 
Decentralisation Deccritralisation 
Training Little Training i Little Training MucliTraining 
Basic Organisational Technostructure/ 
i Technostructure Operating Corc Part Operating Core 
Basic Co-ordinating Standardisation -of Standardisation of Standardisation of 
Mechanism Work Processes Work Skills 
(Note: Shading depicts similarities between Mintzberg's Machine Bureaucracy and ProlOsional 
11ureaucracy, and SOCOG's Build-up formation) 
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The formation adopted by SOCOG during its 'Build-up Period' does not entirely 
correspond with any of Mintzberg's (1979,1981) configurations. However, as table 
7.4 depicts, SOCOG's formation during that period constitutes a hybrid of 
Mintzberg's 'Machine Bureaucracy' and 'Professional Bureaucracy'. In effect, in the 
'Bufld-up Period' SOCOG held the main elements of 'Machine Bureaucracy', since 
the focus was on functional stability through standardisation of work processes and 
formalisation of operations, with the contribution of many analysts of its 
'Technostructure'. Therefore, in line with Mintzberg's theorising, SOCOG was 
highly specialised on the basis of functional responsibilities, with a small degree of 
decentralised decision-making, and also required low levels of staff training 
(Mintzberg, 1981, p. 108). However, as was mentioned earlier, during that period 
there was an emerging Venue-based structure in SOCOG, operating parallel with its 
main functional-based structure, which was progressively undertaking a great deal of 
the organisation's operations. In effect, this new structure would ultimately constitute 
the main operational body of SOCOG, and consequently, apart from the strong 
presence of the 'Technostructure', there was also a significant contribution of the 
'Operational Core' to the organisation's operations. 
According to Mintzberg (1979,1981), a machine bureaucratic structuring suits 
externally controlled organisations, such as the case of SOCOG. However, it is 
suggested that such structuring is more effective in simple and stable environments. 
The main rationale behind this argument is that environmental complexity requires 
decision-making power to be decentralised to the 'Operating Core', while 
environmental stability enables individuals to work with a good deal of autonomy. 
Mintzberg (1979,1981) suggests that these characteristics pertain to organisations 
that rely for their operating tasks on professional staff, whose skills are usually 
standardised outside the organisation, such as in universities or training camps and 
who possess considerable power and autonomy, which in turn decentralises the 
organisational structure (Mintzberg, 1981, p. 109). This description, which refers to 
Mintzberg's 'Professional Bureaucracy', has little to contribute to the account of 
SOCOG's 'Build-up' formation as a whole, yet it should not be ignored. The 'Build- 
up Period' was effectively'a transition stage in SOCOG's fife cycle, since the 
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organisation was both building up its functional areas and gradually shifting the bulk 
of operations to the Venue Teams. As was mentioned earlier, that meant that the 
Venue Teams were steadily becoming more autonomous and, consequently, to a 
degree, they decentralised SOCOG's structure. Moreover, at that stage, the people 
that staffed the Venue Teams came from different operational areas of SOCOG's 
functional structure. Consequently, if the Venue Teams were considered as 
independent entities within SOCOG, it could be claimed that the skills of their 
members were practically externally standardised. 
With respect to Mintzberg's configurations, therefore, it could be argued that during 
that period SOCOG was mainly formed as a machine bureaucratic organisation, yet 
with a sense of 'professionalism', primarily due to the existence of the Venue Teams. 
Besides, Mintzberg (1991) argues that the forces that drive organisations to adopt 
machine bureaucratic and professional bureaucratic structures are 'efficiency' and 
4proficiency' respectively. The former refers to the need of organisations to 
standardise and formalise their operations, while the latter is related to the need of 
organisations to carry out tasks which require high levels of knowledge and skills 
(Mintzberg, 1991, p. 55). Both of these forces were present in the case of SOCOG 
during its 'Build-up Period', since 'efficiency' applies to the organisation's need to 
standardise its operations in order to develop its functional structure, while 
'proficiency' is associated with the work of the Venue Teams, which were performing 
a specialised task, that is, the organisation of the venue-. specific operations. 
Consequently, by following Mintzberg's theorising, it could be argued that during the 
'Build-up Period' SOCOG adopted a bureaucratic amalgam formation. 
7.3.3. SOCOG'S GAMES-TIME FORMATION 
In the course of the 'Games-time Period', SOCOG experienced multiple 
organisational changes. The Venue Teams moved to the respective venues, and the 
organisation employed more people to staff them. SOCOG almost doubled its 
number of staff during that period reaching the peak of its size. The organisation's 
main task was to run the event by co-ordinating the involvement of all the constituent 
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groups of the Games' organisation and, naturaUy, it operated within a heavily 
populated and heterogeneous organisational environment. SOCOG was highly 
dependent on its environment for resources, in terms of financial resources, but 
primarily in terms of human resources. During that period, the organisation required 
a financial subsidy from the NSW government to cover an unexpected deficit, but also 
the contribution of several thousand people in order to deal with the organisational 
magnitude of the Sydney Olympics. The latter took the form of people who were 
working for contractor companies of the Games as well as volunteers. The needs of 
SOCOG's environment, however, were fairly well known in that period, due to the 
long-established relationships that ' the organisation had developed with its 
environmental entities, particularly in the course of its 'Build-up Period'. 
Over the 'Games-time Period' SOCOG also experienced a significant institutional 
change. The organisation merged its operations with OCA and ORTA "under a new . 
organisational scheme, known as 'Sydney 2000', which aimed to bring together the 
various organisational competencies of the event. 'Sydney 2000' was headed by the 
General Director of NSW's OCA, David Richmond, but it was controlled by the 
Games Co-ordination Group (GCOG), which virtuaUy took over the responsibilities 
of SOCOG's Board of Directors. The GCOG was headed by NSW govemment's 
Minister for the Olympics, Michael Knight, and AOC's President, John Coates. 
Consequently, during that period, SOCOG was still subject to external control, as 
much due to the appointment of a NSW government's favourite at its leadership, as to 
the external control over GCOG, the organisation's main decision-making body. 
With respect to structural characteristics, SOCOG underwent fimdarnental changes in 
that period. In particular, the organisation was converted into a venue-based fom 
since its functional operations were entirely moved to the venues and the respective 
Venue Teams. Therefore, the Venue Teams had the most significant contribution to 
the organisation's operations. They consisted of representatives of SOCOG's 
functional areas, who undertook functional responsibilities inside the venues, and 
were headed by a powerful Venue Manager. Co-ordination among the venues and 
internal consistency of their operations were achieved through the Main Co-ordination 
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Centre (MOC), located at the headquarters of SOCOG, and which consisted of 
executives who previously headed the functional areas of the organisation. 
Consequently, there was a dual reporting policy, since the venue members had to 
report both to the Venue Manager and to their functional leaders in the MOC. This 
reporting, however, was of an informal nature, since the communication of all these 
actors took primarily the form of telephone interaction or informal meetings. 
Concerning the decision-making, the Venue Managers held ultimate authority since 
only a limited number of decisions, particularly those that could affect the event as a 
whole, were finalised outside the venues. In effect, SOCOG had to run a real time 
show, namely the sport competitions, and therefore, high flexibility of operations but 
also immediate decision-making was required. As a result, during that period there 
were limited formal instructions that guided the organisation, and also a considerable 
decentralisation of the decision-making authority. Moreover, the co-ordinating roles 
previously undertaken by various committees and commissions were incorporated 
into the GCOG, and therefore SOCOG operated with a single 'Liaison Device'. 
Finally, during that period SOCOG experienced the highest levels of staff training. 
As was mentioned earlier, the organisation required a large number of people to staff 
the Venue Teams only a few months before the event. New staff attended intensive 
training sessions, as much with regard to the organisation of the Games as a whole, as 
with regard to their specific responsibilities inside the venues. 
During the 'Games-time Period', therefore, the organisational focus of SOCOG was 
on the venue operations. The Venue Teams were operating relatively autonomously 
and aimed to serve particular areas, mainly related to the needs of the sporting 
competitions. According to Mintzberg's (1991) theorising, an organisation which 
encourages particular units or divisions to concentrate their efforts on serving 
particular markets or" areas, venues in the case of SOCOG, are driven by the 
4concentration' force, and would be expected to fall into the configuration of 
Tivisionalised ForrW (Mintzberg, 1991, p. 56). However, as depicted in table 7.5, 
SOCOG's 'Games-time' formation has little in common with Mintzberg's 
Tiviisionalised Form. Mintzberg (1979,1981) suggests that Tivisionalised Forms' 
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usually operate in simple and stable environments, and they are controlled by middle 
line managers. Moreover, the Headquarters impose particular structures on the units, 
and by using strict performance control mechanisms, the Headquarters achieve 
standardisation of the units' outputs. In effect, Mintzberg (1979,1981) treats the 
'Divisionalised Form' as a structural evolution of a machine bureaucratic 
organisation, which, in order to adapt to new conditions, spreads its risks by 
overlaying another level of administration that could add and subtract divisions or 
units (Mintzberg, 198 1, p. I 10). Consequently, in line with Mintzberg's arguments, 
each division or unit is a separate 'Machine Bureaucracy', with highly formalised 
operations and limited decision-making authority. 
In 'Games-time Period', however, SOCOG seems to hold more elements of 
Mintzberg's 'Professional Bureaucracy' rather than those of his 'Divisionalised Form' 
(Table 7.5). As was stgted earlier, during that period SOCOG was operating in a 
complex and stable environment, and as a result it required decentralised decision- 
making and flexible operations, although some formalisation existed inside the 
venues. Like Mintzberg's 'Professional Bureaucracy' SOCOG's operations were 
concentrated on its 'Operational Core', and also required much staff training. 
Moreover, although work co-ordination 'was achieved through infortnal means, the 
'Operational Core' of the organisation required highly-trained individuals, like in the 
case of 'Professional Bureaucracy', yet in the case of SOCOG this training took place 
inside rather than outside the organisation. 
Consequently, with regard to Mintzberg's theorising, it could be argued that 
SOCOG's 'Games-time' formation constituted yet again a hybrid of two 
configurations. In effect, the organisation required being 'divisionalised' to serve the 
venue needs, while retainmig a certain degree of 'professionalism' to deal with the 
complexity of its task. Clearly, SOCOG's formation during that period reflects the 
peculiarity of its task, since it was effectively formed as a professional Tivisionalised 
Form'. 
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Table 7.5: SOCOG at 'Games-lime Period' and Mintzbergs 'Divisionalised Form' and 
Prqfessional Bureaucracy' 
SOCOG's 
GAMES-TIME 
PERIOD 
Age Old 
Size Large 
Environment Very Complex/ 
Relatively Stable 
Power High External 
MINTZBERG'S 
DIVISIONALISED 
FORM 
Tý, picallý- Old 
Vey, Large 
Relativclý, 
Simple/Stable 
Middle Line Control 
MINTZBERUS 
PROFESSIONAL 
BUREAUCRACY 
Varies 
Varies 
Complex/stable 
Professional 
Operator Control Control I 
Some Specialisation 
Specialisation Much Specialisation (between Divisions Much Specialisation 
and I leadquarters) 
Functional and Unit Grouping Place-Based Market Marko 
Liaison Devices Few Iiaison Devices Few Liaison Devices 
Formalisation Some Formalisation Much Forrnalisation 
(within Divisions) 
Centralisation Decentralisation Limited Deccritralisation 
Training Much Training -Some Training 
Basic 
Organisational. Part Operating Core I Middle 1, ine 
Basic Co-ordinating Standardisation of 
Mechanism Mutual Adjustment i Outputs 
Some haison 
Devices 
Little Formalisation 
Decent ral isat ion 
Much Training 
Operating Core 
Standardisation of 
Skills 
(Note: Shading depicts similarities between Mintzberg's Divisionalised Form and Profiessional 
Bureaucracy, and SOCOG's Games-time formation) 
7.2.4 SOCOG'S CLOSE-DOWN FORMATION 
After the end of the Sydney Olympics, SOCOG's fiormation changed yet again, this 
time in a rapid fashion. Within a period of two months IbIlowing the peak of' its 
operations, SOCOG managed to perform the appropriate actions for its dissolution. 
E'ssentially, SOCOG's operations during the 'Close-down Period' were entirely ainled 
at the closure of the organisation. SOCOG's size decreased dramatically, 
250 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG CHAPTER VII 
immediately after the end of the Games, since the vast majority of the staff was laid 
off, while a small part of it, particularly that with venue-related responsibilities, 
moved to the organising committee of the subsequent 2000 Paralympic Games. 
Moreover, the entities that formed SOCOG's organisational environment moved their 
operations to other projects, with the exception of the NSW government, and 
particularly its OCA, which virtually led SOCOG's wind-up process. Essentially, 
although OCA and SOCOG were still operating as a merged organisation, legislation 
passed by the NSW government gave OCA ultimate authority over SOCOG's wind- 
up process. Moreover, with SOCOG's President, Michael Knight, resigning right 
after the end of the Games, the NSW government appointed its Treasurer, Michael 
Eagan, as the head of the organisation. SOCOG's Board of Directors resumed its 
position at the top of the organisation, yet it held limited power, since it convened 
only twice during that period only for the purpose of reviewing SOCOG's operations. 
Therefore, during that period SOCOG was still externally controlled, this time solely 
by the NSW government. Besides, the institutional position of SOCOG, required the 
intense involvement of the NSW government, which had to perform the appropriate 
legal and financial arrangements for the organisation's closure. 
In the course of the 'Close-down Period, the Venue Teams had finalised their 
operations, and SOCOG was re-structured in the Headquarters in the base of 
functional responsibilities. However, most of the departments and programme areas 
that had been established in the 'Build-up Period' disbanded soon after the end of the 
Games, and as a result the organisation was operating with a limited number of 
divisions. Regarding the decision-making authority, the divisions were working 
relatively autonomously; however, on institutional grounds, decisions related to the 
closure of each division, essentially required the involvement of OCA, which 
undertook the task * of sorting out SOCOG's legal arrangements on NSW 
government's behalf. Consequently, although major decisions were finafised at the 
top of the organisation, a considerable amount of decision-making authority was 
selectively decentralised to its operational base. Moreover, the NSW government had 
set a specific timetable for SOCOG's dissolution, and therefore the organisation's 
operations were virtually standardised according to certain outcomes, that is the 
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punctual closure of each division. However, during that period, SOCOG was also 
responsible for the filing of the Games' documents and records. This was a massive 
task which required the contribution of record specialists, who were brought into the 
organisation after the end of the Games. As a result, apart from the significant role of 
SOCOG's 'Operational Core', there was also a considerable operational contribution 
of a 'Technostructure', which was actually attached to the organisation during that 
period. 
The discussion above suggests that after the end of the Games, SOCOG did not adopt 
a solid formation, since it rather temporarily re-organised its operations in the 
headquarters, in order to start to dismantle and eventually dissolve. Therefore, the 
organisational status that SOCOG adopted during that period was essentially driven 
by a predominant force, what could be called 'decline and death', since this particular 
status facilitated the organisation's operational decline and closure. As a result, when 
SOCOG's 'Close-down' formation is juxtaposed to Mintzberg's (1979,1981) 
theorising, it is hard to identify strong commonalities with any of his configurations. 
However, as shown in table 7.6, there is a certain degree of congruence between 
SOCOG's 'Close-down' formation and Mintzberg's 'Machine Bureaucracy'. This is 
explained by the fact that, like 'Machine Bureaucracy', SOCOG was an externafly 
controlled organisation, operating in a simple and stable environment, and it 
essentiaUy required some degree of Mintzberg's (1991) 'efficiency', yet not in order 
to enhance its productivity but rather to perform certain tasks within a tight timetable. 
However, unlike the 'Machine Bureaucracy, SOCOG was not required to 'formalise' 
its operations, since the focus was not on standardising its works, but rather on 
dealing with specialised tasks, which were spread across a United number of 
operational areas. SOCOG's limited 'SpecialisatioW, and Tormalisation, combined 
with the small 'Size' of the organisation, constituted characteristics that are usuaUY 
adopted by 'Simple Structures'. Indeed4 SOCOG was a small and flexible 
organisation, however, not due to the volatile conditions of its environment, as in the 
case of the 'Simple Structure', but rather due to the decline of its operations, which, 
naturally affected both its size and its levels of Tormalisation'. Besides, unlike 
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SOCOG, Mintzberg (1991) claims that 'Simple Structures' correspond to new 
organisations that are usually in the process of building their strategic direction. 
Table 7.6: SOCOG's at 'Close-Down Period'and Mintzherg's 'Machine Bureaucracy'and 
'Simple Structure' 
SOCOG's MINTZBERG'S MINTZBERG'S 
CLOSE-DOWN MACHINE SIMPLE 
PERIOD BUREAUCRACY STRUCTURE 
Age Old Typically Old Typically Young 
Size Small Large Small 
Environment Simple/Stable Simple/Stable Simple/Dynainic 
Power High External Technocratic and 'FO Control C 
Control External Control 
Specialisation Little Specialisation Much Specialisation i Little Speciallsation 
Unit Grouping Functional- Based i Usually Functional Usually Functional 
Liaison Devices Few Liaison Devices- T-Few Liaison Devices Fc\% Liaison Devices 
Formalisation Little Formalisation Much Formallsation Little Formalisation 
Centralisation Selective I. Imitcd Cciltralisation 
Decentrallsation Decentralisation 
Training Very Little Training 1 LittleTraming LittleTraining 
Basic Technostructure/ Technostructure S ategic Apex 'tr, I Organisational Part Operating Core I 
Basic Co-ordinating Standardisation of I Standardisation of Direct Supcrv's'011 Mechanism Outputs Work 
(Note. Shading depicts similarities between Mintzberg's Machine Burcaucracý and Simple Sinicitirc. 
and SOCOG's Close-down formation) 
overall, therefore, in the course of the Close-down Period', So('()(, exhibited 
organisational characteristics that can be Ibund K)th in Mintzberg's 'Machine 
Bureaucracy' and 'Simple Structure'. Nonetheless, it would tx- misleading to claim 
that SOCOG's 'Close-down' formation was a blend of the atbreniciltioned 
configurations, since it effectively satisfied none ofthe 'forces', which, according to 
Mintzberg (199 1), drive organisations to adopt the respective formations. As a result, 
it is more appropriate to claim that SOCOG's 'Close-down' tormation does not 
correspond to any of Mintzberg's configurations. 
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7.3.5 MINTZBERG's CONFIGURATION APPROACH AND THE STUDY OF 
SOCOG 
The discussion above has shown that none of the formations adopted by SOCOG 
match entirely with any of Mintzberg's (1979) configurations, with the exception of 
its 'Start-up' formation, which almost coincides exactly with Mintzberg's 'Simple 
Structure'. Therefore, it can be argued that SOCOG's formations show a weak 
association with Mintzberg's ideal organisational types. According to Mintzberg's 
(1979,1981,1991) theorising, this means that overall SOCOG did not achieve an 
ideal organisational formation apart from the early stage of its life cycle. Mintzberg 
(1979,1981) claims that organisations need to achieve 'fit' between their 'Situational 
Elements' and 'Structural Design Parameters' in order to be effective, and SOCOG 
essentially failed to achieve it. Although the organisational. effectiveness of SOCOG 
is beyond the scope of this study, it is difficult to overlook the lack of correspondence 
between SOCOG's formations and Mintzberg's ideal configurations. Essentially, 
with regard to the measurement of organisational effectiveness Mintzberg supports 
that it should be evaluated by reference to the relationship between the structure of the 
organisation and the external conditions of the context in which it operates. However, 
in recent organisational research there has been considerable debate about how 
accurately researchers can measure organisational effectiveness (Cameron, 1986; 
ChelladuraL 1987), which is predominantly seen as a complex multi-dimensional 
concept that must be evaluated in its entire context, especially if the organisation has 
multiple goals and constituents (Chelladurai and Haggerty, 1991), such as a typical 
OCOG. 
Although different models of effectiveness have been posited, such as the 'goals 
model' (in which effectiveness is evaluated against the achievement of formal goals), 
the 'Systems model' (in which effectiveness is evaluated by reference to its ability to 
attract inputs of human and financial resources, process throughputs, and achieve 
outputs), and the 'structures and processes model' (in which effectiveness is evaluated 
by reference to the relationsWp between the structure of the organisation and the waY 
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in which work is organised), it has been noted that having distinct sets of 
effectiveness criteria for different aspects of an organisation is a flawed approach 
because, in reality, these individual aspects of the organisation work in an integrated 
fashion (Chefladurai, 1987; Chelladurai and Haggerty, 1991). Recent research in the 
sport organisational domain has adopted a more persuasive approach in which 
effectiveness is evaluated according to the perceptions of a number of internal and 
external constituents of organisations, commonly known as 'multiple constituency 
approach' (e. g. Papadimitriou, 1994; Chelladurai and Haggerty, 1991). Given that an 
OCOG is by its very nature the centre of multiple and diverse constituencies, the 
Gmultiple constituency approach' is essentially the most appropriate for measuring its 
effectiveness. In the case of SOCOG, for example, organisational effectiveness could 
be assessed in view of the NSW government's perception of its financial 
performance, since it was underwriting the organisation, the IOC's or the IFs' 
perception of the organisational success of the Games' delivery, the level of the 
athletes' satisfaction, or even the sponsors' perception on the quality of services and 
facilities provided for exercising their sponsorship rights. In other words, there'are 
different perceptions of how effective an organisation is, and therefore, the 
examination of SOCOG's effectiveness would require an in-depth analysis of the 
various views of effectiveness by all constituent parties. This in turn reveals a 
significant deficiency of Mintzberg's approach as it solely relies on the fit that an 
organisation achieves between its structure and its context to evaluate effectiveness, 
while it disregards the perspective of the organisation's stakeholders, that is any group 
or individual within or outside the organisation that has a stake in the organisation's 
performance (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
Mintzberg's approach has been criticised as an inefficient tool for measuring 
organisational effectiveness (Doty et al, 1993), yet, in defence of his theorising it 
needs to be stressed that he acknowledges that often 'non-finearity' is observed in 
effective organisations, which practically means that, although he treats his 
configurations as 'ideal types', he virtually accepts that multiple organisational forms 
can be equally effective. This view is justified by Mintzberg's argument, wwch 
claims that often organisations experience more than one of the 'forces' that underlie 
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his configurations. In this sense, an organisation might be simultaneously 'forced' to 
be 'formalised' and 'professionalised', for example, and thus hybrids of more than 
one configuration might emerge (Mintzberg, 1981, p. 113). This view is supported in 
the configuration theory literature under the term of 'equifinality', to imply that there 
is more than one way to achieve organisational success (Meyer et al, 1993). Besides, 
Mintzberg himself has claimed that organisational effectiveness is a multi- 
dimensional issue that is difficult to examine (Mintzberg, 1991), and its assessment 
essentially varies according to the nature of the organisation under study and the 
industry in which it operates. 
Although Mintzberg's approach can be seen as a unilateral diagnostic tool for 
organisational effectiveness, it should be acknowledged that it holds significant 
strengths for the study of SOCOG. As was mentioned in previous chapters, 
Mintzberg's approach constitutes both a theory and a typology, in that it can be used 
as an effective tool for organisational research as well as a basis for deriving 
organisational types. Essentially, the contribution of Mintzberg's approach to the 
present study was two-fold, since it was used both as the theoretical framework for 
the study of SOCOG and as the base for deriving the organisational formations that 
SOCOG exhibited during its fife cycle. Concerning the former, this study has 
significantly benefited through the use of Mintzberg's (1979) approach, as it helped to 
produce a rich account of SOCOG's organisational reality. The examination of 
SOCOG's 'Situational Factors' provided a solid understanding of the setting in which 
the organisation operated, and the analysis of the elements of 'Environmcnt' and 
'Power', in particular, revealed the exogenous organisational dynamics of the 
organisation. Also, the examination of SOCOG's 'Structural Design Parameters' 
provided a comprehensive description of the manner in which the organisation was 
internally operated. For example, the researcher was able to identify the criteria that 
were used by SOCOG to break down organisational tasks (i. e. Unit Grouping), the 
manner that decision-making authority was distributed in the organisation (i. e. 
Centralisation) as well as the levels of adherence of the organisational members to 
formal procedures (i. e. Formalisation). Finally, the analysis of SOCOG's 'Basic 
Organisational Parts' uncovered the place within the organisation where the bulk of 
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work was concentrated, while the examination of the element of 'Basic Co-ordinating 
Mechanism' revealed the way that SOCOG attained co-ordination of its operations as 
a whole. 
The main strength of the configuration theory, not to mention Mintzberg's approach, 
is that it does not treat the organisational characteristics in isolation but in 
combination. Effectively, organisational characteristics are seen as a group of 
interrelated elements which synthesise a particular organisational type. Consequently, 
by examining each of SOCOG's forrnations as a synthesis of a series of interrelated 
attributes, and by following Mintzberg's reasoning, the researcher was able to identify 
the manner in which SOCOG's characteristics were associated with each other, and 
particularly the degree to which the nature of its 'Situational Elements' affected its 
'Structural Design Parameters'. Effectively, Mintzberg's approach allowed the 
behaviour of the organisation towards its external condition to be identified, as well as 
the manner that this behaviour was practically interpreted in terms of its internal 
structuring. Moreover, by juxtaposing SOCOG's formations with Mintzberg's 
configurations, and by considering the 'forces', which, according to Mintzberg (1979, 
1991), put pressure on organisations to adopt particular f6mis, commonalities and 
differences were identified, which in turn provided sufficient reasoning for the 
dymn&s that drove SOCOG to adopt particular formations. 
However, it needs to be stressed that, in order for the study of SOCOG to be 
appropriate, Mintzberg's approach was developed in two main respects. Firstly, the 
attributes that synthesise Mintzberg's configurations were reviewed and adjusted to fit 
the characteristics of OCOGs. Essentially, by attempting to embrace all types of 
organisations of every sector in his configurations, Mintzberg includes in his approach 
a wide range of organisational. features, some of which did not hold particular 
significance for the study of SOCOG. The technology utilised by the organisation 
(i. e. 'Technical Systems' in Mintzberg's terms), for example, was excluded from the 
theoretical fi=ework of the study as it was explained that the examination of such an 
aspect has little to contribute to the present analysis of SOCOG's organisational 
formations. Furthermore, Mintzberg's set of organisational. dimensions failed to 
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capture characteristics that were of particular significance for the study of SOCOG, 
such as the attribute of 'Resource Dependence' which was added to the theoretical 
framework of the study. Secondly, the modified Mintzberg's approach was 
practically considered in different periods in SOCOG's life cycle in order to deal with 
the changing nature of the organisation, since Mintzberg essentially fails to stress the 
time aspect for organisations, that have a chronologically determined life cycle. In 
reality, with regard to the present study the above constitute the two main weaknesses 
of Mintzberg's approach, which however were readily identified, and triggered 
subsequent adjustments of the study's theoretical framework. Nevertheless, while the 
former adjustment provided constructive insights into the organisational particularities 
of SOCOG and avoided reliance on attributes that might be misleading for the 
organisation's account, the latter adjustment revealed a significant inadequacy of 
Mintzberg's approach. Specifically, while Mintzberg's theorising was relatively 
effective in gi i reasoning for SOCOG's organisational adaptations in the three IvIng 
initial stages of its life cycle, it was particularly weak in doing so for SOCOG's 
'Close Down Period'. In other words, Mintzberg's configurations are not accurate in 
capturing the condition of organisations that experience operational decline and 
eventually death. While it could be argued that there is little insight to be gained into 
organisational evolution from the analysis of organisations such as SOCOG, as they 
have a clearly defined finite life, it can also be strongly argued that the analysis of 
SOCOG demonstrated that an examination of this type of organisation is of 
significant interest. In particular, it was shown that during ihat period SOCOG 
required a particular formation in order to carry out its closing operations, which 
among others involved a loose structuring with selective delegation of the decision- 
making authority as well as the contribution of expert staff. 
To conclude, it is claiined that although Mintzbcrg's approach suffers from particular 
weaknesses, it needs to be assessed in terms of the ainis of this study. In doing so, 
Mintzberg's theorising successffly supported the accomplishment of two of the main 
objectives of this study, namely the identification and evaluation of the structural and 
contextual features of SOCOG throughout its life cycle, and the investigation of the 
role of SOCOG in the organisation of the 2000 Olympic Games. Thus, the overall 
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contribution of Mintzberg's approach to the particular study was undoubtedly 
significant. Generally, however, it needs to be stressed that although Mintzberg's 
configuration approach constitutes a landmark in contemporary organisational 
analysis, it should be cautiously utilised. Particularly with regard to organisational 
effectiveness, Mintzberg's approach is ambiguous and its full employment by 
organisational analysts could lead to misleading results. Moreover, although 
Mintzberg includes a wide range of dimensions to describe an organisational 
synthesis, a careful consideration of possible particularities of the organisations under 
investigation should be performed. Specifically, the study of SOCOG showed that the 
conditions of the industries in which organisations operate as well as possible 
distinctive internal elements of individual organisations should be considered. 
Therefore, the applicability of Mintzberg's approach in organisational research and 
analysis should be assessed in relation to a number of factors. However, we believe 
that the unique qualities of Mintzberg's approach, namely its comprehensive 
collection of organisational dimensions and its holistic understanding of organisations 
can provide useful insights into virtually every organisational. analysis. 
7.4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The present study sought to perform an organisational analysis of SOCOG using as its 
theoretical framework a modified version of Mintzberg's configuration approach. In 
doing so, it aimed to provide a holistic understanding of the organisational nature of 
SOCOG by also considering the applicability of a periodisation of its fife cycle, as 
well as to examine its role in the organisation of the 2000 Sydney Olympics. Further, 
it aimed to assess the suitability of the theoretical fiwwwork employed for the 
particular study. Consequently, from an organisational analysis perspective this study 
held a two-fold character, since it not only aimed to contribute to the understanding of 
a particular organisation but also to provide useful theoretical insights into the 
utifisation of a particular conceptual fi-amework. 
With regard to the fonner, this study revealed that SOCOG constituted a distinctive 
organisational entity. It was found that besides its operational temporality SOCOG 
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underwent significant organisational changes throughout its seven-year fife cycle. In 
particular, by taking on board Miller and Friesen's (1984) approach on organisational 
transitions, it was discovered that the organisation went through four main 
chronological stages, namely 'Start-up Period', 'Build-up Period', 'Games-time 
Period' and Close-down Period', and exhibited four respective organisational 
formations. In addition, it was found that the role of SOCOG with regard to the 
organisation of the Sydney Olympics gradually weakened particularly in favour of the 
NSW government, which exerted considerable control over the organisation's 
leadership and operations. 
With regard to the applicability of the theoretical framework employed, it was argued 
that the modified version of Mintzberg's approach was a constructive research tool for 
the examination of SOCOG. By considering the temporary nature of SOCOG as well 
as the particularities of the Olympic Games' organisation, Mintzberg's (1979) original 
approach to organisational analysis was modified and subsequently considered in 
different periods of the organisation's life cycle. In doing so, the researcher was able 
to capture both the internal characteristics of SOCOG and the conditions of the 
industry in which the organisation operated throughout its operational life. Also, by 
drawing on Mintzberg's ideal organisational types the manner in which SOCOG's 
internal and external characteristics were interrelated was considered, and reasoning 
was provided concerning the synthesis of the difTerent organisational formations 
adopted by SOCOG. However, it was stressed that with regard to the study of 
SOCOG Mintzberg's modified approach had one significant weakness. Specifically, 
it was not able to provide an adequate explanation of the organisational formation 
adopted by SOCOG during the period of its operational decline (i. e. 'Close-down 
Period'). As a result, it was suggested that Mintzberg's modified approach should be 
cautiously utilised for the study of organisations that experience predetermined 
decline and closure. 
Although the present study constitutes a case study of SOCOG it has nevertheless 
provided empirical evidence that could lead to some tentative hypotheses with 
reference to future OCOGs as well as the organisation of future Olympic Games. 
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Specifically, through the examination of SOCOG it could be suggested that the 
OCOG holds a central formal role within the network of the interests involved, yet it 
lacks resources and administrative power for fulfilling the organisation and delivery 
of the event on its own. Apart from the powerful positions of the permanent 
organisational entities of the Olympic Games, namely the IOC, the IFs as well as the 
media and sponsor corporations within the network, it seems that the role of the host 
public governance will tend to be significant for future OCOGs. In the case of 
SOCOG the increasing size of the Olympic Games required the building of stadiums 
and support infrastructure which could not be delivered by the OCOG, and therefore it 
could be argued that the early and increasing involvement of host governments in the 
Olympic preparations is likely in future Games. An alternative hypothesis is that 
future OCOGs will adapt to the increased expectations and pressures placed upon 
them rather than losing responsibilities and power to other public or quasi-public 
agencies as was the case in Sydney. However, this scenario is less likely due to the 
continuity expectation, particularly following the problems of the privately-run 
Atlanta Olympics, that public authorities wiU adopt a much more prominent role in 
ensuring the successful delivery of the Games. 
The examination of SOCOG also revealed that like all OCOGs, it was embarking on a 
relatively unknown project, since they possess limited expertise and detailed 
information concerning the organisation of the event. In the case of SOCOG this 
resulted in the slow development of the organisation in the early stages of its 
operations. SOCOG's staff attempted to build its knowledge base through the 
observation of the previous Olympics and other contemporary mega-sporting events 
as well as through the acquisition of documents and Games' data from previous 
OCOGs. Essentially, SOCOG's experience identified and highlighted a significant 
deficiency in OCOGs'which can impede their smooth development, and consequently 
put at risk the successful delivery of the Games. In view of this problem the IOC, 
SOCOG and the Organising Committee of the 2004 Olympic Games (ATIIOC) 
jointly initiated the Transfer of Olympic Knowledge (TOK) programme, designed to 
gather detailed organisational information and key data from the Sydney Olympics in 
the form of a series of organisational manuals, which could then be passed to ATHOC 
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and to future OCOGs. Effectively, the TOK programme creates a potential blueprint 
for the organisation of the Olympics that could be enriched through the years with the 
experience of different OCOGs in order to constitute an effective tool for the Olympic 
organisers, particularly during the demanding initial stages of their operations. 
Overall, this study can contribute to the understanding of the organisational 
particularities of a unique species of sport organisations, providing many benefits to 
the organisation analyst. In particular, it could be utilised as a theoretical base, which 
would allow comparisons between SOCOG and other OCOGs. In doing so, 
commonalities could be identified providing generalisations about the status of 
OCOGs, and also differences could be highlighted, which could support the 
uniqueness of a particular OCOG. However, a comparative study on OCOGs needs 
to consider that although the organisational practices of OCOGs tend to be 
standardised through the TOK programme, they would nevertheless be likely to 
depend, at least to a degree, on the particularities of the various political economies in 
which the event is organised. Consequently, if the case of SOCOG is compared with 
a future OCOG attention should be placed upon issues such as the political and legal 
system of the host country, the levels of public administration involved in the Games' 
organisation, the organisational culture of the host country, and the like. Effectively, 
an OCOG operates within a network of cultures and ideologies which inevitably 
affect its corporate culture and its managerial practices. In particular, an OCOG 
operates as an Olympic agency yet with the status of a private corporation within the 
business and political culture of the host country. Unavoidably, therefore, it is 
affected not only by the ideological and managerial requirements of the Olympic 
Movement, and the IOC in particular, but also by the management practices of the 
country in which it operates. This can include its legal arrangements with suppliers, 
its co-operations with'the public sector, the status of employment of its staff and the 
Eke. 
In view of the above the organisational analyst could utilise the premises of this study 
in order to stress particular characteristics of an OCOG and employ alternative 
theoretical frameworks and methodologies for its examination. For example, the case 
262 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG CHAPTER VII 
of SOCOG showed that the organisation operated in an influential institutional 
environment, which to a certain degree directed its development and imposed 
particular internal organisational changes. It would be, therefore, constructive to 
consider the cultural and political processes through which a particular OCOG's 
organisational actors and their interests are institutionally constructed and mobilised 
in favour of certain externally imposed organising logics. This could be achieved 
through the employment of 'institutional theory', and DiMaggio and Powell's (1991) 
concept of 'inýtitutional isomorphism', in particular. In doing so, the researcher 
would be able to elaborate on the forces that drive an OCOG to adopt a specific 
formation, namely 'coercive', which stems from political influence and the problem 
of legitimacy, 'mimetic" resulting from standard response to uncertainty, and 
'norrnative'. which is associated with professionalisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991, p. 67). 
Finally, this study could also be of particular benefit to future Olympic organisers, but 
also to organisers of other mega-events, such as world sporting championships and 
EX? Os, which are also characterised by long periods of preparation and short periods 
of execution. The case of SOCOG provides for the Olympic Games' organisers a 
comprehensive view of the event's organisation and of the different interests 
involved, which can facilitate their understanding of the particularities of the project 
they undertake. It was shown, for example, that while an OCOG is constantly 
monitored and assisted by the Olympic Movement's agencies it is practically left 
alone after the Olympic Games is over. In managerial terms th at implies that during 
its last operational stage an OCOG operates on its own experience and resources, 
without any guidance from the permanent agencies of the Olympic Games 
organisation, and thus it might find essential the contribution of the public sector, 
such as in the case of SOCOG's Close-down period. Moreover, the changing 
character of SOCOG and the identification of the forces that drove the organisation to 
adopt different formations during its life cycle can assist the planning process of an 
OCOG, stress actors, events and chronologies of major concern, and consequently 
facilitate the development of a contingency planning policy. The concept of 
Periodisation could also be applicable to the organisation of other mega-events, since 
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it essentially stresses the developmental nature of a mega-event organising committee. 
In doing so, large amounts of information about the organisation of a particular event 
could be assessed in terms of key events and chronologies, and consequently broken 
down into manageable categories that would then be easier to comprehend, elaborate 
and store. In addition, the mega-event organiser could utilise the present study as a 
platform for assessing the external condition of a particular organising comn-dttee and 
for considering the dynamics of changes in its structure and processes. 
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APPENDIX I 
THE GROWTH OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
(Source: 10C, 200 1) 
SUMMER OLYMPIC GAMES 
-I 
NATIONS 
FATHLETES 
SPORTS EVENTS 
F 6-797 221 Fý984 140 23 
-8465---- 237 1988 159 25 
[-9367 
1992 169 28 257 
1996 197 20 26 271 
. 
2000 199 10651 28 300 
WINTER OLYMPIC GAMES 
GAMES NATIONS 
I 
ATHLETES I SPORTSFVENTS 
F- 
39 1984 49 1274 6 
'F 46 1988 57 1423 6 
1992 64 1801 7F 57 
1994 67 96 
ýl 761 
1998 72 
F 
2-302 7 68 
2002 77 1 2399 78 
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APPENDIX 11 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
TOPICS 
1. ENVIRONMENT: 
-Complexity (The number and heterogeneity of external elements influencing 
SOCOG) 
PROMPT: From SOCOG's official reports one can identify four 
basic actors in SOCOG's environment: The Olympic Movement (10C, 
EFs, NOCs), the Public Governance (Governments, Public Authorities), 
the Commercial sector (Sponsors, Media, Contractors etc. ), and various 
Public groups (Aboriginals, Greens etc. ). 
QUESTIONS 
e Can you identify any other environmental actors that have 
influenced SOCOG? Which do you think was the most influential entity 
in the organisational environment of SOCOG? What was the role of the 
Austmlian Olympic Committee/the IOC Co-ordination Commission? 
9 What links were established between SOCOG and extcmal 
actors? What kind of agreements was in place with governmental 
agencies (e. g. MoU) such as OCA and ORTA? 
* What was the role of these entities after the end of the 
event? Was there any particular involvement of the IOC, the sponsors or 
any other organisation apart from OCA? 
-Stability (rhe levels of prediction of the needs of external elements influencing 
SOCOG) 
PROMPT: Consider the 10C's corruption scandal and its impact on 
sponsorship, and LAAF's change of track and field competition schedule 
which affected ticketing. 
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QUESTIONS 
* Do you consider predictable the needs of the above actors? 
Can you identify any particular period throughout SOCOG's life that the 
organisation probably did not have the appropriate knowledge or 
expertise to deal with its environmental needs? In which stage of the 
organisation of the Games did you have the most problems to deal with 
the needs of these actors? 
* Was SOCOG getting more familiar with the needs of these 
actors as the organisation progressed towards the time of the Games and 
after the Games? 
* How useful was the participation of SOCOG's staff in 
Olympic-related conferences (e. g. GAIFS) for dealing with the needs of 
these actors? 
2. RESOURCE DEPENDENCE (The I evels of importance of resources possessed by 
external actors to SOCOG): 
PROMPT: Consider the dependence of SOCOG on financial, human, 
physical and legitimate resources. Also, consider NSW government's 
contingency fund for SOCOG. 
QUESTIONS 
-a Which were the external to SOCOG actors that possessed 
resources essential for the operation of SOCOG (e. g. IOC, NSW 
Govemment, Commercial Sector)? 
* In financial terms SOCOG was heavily depended on other 
organisations such as the IOC and the NSW government for resources. 
Do you think that SOCOG could obtain such resources elsewhere? 
* Which specific resources were more important to SOCOG 
during the initial years of its operations? Did it change in latter stages of 
the organisation's operations? 
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* Has this dependence to external resources influenced 
organisational actions, such as strategic planning, budgetary planning, 
management of human resources and so on? If yes how? 
3. POWER (The degree of representation of external actors on policy making bodies of 
SOCOG): 
PROMPT: Consider the role of OCA's Director General David 
Richmond and other individuals which represented NSW government's 
interests. Also, consider the power relations after the merger of OCA 
and SOCOG into 'Sydney 2000' in the last six months of the Olympic 
preparations. 
QUESTIONS 
9 Which do you thing was the main policy-making body in 
SOCOG? Did that change as the organisation progressed towards the 
time the Games? 
9 Which do you think were the most powerful entities or 
individuals in SOCOG's environment (e. g. IOC, NSW government, 
AOC, sponsors)? 
e Whose voice was the most dominant in the Board of 
Directors? 
* Were there any overlaps between SOCOG's and OCA's 
responsibilities? If yes, in such cases which organisation was the most 
dominant? 
* Can you recall any incidents initiated by external actors 
that challenged the authority structure within SOCOG? 
o Who was the most powerful individual in SOCOG after the 
end of the Games? 
298 
An Analysis of the Organisational Configurations over the Life Cycle of SOCOG APPENDICES 
- 4. FORMALISATION (The levels of adherence of SOCOG's staff to both fon-nal and 
informal instructions, and procedures): 
QUESTIONS 
9 Do you think that overall SOCOG was a bureaucratic 
organisation? Do you believe that the day-to-day operations were 
primarily driven by strict rules and instructions? 
* How was work co-ordinated in the initial years of 
SOCOG's operations? Were work processes standardised through the 
use of formal plans, written policies and rules, detailed job descriptions 
and so on? 
Has this changed after the shift of SOCOG's operations 
into the venues/after the end of the event? 
5. CENTRALISATION (The level in the hierarchy of SOCOG where final decisions are 
made): 
PRO MPT: Consider the role of President Michael Knight, particularly 
during Games-time period. Also, consider the staff changes in SOCOG 
that were imposed by President Michael Knight after the ticketing 
problems and how did they affect the decision-making structurc in the 
organisation. 
QUESTIONS 
* Concerning decisions of strategic nature, such as the 
creation of a new division or programme, who was responsible for 
that? - 
*When operational decisions were made, such as the 
appointment or termination of staff or the creation of a new program, 
who was the last person whose assent had to be obtained before 
legitimate action was taken? Was the manager of the respective division 
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responsible for such decisions? Were individuals from different 
SOCOG's levels involved in such decisions? 
* As SOCOG was getting bigger, more committees, 
commissions and management forums were created. Do you think that 
this created a slower decision-making process? 
e How were decisions made when SOCOG was operating 
from the venues? What was the role of venue managers in the decision- 
making process? 
e How decision-making works now that the Games are over? 
6. TRAINING (The levels of training required for the staff available to SOCOG): 
QUESTIONS 
*Was there any training for SOCOG's staff in the 
beginning? When did the bulk of SOCOG's staff training take place? 
*What fonn did SOCOG's training take (On-the-job 
Training, Training Sessions etcJgencral, task-specific)? 
7. UNIT GROUPING (The type of criteria used to break down organisational units): 
QUESTIONS 
e What was the main criterion for the grouping of the various 
organisational units during the life cycle of SOCOG (functions, 
competitions, venues etc. )? 
* When did exactly the shift of SOCOG's operations to the 
venues take place? 
* How was SOCOG structured after the end of the Games? 
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8. BASIC CO-ORDINATION MECHANISM (The fundamental ways in which 
SOCOG achieved co-ordination among its divisions and programmes): 
QUESTIONS 
* In the beginning, when limited departments and divisions 
were established, how was work co-ordinated among its units? 
e As SOCOG was getting bigger there were more committees 
and commissions and more management forums to co-ordinate work. 
Do you think that this was a bureaucmtic way to co-ordinate work? 
e When SOCOG adopted a venue-based structured, were 
there any differences in the way that work was co-ordinated? 
* How is work co-ordinatcd now that the Games are over? 
9. STRATEGY FORMATION (rhe degree that SOCOG can fonnulate strategies at 
operational-level): 
In terms of strategic formation, do you think that SOCOG 
had the appropriate space to form its own strategies or it was 
something that was predetermined by other agents such as the IOC, the 
government and so on? 
* From your experience with SOCOG, how autonomous do 
you thing is an OCOG in fonnulating its own strategies? Do you think 
that their strategic ability is constrained by external actors, such as the 
IOC, the Ifs, governments and so on? 
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APPENDIX III 
ADDITIONAL DATA PROVIDED VIA E-MAIL COMMUNICATION 
A: QUESTIONING SOCOGIS FORMALISATION 
Please note that this question seeks Your perception about the issue under investigation in 
four different chronicle stages in SOCOG's life-cycle. These are: 
Start-up Period: From November 1993 until Michael Knight's appointment as 
President of SOCOG in September 1996; 
Build-up Period: From October 1996 until the establishment of the Main Operation 
Centre in May 2000; 
Games-time Period: From June 2000 until the end of the Olympics in October 2000; 
and 
Close-up Period: From October 2000 until the resolution of SOCOG in December 
2000. 
Question: 
To what extent, do you think, SOCOG's operations were guided by formal means such as 
work plans, written policies and procedure manuals detailedjob descriptions and the like 
in each of its life-cycle periods? 
(1=few formal procedures; 2=some formal procedures; 3=many formal procedures) 
*Please tick (v) appropriately* 
Start-up Build-up Games- 
time 
Close- 
down 
2 
L3 
_ 
I 
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B: QUESTIONING SOCOG'S TRAINING 
Please reply to the question at the end of this message by considering the chronological 
periods in ýOCOG's life cycle provided below: 
Start-up Period: From November 1993 until Michael Knight's appointment as 
President of SOCOG in September 1996; 
" Build-up Period: From October 1996 until the establishment of the Main Operation 
Centre in May 2000; 
" Games-time Period: From June 2000 until the end of the Olympics in October 2000; 
and 
" Close-up Period: From October 2000 until the resolution of SOCOG in December 
2000. 
Question: Please consider TAFE NSW's records and rate the levels of training of 
SOCOG's staff at the chronological periods provided below. 
(1=little training; 2=some training; 3=much training) 
*Pleaqe tirk- (v) nnnmnriatelv* 
Start-up Build-up Games- 
time 
Close- 
down 
2 
_3 
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APPENDIXIV 
MINTZBERG'S ORGANISATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS 
Simple Machine Professional I Divisionali Adhocracy 
I Structure Bureaucracy Bureaucracy Form 
Key Means of Co- Direct Standardisation Standardisation [-i-Wda4sation of Mutual 
ouý ordination Supervision of Work of Skills outputs Adjustment 
Support Staff 
Key Part of the Strategic Apex 
FTechnostructure 
Operating Core Middle Line (AA)/ Organisation Operating Core 
Some 
(OA) 
Specialkeation of Jobs 
Little Much Much Specialisation Much 
Specialisation Specialisation. Specialisation (between Specialisation 
divisions and lIQ) 
Much 
Formahsation of Little Much Little Formalisation Little 
Behaviour- Formalisation- Formalisation. Formalisation- (within Formalisatiun- 
Bureaucratic/Organic Organic Bureaucratic Bureaucratic divisions)- Organic 
Bureaucratic 
Unit Grouping Usually Usually Functional and Market Functional and Functional Functional Market Market 
Wide at bottom, Wide at bottom, Narrow Unit Size Wide narrow Narrow Wide at top throughout elsewhere elsewhere 
Planning and Control Little Planning Little Planning Much Limited Action 
Systems and Control 
Action Planning 
and Control Performance Plann 
in& (esp. 
Control in AO) 
Little Training Little Training Much Traming Training and and and and 
SomeTraining Much Training Indoctrination and Indoctrination Indoctrination Indoctrination Indoctination 
Liaison Devices Few Liaison Few Liaison Some Liaison Few Liaison Many Liaison Devices Devices Devices Devices Devices 
Decentralisation Centralisation Limited Decentralisation Limited Selective Decentralisation Decentralisation Decentralisation 
Age and Size 
Typically Young TypicaUy Old Varies Typically Old and Typically 
and SmaU and Large Very Large Young (OA) 
Very Complex. 
Regulating but Divisible, often 
Technical System Simple, not not Automated, Not Regulating otherwise like Automated Regulating not very or Complex Machine (AA), not 
Complex Bureaucracy Regulating or 
C2T21ex OA) L 
Environment Complex and Relatively S Complex and Simple and Simpleand 
Dynamic Dynamic Stable Stable and Stable 
CEO Control, 
Technocratic Professional Middle-line Expert Control. 
Power and External Operator Control, very 
Fnc 
t Fashionable Control, not Control, Fashionable Fashionable Fashionable Fashionable 
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APPENDIX V 
DATA ANALYSIS TEMPLATE 
I-DAT 
A THEMES OPERATIONALISATION 11 SOURCES 
Size The Number of Staff available to SOCOG (Kimberly, 
1976, Hall, 1972) Documentary Data 
Environmental he number and heterogeneity of external elements 
FT 
I Documentary Data 
[ 
Complexity fluencing SOCOG (Duncan, 1972) in Anterview Data 
- 
Environmental The levels of prediction of the needs of external elements Interview Data Stability influencing SOCOG (Duncan, 1972) 
_ 
Resource- levels of importance of resources possessed by e ý 
F 
Interview Data/ 
ternal actors to SOCOG (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) Dependence Documentary Data 
The degree of representation of external actors on the Documentary Data 
1 
Power decision-making bodies of SOCOG (Pugh et al, 1968, /Interview Data 1969) 
he number of operational areas (major divisions, Documentary Data 
1 
Specialisation depa eLts and programmes) in SOCOG (Hall et al, Anterview Data 11 1967 Ki lis et al, 1989; Hollenbeck, 2000) 
- 
he levels of adherence of SOCOG's staff to both formal Formalisation 
F 
Interview Data 
E-mail 
and informal instructions, and procedures (Hall, 1982) Questionnaire 
The level in the hierarchy of SOCOG where final 
Centralisation decisions are made (Pugh et al, 1969; Kikulis et al, 1989; Interview Data 
1 
Theodoraki. 1996) 
The levels of training required for SOCOG's staff Trainin 
Interview Data 
E-mail g (Mintzberg, 1979) Questionnaire 
Unit Grouping The type of criteria used to break down organisational 
F, 
Documentary Data 
1 
units (Mintzberg, 1979) / Interview Data 
Liaison Devices The number of standing committees, commissions and 
[ 
Documentary Data 
1 
task forces in SOCOG (Mintzberg, 1979) / Interview Data 
e of the organisation which makes the most : 
contribution to SOCOG's operations Basic Part signific t w Data 
( intzberg, 1979) 
Basic Co- The fundamental ways in which SOCOG achieves co- 
ordinating ordination among its divisions and programmes Interview Data 
Mechanism (Mintzberg, 1979) 
Strategic Capacity The degree that SOCOG can formulate strategies at 
[ 
Interview Data 
[ 
overational-level. 
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APPENDIX VI 
SAMPLE INTERVIEW 
INTERVIEW WITH SANDY HOLLWAY (Chief Executive Officer of SOCOG) 
26-11-00, Hotel Metropolitan, Athens, Greece 
Researcher: I can see from Socog's official reports that the most important actors 
in its organisational environment were the Olympic Movement, the public 
governance, the commercial sector and the various public groups. Do you consider 
the needs of these actors predictable? 
Hollway: I think right from the beginning we understood that there were a number of 
actors, interest groups who we had to take into account. Our main concern was to 
establish the frameworks and policies for the organisation by taking into consideration 
the long-term relationships of Socog with the various constituents of the Games; this was 
actually responsibility of the Board. We had always said of course that it should be the 
athletes Games and we would understand the need to look after the interests of the 
athletes and therefore the IFs. I think we had always developed a high respect for the role 
of the NOCs around the world and we knew we needed to satisfy them. President 
Samaranch always reminded us that the inass media would be the ones to determine 
whether we would be successful or not. Their view of the Games would be very 
important so we understood the need to look after them. And I think right from the 
beginning we understood the need to involve government in our model. This was not a 
big philosophical problem for us. We understood the importance of government and I 
think also the indigenous people and the Green groups and community organisations. I 
think, yes, from the very beginning we had a very good idea that we needed to cover off 
multiple players with multiple interests. Now, at least one of those players would say 
that we should have been moved more quickly and I am thinking of the aboriginal 
leadership. We set up an advisory committee of the aboriginal leadership to help us, but 
we were probably slower in doing that than we should have been. They believed they 
should have come one or two years earlier. But I think that we always understood the 
need to cover the interests of these groups. 
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Researcher: I understand that Socog had the appropriate knowledge and expertise 
to deal with their needs, right? 
Hollway: It is a good question. I think the answer is yes. For example, in the case of the 
indigenous people we made sure that We hired somebody, who happened to be Garriela, 
an indigenous person, a former rugby player for Australia, well regarded with strong 
connections. I myself had a lot of experience in that area. In the case of the Green 
groups, yes we had a couple of people who had already strong connections and held good 
respect by those groups. So, yes; we did believe we needed people with expertise. Again 
I will give you another example. If you take the media and I am not talking about 
influencing media stories, but servicing the media at Games-time with all the operational 
support they need, we made a decision that our media division will be made up of people 
we hired who were working journalists. So, everybody, at any level of seniority that we 
hired was a professional journalist who knew what was required. 
Researcher: Which was the most difficult period to deal with the needs of those 
interest groups? 
Hollway: I honestly think with those actors that there was not a particular period of great 
stress or difficulty. In the beginning we did not have many relations with all the 
constituents groups apart from the NSW government with concern to the delivery of the 
permanent venues, the EFs with concern to the sporting venues, and the IOC which was 
co-ordinating our agreements with the sponsors and the media. We did have a period of 
great, great, great stress and difficulty which was in the last quarter of 1999 and this is 
when the issues of ticketing, as you know had become very controversial and there were 
widespread criticism of us. 
Researcher: You mean from the NSW government. 
Hollway: This was really from the community. It was the customer. The problems were 
that people were upset that there were not enough tickets in particular sports for 
Australian customers. They believed that we had managed a premium ticket programme. 
This is of course, selling tickets of premium prices but we have been secretive about it. 
There were issues about the processes of purchasing tickets and whether it was fair. And 
these whole set of issues became extremely controversial and became the source of 
almost daily, prominent criticism of the Socog in the media both printed media and on 
radio and television. So, that was a very tough time that we had to battle through and get 
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passed. But one could say that this was a reaction of the community fuelled by a very 
intense and critical media. It was not a problem with any particular player or group. 
Researcher: Can you see the ticketing problem as an issue which challenged the 
power structure within Socog. I can recall Mr Knight's action to move some civil 
servants into the organisation to deal with the problem. Did you see that as a 
change in the decision-making power? 
Hollway: First of all, the ticketing actually did not directly affect the budget. The single 
most important difficulty we had with the budget was in fact on sponsorship revenue. 
We in fact achieved a record in sponsorship revenue but we had been striving for even 
more and we reached too high. We could not get as much as we wanted and that left a 
problem to us in terms of having to cut back in expenditure in 1999 and 2000. But 
coming to the ticketing issue, by the end of 1999 this was clearly our biggest, single 
problem; and we substantially reinforced the ticketing area. We brought in new deputy 
executive officer in the form of Michael Eyers who focused a lot of his attention on 
ticketing. We put in place, then, a general manager in the form of A. March to do 
ticketing. We also introduced a consumer liaison and complaints mechanism, in about of 
November 1999. 
Researcher: Don't you think that SOCOG experienced changes as the NSW 
government essentially took over some of its responsibilities? 
Not really; I think that nothing changed in SOCOG. We were fortunate to have a 
government that was willing to do things for us. The ticketing was one area. We were 
working closely with the NSW government throughout. I did not see it as a major change 
in our practices. - 
Researcher: You mentioned that you had problems to reach the expected revenues 
from sponsorship. Do you think that the IOC corruption scandal affected 
sponsorship revenues? 
Hollway: That's a good question. I think that that was a factor. Certainly when we 
needed the revenue to be pull in, throughout 1999 and especially the first half of 1999, it 
was a very bad climate in which to be going out to a company and say "here, come and 
support the Games"... because the IOC was facing such a difficulty. But honestly I do 
not think it was the biggest factor. I think the biggest factor was that our marketing 
department simply overestimated the amount of sponsorship that it could obtained. 
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Researcher: In flnancial terms Socog was heavily depended on other organisations 
such as the IOC and the NSW government. Do you think that Socog could obtain 
such resources elsewhere? 
Hollway: Oh no. We had a budget of about AS 2,4 billion and the revenue from that was 
from the broadcast rights, from sponsorship, from ticket sales and from merchandise sales 
and that is all private money. The contribution by the government was at the end; a 
contingency fund of A$ 140 million which is a small amount of money against A$ 2,4 
billion and we would certainly not even use all of that. Moreover, Socog from its private 
income is in fact making longer contributions to the NSW government and to AOC. 
Socog's part of the Games would have been delivered almost entirely on the basis of 
private funding. 
Researcher: The IOC, however, encouraged involvement of the NSW government. 
Was it only for delivering the Games-related infrastructure? 
Hollway: No, I think it was also services and financial underwriting. In relation to 
services, for example, I think the IOC had reached the conclusion, in particular from 
observing Atlanta that if you wanted to get good transport, if you wanted to get good 
security arrangements, and so on, then government had to be involved because it is the 
most reliable supplier of such services. In terms of the financial security, obviously is 
highly desirable to have right from the beginning a government as the underwriter if you 
were running a deficit at the end and we had that with the NSW government. Now, the 
government of course quite properly insisted that we operate within our means, the 
private money I was talking about before. But when we got to the point where we needed 
a bit extra, at least the government was the underwriter and at least we could have an 
intelligent conversation with the underwriter. Where you can say "look, if you give us 
some funding we can deliver a fantastic Games. If we do not get funding we would have 
to cut away", and this could be satisfactory but it would not be good, right? In Atlanta 
they did not really have the opportunity for such a discussion and so I think the 
importance of the link with government is in relation to services and some sort of 
financial insurance in the crutch. 
Researcher: As Socog was getting bigger, more committees, commissions and 
management forums were created. Do you think that this created a slow process of 
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decision-making, in other words, do you think that the organisation became more 
bureaucratic? 
Hollway: I think that Board level committees came and went. We had for example a 
committee to develop the look and image of the Games which I think played a very 
useful role in about 1998-early 1999 and having done its job, disbanded. We had a 
committee of the Board that was concerned with accommodation, and essentially when it 
had done its job, disbanded. At the other extreme we had committees which were 
permanent. Committees of the Board like the sport commission which looked after the 
sports and sport-related issues, like the committee for arts and festivals and I think these 
in fact were helpful bodies, not bureaucratic ones. 
Researcher: The structure of Socog was initially functional-based and as it was 
getting closer to the Games it was becoming more venue-based. How did this 
integration happen? How diff"icult is to pass from an o pe ratio nal-based to a venue- 
based structure? 
Hollway: It is not very difficult if it is well planned and is everybody in the organisation 
understands what is happening. We were planning that since 1996 because essentially 
your purpose is to run the Games from the venues. Now, I think we did plan well and 
everybody in the organisation did understand what was happening. Our plan in brief was 
as follows: that we would start with a functional structure, we would develop a venue- 
operating plan for a venue, and we used the Aquatic Centre as the model, as the example, 
as the pilot. Then we would put together teams, still in the headquarters, not in the 
venues, to plan each of the venues. So, your team for example, might be responsible for 
taking the generic plan, the Aquatic Centre model, and translate it into plans for the 
Velodrome, the Stadium, the Equestrian, and so on. And then as we went along, we 
developed more and more teams for each venue and finally we moved the people actually 
out in the venue and then we recruited more people to go to the venue. Every member of 
staff knew that they were migrating from their original roles through to either staying in 
the headquarters, as some did, but for most of them going to a Games-time role in the 
venues. And the impression that we gave to staff was that this was an exciting and 
interesting thing to be doing. It was not an uncertainty, it was not a threat, it was not an 
insecurity. It was an exciting progression to be made. Now, how fast you make that 
move is a very important question which we thought about in great detail and we talked a 
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lot to Atlanta and Barcelona about this. Because you want to be out to the venues well 
before the Games, you want your venue teams, but you do not want to put everybody in 
your venue teams before certain common policies have been established. I think we got 
the timing right. 
Researcher: When exactly did you pass to the venue-based structure? 
Hollway: The venue managers were appointed in September 1999, one year out of the 
Games. By that stage, however, venue plans have been developed for every venue and 
after that the venue teams were all put together. People moved into the venues at 
different times at somewhere between 6 months and 3 months out of the Games. 
Researcher: Socog employed TAFE (training agency) to run training sessions for Its 
staff. What those sessions involve? Did they involve information about the history 
of the Olympic Games, for example? 
Hollway: Yes it did. Typically our training even for the average volunteer was in three 
parts. The first part was a general orientation about the Olympics. The second part was 
training on the specific functional job and the third part of the training was actually at the 
venue where they would be located to make sure they understood their role. In the first 
part we gave a lot of lectures, a lot of information material about the Games, the history 
of the Games, the values of the Games, why the Games were important to Australia and 
we tried to engender a really good spirit. In other words, we did not say to the 
volunteers: well you are going to rip tickets and you will be at the Equestrian Centre, so 
go and do that. We wanted them to have a sense of the bigger picture and the mission 
and the importance of it, and the Olympic tradition in which they were working. This 
was very important. 
Researcher: There was some criticism on Socog's recruiting practices. For 
example, P. Collins (NSW opposition leader) claimed that 70% of the jobs In Socog 
between 1997 and 1998 were not advertised. Do you want to comment on this? 
Hollway: My commeni would be like this: first of all I come from a background in the 
public service, this civil service, where indeed every hob is advertised, processes are 
going through for selection and I understand this system very well. But with the 
Organising Committee, forjobs at least, it has to be different for two reasons. One is that 
you do not have the time for laborious recruitment processes, and certainly for some of 
the key technical jobs or very seniorjobs it is very sensible for people to target particular 
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individuals and try to go and recruit them. So, the other comment I would make is that 
this issue was never a major political or administrative issue for us. 
Researcher: You were member of the Human Resources Committee which was 
responsible for recruiting senior executives... 
Hollway: That committee was only important I would say late 1996 and very early 1997 
at a time when M. Knight had the responsibility of trying to locate the senior executive 
team. One that was done by about March of 1997.1 think the committee actually did not 
meet again, or it met very infrequently. So, it was a committee which had a specific 
purpose: to help with high level recruitment and then really it ended, it finished. 
Researcher: I can see from your official reports that there was a Venue Olympic 
Construction Division within Socog that acted as the link to OCA. It has been claimed 
here, however, that this division was not the actual link to OCA but rather informal 
communication between the two organisations. Would you agree with that? 
Hollway: Yes, I do agree with that. 
Researcher: Were there any conflicts between OCA and Socog? 
Hollway: I think in the early days OCA was focusing on organising the constructio 
,n 
of 
the Games and that involved no conflict with Socog at all. Then, when we needed 
somebody to actually help with the planning of the venues and how they would operate 
and also to put the Olympic overlay into the venues, it was natural to work very closely 
with OCA. OCA was performing the job, in the early days, of constructing the venues 
which was one of its key roles and as we moved on we used OCA to also put in the 
Olympic overlay and to help with the planning of the venues and none of that involved 
anyconflicts. If there were issues, they were just normal issues of debate and discussion 
and so on. Sometimes there were issues about who paid for what. I mean, should 
sometimes be on the government's budget as part of the construction or should it be on 
Socog's side as part of the operation. But these were traditional issues; there was no 
major conflict there. Then OCA also had a role of co-ordinating governmental services 
which we also found very useful to have a governmental entity that was doing that. So, I 
think it was a relationship that actually came closer as we came towards the Games. 
Researcher: At the end, however, the two organisations became one In the form of 
"Sydney 2000". Did that create conflicts of power and authority within the new 
organisation? 
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Hollway: It went through four stages. Stage one was co-operation, stage two was 
collaboration, stage three was integration and stage four was joint operations during the 
Games. The first stage of co-operation was really ... we discussed common issues and we 
tried to understand each other's plans. I am talking 3-4 years out of the Games. The 
collaboration stage was where, for example, we had outsourced to the government some 
important functions like organising the transport for the Olympic Family, and we really 
became quite operationally close. Then it was the integration which I think only really 
started with the development of tight, common structures in about January 2000,9 
months out from the Games. Creation also of common committees to jointly drive the 
project and then of course at Games-time everybody was just into a joint operation. I 
have never seen it in terms of conflicts of power but one comment I would make is that 
you will see some Australian press reports that say that OCA or the government took 
over. The right description is that it was a merger if you want a business parallel. You 
mentioned earlier the civil servants' involvement but it is a wrong picture because of two 
reasons. One was that even in the areas where we were operating together, we were 
operating as a merger not as take over but the second reason is that the vast majority of 
the things Socog did it led itselE Accreditation, volunteers' recruitment, uniforms, youth 
camps, technology, venue operations and so on. So, we had probably, I would say... 
substantial parts of our programmes were ones thatjust went on through the whole four 
year period in the same way, without in fact any governmental involvement at all. 
Researcher: How are things after the Games. Who is mostly Involved In the 
wounding up process? Are you personaUy involved in this? 
Hollway: The only aspect that I am deeply involved in is the volunteer legacy. How we 
can take the tremendous success of the volunteer programme and translate that in other 
areas of Australian life. And that is the part of the follow up that I am doing. and of 
course I am involved in the transfer of know-how and some bits and pieces like that. The 
government passed legislation a couple of weeks ago (middle ofNovember 2000) and the 
important point is that ... it very sensibly says in effect that the government will be around 
for long time and therefore, it should lead the process of tight up the Games, the financial 
reporting, the ultimate financial resolution, the selling of the remains of the Games, the 
assets disposal and all of that. So, this would be lead by OCA and Socog and ORTA and 
the other specific Olympic agencies would just end. 
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Researcher: How many staff are there now in Socog? 
Hollway: As we speak there are probably about 500 and by the 15 th of December it will 
be down to not more than 100. When we leave our present offices and we move to 
smaller offices, these will do just the rap up. So, the staff hit a pick of perhaps 2400 and 
then drops away to no more than 100 within two months. So it is a very rapid decline. 
Researcher: In terms of strategy, do you think that there is much space for an 
OCOG to develop its own strategies it is like a train running on a predetermined 
track? 
Hollway: I think that an OCOG does actually have a leadership role and there are turning 
points on the track which it can lead to different directions. I think that it is an important 
role for an OCOG to help establish what the vision of the Games is, as well as to make 
the right choices along the way of how to get there. So, I do not see it as just a 
mechanical, technical exercise of organising the Games because point one, I think there 
are different kinds of Games you can organise with different character and legacy and 
image, and secondly there are different ways you can get there. So, I think it has to be a 
highly creative organisation as well as a technically solid one. For example, image, I 
think it would generally be said that the visual look of the Games in Sydney was good, 
and the sports presentation to the spectator was good and the attitude and friendliness of 
the staff and the volunteers was very good and notable. And all of these things matters 
that are intangible that are creative and that do not come from nothing. They come from 
deciding to do things in certain ways, whereas an issue as accreditation for 200,000 
people. That is a very tough task but it is more a mechanical task like the train on the 
track. 
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